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
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18°

THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

BY
CONNOP THIRLWALL, D.D.

BISHOP OF ST. DAVID'S.

IN EIGHT VOLUMES.

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ANALYTICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER XI.


CIVIL HISTORY OF ATTICA TO THE EXPULSION OF THE PISISTRATIDS.

~~Division of Attica into Little States — Early Ten~~

ERRATUM.

Page 490. line 2. from bottom, for "So Nepos assigns 300 to the whole, and 200 to the Athenians," read "So Demosthenes (Cor. § 297.) assigns 300 to the whole, and 200 to the Athenians. From which passage Wesseling (on Diodorus xl. 12.) proposed, with great probability, to substitute διακοσίας for ἑκατὸν in De Symmor. § 35. Nepos has the same numbers, Themistocles 3."

the Lucinaeas. — Recovery of Salamis. — Character of Epimenides. — Epimenides at Athens. — Misery of the Attic Peasantry. — State of Parties in Attica. — Legislation of Solon. — Measures of immediate Relief. — Reform of the Constitution. — Division of Classes. — General Scope of Solon's Institutions. — Council of Four Hundred. — The Assembly of the People. — The Haliaea. — Periodical Revision of the Laws. — Simplicity of Solon's Institutions. — Power of the Tribunals. — The Areopagus. — Education of the Athenian Youth. — Regulations concerning Women. — The Naucraries — the Metics. — Slavery at Athens. — Solon again leaves Athens. — State of Parties. — Pisistratus becomes Master of Athens. — Character of his Government. — Solon's Death. — Expulsion and Restoration of Pisistratus. — Personation of Athene. — Second Expulsion and Restoration of Pisistratus. — His foreign and domestic Policy.



HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER XI.

CIVIL HISTORY OF ATTICA TO THE EXPULSION OF THE PISISTRATIDS.

Division of Attica among several little States. — Early Tendency toward a National Union. — Attic Tribes. — Tribes have been founded by Ion. — Meaning of their Names. — They were politically united. — Attic Castes. — Change effected by Theseus. — His Institution aristocratical. — How far democratical. — The Classes under Theseus. — Gradual Abolition at Athens. — Division of the Archonship. — The early History of Attica. — Story of Hippocleides. — Legislation of Draco. — Conspiracy of Cylon. — Cylon curs the Guilt of Sacrilege. — Early History of War between Athens and Megara. — Exile of Alcibiades. — Recovery of Salamis. — Character of Epimenides at Athens. — Misery of the Attic People. — State of Parties in Attica. — Legislation of Solon. — Measures of immediate Relief. — Reform of the Constitution. — Division of Classes. — General Scope of Solon's Institutions. — Council of Four Hundred. — The Assembly of the People. — The Heliæa. — Periodical Revision of the Laws. — Simplicity of Solon's Institutions. — Power of the Tribunals. — The Areopagus. — Education of the Athenian Youth. — Regulations concerning Women. — The Naucræa. — the Metics. — Slavery at Athens. — Solon again leaves Athens. — State of Parties. — Pisistratus becomes Master of Athens. — Character of his Government. — Solon's Death. — Expulsion and Restoration of Pisistratus. — Personation of Athene. — Second Expulsion and Restoration of Pisistratus. — His foreign and domestic Policy.

— *His Encouragement of Art and Literature.* — *He dies and is succeeded by his Sons.* — *Government of the Pisistratids.* — *Harmodius and Aristogeiton.* — *Murder of Hipparchus.* — *Tyranny of Hippias.* — *Machinations of the Alcmaeonids.* — *The Spartans invade Attica.* — *Hippias quits Attica.* — *Institutions of Cleisthenes.* — *His Expulsion and Return.* — *Spartan Invasion of Attica.* — *Victories of the Athenians.* — *Hippias at Sparta.* — *The Spartans baffled by their Allies.*

CHAP.
XI.

WE have already taken a survey of the legends relating to the origin of the people of Attica, and to the events of their history down to the Ionian migration. We must now look back to the same period, in order to trace the progress of their political institutions, from the earliest times to the establishment of that form of government under which the Athenians were living when they first came into conflict with the power of Persia.

Division
of Attica
among several
little
States.

Early Tendency
toward a
National
Union.

Among the few facts which we are able to collect with regard to the state of Attica in the earliest times, there are two which seem to be so well attested, or so clearly deduced from authentic accounts, that they may be safely admitted. We read that the territory of Attica was originally divided into a number of little states; and tradition has preserved the names of some petty chiefs, who are said to have ruled in these districts with the title of king.¹ These communities were independent of each other and of Athens in their internal government, and sometimes even made war on their neighbours. On the other hand, we are informed that attempts were made, at a very early period, to unite the forces of the whole nation for the purpose of mutual defence. It was Cecrops, according to an Attic antiquarian², who

¹ Colænus at Myrrhinus (Pausan. 1. 31. 5.). Porphyreon at Athmonia (Paus. 1. 14. 7.). Crocon, whose palace had stood near Rheiti (Pausan. 1. 38. 1.). Compare Plut. Thea. 32. Thucydides, ii. 15. But it is not clear that there is any reference to this state of things in the tradition that Cranaus, when dethroned by Amphictyon, fled to the deme of Lamptrae, and was buried there (Paus. 1. 31. 3.); which Platner (*Beiträge*, p. 25.) considers as another example.

² Philochorus in Strabo, ix. p. 397.

first established a confederacy among the inhabitants of Attica, to repel the inroads of the Carian pirates, and of the Bœotians, who invaded it on the land side. The same author indeed speaks as if Cecrops, with this view, had founded twelve cities, or had divided the country into twelve districts, which were members of this confederacy: and this it was necessary to suppose, if Cecrops was believed to be sovereign of Attica. But though we reject this opinion, we need not on this account question the existence of the league itself. The number (one which predominates in the Ionian institutions)¹ was made up, according to Philochorus, of the following names:—*Cecropia, Tetrapolis, Epacria, Decelea, Eleusis, Aphidna, Thoricus, Brauron, Cytherus, Sphettus, Cephisia, Phalerus*. The first of these names probably represents the town which afterward became the capital, but which may not have been more ancient than several of the others in this list, nor, for a long time, more powerful. Among the rest, the Tetrapolis (which contained the four villages, *Ænoe, Marathon, Probalinthus, Tricorythus*) and Sphettus were, according to other traditions, founded long after the time of Cecrops. It seems to be a similar event, if it is not the same, that is implied in the name of the Attic king, Amphictyon. This may be probably interpreted to signify the foundation of an Amphictyonic congress, such as appears to have subsisted in early times in almost every part of Greece. But the influence attributed to Cecrops, and the mention of Amphictyon among the kings of Athens, indicate that Athens was acknowledged as the head of this confederacy. The periodical meetings of its council were probably held

¹ C. F. Hermann, however, in a review of Meier *De Gentilitate Attica* in *Zimmermann's Zeitschrift*, 1835, observes: *That the number twelve does not belong in an especial manner to the Ionian race, is proved by its occurrence in the Amphictyonic League, among the Asiatic Æolians, and among the Etruscans, where Ionian influence is out of the question.*

CHAP.
XLAttic
Tribes.

in Cecropia, and the religious rites, which were variably connected with such associations, celebrated in the temple of the Athenian goddess.

It is not so clear what kind of foundation ought to be attributed to other accounts, in which the whole country, or people, is said to have been divided into four tribes, which changed their names, if not their constitution, under several successive kings. Till in the reign of Cecrops, these tribes received their names, *Cecropis*, *Autocthon*, *Actæa*, and *Paralios*. Under Cranaus, either a new distribution was made, or the old one was designated by the new names, *Cranaïs*, *Atthis*, *Mesogæa*, *Diacris*. Under Erichonius again each tribe took its name from a god: they were then called *Dias*, *Athenais*, *Posidonias*, *Hephestias*. It must be observed that, as the last series of names is entirely derived from the religion of the country, so in the two preceding some of the names relate to the natural features of the land, (*Actæa*, *Paralia*, *Mesogæa*, *Diacris*, and perhaps *Atthis*), others to the origin or political relations of its inhabitants (*Cecropis*, *Autocthon*, *Cranaïs*). We are readily believe that the inhabitants of Attica were very early distinguished from one another by various names, according to the different stocks from which they sprang; which may perhaps be indicated by the names of some of their mythical kings, as Cranaus and Cecrops: or according to the nature of the regions which they occupied, in the plains, or highlands, or the coast: or according to the habits and pursuits belonging to these various situations, or finally according to the deities who were exclusively or pre-eminently objects of worship among them. And it would not be difficult, without much violence, to make the three above-mentioned divisions tally with each other.¹ But we have so little as

¹ The reader may see how this has been done for the first two divisions in

ance that they are any thing more than arbitrary combinations, invented by writers who transferred the form of institutions which existed in the historical period to the mythical ages, that the attempt is scarcely worth making.

Even if we believe that, in the period represented by the reigns of Cecrops and Cranaus, Attica comprehended four main divisions, described by any of the above-mentioned names, it will not follow that the term *tribe* is correctly applied to them in a sense implying the existence of a political unity pervading the whole nation. They may still have been connected by no bond but the temporary fear of a common enemy. The fourfold distribution of the country is the foundation of another tradition, which distinctly asserts the absolute independence of the several parts. The four sons of Pandion share his dominions among them, and rule their respective portions with supreme authority. But all these divisions were finally superseded by one much more celebrated and lasting, which is said to have been instituted by Ion, the progenitor of the Ionian race, and to have derived its names from his four sons.¹ This last feature in the tradition indeed, though it is adopted with perfect confidence by Herodotus, excited the suspicion of many even among the ancients, who perceived that the names of the tribes founded by Ion were all or mostly descriptive of certain occupations.² They were the Teleontes, or as it is also

Tribes said
to have been
founded by
Ion.

Arnold (Thucyd. i. p. 656.), and for the third by Platner in a little dissertation, *De Gentibus Atticis*.

¹ Schömann *Antiq. J. P. Gr.* p. 163. n. 9. remarks: *Hoc tantum dico persuasum mihi esse fabulam de Ione ejusque filiis apud Atticos non ante colonias Ionicas ex Attica in Asiam deductas ortam esse, quum ipsi Athenienses non amplius Iones dicerentur sed hoc nomen Asianis solis et insularis proprium esset.*

² With the highest respect for Mr. Malden's judgment, we cannot be satisfied with his assertion (*History of Rome*, p. 140.) that *the notion that the four Ionic tribes were castes, deriving their names from their employments, is founded on nothing but bad etymologies.* He should at least have proposed some better etymology for Ὀπληται and Αἰγυρόπει. Niebuhr's objection, from the order in which the names occur, is weighty, but not conclusive. On a point of etymology Buttmann's

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Meaning
of their
Names.

found written, Geleontes, or Gedeontes; the Hopletes; the Ægicores, and the Argades. With regard to the second and third of these names, there is no question that the former denotes a class of warriors; and there seems to be as little room to doubt, that the latter was once applied to the race which tended its flocks on the Attic hills. And this is ground sufficient for inferring, that the two other names are similarly significant; but their precise meaning is still the subject of a controversy, which is not likely to be ever decided, because each of the conflicting opinions may be easily connected with a plausible theory. With the assistance however of other descriptions left by the ancients of these divisions, we perceive that the last name, which will signify *labourers* in general, must have been applied in this case either to a class of husbandmen, or to one employed in other laborious occupations. Our choice between these meanings must depend on that which is to be assigned to the first name, which is unfortunately both variously written, and, according to each way of writing it, ambiguous in sense: and the difference amounts to nothing less than the whole interval between the summit and the base of the social scale. For according to one opinion the Teleontes, or Geleontes, were a sacerdotal caste, according to another they were peasants, who tilled the land of their lords, and paid a tribute, or a rent, for the use of it.¹

This question is subordinate to another as to the origin and nature of these divisions; for it is doubt-

authority is at least sufficient to shelter those who agree with him from the suspicion of having fallen into any very palpable error. See his *Mythologus*, ii. p. 318. C. F. Herrmann u. s.: *The names of those four tribes appear to us most intimately associated with the soil of Attica, and this not merely by historical reference but by their import, which is such that they must have belonged not to a race but to a land, which by its natural character favours the equable developement of the four functions which they designate.*

¹ Schömann, *Antiq. J. P. Gr.* p. 166. n. 5., observes of the name Geleontes: *Nobilitatem indigenam hoc nomine designari propterea credo, quod huic in reliquis locus vix esse videtur.*

ful in what sense they are to be called *tribes*. The mythical story describes Ion as their founder, just as Romulus is said to have instituted the distinction between the patricians and the plebeians at Rome. This supposition needs not now be refuted: but we still have to inquire, whether these four tribes were from the beginning comprehended under a higher national unity, or whether they remained insulated and independent of each other down to the period represented by the reign of Theseus. One of the four names—that of the pastoral tribe—implies a geographical separation, and it must have been contrasted in the same sense to one of the rest, that which describes the tillers of the plain. This leads us to believe that the other two were similarly separated from each other and the rest, though a tribe of warriors or priests was not necessarily connected with any peculiar habitation.¹ If however the warrior tribe was chiefly composed of foreign conquerors, it may easily be imagined that it may have occupied a separate district, and that it was thus locally distinguished from the rest. But here we find ourselves perplexed by the ambiguity of the name Geleontes, which in Herodotus stands first, and by this position seems to confirm the opinion that it denoted a priestly caste. In this case no reason can be assigned for limiting it to any situation distinct from the others. Still it is not impossible that it may have occupied a territory of its own; and it is not an improbable conjecture that this territory was the hallowed land of Eleusis. On this supposition the four tribes would correspond to a geographical division of Attica, which may be compared with that which is attributed to the sons of Pandion, and which may also be easily adjusted to that which we find at a

How far
they were
politically
united.

¹ Schömann u. s. p. 165: *dubitari non posse videtur, quin hac tribum descriptio etiam ad sedium et regionum rationem accommodata fuerit.*

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much later period determining the state of political parties in Attica—the threefold division, of the plain, the highlands, and the coast. On the other hand, the tribe which has been taken for a priestly caste was really composed of a dependent peasantry, and cannot so well have been locally distinguished from the warriors; for these must then have been the lords whose lands they tilled: as on the other supposition both the priests and the warriors must be conceived to have employed the services of a similar class of subjects in cultivating their possessions; and it would therefore be necessary to suppose either that the warriors were confined to the town and a district in its immediate vicinity, while their serfs inhabited the country, or that the Geleontes were a tribe of free husbandmen, who occupied a different part of the Attic plains. But in any case we perceive that no political union is implied by the four tribes of Ion. The Eleusinian priesthood indeed might only be protected by its sanctity; but the inhabitants of the mountains and of the maritime valleys might have been able long to maintain their independence against the warrior tribe, notwithstanding the advantages it may have possessed in its weapons, or in its armour, or its closer and more orderly array.

Attic
Castes.

We have spoken of the priestly tribe as a caste, and if there was such a tribe, it can scarcely be considered in any other light. Hence we are naturally led to apply the same term to the other three: and undoubtedly there may have been a period during which the occupations from which they derived their names continued hereditary in the same families. But we have no ground for believing that this separation was ever enforced by any religious sanction, or was any thing more than the natural result of situation and circumstances. We have no reason to imagine that the four tribes constituted a hierarchy

after the manner of the Indian or Egyptian: on the contrary it is probable that, in proportion as they became more closely united in one body, the primitive distinctions, to which they owed their names, were gradually obliterated by mutual intercourse. The difficulty of conceiving how this may have been effected with regard to the priests, is rather an objection to the hypothesis that they once formed a caste, than a ground for doubting that they had ceased to be one, before they became a part of the Attic nation. For if they once occupied such a station by the side of the warrior tribe, it could only have been through some convulsion, of which no trace is left in history, that they lost their sacred character, with its consequent privileges and influence. Such a revolution may undoubtedly have occurred: but if so, it must have preceded that settlement of the Attic population which is designated in the legend by the arrival and the Institutions of Ion; for from this epoch we must date the commencement of a heroic age in Attica, during which the state of society became more and more similar to that described in the Homeric poems, when a priestly caste was utterly unknown in Greece, or at the utmost all that remained of such a one were a few scattered fragments—sacred functions appropriated to certain families—affording doubtful traces of a long past existence.

The four tribes of Ion then were perhaps originally not members of one body, but distinct communities, long kept apart by differences of descent, of situation, of pursuits, and of religion, yet still connected by neighbourhood, by affinities closer or looser of blood and language, and by the occasional need of mutual assistance. Thus was their gradual interfusion prepared and promoted; while the superiority of the race which occupied Athens, as it became more and

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more felt, disposed all to look to their city as the natural centre of political union. The time at length arrived when the effect of all these causes became visible, in the important change which is commonly described as the work of Theseus, by which the national unity was consolidated, and many of the germs were fixed, out of which the institutions to which Athens owed her greatness finally unfolded themselves.

Nature of
the Change
effected by
Theseus.

Theseus is said to have collected the inhabitants of Attica in one city, and thus for ever to have put an end to the discord and hostilities, which had till then prevented them from considering themselves as one people. The sense in which this account is to be understood, is probably not that any considerable migration immediately took place out of other districts to Athens, but only that Athens now became the seat of government for the whole country; that all the other Attic towns sank from the rank of sovereign independent states to that of subjects; and that the administration of their affairs, with the dispensation of justice, was transferred from them to the capital.¹ The courts and councils in which the functions of government had hitherto been exercised throughout the rest of Attica were abolished, or concentrated in those of the sovereign city. This union was cemented by religion, perhaps by the mutual recognition of deities, which had hitherto been honoured only with a local and peculiar worship, and certainly by public festivals, in which the whole people as-

¹ Dr. Arnold (Appendix iii. to Thucydides, i. p. 662.) seems to think that residence at Athens was the condition on which the nobles were admitted to a share in the government; and that those parts of the population of Attica which still remained in their original habitations, were not included in the tribes at all. We conceive both these points to be very doubtful, and the second extremely improbable. Indeed the former proposition is a little qualified in a subsequent page (664.), where it is said *the Eupatrides seem mostly to have resided at Athens*; and as it is there admitted that some inhabitants of the country were enrolled in the tribes, it does not appear in Dr. Arnold's statement on what principle the rest were excluded.

sembled to pay their homage to the tutelary goddess of Athens, and to celebrate the memory of their incorporation.¹ That this event was attended with a great enlargement of the city itself might be readily presumed, even if it was not expressly related. Thucydides fixes on this as the epoch when the lower city was added to the ancient one, which had covered little more than the rock, which was afterwards the citadel, though it still retained the name of the city. And hence there may seem to have been some foundation for Plutarch's statement that Theseus called the city Athens, if this name properly signified the whole inclosure of the Old and the New Town.² But though, after this revolution, new temples, and other buildings public and private, must have continued to rise at the foot of the Cecropian rock, it is not necessary to suppose that any considerable addition was immediately made to the population of Athens. It is probable that the families who were induced by the new order of things to change their abode, were chiefly those of the highest rank, whose members had constituted the ruling class in their respective states, and were admitted to a similar station under the new constitution.

This leads us to consider the ambiguous light in which Theseus is represented by the ancients, on the one hand as the founder of a government which was, for many centuries after him, rigidly aristocratical, and on the other hand as the parent of the Athenian democracy. If we make due allowance for the exaggerations of poets or rhetoricians, who adorn him with the latter of these titles, in order to exalt the

¹ The *Συνολία* (Thuc. ii. 15. and Steph. Byz. voc. 'Αθήναι), Panathenæa, Festival of Aphrodite Pandemus (Pausan. i. 22. 3.). To the same head may perhaps be referred the introduction of the worship of Dionysus, which is said to have taken place under Amphictyon.

² Göttling (in an article in the *Rhein. Mus. neue Folge: Das Thor von Mykenæ*, i. p. 162.) has proposed a similar explanation of the plural *Μυκήναι*.

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antiquity of the popular institutions of later times we shall perhaps find that neither description is entirely groundless, though the former is more simple and evidently true. Theseus is said to have accomplished his purpose partly by force, partly by persuasion. With the lower classes, we read, he found difficulty; but the powerful men were only induced to comply with his proposals, by his promise that they should be admitted to an equal share in the government; and that he would resign all his royal prerogatives, except those of commanding in war, and of watching over the laws. This promise he fulfilled in his regulation of the state, when he laid aside his kingly majesty, and invited all the citizens to equal rights. But on the other hand, to guard against democratical confusion, he instituted a gradation of ranks, and a proportionate distribution of power. He divided the people into three classes, nobles, husbandmen, artisans¹; and to the first of these he reserved all the offices of the state, with the privilege of ordering the affairs of religion, and of interpreting the laws, human and divine. This same division however is also represented to have been made among each of the four tribes, so that each included a share of each class. This can only be conceived possible under the supposition, that the distinctions which originally separated the tribes had become merely nominal; and that although the occupations from which two of them at least derived their names were always held ignoble, there were families among them no less proud of their antiquity, than the most illustrious of the warriors or the priests. Still we need not imagine that the numbers of the noble class were equal in each of the tribes. The nobles of the tribe to which Athens itself belonged may have formed the ma-

¹ Εὐπατρίδαι, Γεωμόροι, Δημιουργοί.

body, and may on that account have been the less unwilling to extend and strengthen their power on condition of admitting a few additional partners.

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The privileges which Theseus is said to have conferred on his nobles, were undoubtedly the same which they had enjoyed, in narrower spheres, before the union. His institutions were aristocratical, because none were then known of any other kind. The effect of the union would even be, in the first instance, to increase the influence of the noble class, by concentrating it in one spot; and hence it proved too powerful both for the king and the people. In this sense we may say with Plutarch, that Theseus gained the assent of the great men to his plan, by surrendering his royal prerogatives, which they shared equally among them. The king was no more than the first of the nobles; the four kings of the tribes¹, all chosen from the privileged class, were his constant assessors, and rather as colleagues than as counsellors. The principal difference between them and him appears to have consisted in the duration of their office, which was probably never long enough to leave them independent of the body from which they were taken, and to which they returned.

His Institutions how far aristocratical.

But there was also a sense in which Theseus might without impropriety be regarded as the founder of the Athenian democracy, both with respect to the tendency, and remote consequences, and to the immediate effect, of the institutions ascribed to him. The incorporation of several scattered townships in one city, such as took place in Attica, was in many, perhaps in most parts of Greece, the first stage in the growth of a free commonalty, which, thus enabled to feel its own strength, was gradually encouraged successfully to resist the authority of the nobles. And hence in later times the dismemberment of a capital,

How far democratical.

¹ Φυλοβασιλεῖς. Pollux, viii. § 111.

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and its repartition into a number of rural communities, was esteemed the surest expedient establishing an aristocratical government. But in using the name of Theseus, we would be understood to speak rather of a period than of an individual, though without questioning that the name may have been borne by one who contributed the largest share, or put the finishing hand, to the change which is commonly considered as his work, we must be allowed to conjecture that it was really a democratical revolution, in something more than this general character and tendency. We read that the four tribes were divided into a certain number of smaller bodies, which continued to subsist, and to exercise their functions, long after the tribes themselves had been abolished. Each tribe contained three *phratries* (a name in its origin equivalent to fraternity¹, and in its political relations analogous to the Spartan *obse* and the Roman *curia*); each phratry was subdivided into thirty sections, which bore a name exactly answering to the Roman *gens*, and nearly equivalent to the terms sept, clan, house, taken in its larger signification as an aggregation of families. The *genos*, or house, was again made up, it is said, of thirty *gennetes*, or heads of families, the last elements of the whole body, amounting therefore in the whole to 10,800 persons.² It is however

¹ Φρατρία, or φρήτηρ, etymologically connected with *frater*, brother (φρήτηρ φρήτηρ): it seems to have been an Ionian word. There is another less probable derivation, from φρέαρ, a well, according to which it would signify persons associated by the use of a common spring.

² Γένος, genus, gens: its members γενήται, or γεννήται, also called δμογάλακτοι. Pollux, viii. 111.

³ But see Böckh. C. J. i. p. 900. on the ambiguity of the word τριακάς, and the passage of Pollux (*quem ex uberiore rei definitione male concisum et luxatum putabam*) ἐκάστου δὲ ἔθνους (φρατρίας) γένη τριάκοντα ἐξ ἀνδρῶν τοσούτων, ἐκαλεῖτο τριακάδες (viii. 111.). Either the family was called τριακάς, as thirtieth part of the γένος, or the γένος was so called as reckoned to contain thirty men. C. F. Hermann (u. s. p. 1143.) agrees with Meier, that so great a number of families (10,800) is inconceivable for so early a period as that to which this subdivision is referred. Yet it would seem that according to either interpretation each man was the head of a family.

no means certain that these numbers, which were evidently adopted for the sake of symmetry, perhaps with reference to the parts of the year, and certainly were not the result of any exact account taken of the population, included the whole body of citizens. We find mention of a class of Athenians, who were not comprehended in any of the numbered families¹; and it has been conjectured with some probability that they were entitled to be admitted into the phratries as vacancies occurred, without however being debarred in the mean time from the other rights of citizenship.

We are not informed that this division of the tribes was made by Theseus; but we have strong reasons for referring it to the period when the inhabitants of Attica were united into one people: for it is difficult to conceive, that it can have taken place either earlier or later. Its uniformity seems to imply, that it could not have happened so long as the four tribes were independent of each other; and if it had been effected by any subsequent innovation, this and its author could scarcely have escaped the notice of history. Now this division, whenever it took place, was purely artificial, and framed for political purposes. The word indeed which we have rendered *house*, properly signifies a race of men; but we are expressly informed that, in the language of the Athenian constitution, it did not imply a community of descent among the persons comprehended under it. By this arrangement therefore Theseus, or whoever its author may have been, introduced a new principle, which tended to level the distinctions that had previously existed among the different classes of society. In the little states into which Attica was originally divided, though similar associations undoubtedly existed, they

Relations of
the Classes
under Theseus.

¹ Hesych. Ἀριθμηταί. See Böckh. Corp. Inscript. i. p. 140. Wachsmuth, l. l. p. 238.

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were probably of natural growth, rather than created by a deliberate enactment, and comprised a much smaller number of families, whose claims to political privileges rested perhaps chiefly on this basis. But the freemen who were admitted into the phratries, which also contained these noble houses, though they did not immediately share all their privileges, were at least placed on a footing of equality with them as citizens of Athens. Beside the religious rites which were peculiar to some of the houses, and which gave their members a right to the exclusive exercise of certain priestly offices, there were others common to all, and which by their very nature suggested the sentiment of a domestic, rather than of a merely political connection. The worship of Zeus and Apollo was the symbol and the seal of this intimate union: of Zeus, as the guardian of households; of Apollo, as the progenitor of the Athenian people.¹

Beyond this we have no means of ascertaining the exact relation between the nobles and the two inferior classes, or that in which the latter stood to one another. Even their names are not free from ambiguity. For that which we have expressed by husbandmen, may signify either independent landowners, or peasants who cultivate the lands of their lords. It seems however unnecessary and inconvenient to limit it to the latter sense, which would imply that the nobles were owners of the whole soil of Attica.² There is no reason for denying that this class may have contained a number of freemen who cultivated their own land, but were not entitled by their birth to rank with the nobles, and in other respects were perhaps

¹ Ζεὺς Ἐρκεῖος. Ἀπόλλων Πατρῶος. K. O. Müller however conceives that the latter worship was originally confined to the Ionian Eupatrids, and was only shared by the other families after the archonship was thrown open. Dor. ii. 2. 15.

² Schömann Antiq. J. P. Gr. p. 167. n. 15.; *Geomoros δῆτας fuisse, quod Wachsmuth l. i. p. 235. opinatur, parum probabile est: neque enim unquam illud nomen nisi de dominis agrorum usurpatum novimus.*

but little raised above those who, possessing no property of their own, depended on the rich, whose estates they occupied as tenants. The third class comprehended all those who subsisted on any other kind of industry beside that connected with agriculture. The name of this class would include a great variety of occupations, which were held in very different degrees of esteem; and as these were not connected with the soil, it has been suspected that those who exercised them were considered as sojourners¹, who, like the resident aliens of later times, needed the protection of a patron. Plutarch observes of this class that it had the superiority in numbers, as the second had in the importance of its labour, and the first in the lustre of its rank. But we hear of no political distinction between the second and the third class, and it is possible that none such existed. The distance which separated both from the first was so great, that all slighter gradations may have been lost in it. Accordingly Dionysius of Halicarnassus, comparing the early institutions of Rome and Athens, notices only two classes in the latter, one corresponding to the Roman patricians, the other to the plebeians.²

We may perhaps safely conclude from analogy, that, even while the power of the nobles was most absolute, a popular assembly was not unknown at Athens; and the example of Sparta may suggest a notion of the limitations which might prevent it from endangering the privileges of the ruling body. So long as the latter reserved to itself the office of making, or declaring, of interpreting, and administering the laws, as well as the ordinary functions of government, it might securely entrust many subjects,

¹ This is the view which Wachsmuth, l. i. p. 233., takes of the *δημιουργοί*, who, he observes, are also called *ἐπιτεώμοροι* in Etym. M. *Εἰπατρίδαι*.

² Il. 8. Schömann u. s. p. 167. explains the name *Demiurgi* as equivalent to *operarii*, *qui agros non haberent, sed tantummodo manuum opera quæstum facerent*.

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XLGradual
Abolition of
Royalty at
Athens.

to the decision of the popular voice. Its first contests were waged, not with the people, but with the kings. Even in the reign of Theseus himself the legend exhibits the royal power as on the decline. Menestheus, a descendant of the ancient kings, is said to have engaged his brother nobles in a conspiracy against Theseus, which finally compelled him and his family to go into exile, and placed Menestheus on the throne. After the death of this usurper indeed the crown is restored to the line of Theseus for some generations. But his descendant Thymœtes is compelled to abdicate in favour of Melanthus, a stranger, who has no claim but his superior merit. After the death of Codrus, the nobles, taking advantage perhaps of the opportunity afforded by the dispute between his sons, are said to have abolished the title of king, and to have substituted for it that of *archon*. This change however seems to have been important, rather as it indicated the new, precarious tenure by which the royal power was held, than as it immediately affected the nature of the office. It was indeed still held for life; and Medon, the son of Codrus, transmitted it to his posterity¹, though it would appear that, within the house of the Medontids, the succession was determined by the choice of the nobles. It is added however that the archon was deemed a responsible magistrate, which implies that those who elected had the power of deposing him; and consequently, though the range of his functions may not have been narrower than that of the king's, he was more subject to control in the exercise of them. This indirect kind of sway however did not satisfy the more ambitious spirits; and we find them steadily, though gradually, advancing toward the accomplishment of their final object—a complete and equal participation of the sovereignty. After twelve reigns,

¹ Paus. iv. 5. 10.

ending with that of Alcmaëon¹, the duration of the office was limited to ten years; and through the guilt or calamity of Hippomenes, the fourth decennial archon², the house of Medon was deprived of its privilege, and the supreme magistracy was thrown open to the whole body of the nobles. This change was speedily followed by one much more important. When Tlesias, the successor of Eryxias, had completed the term which his predecessor had left unfinished, the duration of the archonship was again reduced to a single year; and at the same time its branches were severed, and distributed among nine new magistrates. Among these, the first in rank retained the distinguishing title of *the* archon, and the year was marked by his name.³ He represented the majesty of the state, and exercised a peculiar jurisdiction,—that which had belonged to the king as the common parent of his people, the protector of families, the guardian of orphans and heiresses, and of the general rights of inheritance. For the second archon the title of king, if it had been laid aside, was revived⁴, as the functions assigned to him were those most associated with ancient recollections. He represented the king as the high priest of his people; he regulated the celebration of the mysteries and the most solemn festivals; decided all causes which affected the interest of religion, and was charged with the care of protecting the state from the pollution it might incur through the heedlessness or impiety of individuals. The third archon bore the title of *polemarch*⁵, and filled the place of the king, as the

Division of
the Archon-
ship.

¹ The successors of Medon were Acastus, Archippus, Thersippus, Phorbas, Megacles, Diognetus, Pherecles, Ariphron, Thespleus, Agamestor, Æschylus, Alcmaëon (Ol. vii. 1. B. C. 752.).

² His predecessors were Charops, Æsimeides, Clidicus; he was succeeded by Leocrates, Apsander, and Eryxias. Creon, the first annual archon, enters upon his office B. C. 684.

³ Ὁ Ἀρχων, Ἀρχων ἐπώνυμος, or ὁ Ἐπώνυμος.

⁴ Ἀρχων Βασιλεύς. Wachsmuth suspects with great probability that the title had never been dropped.

⁵ Πολέμαρχος (commander-in-war).

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leader of his people in war, and the guardian who watched over its security in time of peace. Connected with this character of his office was the jurisdiction he possessed over strangers who had settled in Attica under the protection of the state, and over freedmen. The remaining six archons received the common title of *thesmothetes*¹, which literally signifies legislators, and was probably applied to them, as the judges who determined the great variety of causes which did not fall under the cognizance of their colleagues; because, in the absence of a written code, those who declare and interpret the laws may be properly said to make them.

Long Blank
in the early
History of
Attica.

These successive encroachments on the royal prerogatives, and the final triumph of the nobles, are almost the only events that fill the meagre annals of Attica for several centuries. Here, as elsewhere, a wonderful stillness suddenly follows the varied stir of enterprise and adventure, and the throng of interesting characters, that present themselves to our view in the heroic age. Life seems no longer to offer any thing for poetry to celebrate, or for history to record. Are we to consider this long period of apparent tranquillity, as one of public happiness, of pure and simple manners, of general harmony and content, which has only been rendered obscure by the absence of the crimes and the calamities which usually leave the deepest traces in the page of history? We should willingly believe this, if it were not that, so far as the veil is withdrawn which conceals the occurrences of this period from our sight, it affords us glimpses of a very different state of things. In the list of the magistrates who held the undivided sovereignty of the state, the only name with which any events are

Story of
Hippo-
menes.

¹ Θεσμοθέται. Θεσμοί is used for laws in the ancient oath of the Attic soldier, Pollux, viii. 105., which was probably earlier than Solon, whose laws are commonly said to have been distinguished by the name of νόμοι, from Draco's Δεσμοί.

connected is that of Hippomenes, the last archon of the line of Codrus. It was made memorable by the shame of his daughter, and by the extraordinary punishment which he inflicted on her and her paramour.¹ Tradition long continued to point out as accursed ground the place where she was shut up to perish from hunger, or from the fury of a wild horse, the companion of her confinement. The nobles, glad perhaps to seize an opportunity so favourable to their views, deposed Hippomenes, and razed his house to the ground. This story would seem indeed to indicate the austerity, as well as the hardness, of the ancient manners: but on the other hand we are informed, that the father had been urged to this excess of rigour by the reproach that had fallen upon his family from the effeminacy and dissoluteness of its members. Without however drawing any inference from this insulated story, we may proceed to observe, that the accounts transmitted to us of the legislation of Draco, the next epoch when a gleam of light breaks through the obscurity of the Attic history, do not lead us to suppose that the people had enjoyed any extraordinary measure of happiness under the aristocratical government, or that their manners were peculiarly innocent and mild.

The immediate occasion which led to Draco's legislation is not recorded, and even the motives which induced him to impress it with that character of severity to which it owes its chief celebrity, are not clearly ascertained. We know however that he was the author of the first written laws of Athens: and as this measure tended to limit the authority of the nobles, to which a customary law, of which they were the sole expounders, opposed a much feebler check,

Legislation
of Draco.

¹ The precise nature of the extraordinary punishment inflicted on the seducer, can only be conjectured from the description of Heraclides Ponticus, l., who says that Hippomenes put him to death by yoking him to a chariot. The occurrence is mentioned by Æschines Timarch. 182.

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we may reasonably conclude that the innovation did not proceed from their wish, but was extorted from them by the growing discontent of the people. On the other hand, Draco undoubtedly framed his code as much as possible in conformity to the spirit and the interests of the ruling class, to which he himself belonged; and hence we may fairly infer that the extreme rigour of its penal enactments was designed to overawe and repress the popular movement which had produced it. Aristotle observes that Draco made no change in the constitution; and that there was nothing remarkable in his laws, except the severity of the penalties by which they were sanctioned. It must however be remembered that the substitution of law for custom, of a written code for a fluctuating and flexible tradition, was itself a step of great importance; and we also learn that he introduced some changes in the administration of criminal justice, by transferring causes of murder, or of accidental homicide, from the cognizance of the archons to the magistrates called *ephetes*¹; though it is not clear whether he instituted, or only modified or enlarged, their jurisdiction. Demades was thought to have described the character of his laws very happily, when he said that they were written not in ink, but in blood. He himself is reported to have justified their severity, by observing that the least offences deserved death, and that he could devise no greater punishment for the worst. This sounds like the language of a man who proceeded on higher grounds than those of expediency, and who felt himself bound by his own convictions to disregard the opinions of

¹ Ἐφέται (Pollux, viii. 125.) Courts of Appeal: κρίσις ἐφέσιμος. Schömann however observes, *Ant. J. P. Gr.* p. 171. n. 5.: *Ephetarum nomen nonnulli inde explicaverunt, quod provocari ad eos a magistratuum sententiis potuerit, sed neque credibile est ante Draconem solos magistratus, non senatum, de cædibus judicasse, neque ἐφέρης recte dici potest, is ad quem provocatur.* Compare however on the other hand C. F. Hermann *Lehrbuch*, § 103. n. 12.

his contemporaries. Yet it is difficult to believe, that Draco can have been led by any principles of abstract justice, to confound all gradations of guilt, or, as has been conjectured¹ with somewhat greater probability, that, viewing them under a religious rather than a political aspect, he conceived that in every case alike they drew down the anger of the gods, which could only be appeased by the blood of the criminal. It seems much easier to understand how the ruling class, which adopted his enactments, might imagine that such a code was likely to be a convenient instrument in their hands, for striking terror into their subjects, and stifling the rising spirit of discontent, which their cupidity and oppression had provoked. We are however unable to form a well-grounded judgment on the degree in which equity may have been violated by his indiscriminate rigour; for though we read that he enacted the same capital punishment for petty thefts as for sacrilege and murder, still as there were some offences for which he provided a milder sentence², he must have framed a kind of scale, the wisdom and justice of which we have no means of estimating.

The danger which threatened the nobles at length showed itself from a side on which they probably deemed themselves most secure. Twelve years after Draco's legislation³, a conspiracy was formed by one of their own number for overthrowing the government. Cylon the author of this plot, was eminent both in birth and riches. His reputation, and still more his confidence in his own fortune, had been greatly raised by a victory at the Olympic games; and he had further increased the lustre and influence

Conspiracy
of Cylon.

¹ Wachsmuth, il. 1. p. 240.

² Loss of franchise for an attempt to change one of his laws. Demosth. Aristocr. p. 640. : a mulct of the value of ten oxen, Pollux, ix. 61.

³ Ol. 42. 1. Draco's archonship, in which his laws were enacted, is placed Ol. 39. 1. B. C. 624.

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of his family by an alliance with Theagenes, the tyrant of Megara, whose daughter he married. This extraordinary prosperity elated his presumption, and inflamed his ambition with hopes of a greatness, which could only be attained by a dangerous enterprise. He conceived the design of becoming master of Athens. He could reckon on the cordial assistance of his father-in-law, who, independently of their affinity, was deeply interested in establishing at Athens a form of government similar to that which he himself had founded at Megara; and he had also, by his personal influence, insured the support of numerous friends and adherents. Yet it is probable that he would not have relied on these resources, and that his scheme would never have suggested itself to his mind, if the general disaffection of the people toward their rulers, the impatience produced by the evils for which Draco had provided so inadequate a remedy, and by the irritating nature of the remedy itself, and the ordinary signs of an approaching change, the need of which began to be universally felt, had not appeared to favour his aims. At this period scarcely any great enterprise was undertaken in Greece without the sanction of an oracle; yet we cannot but feel some surprise, when we are informed by Thucydides, that Cylon consulted the Delphic god on the means by which he might overthrow the government of his country, and still more at the answer he is said to have received: that he must seize the citadel of Athens during the principal festival of Zeus.¹ Cylon naturally interpreted the oracle to mean the Olympic games, the scene of his glory; and Thucydides thinks it worth observing, that the great Attic festival in

¹ A similar inquiry however is related in Athenæus, xiii. p. 602. b., apparently on the authority of Heraclides Ponticus ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἑρωτικῶν, with regard to Phalaris the tyrant. The conspirators consult the oracle of Delphi: δπως αὐτῷ ἐπιθεῖνται, and the god grants a respite to Phalaris, on account of the clemency he had shown toward Chariton and Menalippus, the Agrigentine Harmodius and Aristogelton.

honour of the same god occurred at a different season. At the time however which appeared to be prescribed by his infallible counsellor, Cylon proceeded to carry his plan into effect. With the aid of a body of troops furnished by Theagenes, and of his partisans, he made himself master of the citadel. We hear nothing more of his Megarian auxiliaries, and perhaps when his first object was accomplished he dismissed them, relying on the favourable dispositions of the people. But the insurrection seems not to have been judiciously concerted. Those who had most cause to wish for a change, had no reason to believe that this was designed for their benefit, and the co-operation of the foreigners was sufficient to deter all patriotic citizens from espousing his cause. Cylon and his friends soon found themselves besieged by the forces which the government called in from all parts of the country. The greater part of these were soon dismissed, as the blockade proved tedious, and only a small body was left under the command of the nine archons, to wait till famine should compel the insurgents to surrender. In the mean while Cylon and his brother effected their escape. Their adherents seem never to have entertained any hopes of mercy. When their provisions were all spent, and some had died of hunger, the remainder abandoned the defence of the walls, and took refuge in the temple of Athene. The archon Megacles and his colleagues, seeing them reduced to the last extremity of weakness, began to be alarmed lest the sanctuary should be profaned by their death. To avoid this danger, they induced them to surrender on condition that their lives should be spared. Thucydides simply relates that the archons broke their promise, and put their prisoners to death when they had quitted their asylum, and that some were even killed at the altars of the *dread goddesses*, as the Eumenides, or Furies, were

Megacles
incurs the
Guilt of
Sacrilege.

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called, to which they had fled in the tumult. Plutarch adds a feature to the story, which seems too characteristic of the age to be considered as a later invention. More effectually to insure their safety, the suppliants, before they descended from the citadel, fastened a line to the statue of Athene, and held it in their hands, as they passed through the midst of their enemies. But the line chancing to break as they were passing by the sanctuary of the Eumenides, Megacles, with the approbation of his colleagues, declared that they were no longer under the safeguard of the goddess, who had thus visibly rejected their supplication, and immediately proceeded to arrest them. His words were the signal of a general massacre, from which even the awful sanctity of the neighbouring altars did not screen the fugitives: none escaped but those who found means of imploring female compassion.¹

If the conduct of the principal actors in this bloody scene had been marked only by treachery and cruelty, it would never have exposed them to punishment, perhaps not even to reproach. But they had been guilty of a flagrant violation of religion; and Megacles and his whole house were viewed with horror, as men polluted with the stain of sacrilege. All public disasters and calamities were henceforth construed into signs of the divine displeasure: and the surviving partisans of Cylon did not fail to urge, that the gods would never be appeased until venge-

¹ Plut., Sol. 12. Herodotus, v. 71., tells the story somewhat differently. According to him the magistrates called prytanes of the Naucraries (*πρυτάνεις τῶν ναυκράρων*), of whose power he speaks in terms very similar to those which Thucydides, i. 126., applies to the archons, (*ἐνεμον τότε τὰς Ἀθήνας — τότε τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἐπρασσον*), entered into the engagement with the suppliants, who were afterwards murdered by the Alcmaeonids. Wachsmuth (l. i. p. 246.) ingeniously reconciles these accounts by the supposition that the magistrates mentioned by Herodotus were assessors of the first archon, and were therefore in public proceedings identified with him and his colleagues. Dr. Arnold's explanation, Thuc. i. p. 664., seems to create new difficulties, and to fail of reconciling Herodotus with Thucydides.

ance should have been taken on the offenders. Yet if this had been the only question which agitated the public mind, it might have been hushed without producing any important consequences. But it was only one ingredient in the ferment which the conflict of parties, the grievances of the many, and the ambition of the few, now carried to a height that called for some extraordinary remedy. Hence Cylon's conspiracy and its issue exercised an influence on the history of Athens, which has rendered it for ever memorable, as the event which led the way to the legislation of Solon.

Solon, son of Execestides¹, was sprung from the line of Codrus. His father had reduced his fortune by his imprudent liberality; and Solon in his youth is said to have been compelled, in order to repair the decay of his patrimony, to embark in commercial adventures—a mode of acquiring wealth which was not disdained by men of the highest birth, as it frequently afforded them the means of forming honourable alliances in foreign countries, and even of raising themselves to princely rank as the founders of colonies. It was however undoubtedly not more the desire of affluence than the thirst of knowledge that impelled Solon to seek distant shores; and the most valuable fruit of his travels was the experience he collected of men, manners, and institutions. We are unable to ascertain the precise time at which he returned to settle in Athens; but if, as is most probable, it was in the period following Cylon's conspiracy², he found his country in a deplorable condition, distracted within by the contests of exasperated parties, and scarcely able to resist the attacks of its least powerful neighbours. Even the little state of Megara was at

Early His-
tory of
Solon.

¹ Only one writer, of little note, called him the son of Euphorion, Plut. Sol. 1.

² As he can scarcely have been born much earlier or later than B. C. 638, he would be about twenty-six at the time of the conspiracy, B. C. 612. See Clinton's Fasti, I. p. 301.

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War be-
tween
Athens and
Megara.

this time a formidable enemy. It had succeeded in wresting the island of Salamis from the Athenians, who had been repeatedly baffled in their attempts to recover what they esteemed their rightful possession. The losses they had sustained in this tedious war had broken their spirit, and had driven them to the resolution of abandoning for ever the assertion of their claims. A decree had been passed, which, under penalty of death, forbade any one so much as to propose the renewal of the desperate undertaking. Solon, who was himself a native of Salamis, and was perhaps connected by various ties with the island, was indignant at this pusillanimous policy; and he devised an extraordinary plan for rousing his countrymen from their despondency. He was endowed by nature with a happy poetical talent, of which some specimens are still extant in the fragments of his numerous works; which, though they never rise to a very high degree of beauty, possess the charm of a vigorous and graceful simplicity. He now composed a poem on the loss of Salamis, which Plutarch praises as one of his most ingenious productions. To elude the prohibition, he assumed the demeanour of a madman; and rushing into the public place, mounted the stone from which the heralds were used to make their proclamations, and recited his poem to the by-standers.¹ It contained a vehement expostulation on the dis-

¹ Welcker, as it appears from Bach (*Solonis Atheniensis Quæ Supersunt*, p. 24.) concludes from the first line of the poem. *αὐτὸς κῆρυξ ἦλθον ἀφ' ἡμερτῆς Σαλαμῖνος*, that Solon had either been sent on an embassy to Salamis, or assumed the language of one who had been employed on such a mission. And Bach further conjectures, that the poem contained the answer which the Salaminians were supposed to have given to the Athenian ambassador, in which they may have been represented as taunting the Athenians with the want of courage and energy implied in the epithet *Σαλαμυναφέτων*. It may not be a strong objection to the first of the above-mentioned suppositions that it contradicts the common story. But it is not easy to understand what the purpose of the embassy could have been, unless it was a secret mission designed to excite an insurrection in Salamis against the Megarians; but then it may be doubted whether Solon would have described himself as a herald. It also seems evident that the object of the poem was to rouse the Athenians, not to more vigorous efforts, but from a state of total inaction with regard to Salamis.

grace which the Athenian name had incurred, and a summons to take the field again, and vindicate their right to the *lovely island*. The hearers caught the poet's enthusiasm, which was seconded by the applause of his friends, and particularly by the eloquence of his young kinsman Pisistratus. The restraining law was repealed, and it was resolved once more to try the fortune of arms.

Solon not only inspired his countrymen with hope, but led them to victory, aided in the camp as in the city by the genius of Pisistratus.¹ The stratagem with which he attacked the Megarians is variously related: but he is said to have finished the campaign by a single blow, and certainly succeeded in speedily recovering the island. We may even conclude that the Athenians at the same time made themselves masters of the port of Megara, Nisæa, since it is said

¹ That Pisistratus took a part in Solon's expedition against Salamis is not only asserted by Plutarch (Sol. 8.), but confirmed by the testimony of Herodotus, l. 59., and of several later writers. Solon's stratagem (Plut. Sol. 8. Polyæn. l. 20.) is attributed to Pisistratus by Justin, ll. 8. Æneas Pollorc, 4. Frontinus Strateg. iv. 44. Nevertheless, if Plutarch is to be trusted as to the date of this expedition, which he places before the Círrhæan war, or at least before the archonship of Solon, it would be hardly possible that Pisistratus should have had a share in it: for he must then have been between sixty and seventy when he first seized the tyranny, a. c. 560. For this observation I am indebted to Sir Lytton Bulwer (*Athens*), who has clearly pointed out the difficulty; but the expedient by which he proposes to solve it is one which few critics in our day will approve of, though there was a time when it would have been thought by many ingenious and happy. He supposes that Salamis was twice recovered, once by Solon, and afterwards by Pisistratus. And as Plutarch mentions two stories which were told about Solon's expedition, he thinks that one of them related to Solon, the other to Pisistratus. But this separation is merely arbitrary, especially as the two stories are not in the slightest degree inconsistent with one another, when referred to the same epoch; and it is clear that none of the writers, consulted by Plutarch, knew of more than one expedition which ended with the conquest of Salamis. We are therefore led to conclude that the expedition against the Megarians in which, according to Herodotus, l. 59., Pisistratus commanded and took Nisæa, was no other than that described by Plutarch, after which, in consequence of the civil troubles, he says (Sol. 12.), Nisæa was again lost. It would perhaps be easier to suppose Plutarch mistaken in his chronology, both with regard to Pisistratus and to Solon, and that the expedition took place at a much later period. Then indeed the story of the feigned madness, which however seems to imply a more popular form of government than subsisted before Solon's archonship, must be differently told. This conjecture might seem to be not wholly without authority to support it, since Diogenes Laertius (Solon, l. § 46.) relates the recovery of Salamis as if it was subsequent to Solon's legislation. But it may as well be left to its own merits. Where all is so doubtful, I have thought it best to leave the text as it stands, with this warning to the reader.

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XLExile of the
Alcmaeonids.Recovery of
Salamis.

to have been soon after reconquered by the Megarian. The reputation which Solon acquired by this enterprise was heightened, and more widely diffused throughout Greece, by the part he took in the sacred war, which ended with the destruction of Cirrha. But already before this he had gained the confidence of his fellow-citizens, and had begun to exert his influence in healing their intestine divisions. The outcry against Megacles and his associates in the massacre had risen so high, that it became evident that quiet could never be restored until they had expiated their offence, and had delivered the city from the curse which they seemed to have brought upon Solon, with the assistance of the most moderate nobles, prevailed on the party of Megacles to submit their cause to the decision of an impartial tribunal. An extraordinary court of Three Hundred persons chosen from their own order, was commissioned to try them. Under such circumstances their condemnation was inevitable: those who had survived went into exile, and the bones of the deceased were taken out of their graves, and transported beyond the frontier. In the mean while the Megarians had not relinquished their pretensions to Salamis, and they took advantage of the troubles which occupied the attention of the Athenians to dislodge their garrison from Nisæa, and to reconquer the island, where five hundred Athenian colonists, who had voluntarily shared Solon's first expedition, had been rewarded with an allotment of lands, which gave them a predominant influence in the government. It seems probable that it was after this event that the two states, seeing no prospect of terminating by arms warfare subject to such vicissitudes, and equally

¹ It was taken by Pisistratus, Herod. i. 59. Plut. Solon, c. 12.

² This war began a. c. 600, four years after the recovery of Salamis. See Clinton, F. H. ii. p. 196.

harassing to both, now that their honour had been satisfied by alternate victories, agreed to refer their claims to arbitration. At their request the Lacedæmonians appointed five commissioners to try the cause. Solon, who was the chief spokesman on the side of the Athenians, maintained their title on the ground of ancient possession, by arguments which, though they never silenced the Megarians, appear to have convinced the arbitrators. The strongest seem to have been derived from the Athenian customs, of which he pointed out traces in the mode of interment observed in Salamis, as well as inscriptions on the tombs, which attested the Attic origin of the persons they commemorated. He is also said to have appealed to the authority of the Homeric catalogue of the Grecian fleet, and to have resorted to a patriotic fraud, by forging a line which described Ajax as ranging the ships which he brought from Salamis in the Athenian station; and he interpreted some oracular verses, which spoke of Salamis as an Ionian island, in a similar sense. Modern criticism would not have been much better satisfied with the plea, which he grounded on the Attic tradition, that the sons of the same hero had settled in Attica, and had been adopted as Athenian citizens, and in return had transferred their hereditary dominion over the island to their new countrymen. The weight however of all these arguments determined the issue in favour of the Athenians: and it seems more probable that the Megarians acquiesced in a decision to which they had themselves appealed, than that, as Plutarch represents, they almost immediately renewed hostilities.

Party feuds continued to rage with unabated violence at Athens. The removal of the men whom public opinion had denounced as objects of the divine wrath, was only a preliminary step toward the restoration of tranquillity; but the evil was seated much

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of Epime-
nides.

deeper, and required a different kind of remedy which was only to be found in a new organisation of the state. This it is probable Solon already meditated, as he must long have perceived its necessity. But he saw that, before it could be accomplished, the minds of men must be brought into a frame fitted for its reception, and that this could only be done with the aid of religion. There were superstitious fears to be stilled, angry passions to be soothed, barbarous usages hallowed by long prescription to be abolished; and even the authority of Solon was not of itself sufficient for these purposes. He therefore looked abroad for a coadjutor, and fate directed his view to a man peculiarly qualified to meet the extraordinary emergency. Crete at this time boasted of a person whom his contemporaries regarded as a being of a superior nature, and who even to us appears in a mysterious or at least an ambiguous light, from our inability to decide how far he himself partook in the general opinion which ascribed to him an intimate communication with higher powers. This was Epimenides¹, a native it is said, of the town of Phæstus, but, as his history seems to show, a citizen of Cnossus, the ancient capital of Minos. His origin seems to have been obscure, for, like the ancient sage Musæus, he was said to be the son of a nymph; a kind of parentage which in both cases implies the popular belief of inspired wisdom in those to whom it was ascribed. His youth, and even a great part of his manhood, according to a legend which seems to have been current even in his own time, passed away in a preternatural slumber: he had been sent by his father to fetch sheep from the country; but having turned aside into a cave, for shelter from the noontide heat, he was overtaken by sleep. He woke unconscious

¹ On the history of Epimenides there is a useful little work by Heinrich *Epimenides aus Kreta*.

any change; and it was only by that which he gradually discovered in the persons and things around him, that he found more than half a century had elapsed since he left his father's house. Many of the ancients perceived that this marvellous tale was not without a meaning, though they were not unanimous in their interpretation of it. The greater part of them however drew from it the probable inference, that Epimenides had spent the early part of his life in obscurity, — either that of voluntary seclusion, or of distant travel, — and that the time during which he thus withdrew himself from the eyes of his countrymen was employed in acquiring those stores of knowledge by which he afterwards excited their astonishment.¹ He seems to have studied the healing virtues of plants, and thus to have made some proficiency in an art which enabled him to confer solid benefits upon mankind. But this was not the main foundation of his fame, nor probably that which he himself considered as the most precious result of his solitary meditations. His rude attempts to explore the secrets of nature, by opening new sources of wonder to his inquisitive mind, served perhaps to nourish that credulous enthusiasm, from which some of the greatest intellects of this period were not exempt, and which was rather strengthened than sobered by the first essays of philosophical speculation. He sought a more direct road to knowledge in the favour of the gods, which he strove to win, both by the diligent practice of old observances, and by the institution of new and more acceptable rites. Thus, in the opinion of his countrymen, and probably in his own, he rose to the dignity of a priestly seer, profoundly learned in mystic ordinances, eminently skilled

¹ So Manes is said to have shut himself up for a year or more in a cave, before he published his pretended revelations (Beausobre, *Hist. de Manichée*, i. p. 189.); and Ritter (*Die Stupa's*, p. 32.) observes that a similar feature frequently occurs in the legends of the Life of Buddha.

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in the art of propitiating the anger of heaven when provoked by impiety or neglect, and honoured with frequent revelations of the divine will, if not endowed with the faculty of penetrating, as often as he wished, into the depths of futurity. He was a poet too as well as a prophet, and the descriptions given of his works attest the fecundity of his genius. It seems however that he did not disdain to heighten the respect which these advantages procured for him, by assuming an exterior which distinguished him from the rest of mankind, and by affecting an oriental austerity of habits. It was said that no one ever saw him eat, and when he appeared in public the awful gravity of the sage was announced by the length of his flowing hair.

Epimenides
at Athens.

This venerated person was now publicly invited to Athens, to exert his marvellous powers on behalf of the distracted city. His visit to Athens, as it was the most memorable event of his life, is also that which gives us the clearest view of his character, and shows that, though he may not have a claim to the title of a philosopher, it would be equally unjust to consider him as a juggler and an impostor. The measures he adopted on his arrival consisted in great part of religious rites, which, as they finally allayed the fears of the superstitious, were undoubtedly as efficacious as any that could have been devised. We regret indeed to find that among other propitiations he prescribed the sacrifice of a human victim: it was perhaps demanded by the public opinion, in which he may himself have partaken. A youth, named Cratinus, voluntarily devoted himself for his country, and was joined in death by his friend Aristodemus.¹ A still more significant and important act was the foundation of a temple to the Eumenides, on the Areopagus—a hill already hallowed by the most

Athenæus, p. 602. *Diogenes Laertius*, i. 110., names Cratinus and Ctesibius.

ancient court of criminal justice — and the consecration of two altars to appease the baneful Powers, whose malignant influence had stifled in the breasts of the citizens the respect they owed to each other and to the laws.¹ But Epimenides appears not merely as a founder of sacred rites and monuments; he also introduced some regulations, which, though not wholly foreign to religion, had manifestly a political object, and were probably framed either at the suggestion of Solon, or in order to meet his views. They imposed restraints on the profuse expense with which private persons celebrated the worship of the gods, and on the wild and unseemly signs of grief which the women had been accustomed to display at funerals. These to us may seem trifles, but Solon thought them worthy objects of his legislation; and as the last was perhaps not unconnected with the cause of the disorders which had called for the presence of Epimenides, so no less an authority may have been requisite for innovations which seemed to encroach upon the most sacred privileges.

Epimenides had been received with a reverence which insured the success of his beneficent work, and when it was accomplished he was dismissed with tokens of the warmest gratitude. The Athenians decreed gold and signal honours to their benefactor; but he had too high a sense of the sanctity of his office to accept such rewards. The only boon he requested was, for himself, a branch from the sacred olive-tree which grew on the citadel, the gift, it was believed, of Athene, when she claimed the land as her own; and for his country, a decree of perpetual friendship and alliance between Athens and Cnossus. This pleasing monument of his visit seems to have

¹ *Ῥέσις* and *Ἀναίδεια*, insolence and impudence. *Contumelia* and *impudentia*, in Cicero de Leg. ii. 11., who speaks of a temple; other authors know only of altars. Compare Paus. i. 28. 5. and Heinrichs, *Epimenides*, p. 98.

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subsisted in the time of Plato¹, and a statue of the Cretan sage long adorned one of the Athenian sanctuaries. But though the visit of Epimenides was attended with the most salutary consequences, so far as it applied a suitable remedy to evils which were entirely seated in the imagination, and though it may have wrought still happier effects by calming, softening, and opening hearts, which had before only beaten with wild and malignant passions, still it had not produced any real change in the state of things, but had at the utmost only prepared the way for one. This work remained to be achieved by Solon.

Misery of
the Attic
Peasantry.

The government had long been in the hands of men who appear to have wielded it only as an instrument for aggrandising and enriching themselves. They had reduced a great part of the class whose industry was employed in the labours of agriculture to a state of abject dependence, in which they were not only debarred from all but perhaps a merely nominal share of political rights, but held even their personal freedom by a precarious tenure, and were frequently reduced to actual slavery. The smaller proprietors, impoverished by bad times, or casual disasters, were compelled to borrow money at high interest, and to mortgage their lands to the rich, or to receive them again as tenants upon the same hard terms as were imposed upon those who cultivated the estates of the great landowners. The laws made by the nobles enabled the creditor to seize the person of his insolvent debtor, and to sell him as a slave; and this right had been frequently exercised: numbers had been torn from their homes, and condemned to end their days in the service of a foreign master; others were driven to the still harder necessity of

¹ De Leg. i. 11. Though Plato's chronology is enormously wrong, — he places the visit of Epimenides only ten years before the Persian war, about B. C. 500, — we may receive his testimony to the fact stated in the text, which is also mentioned by Diogenes Laert. i. 111.

selling their own children. One who travelled at this time through Attica saw the dismal monuments of aristocratical oppression scattered over its fields, in the stone posts¹, which marked that what was once a property had become a pledge, and that its former owner had lost his independence, and was in danger of sinking into a still more degraded and miserable condition. Such spectacles had frequently struck the eye of Solon, and they undoubtedly moved him no less than that which roused the holy indignation of the elder Gracchus against the Roman grandees.²

Those who groaned under this tyranny were only eager for a change, and cared little about the means by which it might be effected. But the population of Attica was not simply composed of these two classes. We have already noticed an ancient geographical division of the country, which from time immemorial had determined the pursuits and the character of its inhabitants; and this now separated them into three distinct parties³, animated each by its peculiar interests, views, and feelings. The possessions of the nobles lay chiefly in the plains. As a body they desired the continuance of the existing state of things, on which their power and exclusive privileges depended; but, as we have seen, there were among them some moderate men, who were willing to make concessions to prudence, if not to justice, and to resign a part for the sake of securing their possession of the rest. The inhabitants of the highlands, in the eastern and northern parts of Attica, do not seem to have suffered any of those evils which the rapacity and hard-heartedness of the powerful had inflicted on the lowland peasantry; but, though in-

State of
Parties
in Attica.

¹ Ὀποί. They were inscribed with the amount of the debt and the name of the creditor.

² Plut. Tib. Gracchus, c. 8.

³ The lowlanders were called Πεδῖεῖς or Πεδιαῖοι: the highlanders Διάκριοι: the men of the coast, Πάραλοι.

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dependent, they were probably for the most part poor, and had perhaps been less considered than their neighbours in the distribution of political rights. They generally wished for a revolution which should place them on a level with the rich; and, uniting their cause with that of the oppressed, they called for a thorough redress of grievances, which they contended could only be afforded by reducing that enormous inequality of possessions, which was the source of degradation and misery to them and their fellows.¹ The men of the coast, who probably composed a main part of that class which subsisted by trade, by the exercise of the mechanical arts, and perhaps by the working of the mines, and now included a considerable share of affluence and intelligence, were averse to violent measures, but were desirous of a reform in the constitution, which should promote the prosperity of the country by removing all grounds of reasonable complaint, and should admit a larger number to the enjoyment of those rights which were now engrossed and abused by a few.

It is probable that the wiser nobles now regretted the blind eagerness with which their ancestors abolished the regal dignity, under which they might perhaps still have retained their power, even if they had been compelled to exercise it with greater moderation. The people in general felt the need of a leader, and would have preferred even the despotic rule of one man to the tyranny of their many lords. As Solon's established reputation pointed him out as the person most capable of remedying the disorders of the state, so he united all the qualities which could fit him for coming forward as the protector of the commonalty without exciting the fears of the nobles. He belonged to the latter by birth and station, and he had recommended himself to the former by the proofs

¹ Plut. Sol. 13. 29.

he had shown of activity, prudence, justice, and humanity. He was therefore chosen, with the unanimous consent of all parties, to mediate between them, and arbitrate their quarrels; and, under the legal title of archon, was invested with full authority to frame a new constitution, and a new code of laws. (Ol. 46. 3. B. C. 594.) Such an office, under such circumstances, conferred almost unlimited power, and an ambitious man might easily have abused it to make himself absolute master of the state. The contending parties would probably have acquiesced without much reluctance in such a usurpation, as an evil less than those which some suffered and others feared. Solon's friends exhorted him to seize the opportunity of becoming tyrant of Athens; and they were not at a loss for fair arguments to colour their foul advice. They bade him consider that the name of a tyranny was harmless, and the thing salutary, so long as it was wisely and justly administered; and they reminded him of recent instances — of Tynnondas in Eubœa, and Pittacus at Mitylene, who had exercised a sovereignty over their fellow-citizens without forfeiting their love. Solon saw through their sophistry, and was not tempted by it to betray the sacred trust reposed in him; and he consoled himself for the taunts with which they reproached his want of spirit and prudence, by the approbation of his conscience, the esteem of his countrymen, and the honour with which his name has come down to posterity. Instead of harbouring any schemes of selfish aggrandisement, he bent all his thoughts and energies to the execution of the great task which he had undertaken.

This task consisted of two main parts: the first and most pressing business was to relieve the present distress of the commonalty; the next to provide against the recurrence of like evils, by regulating the rights of all the citizens according to equitable prin-

Legislation
of Solon.

CHAP.
XLMeasures of
Immediate
Relief.

ciples, and fixing them on a permanent basis. In proceeding to the first part of his undertaking, Solon held a middle course between the two extremes — those who wished to keep all, and those who were for taking every thing away. The most violent or needy would have been satisfied with nothing short of a total confusion of property, followed by a fresh distribution of it. They desired that all debts should be cancelled, and that the lands of the rich should be confiscated and parcelled out among the poor. Solon, while he resisted these reckless and extravagant demands, met the reasonable expectations of the public by his *disburdening ordinance*¹, and relieved the debtor, partly by a reduction of the rate of interest, which was probably made retrospective, and thus in many cases would wipe off a great part of the debt, and partly by lowering the standard of the silver coinage, so that the debtor saved more than one fourth in every payment.² He likewise released the pledged lands from their incumbrances, and restored them in full property to their owners: though it does not seem certain whether this was one of the express objects of the measure, or only one of the consequences which it involved. Finally, he abolished the inhuman law which enabled the creditor to enslave his debtor, and restored those who were pining at home in such bondage to immediate liberty; and it would seem that he compelled those who had sold their debtors into foreign countries to procure their freedom at their own expense. The debt itself in such cases was of course held to be extinguished. Solon himself, in a poem which he afterwards composed on the subject of his legislation, spoke with a becoming pride

¹ *Ξειράχθεια*.

² Plutarch (Sol. 15.) says, that he made the mina, which before contained 73 drachms, to contain 100; that is, he made 73 old drachms to be worth 100 new. Böckh, *Staatsh.* ii. p. 360., thinks that he meant to reduce the value of the drachm only by one quarter, but that the new coin proved lighter than was expected.

of the happy change which this measure had wrought in the face of Attica, of the numerous citizens whose lands he had discharged, and whose persons he had emancipated, and brought back from hopeless slavery in strange lands. He was only unfortunate in bestowing his confidence on persons who were incapable of imitating his virtue, and who abused his intimacy. At the time when all men were uncertain as to his intentions, and no kind of property could be thought secure, he privately informed three of his friends of his determination not to touch the estates of the landowners, but only to reduce the amount of debt. He had afterwards the vexation of discovering, that the men to whom he had entrusted this secret had been base enough to take advantage of it, by making large purchases of land, which at such a juncture bore no doubt a very low price, with borrowed money. Fortunately for his fame, the state of his private affairs was such as to exempt him from all suspicion of having had any share in this sordid transaction. He had himself a considerable sum out at interest, and was a loser in proportion by his own enactment.

We have here followed that account of Solon's measures of relief, which seems the most probable in itself, and is confirmed by the best evidence. There was however another, adopted by some ancient writers, which represented him as having entirely cancelled all debts, and as having only disguised the violence of this proceeding under a soft and attractive name. It does not appear that the ancients saw any thing to censure in his conduct according to either view. On the other hand, in our times there will perhaps be some who will consider such a change in property and contracts, even upon the mildest interpretation, as unjust in principle, and as a precedent pregnant with consequences the most dangerous to

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society. But the example of Solon cannot be fairly pleaded by those who contend that either public or private faith may be rightly sacrificed to expediency. He must be considered as an arbitrator to whom all the parties interested submitted their claims, with the avowed intent that they should be decided by him, not upon the footing of legal right, but according to his own view of the public interest. It was in this light that he himself regarded his office, and he appears to have discharged it faithfully and discreetly. The strongest proof of the wisdom and equity of his measures is that they subjected him to obloquy from the violent spirits of both the extreme parties. But their murmurs were soon drowned in the general approbation with which the disburdening ordinance was received: it was celebrated with a solemn festival, and Solon was encouraged, by the strongest assurances of the increased confidence of his fellow-citizens, to proceed with his work; and he now entered on the second and more difficult part of his task.

Reform of
the Con-
stitution.

He began by repealing all the laws of Draco, except those which concerned the repression of bloodshed, which were in fact customs hallowed by time and by religion, and had been retained, not introduced, by his predecessor. As a natural consequence perhaps of this measure, he published an amnesty, or act of grace, which restored those citizens who had been deprived of their franchise for lighter offences, and recalled those who had been forced into exile; and it seems probable that this indulgence was extended to the house of Megacles, the Alcmaeonids, as they were called from a remote ancestor, the third in descent from Nestor, and to the partners of his guilt and punishment: the city, now purified and tranquillised, might be supposed to be no longer either polluted or endangered by their presence; and it was always liable to be disturbed by their machinations, so long

they remained in banishment. The four ancient ~~as~~ were retained, with all their subdivisions; but ~~ems~~ probable that Solon admitted a number of citizens; for it is said that he invited foreigners ~~hens~~ by this boon, though he confined it to such ~~ttled~~ there with their whole family and substance, ~~ad~~ dissolved their connection with their native

The distinguishing feature of the new constitution was the substitution of property for birth, ~~itle~~ to the honours and offices of the state.² This ~~re~~, though its consequences were of infinite ~~im-~~ ~~nce~~, would not appear so violent or momentous ~~e~~ generation which witnessed it, since at this ~~these~~ two claims generally concurred in the same

n. Solon divided the citizens into four classes, ~~ding~~ to the gradations of their fortunes, and ~~re-~~ ~~ed~~ the extent of their franchise, and their ~~con-~~ ~~tions~~ to the public necessities, by the amount of incomes. The first class, as its name expressed, ~~sted~~ of persons whose estates yielded a net yearly ~~ie~~, or rent, of 500 measures of dry or liquid ~~ice~~.³ The qualification of the second class was

Division of
Classes.

fifths of this amount; that of the third two ~~s~~, or more probably half, of the latter. The ~~ers~~ of the second class were called *knights*⁴, ~~accounted~~ able to keep a war-horse: the name ~~e~~ third class, whom we might call yeomen, was ~~ed~~ from the yoke of cattle for the plough, which ~~m~~ of the extent described was supposed to re-

~~s~~ appears to be the foundation of Plutarch's statement, Sol. 24., which is that no foreigners could be adopted as citizens, but those who had either ~~n~~ Attica, as above mentioned, or were banished from their own countries. He seems to suppose that such aliens had a legal *right* to the freedom of

buhr takes a very different and peculiar view of this subject (*History of* . ii. ed. 2. p. 305. of the English translation: *by his constitution of the Solon removed all the indigent eupatrids from the government without letting* *ch members of the demus*. Vol. i. n. 1017.) See Appendix I.

τακοσιμέδιστοι. The *medimnus* exceeds the bushel by six pints and a

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quire.¹ The fourth class comprehended all whose incomes fell below that of the third, and, according to its name, consisted of hired labourers in husbandry. The first class was exclusively eligible to the high offices, those of the nine archons, and probably to others which had hitherto been reserved to the nobles; they were also destined to fill the highest commands in the army, as in later times, when Athens became a maritime power, they did in the fleet. Some lower offices were undoubtedly left open to the second and the third class, though we are unable to define the extent of their privileges, or to ascertain whether their political rights one had any advantage over the other. They were at least distinguished from each other by the mode of their military service: the one furnishing the cavalry, the other the heavy-arm infantry. But for their exclusion from the dignities occupied by the wealthy few, they received a compensation in the comparative lightness of their burdens. They were assessed not in exact proportion to the amount of their incomes, but at a much lower rate, the nominal value of their property being for this purpose reduced below the truth, that of the knights by one sixth, that of the third class by one third.³ The fourth class was excluded from all share in the magistracy, and from the honours and duties of the full-armed warrior, the expense of which would in general exceed their means: on shore they served only as light troops, in later times they manned the fleets. In return they were exempted from all direct contributions, and they were permitted to take a pa

¹ *Zeutyrai*.² *Θῆτες*.³ As the price of the *medimnus* was estimated by Solon at a drachm, the low income of the first class was equivalent to 500 drachms, the twelfth part of a talent; and the property which yielded this income was rated at a talent, and taxed accordingly. But the property of persons in the second class, instead of being rated at twelve times the amount of their income, or 3600 drachms, was rated at only 3000; that of the yeomen at 1200 instead of 1800. For the proof and illustration of these statements, see Böckh's *Public Economy of Athens* (book iv. ch. 5.) which first threw light on this subject.

the popular assembly, as well as in the exercise of those judicial powers which were now placed in the hands of the people. We shall shortly have occasion to observe, how amply this boon compensated for the loss of all the privileges that were withheld from them. Solon's classification, as we see, takes no notice of any other than landed property: yet as the example of Solon himself seems to prove, that Attica must already have carried on some foreign trade, it is not unlikely that there were fortunes of this kind equal to those which gave admission to the higher classes. But it can hardly be supposed that they placed their possessors on a level with the owners of the soil; it is more probable that these, together with the newly adopted citizens, without regard to their various degrees of affluence, were all included in the lowest class.

Solon's system then made room for all freemen, but assigned to them different places, varying with their visible means of serving the state. His general aim in the distribution of power, as he himself explains it in a fragment which Plutarch has preserved from one of his poems, was to give such a share to the commonalty as would enable it to protect itself¹, and to the wealthy as much as was necessary for retaining their dignity, — in other words, for ruling the people without the means of oppressing it.² He threw his strong shield, he says, over both, and permitted neither to gain an unjust advantage. The magistrates, though selected upon a different qualification, retained their ancient authority; but they were now responsible for the exercise of it, not to their own body, but to the governed. The judicial functions of the archons

General
Scope of
Solon's
Institu-
tions.

¹ Δῆμος μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκε τόσον κράτος ὅσον ἐπαρκεῖν. Niebuhr (ii. p. 305. transl. 3d edit.) gives a different interpretation; *Solon had conceded (to the demos) only so much authority in the state as could not be withheld from it.*

² Οἱ δ' εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγῆτοί καὶ τοῖς ἐφρασάμην μηδὲν ἀεικέες εἶναι.

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were perhaps preserved nearly in their full extent ; but appeals were allowed from their jurisdiction to courts numerous composed, and filled indiscriminately from all classes.¹ Solon could not foresee the change of circumstances by which this right of appeal became the instrument of overthrowing the equilibrium which he hoped to have established on a solid basis, when that which he had designed to exercise an extraordinary jurisdiction became an ordinary tribunal, which drew almost all causes to itself, and overruled every other power in the state. He seems to have thought that, while he provided sufficiently for the security of the commonalty, by permitting the lowest of its members to vote in the popular assembly, and to sit in judgment on cases in which the parties were dissatisfied with the ordinary modes of proceeding, he had also insured the stability of his new order of things by two institutions, which appeared to be sufficient guards against the sallies of democratical extravagance — anchors, as Plutarch expresses it, on which the vessel of the state might ride safely in every storm. These were the two councils of the Four Hundred, and the Areopagus.

Council
of Four
Hundred.

The institution of the Four Hundred was uniformly attributed to Solon. But as the foundation of the Areopagus was likewise attributed to him by most of the ancients, though it is certain that he only made some changes in its constitution, there is ground for inquiring, whether a similar mistake may not have prevailed in the other case. It is indeed highly probable that an aristocratical council existed before

¹ Plut. Sol. 18. Plutarch's statement on this subject seems to be generally rejected as erroneous : Wachsmuth does not even notice it ; and Platner, *Beiträge*, p. 59., thinks it clear that Plutarch confounded the ἀνάκρισις with an ἐφεσις — the magistrate's preliminary investigation with an appeal from his sentence. This would be a singular mistake. Whereas the appeal, of which Draco had left a precedent in the institution of the Ephetes, seems in itself by no means improbable, as a transition from the original plenitude of the magistrate's judicial power to its subsequent comparative nullity. Still it must be owned that on such a point Plutarch's authority is not weighty.

Solon: but we have neither evidence nor any sure analogy to guide us in determining its numbers; nor can we decide whether it represented the four tribes, or any of their subdivisions. If we knew how the eupatrids were distributed among the tribes, it might be possible to arrive at some probable conclusion on this point; but so long as there is room for the present diversity of opinions with regard to the composition of the tribes, there can be little hope of ascertaining the nature of the council, as it stood before the time of Solon. There are however two well-attested facts which appear to have a bearing on this question, and which we believe have been hitherto overlooked. We have seen that the cause of the Alcmaeonids was referred to an aristocratical tribunal of Three Hundred persons; and we shall see that when the chief of the Alcmaeonids had substituted a new council in the room of Solon's, his political antagonist, having suppressed it, established one of Three Hundred in its stead. This can hardly be a merely casual coincidence. Even if it does not warrant the conclusion that three hundred was the number of the ancient council — which indeed cannot be imagined, unless the eupatrids were all contained in three of the tribes — it seems to raise a strong objection against the supposition that the real number exceeded this by sixty or a hundred; since in that case, on both the occasions just mentioned, we should probably have heard, not of the Three Hundred, but either of 360 or 400 members of those aristocratical assemblies. We are therefore led to suspect that the old Athenian council came nearer in numbers to the Spartan *gerusia*. But it is possible that beside this, the eupatrids held general assemblies of their order, either periodically, or as occasions arose for them. The council of Four Hundred was perhaps intended to replace both these institutions. It succeeded to

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the ancient council in the regular management of public affairs, and its number was probably fixed with a view to admit as many of the citizens to a share in the government, as it appeared safe to entrust with it. It was a popular body, as compared with an assembly of the eupatrids; for its members were taken from the first three classes, each tribe furnishing one hundred; but on the other hand it was aristocratical, inasmuch as it excluded one large division of the people. And there is even room to suspect that it may have been composed in a manner which rendered it more subject to the influence of the eupatrids than has been generally believed. For it does not seem that entire reliance can be placed on the opinion, that the success of the candidates was determined, as in the later practice, by lot.¹ If they were elected, it would be easy to conceive that the noble families might generally be able to bring in men of their choice. But the competitors, however appointed, were obliged to give proof of their legal capacity in a previous examination.² To the security for their fitness afforded by the prescribed qualification of fortune, was added that of a mature age, none being eligible under thirty. They were changed every year, and at the end of this term were liable to render a general account of their conduct, and to meet all charges that might be brought against them, and even during its continuance they might be expelled for misconduct by their colleagues. As the council was principally designed to restrain and conduct the enlarged powers of the popular assembly, committed as they now were to a multitude

¹ Wachsmuth, l. l. p. 257., refers to a collection of authorities in Tittmann relating to the council of Five Hundred; and contents himself with adding, *there is no trace that Solon originally appointed an election of the council*. But it seems doubtful whether this is the right way of stating the question, and whether, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it ought not to be presumed that this was Solon's regulation. Where the thing itself is so probable, we might perhaps be justified in laying some stress on Plutarch's expression (Sol. 19.): ἀπὸ φυλῆς ἐκάστης ἑκατὸν ἄνδρας ἐπιλεξάμενος.

² Δοκιμασία.

of inexperienced hands, the main part of its business was to prepare the measures which were to be submitted to the votes of the assembly, and to preside over its deliberations. It was divided into sections, which, under the venerable name of *prytanes*, succeeded each other throughout the year as the representatives of the whole body. Each section during its term assembled daily in their session house, the *prytaneum*, to consult on the state of affairs, to receive intelligence, information, and suggestions, and instantly to take such measures as the public interest rendered it necessary to adopt without delay. Like the ancient magistrates of the same name, they were entertained at a common table, together with the other guests of the state who enjoyed that privilege either by virtue of some office, or as a reward of merit. Beside however the function of prompting and directing the proceedings of the popular assembly, the council possessed others connected with the finances and other objects of administration, which it exercised without any restraint except its general responsibility. In this capacity it had the power of issuing ordinances, not unlike the edicts of the Roman magistrates, which continued in force for the current year, and of inflicting fines at its discretion to a certain amount.

According to the theory of Solon's constitution, the assembly of the people was little more than the organ of the council, as it could only act upon the propositions laid before it by the latter.¹ But beside the option of approving or rejecting, it seems always to have had the power of modifying the measures proposed, without sending them back for the acceptance of the council in their altered form. There was however a mode by which the council might become the organ of the assembly, or rather the channel through which measures were introduced into it by private

The Assembly of the People.

¹ Προβουλεύματα.

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individuals. This happened when the council received a proposition not emanating from its own body, and merely clothed it with the legal form and sanction.¹ These two cases probably did not enter into Solon's plan, and perhaps if he had foreseen them he would have endeavoured to guard against them. In his time their importance could scarcely have been perceived. The ordinary assemblies², which at first perhaps were not held oftener than once a month, seem then not to have excited so lively an interest as in after-times. The attendance of the citizens seems to have been considered by the greater number as a burdensome duty, rather than a privilege; and it was necessary to enforce it by marking and fining those who were seen to pass through the streets in a different direction at the hour of meeting. No fixed number of voters was necessary, except in a few cases, which required the presence of at least 6000 citizens. The votes on public measures were taken by show of hands, and without any distinction of classes: the vote of the poorest peasant weighed in itself as much as that of the richest noble, though the latter might command many by his personal influence. Every voter was allowed to speak. The exercise of this right began after the age of twenty; but, among his other precautions against the dangers that might arise from ignorance and rashness, Solon provided that in every assembly the crier should invite those who were past fifty to speak first on each question. The president had the power of repressing and punishing all breaches of order and decorum.

The Halica.

But the judicial power which Solon had lodged in the hands of the people, was the most powerful instrument on which he relied for correcting all abuses, and remedying all mischiefs that might arise out of

¹ See Tittmann, *Staatsv.* p. 184.

² *Kyriai ekklesiái* opposed to *σύγκλητοι* and *κατακλησίαι*.

the working of his constitution. A body of 6000 citizens was every year created by lot to form a supreme court, called *Heliaea*¹, which was divided into several smaller ones, not limited to any precise number of persons. The qualifications required for this were the same with those which gave admission into the general assembly, except that the members of the former might not be under the age of thirty. It was therefore in fact a select portion of the latter, in which the powers of the larger body were concentrated, and exercised under a judicial form. That Solon himself viewed it in this light, and designed it much rather to be the guardian of the constitution, than the minister of the laws, appears from the oath which he prescribed to its members.² It relates, for the most part, to their political duties of resisting all attempts to subvert the democracy, and to substitute any other form of government, and all measures tending to that end; and only after these obligations have been fully described, proceeds to enumerate those which belong to the judicial character, of rejecting bribes, hearing impartially, and deciding faithfully. It is not indeed clear that Solon intended wholly to transfer ordinary cases from the cognizance of the archons to that of the popular courts, though subsequently the magistrates only retained the functions of conducting causes to that stage in which they were ripe for the decision of the jurors, of presiding at the trial, and executing the judgment.³ But the peculiar sphere of action in which the jurors appeared in the plenitude of their power, as representatives of the people, and carried into effect the proper intention of the legislator, lay in questions relating to political offences, which were brought before them chiefly by means of the prosecutions

¹ *Ἡλιαία*, an assembly. Herod. v. 29. has the form *ἁλήη*.

² Demosthenes, *Timocr.* p. 746.

³ *Ἀνδραγισίς*, and *ἡγεμονία δικαστηρίου*.

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instituted against the authors of illegal measures. The person who had succeeded in causing a law or a decree to be passed, which was afterwards found to be inconsistent either with other laws that remained in force, or with the public interest, was still held responsible for his conduct, and, if convicted within a year after his proposition had been carried, was liable to a punishment depending on the pleasure of his judges, and measured by their opinion of the motives or consequences of his act. They decided at once on the fact and on the law; and the grounds of their verdict might embrace the widest field connected with the foreign or domestic policy of the state. This jurisdiction enabled them at the same time to punish the individual, and warn others from following his example, and to reverse the proceedings of the legislative assembly, though they had been adopted on mature deliberation, with a full consciousness of their nature, and a strict adherence to all the legal forms.

Periodical
Revision of
the Laws.

Another important provision by which Solon endeavoured to secure the stability of his institutions, without depriving them of the flexibility necessary for continual adaptation to altered circumstances, consisted in the regulations by which he subjected them to a perpetual revision. It was a part of the ordinary business of the first assembly held every year, to receive the proposals that might be made by individual for a change in the existing laws. If these appeared sufficiently well grounded to merit further investigation, the third ordinary assembly of the year might direct the appointment of a committee of legislation¹ drawn by lot from the whole body of jurors, to compare the relative merits of the old law with that which was proposed to be substituted for it. The latter in the mean while was exposed in a conspicuous

¹ Γραφὰ παρανόμων.

² Νομόθεται.

place for the inspection of every citizen, to enable them to determine the numbers of the legislative committee, and the time to be allowed for their task, during which they received a stipend from the treasury. The committee proceeded according to the forms of a legal trial. Five advocates¹ were chosen to defend the old law; if they failed in making out their case, that which was approved came immediately into force, though its author was still responsible for his measure. But as this kind of reformation depended on the vigilance and sagacity of private citizens, Solon added a more certain provision for correcting defects and incongruities, which might creep in through error and inadvertency. The thesmotheses, who were naturally led by their judicial practice to notice the imperfections of the law, were officially authorised to review the whole code, and to refer all statutes which they deemed void, contradictory, or superfluous, to the legislative committee, in order that the law might be restored to its pristine simplicity.

The wisdom and ingenuity displayed in many of these arrangements must command our admiration; but it may appear surprising that so cautious and temperate a statesman as Solon should have thought it safe to commit such extensive powers to so numerous a body, taken indiscriminately and by chance from the great mass of the people, without any peculiar advantages of fortune and education, or any special training to prepare them for the execution of such apparently arduous and delicate tasks. He manifestly believed that no higher qualities were requisite for the discharge of the duties he assigned to them, than the ordinary degree of intelligence and integrity which might be expected in every citizen, aided by that practical experience, which it was the great object of

Simplicity
of Solon's
Institu-
tions.

¹ *Σύνδικοι.*

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his institutions to impart equally to all. Nothing seems more directly opposite to his views, and to the genius of his system, than the design attributed to him by Plutarch, who fancies that he wrapt his laws in studied obscurity, for the purpose of multiplying the causes of litigation. It is possible that their antique simplicity itself may have laid them more open to be wrested by chicanery, than those framed in ages of greater refinement. But the legislator himself assuredly thought their sense so plain, as to be within the reach of the commonest capacity. Hence he was not led to draw that nice distinction which is so familiar to us, between the province of the judge and the jury: hence every magistrate, within whose sphere of administration legal controversies might arise, was empowered to preside over the court to which they were referred: hence at Athens there was no class of men who dedicated themselves to the study of the law as a profession; the only persons who there corresponded in some degree to the Roman jurists, were the expounders of the traditional rules and forms concerning religious observances.¹ It was Solon's wish to accustom every citizen to consider himself as personally concerned in the maintenance of the laws: the best state, he is reported to have said, is that in which all who witness wrong are no less active in procuring its redress, and the punishment of the aggressor, than the sufferer himself. Hence he permitted and encouraged every citizen to come forward as prosecutor in cases affecting the interest of the state; and he multiplied the avenues to justice, by affording the means of choosing among a great variety of modes of proceeding. But how far removed he was from any design of cherishing litigation, sufficiently appears from his institution of the public arbitrators²; a body

Power of
the Tri-
bunals.

¹ 'Εξηγηταί. Tim. Plat. Lex. and Ruhnken.

² The διατηρηταί, on whom there is a useful treatise by Hudtwalcker

of persons annually created by lot, but who were required to have passed the age of sixty, before each of whom all private causes might be brought, and from whom, when they were selected by the common consent of the parties, no appeal was allowed. The motive which led Solon to direct that so great a number of jurors as composed each of the Heliastic courts, never amounting to less than several hundreds¹, should sit together on the same cause, must be referred to the view he took of them as representatives of the people. Hence to insure that the spirit with which they were animated should always be in accordance with the opinions and sentiments of the whole body, it might seem necessary to collect them in large masses. For the same reason they were free from all legal responsibility; and they were screened from disgrace, not only by the greatness of their numbers, but by the secrecy of their votes. It might reasonably have been expected that the danger arising from the certainty of impunity accompanying the exercise of almost absolute power, would have been in some measure compensated by the security which seemed to be afforded by the same causes against venality and corruption. We learn however that means were at length discovered of eluding these obstacles, and that the practice of bribery in the courts of justice was reduced to a regular system.²

Solon was the less apprehensive of any danger, as he had provided the state with a second anchor in the council or court of Areopagus. The Areopagus, or, as it was interpreted by an ancient legend, Mars' Hill³, was an eminence on the western side of the

The Areopagus.

¹ The ordinary number seems to have been 500 (Wachsmuth, ii. l. p. 315. has made a curious mistake in referring to Pollux, viii. 124.), but in some cases to have been as low as 400 and 200. See Böckh in a note at the end of Suevern's essay on the Clouds of Aristophanes.

² First contrived, according to Aristotle, by one Anytus. Harpocration *Δεινός*.

³ Meier (in an essay in the *Rhein. Mus.* ii. p. 266.) considers 'Απελος as equivalent to *φονικός*.

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Acropolis¹, which from time immemorial had been the seat of a highly revered court of criminal justice. It took cognizance of charges of wilful murder, maiming, poisoning, and arson. Its forms and modes of proceeding were peculiarly rigid and solemn. It was held in the open air², perhaps that the judges might not be polluted by sitting under the same roof with the criminals. The defendant was kept closely to the point at issue, and restrained from all rhetorical digressions and appeals to the passions. Both parties, before the pleadings began, were bound to affirm the truth of their allegations with the most awful oaths. But before sentence was passed, the culprit might withdraw out of its reach into voluntary exile.

It is not certain whether Solon introduced, or only retained the regulation which fixed the manner in which the court was henceforth composed. It was filled with the archons who had discharged their office with approved fidelity, and they held their seats for life. The venerable character of the court seems to have determined Solon to apply it to another purpose; and, without making any change in its original jurisdiction, to erect it into a supreme council, invested with a superintending and controlling authority, which extended over every part of the social system. He constituted it the guardian of the public morals and religion, to keep watch over the education and conduct of the citizens, and to protect the state from the disgrace or pollution of wantonness and profaneness. He armed it with extraordinary powers of interfering in pressing emergencies, to avert any sudden

¹ Hence the council was sometimes called the upper—*ἡ ἄνω βουλή*—to distinguish it from the Four Hundred.

² And, according to Lucian (Herm. 64. De Dom. 18.) and Clearchus in Athen. vi. p. 255. F., in the dark,—an absurdity which has been often repeated by modern writers, as if it rested on the best authority. Barthelemy, *Anacharsis*, c. xvii., observes: “La passion se peindroit vainement dans les yeux et dans les gestes de l’orateur: l’aréopage tient *presque* toutes ses séances pendant la nuit:” but he cites no authority even for this qualified statement.

and imminent danger which threatened the public safety. The nature of its functions rendered it scarcely possible precisely to define their limits; and Solon probably thought it best to let them remain in that obscurity which magnifies whatever is indistinct. The strength of the council rested on public opinion, not on the letter of the law. It could only exercise its trust with advantage, so long as it retained the confidence of its fellow-citizens; when that was lost it became time that its legal authority should cease.

We cannot here attempt to give any thing more than a very general outline of Solon's institutions, especially as we have still to notice some changes which before long were introduced in them. We therefore abstain from entering upon a survey of his civil and penal codes, our whole knowledge of which is scanty and fragmentary, and made up of particulars which are often obscure and disputable. We shall only remark on a few points connected with the progress of society, and the state of manners and education at Athens. Solon had neither the means, nor the inclination, to exercise the same degree of control over the pursuits and the domestic habits of his people, as the Spartan lawgiver had found to be practicable and politic. To the age of sixteen the education of the Athenian boy was left entirely to the care of his parents or guardians. During the next two years the state seems to have interfered, to compel his attendance at the gymnastic schools, where he was trained to manly exercises under masters publicly appointed¹, and subject to a discipline not much less severe than that of Sparta. At eighteen the youth might become master of his patrimony, and entered upon what may be considered either as the beginning of his military service, or his apprenticeship in arms. He was sent into the country, to keep watch and ward in the

Education
of the
Athenian
Youth.

¹ *Κόσμηται, σωφρονισταί, γυμνασταί, παιδότηριβαι.*

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XL.Regulations
concerning
Women.

towns and fortresses on the coast and frontier, and perform any other tasks which might be imposed upon him for the protection of Attica. It appears to have been on this occasion that he took the military oath by which he pledged himself never to disgrace his arms nor to desert his comrade; to combat to the last in defence of Attica, its altars, and its hearths; to leave his country not in worse, but in better plight than he found it; to obey the magistrates and the laws, and resist all attempts to subvert them; and to respect the religion of his ancestors. This service lasted two years; at the end of it he was admitted to share all the rights and duties of a citizen, for which the law had not prescribed a more advanced age, as they included that of voting and speaking in the general assembly. Till the end of his sixtieth year he was liable to be called out to military duty. Solon also made regulations for the government of the other sex. All their details are not perfectly intelligible, but their general object was to restrain the licence which he had hitherto enjoyed, and often abused to the detriment of the public morals and decency, and peculiar officers were appointed to enforce the observance of them.² They seem to prove that at this time at least the Attic women were far from being subject to the jealous seclusion, by which it has often been supposed that they were rigidly confined to their homes. They were forbidden to go abroad with more than three changes of apparel, and a stated quantity of provision to pass through the streets by night otherwise than in a carriage, and with a light carried before them, to disfigure their persons, and to wail with frantic and studied vehemence at funerals, and were still more closely restricted in their attendance on the obsequies of a neighbour.

¹ Pollux, viii. 105.² *Γυναικονόμοι*, or *γυναικοκόσμοι*, or *γυναικοκόμοι*, Pollux, viii. 112. From Philochorus in Athen. vi. p. 245., it seems that they acted as ministers of the Areopagus.

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XLThe Nau-
craries.

Solon appears first distinctly to have perceived the peculiar advantages of the maritime position of Attica, which had either been unnoticed, or studiously kept barren by the aristocratical government. He appears to have laid the foundation of the Attic navy, by charging the forty-eight sections, called *naucraries*¹, into which the tribes had been divided for financial purposes, each with the equipment of a galley, as well as with the mounting of two horsemen. He also gave active encouragement to trade and manufactures, and with this view invited foreigners, who brought with them any branch of useful industry, to settle in Attica, by the assurance of protection, and by larger privileges. These resident aliens² were still indeed, as they had always been, and were throughout Greece, distinguished by a broad line from the citizens. They were restrained from acquiring property in land: their burdens were heavier, and some peculiar to themselves. Each was compelled to purchase the shelter he received from the state, by the payment of a small annual sum³,—in default of which he was liable to be sold as a slave,—and to place himself under the guardianship of a citizen, who was his formal representative in the courts of justice.⁴ The aliens were also subject to some duties, which seemed designed to mark the inferiority of their condition. In certain solemn processions, as at the Panathenaic festival, they were compelled to bear a part of the sacred utensils, and their wives and daughters to pay a kind of servile attendance on the Attic women.⁵

The Metics.

¹ *Ναυκραρίαι*. That they existed before Solon, seems proved by the mention of them in Her. v. 71. But the name seems to have had nothing to do with navigation, but to be derived from *ναίω*. *Ναύκραρος* is another form of *ναύκληρος*, in the sense of a householder, as it is interpreted by Pollux, x. 20., as *ναῦλον* was used for the rent of a house, *ἐνοίκιον*; though it does not follow that *ναῦς* itself ever signified a house, as Hemsterhuis supposes. On their relation to the *τριττύες*, see Wachsmuth, l. i. p. 239., or Dr. Arnold, Thuc. i. p. 663.

² *Μέτοικοι*.

³ *Μετοίκιον*.

⁴ *Προστάτης*.

⁵ *Ælian*, vi. 1., and *Perizonius*, p. 409.

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This however may have been an innovation of a later period, when the value of the civic franchise had risen with the power of the state. Solon is said to have admitted many to the freedom of the city, and those who had earned the favour of the people might be rewarded with an immunity which relieved them from their peculiar burdens, and placed them, with respect to taxation, on a level with the citizens.¹ It may be considered as an indication of the same spirit in which Solon cherished commerce and manufactures, that he removed one of the restraints which had before been imposed on the alienation of property, and permitted the childless testator to leave his estate out of his own family and house, which anciently had an indefeasible claim to the vacant inheritance.

Slavery at
Athens.

It is not certain how far Solon may have deserved the praise of introducing the humane laws, which in Attica mitigated the lot of the slave. The peculiar causes which rendered his condition generally less wretched there than in most other parts of Greece, arose in later times. But he was early entitled to claim the protection of the law against the cruelty of a brutal master, who might be compelled to transfer him to another owner. As little are we able to determine whether the legislator expressly sanctioned, or only tacitly permitted, that horrible barbarity in the treatment of these unhappy beings, which is one of the foulest stains on the manners of Greece, though common to it with the rest of the ancient world, and one with which few nations of modern Europe have a right to reproach it. It is to be feared that he recognised and approved of the atrocious abuse to which the slave was subject in the Athenian courts, where, at the discretion of either of the parties, evidence might be wrung from him by torture, without even the

¹ They then became *ισοτέλεις*.

excuse of necessity, or of so much as a probable advantage; for though he might be willing to offer it freely, it was rejected as worthless, until it had been sifted by the rack. There is the less reason to doubt that in this respect Solon did not rise above the prejudices of his age and country, as even resident aliens were exposed to the same treatment, though in their case at least policy as well as humanity should have induced him to prohibit it.

Solon was not one of those reformers who dream that they have put an end to innovation, and that the changes they have wrought are exempt from the general condition of mutability. But the very provisions which he made for the continual revision and amendment of his laws seem to show the improbability of Plutarch's account: that he enacted them to remain in force for no more than a century. They were inscribed on wooden tablets, arranged in pyramidal blocks turning on an axis¹; which were kept at first in the Acropolis, but were afterwards for more convenient inspection brought down to the Prytaneum.²

According to Plutarch, Solon, after the completion of his work, found himself exposed to such incessant vexation from the questions of the curious, and the cavils of the discontented, that he sought and obtained permission to withdraw from Athens for ten years, and set out on the travels in which he visited Asia Minor, Cyprus and Egypt, collecting and diffusing knowledge, and every where leaving traces of his presence in visible monuments, or in the memories of men. But there is some difficulty in reconciling this

Solon again
leaves
Athens.

¹ *ἄξονες, κέρβεαι*. According to some authors, the *ἄξονες* contained the civil laws; *κέρβεαι*, the canons, or laws pertaining to religion. Plut. Sol. 25.

² Pollux, viii. 128. Ephialtes is said to have been the author of this measure. Harpocrat. *ὁ κέρβεον νόμος*. The Prytaneum in later times stood below the Acropolis, near the *ἀγορά*. Paus. i. 18. 3. But the most ancient must have stood on the Acropolis; and it seems to have been there that Solon's laws were deposited. Perhaps their removal was only a natural consequence of the erection of a new Prytaneum on the lower site in the time of Pericles.

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story with chronology, since it supposes him to have found Cræsus reigning in Lydia, who did not mount the throne within twenty or thirty years after, and the alleged occasion of the journey is very doubtful, though it is in substance the same with that assigned by Herodotus. It is probable that Solon remained for several years at Athens, to observe the practical effect of his institutions, and to second their operation by his personal influence. He was undoubtedly well aware, how little the letter of a political system can avail, until its practice has become familiar, and its principles have gained a hold on the opinions and feelings of the people, and that this must be a gradual process, and liable to interruption and disturbance. Hence it could not greatly disappoint or afflict him, to hear voices raised from time to time against himself, and to perceive that his views were not fully or generally comprehended. But he may at length have thought it prudent to retire for a season from the public eye, the better to maintain his dignity and popularity, and as he himself declared that age, while it crept upon him, still found him continually learning, we need not be surprised if at an unusually late period of life he set out on a long course of travels.

State of
Parties.

On his return he found that faction had been actively labouring to pervert and undo his work. The three parties of the Plain, the Coast, and the Highlands, had revived their ancient feuds, though the grounds of their mutual animosity could not have been the same as before, and perhaps were almost reduced to a name, which however would serve the purpose of their leaders as well as more solid objects of contention. The first of these parties was now headed by Lycurgus, the second by Megacles, a grandson of the archon who brought the stain and curse upon his house, the third by Pisistratus, son of Hippocrates, Solon's kinsman, and the friend of his

youth, whom we have already seen supporting Solon's measures by his eloquence and his military talents. Solon had early detected the secret designs of Pisistratus, and is said to have observed of him, that nothing but his ambition prevented him from displaying the highest qualities of a man and a citizen. But it was in vain that he endeavoured to avert the danger which he saw threatened by the struggle of the factions, and used all his influence to reconcile their chiefs. This was the more difficult because the views of all were perhaps equally selfish, and none was so conscious of his own sincerity as to rely on the professions of the others. Pisistratus is said to have listened respectfully to Solon's remonstrances; but he waited only for an opportunity of executing his project. He had resolved to renew the enterprise of Cylon, in which his illustrious birth, eminent abilities, and winning manners, and the popularity he had acquired by his munificence toward the poorer citizens, gave him a better prospect of success. His schemes also were more artfully laid. When they appeared to be ripe for action, he was one day drawn in a chariot into the public place, his own person and his mules disfigured with recent wounds, inflicted, as the sequel proved, by his own hand, which he showed to the multitude, while he told them that on his way into the country he had narrowly escaped a band of assassins, who had been employed to murder the friend of the people. While the indignation of the crowd was fresh, and from all sides assurances were heard that they would defend him against his enemies, an assembly was called by his partisans, in which one of them, named Aristo, came forward with a motion, that a guard of fifty citizens, armed with clubs, should be decreed to protect the person of Pisistratus. Solon, the only man who ventured to oppose this proposition, warned the assembly of its pernicious consequences.

But as all those who were not blind to the danger shrank from facing it, his arguments were unavailing, and the body-guard was decreed. The smallness of its numbers, and the simplicity of its weapon, may have seemed sufficient security that it would be applied to no other purpose than that of necessary defence. But the people which eagerly passed the decree, did not keep a jealous eye upon the mode of its execution; and Pisistratus took advantage of it to raise a force, which enabled him to make himself master of the citadel. Perhaps his partisans represented this as a necessary precaution, to guard it against the enemies of the people. Megacles and the Alcmaeonids left the city. Solon, after an ineffectual attempt to rouse his countrymen against the growing power which was making such rapid strides toward tyranny, is said to have taken down his arms, and laid them in the street before his door, as a sign that he had made his last effort in the cause of liberty and the laws. Lycurgus and his party seem to have submitted quietly for a time to the authority of Pisistratus, waiting, as the event showed, for a more favourable opportunity of overthrowing him.

The usurper was satisfied with the substance of power, and endeavoured, as much as possible, to prevent his dominion from being seen and felt. He made no visible changes in the constitution, but suffered the ordinary magistrates to be appointed in the usual manner, the tribunals to retain their authority, and the laws to hold their course. In his own person he affected the demeanour of a private citizen, and displayed his submission to the laws by appearing before the Areopagus to answer a charge of murder, which however the accuser did not think fit to prosecute.¹

¹ An anecdote is related in Diodorus (*Mai Vet. Script.* ii. p. 28.) of his forbearance towards a youth who had taken the liberty of saluting his beautiful daughter as she was walking in a public procession. Plutarch, *Apophth.* gives a different version of the story.

He continued to show honour to Solon, to court his friendship, and ask his advice, which Solon did not think himself bound to withhold, where it might be useful to his country, lest he should appear to sanction the usurpation which he had denounced. He probably looked upon the government of Pisistratus, though at variance with the principles of his constitution, as a less evil than would have ensued from the success of either of the other parties; and even as a good, so far as it prevented them from acquiring a similar preponderance. Still, it must have been with mournful feelings that he viewed a state of things, in which such an alternative could seem the best; and certainly can have set little value on a liberty which had no security but the moderation of one man. It is not certain how long he survived this inroad upon his institutions: one account¹, apparently the most authentic, places his death in the year following that in which the revolution took place (B. C. 559). The leisure of his retirement from public life was to the last devoted to the Muses; and, if we might trust Plato's assertions on such subjects, he was engaged at the time of his death in the composition of a great poem, in which he had designed to describe the flourishing state of Attica before the Ogygian flood, and to celebrate the wars which it waged with the inhabitants of the vast island which afterwards sank in the Atlantic Ocean. On the fragments of this poem preserved in the family, Plato, himself a descendant of Solon, professes to have founded a work which he left unfinished, but in which he had meant to exhibit his imaginary state in life and action. It is certainly not improbable that Solon, when the prospects of his country became gloomy, and his own

Solon's
Death.

¹ That of Phanias of Lesbos. Heraclides Pont. asserted that he lived much longer. Phanias seems to have been more accurate in his dates, and his account is in itself the most probable. See Clinton's F. H. ii. p. 301.

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political career was closed, indulged his imagination with excursions into an ideal world, where he may have raised a social fabric as unlike as possible to the reality which he had before his eyes at home, and perhaps suggested by what he had seen or heard in Egypt. It is only important to observe, that the fact if admitted, can lead to no safe conclusions as to his abstract political principles, and can still less be allowed to sway our judgment on the design and character of his institutions.

Expulsion
and Restor-
ation of
Pisistratus.

Pisistratus did not long retain his power. The party of Lycurgus, discovering that singly it was not strong enough to attack him, entered into a coalition with the exiled Alcmaeonids, and their united force compelled him to leave Athens. But they had soon occasion to perceive how formidable he continued to be after this defeat; for when his property was exposed to public sale no one could be found bold enough to bid for it but Callias, an ancestor of the celebrated Alcibiades.¹ The two factions had not sooner accomplished the object of their temporary union, than they began to quarrel for the prize which they had wrested from their common enemy, and at the end of five years, Megacles, finding himself the weakest, made overtures of reconciliation to Pisistratus, and offered to bestow on him the hand of his daughter Cæsyra², and to assist him in recovering the station he had lost. As Herodotus describes the bargain, Megacles sent to know whether Pisistratus would take his daughter, on condition of being reinstated in the tyranny. Megacles was probably desirous of the match, because the old stain still clung to his house, and he hoped that it might be effaced by the lustre of the new alliance. Pisistratus accepted the proposal, though he was now long past the prime

¹ Her. vi. 121.

² Schol. Aristoph. Nub. 49.

of life, and the father of three sons and a daughter by a former marriage. When the contract was concluded, the two parties concerted a plan for executing the main condition, the restoration of Pisistratus. For this purpose Herodotus supposes them to have devised an artifice, which excites his astonishment at the simplicity of the people on whom it was practised; and which appears to him to degrade the national character of the Greeks, who, he observes, had of old been distinguished from the barbarians by their superior sagacity. Yet in itself the incident seems neither very extraordinary, nor a proof that the contrivers reckoned on an enormous measure of credulity in their countrymen. In one of the Attic villages they found a woman, Phya by name, of unusually high stature, and comely form and features. Having arrayed her in a complete suit of armour, and instructed her to maintain a carriage becoming the part she was to assume, they placed her in a chariot, and sent heralds before her to the city, who proclaimed that Athene herself was bringing back Pisistratus to her own citadel, and exhorted the Athenians to receive the favourite of the goddess with good-will. Pisistratus rode by the woman's side. When they reached the city, the Athenians, according to Herodotus, believing that they saw the goddess in person, adored her, and received Pisistratus. This story would indeed be singular, if we consider the expedient in the light of a stratagem, on which the confederates relied for overcoming the resistance which they might otherwise have expected from their adversaries. But it seems quite as probable, that the pageant was only designed to add extraordinary solemnity to the entrance of Pisistratus, and to suggest the reflection, that it was by the special favour of Heaven he had been so unexpectedly restored. The new coalition must have rendered all resistance hopeless. As the

Personation
of Athene.

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procession passed, the populace no doubt gazed, some in awe, all in wonder; but there is no reason to think that the result would have been different if they had all seen through the artifice. Pisistratus is said to have rewarded Phya for her services, by giving her in marriage to his son Hipparchus—a kind of recompence which increases the improbability of the view which Herodotus takes of the story, but which, as we know nothing with certainty of her previous rank¹, may have been perfectly natural on the other.

Second Ex-
pulsion and
Restoration
of Pisis-
tratus.

Pisistratus, restored to power, nominally performed his part of the compact by marrying the daughter of Megacles; but it was soon discovered that he had no intention of really uniting his blood with a family which was commonly thought to be struck with an everlasting curse, and that he treated his young wife as one only in name. The Alcmaeonids were indignant at the affront, and at the breach of faith, and once more they determined to make common cause with the party of Lycurgus. Once more the balance inclined against Pisistratus, and, unable to resist the combined force of his adversaries, he retired into exile to Eretria in Eubœa. Here he deliberated with his sons whether he should not abandon all thoughts of returning to Attica. They appear to have been divided in their wishes or opinions, but Hippias, the eldest, prevailed on his father again to make head against his enemies. He possessed lands on the river Strymon in Thrace, which yielded a large revenue, and his interest was strong in several Greek cities, especially at Thebes and Argos. He now exerted it to the utmost to gather contributions toward his projected enterprise; the Thebans distinguished themselves by the liberality of their subsidies. By the end of ten years he had completed his preparations; a body of

¹ According to Athen. xlii. p. 609., she was a garland-seller. If so, it is hard to believe that Pisistratus married her to his son.

mercenaries was brought to him from Argos, and Lygdamis, one of the most powerful men in the isle of Naxos, came to his aid, with all the troops and money he could raise. In the eleventh or twelfth year after his last expulsion he set sail from Eretria, and landed on the plain of Marathon, to recover his sovereignty by open force. The two adverse parties were firmly united by their common interest, and the deadly hatred of the Alcmaeonids; but their government was not popular, and Pisistratus had many friends in the country and in Athens, who, on his arrival, flocked to his camp. His enemies, who had viewed his preparations with supine indifference, now hastily collected their forces, and marched to meet him. But they showed as little of vigilance and activity in the field, as of forethought in their counsels. The two armies were encamped near each other, and not far from Athens. At noon, when the Athenians from the city, after their meal, had turned some to dice, others to sleep, Pisistratus suddenly fell upon the camp, killed many, and put the rest to a complete rout. This first success he followed up by a step which showed a spirit worthy of his fortune. Instead of pushing his troops forward, to deal slaughter among the flying enemy, he sent his sons on horseback to overtake the fugitives, and proclaim a general amnesty, on condition of their dispersing quietly to their homes. The leaders of the hostile factions now found themselves deserted by all but their most zealous adherents, who, with them, abandoned the city, and left Pisistratus undisputed master of Athens.

What he had so hardly won, he prepared to hold henceforward with a firmer grasp. He no longer relied on the affections of the common people, but took a body of foreign mercenaries into constant pay; and seizing the children of some of the principal citizens,

His foreign
and domestic
Policy.

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who had not made their escape, and whom he suspected of being ill disposed toward him, he sent them to Naxos, which he had reduced under the power of his friend Lygdamis, to be kept as hostages. Among the exiles was Cimon, the father of the celebrated Miltiades. He afterwards obtained permission to return to Athens, on condition of transferring to Pisistratus the honour of a victory which he had gained in the chariot race at Olympia.¹ He appears to have maintained a considerable naval force; for, besides the conquest of Naxos, he engaged in another expedition in a more distant quarter, the object of which may have been partly to provide a place of retreat for his family against any new turn of fortune, but which was no doubt principally designed to increase his reputation and popularity at home. He revived the claim of the Athenians to the town of Sigeum on the Hellespont; which was then in the possession of the Mitylenæans, but to which the Athenians pretended a title grounded on their supposed share in the Trojan war. Already, about half a century before, it had been the subject of a war between the same cities, memorable for the victory which the sage Pittacus gained in single combat, by a new device², over the Athenian general Phryno, and for a defeat of the Mitylenæans, in which the poet Alcæus left his shield a trophy to the enemy. This war had been terminated by the mediation of Periander, the ruler of Corinth, who awarded Sigeum to Athens. Pisistratus now took it from the Mitylenæans, and committed it to the keeping of his bastard son Hegesistratus, who successfully defended it against their long-continued attacks. As the ruler of Athens, the chief city of the Ionian name, Pisistratus undertook the purification of Delos, which was

¹ See Vol. I. p. 443.

² Pittacus came, it is said, into the field, armed with a casting net, a trident, and a dagger. He first entangled, and then despatched his antagonist.

enjoined by an oracle, and was effected by the removal of all the bodies that had been buried within sight of the temple of Apollo.¹ At home he still preserved the forms of Solon's institutions, and courted popularity by munificent largesses, and by throwing open his gardens to the poorer citizens.² At the same time he tightened the reins of government, and he appears to have made use of the authority of the Areopagus, to maintain a rigorous police. He enforced Solon's law, which required every citizen to give an account of his means of gaining a subsistence, and punished idleness; and hence by some he was supposed to have been the author of it. It afforded him a pretext for removing from the city a great number of the poorer sort, who had no regular employment, and for compelling them to engage in rural occupations, in which however he assisted the indigent with his purse.³ The same policy prompted him, no less perhaps than his love for the arts, to adorn Athens with many useful or magnificent works. Among the latter was a temple of Apollo, and one dedicated to the Olympian Jove, of which he only lived to complete the substructions, and which remained unfinished for 700 years, exciting the wonder, and sometimes the despair of posterity, by the vastness of the design, in which it surpassed every other that the ancient world ever raised in honour of the father of the gods. Among the monuments in which splendour and usefulness were equally combined, was the Lyceum, a garden at a short distance from Athens, sacred to the Lycian Apollo, where stately buildings, destined for the exercises of the Athenian

His Encouragement of Art and Literature.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 104.

² Theopompus ap. Athen. xii. 44. Nitzsch, *De Histor. Homeri*, i. p. 158. observes: *Idem auctor quod ap. Athen. xii. 533. A. in Pisistratum eandem liberalitatis laudem confert, qua Cimon prædia aut tribulibus aut omnibus aperuisse fertur, id non ad Cimonis similitudinem fictum esse puto, sed ita potius mihi persuadeo; viros publici favoris studiosos multa fecisse, quæ prævisset Pisistratus.*

³ Ælian. ix. 25. says he supplied them with cattle and seed.

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XI.

youth, rose amidst shady groves, which became one of the most celebrated haunts of philosophy, and the fountain of Callirhoe, which, from the new channels in which Pisistratus distributed its waters, was afterwards called the fountain of the Nine Springs.¹ To defray the expense of these and his other undertakings, he laid a tithe on the produce of the land: an impost which seems to have excited great discontent in the class affected by it, and, so far as it was applied to the public buildings, was in fact a tax on the rich for the employment of the poor; but which, if we might trust a late and obscure writer, was only revived by Pisistratus after the example of the ancient kings of Attica.² He is also believed to have been the author of a wise and beneficent law, which Solon however is said to have suggested, for supporting citizens disabled in war at the public expense. According to a tradition once very generally received, posterity has been indebted to him for a benefit greater than any which he conferred on his contemporaries, in the preservation of the Homeric poems, which till now had been scattered in unconnected rhapsodies. After every abatement that can be required in this story for misunderstanding and exaggeration, we cannot doubt that Pisistratus at least made a collection of the poet's works, superior in extent and accuracy to all that had preceded it, and thus certainly diffused the knowledge of them more widely among his countrymen, perhaps preserved something that might have been lost to future generations. In either case, he may claim the same

¹ Ἐννεάκρουνος.

² The letter of Pisistratus to Solon in Diog. Laert. i. 53. There is an anecdote on this subject in Diodorus Mai ii. p. 28. Pisistratus sees a man at work on some poor rugged ground on Hymettus, and sends to inquire what his land yields him. The man answers: toil and trouble (κακὰς ὁδύνας), but that he does not mind, so long as Pisistratus has his share of the produce (τούτων τὸ μέρος Πεισιστράτης διδόναι). Pisistratus laughs, and takes the tax off from his land, — whence the proverb οἱ σφακελοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἀτέλειαν. Another connected with this part of the history of Pisistratus will be found in the *Paræmiographi Græci*, Gaisf. p. 46.

merit as a lover of literature: and this was not a taste which derived any part of its gratification from the vanity of exclusive possession. He is said to have been the first person in Greece who collected a library, and to have earned a still higher praise, by the genuine liberality with which he imparted its contents to the public.¹ On the whole, though we cannot approve of the steps by which he mounted to power, we must own that he made a princely use of it; and may believe that, though under his dynasty Athens could never have risen to the greatness she afterwards attained, she was indebted to his rule for a season of repose, during which she gained much of that strength which she finally unfolded. Pisistratus retained his sovereignty to the end of his life, and died at an advanced age, thirty-three years after his first usurpation (B. C. 527). His power was so firmly rooted, that his sons, Hippias, Hipparchus, and Thessalus, succeeded him in the government without any opposition. The authority of Thucydides seems sufficient to prove, that Hippias was the eldest, though his reasons are not of themselves convincing, and the current opinion in his own day gave the priority to Hipparchus.² As the eldest, Hippias would take his father's place at the head of affairs; but the three brothers appear to have lived in great unanimity together, and to have co-operated with little outward distinction in the administration of the state. Their characters are described as very different from each other. Hippias seems to have possessed the largest share of the qualities of a statesman. Hipparchus inherited his father's literary taste; but he was addicted to pleasure, and perhaps to amusements not becoming the dignity of his station³: of Thessalus

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XL.

B. C. 527.

He dies and
is succeeded
by his Sons.

¹ Aul. Gell. N. A. vi. 17. Nitzsch, *De Hist. Hom.* i. p. 157.

² Kreuser, *Rhaps.* p. 209., assumes that Thucydides is mistaken, without condescending to assign any reason.

³ It is probable that what Idomeneus, in Athen. xii. p. 532., related of both the elder brothers applied, so far as it was well founded, principally to Hipparchus. Heracl. P. 1. calls him παιδιώδης, as well as ἐρωτικός and φιλόμουσος.

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XL.

Govern-
ment of the
Pisistratids.

the youngest we hear only that he was a high-spirited youth.¹ The successors of Pisistratus for some years trod in his steps, and prosecuted his plans. They seem to have directed their attention to promote the internal prosperity of the country, and the cultivation of letters and arts. One of their expedients for the latter purpose, the credit of which seems to have belonged principally to Hipparchus, was to erect a number of Hermæ or stone busts of Mercury along the side of the roads leading from the capital, inscribed on one side with an account of the distance which it marked, on the other with a moral sentence in verse², probably the composition of Hipparchus himself, though he often received the first poets of the age under his roof. To him also is ascribed the establishment of the order in which the Homeric poems continued in after-times to be publicly recited at the Panathenaic festival. The brothers imitated the sage policy of their father, in dropping the show of power as much as was consistent with a prudent regard to securing the substance. Yet it seems that they were not scrupulous about the means they employed to get rid of persons who had incurred their resentment, or roused their jealousy. For Herodotus relates as a notorious fact, that Cimon, after he had been restored, as we have seen, by Pisistratus, was murdered by assassins who were hired by his sons. They kept up a standing force of foreign mercenaries³; but they made no change in the laws or the forms of the constitution, only taking care to fill the most important offices with their own friends. They even reduced the tax imposed by Pisistratus to a twentieth, and, without laying on any fresh burdens,

¹ Heracl. P. *ῥασις*.

² Pseudo-Plato in Hipparch. and Harpocratio. *Τρικέφαλος*.

³ Who seem according to Aristotle (in the Scholiast of Aristoph. Lys. 664.) to have been distinguished by an uniform from which they acquired the name of Wolves' Feet (*Λυκόποδες*).

provided for the exigencies of the state, and continued the great works which their father had begun. The language of a later writer¹, who speaks of their dominion as having recalled the happiness of the golden age, seems almost justified by the sober praise of Thucydides, when he says that these tyrants most diligently cultivated virtue and wisdom. The country was flourishing, the people, if not perfectly contented, was certainly not impatient of the yoke, and their rule seemed likely to last for at least another generation, when an event occurred which at once changed the whole aspect of the government, and led to its premature overthrow.

The names of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the persons who indirectly brought about this revolution, have been immortalised by the ignorant or prejudiced gratitude of the Athenians; in any other history they would perhaps have been consigned to oblivion, and would certainly never have become the themes of panegyric. Aristogeiton was a citizen of the middle rank; Harmodius a youth distinguished by the comeliness of his person; they were both sprung from a house supposed to have been of Phœnician origin, were perhaps remotely allied to one another by blood, and were united by ties of the closest intimacy. The youth had received an outrage from Hipparchus, which, in a better state of society, would have been deemed the grossest that could be offered to him: it roused however not so much his resentment as the fears of his friend, lest Hipparchus should abuse his power, to repeat and aggravate the insult. But Hipparchus, whose pride had been wounded by the conduct of Harmodius, contented himself with a less direct mode of revenge, an affront aimed not at his person, but at the honour of his family. By his orders

Harmodius
and Aris-
togeiton.

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the sister of Harmodius was invited to take part in a procession, as bearer of one of the sacred vessels. When she presented herself in her festal dress, she was publicly rejected and dismissed, as unworthy of the honour. This insult stung Harmodius to the quick, and kindled the indignation of Aristogeiton: they resolved not only to wash it out in the blood of the offender, but to engage in the desperate enterprise, which had already been suggested by different motives to the thoughts of Aristogeiton, of overthrowing the ruling dynasty. They communicated their plan to a few friends, who promised their assistance, but they hoped that, as soon as the first blow was struck, they should be joined by numbers, who would joyfully seize the opportunity of recovering their freedom. The conspirators fixed on the festival of the Great Panathenæa, as the most convenient season for effecting their purpose. The festival was celebrated with a procession, in which the citizens marched armed with spears and shields, and was the only occasion on which in time of peace they could assemble under arms without exciting suspicion. It was agreed that Harmodius and Aristogeiton should give the signal by stabbing Hippias, while their friends kept off his guards, and that they should trust to the general disposition in favour of liberty for the further success of their undertaking. When the day came the conspirators armed themselves with daggers, which they concealed in the myrtle boughs which were carried on this occasion.¹ But while Hippias, surrounded by his guards, was in the suburb called the Ceramicus, directing the order of the procession, one of the conspirators was observed to go up to him — for he was easy of access to all — and to enter

¹ Perhaps by a part of the younger citizens, as olive branches were by the old men — though it does not appear that there is any mention of this custom except in the famous drinking song, *ἐν μύρτου κλαδί τὸ ξίφος φορήσω*, κ. τ. λ. Athen. xv. p. 695. B.

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XL.B. C. 514.
Murder of
Hipparchus.

into familiar conversation with him. The two friends on seeing this, concluded that they were betrayed, and that they had no hope left but of revenge. They instantly rushed into the city, and meeting with Hipparchus, killed him before his guards could come up to his assistance. They however arrived in time to revenge his death upon Harmodius: Aristogeiton escaped for the moment through the crowd, but was afterwards taken. When the news was brought to Hippias, instead of proceeding to the scene of his brother's murder, he advanced with a composed countenance toward the armed procession, which was yet ignorant of the event, and as if he had some grave discourse to address to them, desired them to lay aside their weapons, and meet him at an appointed place. He then ordered his guards to seize the arms, and to search every one for those which he might have concealed upon his person. All who were found with daggers were arrested, together with those whom on any other grounds he suspected of disaffection.

The fate of Aristogeiton may be easily imagined: he was put to death, according to some authors, after torture had been applied, to wring from him the names of his accomplices.¹ It is said that he revenged himself by accusing the truest friends of Hippias, and that a girl of low condition, named Leæna, whose only crime was to have been the object

¹ Though the torture is expressly mentioned only by late writers, as Polyænus, Justin, and Seneca, the fact is strongly confirmed, if not fully established, by the emphatic expression of Thucydides: *he was not gently treated* (οὐ ῥαδίως διετέθη): which would be absurd if it only meant that the assassin was not caressed by the friends of Hipparchus. We can only smile at the partiality which could suggest such a construction. But we hardly know whether even partiality for a despot ought to be considered as a sufficient excuse for so gross a misrepresentation, as that by which Thucydides has been made to say that Aristogeiton was *taken by the people*, when he distinctly informs us that it was owing to the concourse of the people that he was not at first taken by the guards: τοὺς δορυφόρους τὸ αὐτίκα διαφεύγει ὁ Ἀ., ξυνδραμόντος τοῦ ὄχλου, καὶ ὕστερον ληφθεὶς οὐ ῥαδίως διετέθη. If it rested on the utterly unauthorised conjecture of Portus, who proposed to insert δι' after ξυνδραμόντος, why was not the reader apprised that this reading was at least uncertain?

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XLTyranny of
Hippias.

of his affection, underwent like treatment; she was afterwards celebrated for the constancy with which she endured the most cruel torments. It was now seen how little the happiness of a people is worth, when it depends on the virtue and wisdom of one man. Hippias had displayed both qualities in an eminent degree so long as he had no injury to avenge, and no fears for his personal safety. On a sudden, from a mild, affable, and beneficent prince, he was turned into a suspicious, stern, and cruel tyrant, who regarded all his subjects as secret enemies, and instead of attempting to conciliate them, aimed only at cowing them by rigour. But as, the more conscious he was of deserving their hatred, the less secure he could feel from its effects, he seems to have henceforth considered Attica as a domain held by a precarious tenure, and to have thought only of profiting as much as possible by his uncertain possession. We now hear of frequent executions, of extraordinary imposts, and of artifices by which he filled his treasury at the expense of all classes of the people. At the same time he entered into a foreign alliance, not so much with the view of strengthening his power, as of providing a place of retreat for himself or his family, whenever the reverse which he foreboded should befall him. He gave his daughter Archedicé in marriage to the son of Hippoclus, tyrant of Lampascus, a match which Thucydides looks upon as so great a disparagement, that he thinks Hippias could never have submitted to it, if he had not believed he should soon need an asylum. Hippoclus stood high in the favour of the Persian king Darius, and Hippias already began to turn his views toward that quarter.

Machina-
tions of the
no-

He was threatened not only by the discontent of the people at home, but from without by the machinations of powerful enemies, who were instigated

by the strongest motives, both of interest and resentment, to spare no effort for his destruction. The banished Alcmaeonids were not the less formidable, because after the last breach between the houses Pisistratus or his successors had confiscated their estates in Attica, and had caused their mansions to be razed to the ground, and their sepulchres to be demolished.¹ They had secured so many resources abroad, that they were able to command every kind of assistance that money could purchase. After the death of Hipparchus the growing unpopularity of Hippias had encouraged them to renew their attempts at a revolution; but though they had taken possession of a stronghold on the frontier of Attica², they were repulsed by his energy and vigilance with considerable loss. They now looked round them for foreign aid, and the influence they had acquired over the Delphic oracle enabled them to obtain it. The temple at Delphi had been destroyed some years before by a fire; probably accidental, but which was imputed to the Pisistratids by their enemies, and the Alcmaeonids had contracted with the Amphictyons to rebuild it on certain terms. With politic liberality they executed their undertaking in a style more magnificent than the letter of the agreement prescribed, and in the front of the temple substituted Parian marble for the less costly stone of which the whole was to have been built. This munificence, while it raised their reputation throughout Greece, secured the useful gratitude of the Delphians, who were the chief gainers by it, and Cleisthenes, now the head of the house, found means of making the Pythian priestess the instrument of his designs. By his direction, as often

¹ Isocrates De Big. § 29.

² Lipsydrium. Aristotle described it as on the heights of Parnes (*ὑπεράνω Πάρνης*). Schol. Aristoph. Lysistr. 665.) Herodotus as *ὑπὲρ Παιονίδων* v. 62., which—whether this or *Παιονιδῶν* be the true reading—seems to relate to a place which was a family seat of the Pæonids who were kinsmen of the Alcmaeonids. Paus. ii. 18. 9.

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XLThe Spar-
tans invade
Attica.

as any Spartans came to consult the oracle, whether on public or private affairs, they received but one answer, bidding them restore Athens to freedom. These repeated exhortations at length produced the desired effect on the Spartans, whose reverence for the oracle was unbounded, and, though the family of Pisistratus was connected with them by the ties of public hospitality, they determined to send an army to expel it. This force was placed under the command of Anchimolius, a man of high reputation, though not of the royal blood, and was transported over sea to Attica, and landed at the port of Phalerum. But the Athenian government had received intelligence of their meditated expedition, and had sent to Thessaly, with which it had formed an alliance, for succours. The Thessalians sent a thousand horse under Cineas, whom Herodotus entitles king, and who was probably either tagus, or one of their most powerful nobles. He routed the Spartans, slew their commander, and drove them to their ships. The Spartans now sent out a greater force under their king Cleomenes, to invade Attica by land. This time the Thessalian cavalry was defeated, and though their loss was small they immediately abandoned their allies, and returned home.¹ Hippias was unable to face Cleomenes in the field, and even to defend the city, but he maintained himself in the citadel, which was well supplied with stores. The Spartans, who were not prepared for a siege, would have retired in a few days, if Hippias had not, by an excess of precaution, afforded them an unexpected triumph. He ordered his children to be conveyed out of the country to a place of safety; on their way they fell into the hands of the enemy, and he could only redeem them on condition of quitting

¹ This seems to be the battle to which Andocides alludes, De Myst. 106., as fought ἐν Πιπληρίᾳ, in which the patriots were headed by his great-grandfather Leogoras and Charias his father-in-law.

Attica within five days. In the fourth year after his brother's death (B. C. 510) Hippias set sail for Asia, where he fixed his residence for a time in his hereditary principality of Sigeum. After his departure many severe measures were taken against his adherents, who appear to have been for a long time after a formidable party. They were punished or repressed, some by death, others by exile or by the loss of their political privileges.¹ The family of the tyrants was condemned to perpetual banishment, and appears to have been excepted from the most comprehensive decrees of amnesty passed in later times.² On the other hand the fortunate tyrannicides received almost heroic honours. They were either the first or among the first mortals to whom statues were erected at the public expense as the reward of virtue.³ Their names never ceased to be repeated with affectionate admiration in the convivial songs of Athens, which assigned them a place in the islands of the Blessed by the side of Achilles and Tydides⁴: and when an orator wished to suggest the idea of the highest merit and of the noblest services to the cause of liberty, he never failed to remind his hearers of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. It is probable enough that much of this enthusiasm was spurious and artificial as well as misplaced, and that the popular hatred was studiously inflamed against the exiled family by their personal enemies and political rivals. But still these efforts would have been vain, had not Hippias in the latter years of his government laid a real foundation for the obloquy which indiscriminately overwhelmed his own faults and merits, and those of his house.

The expulsion of the Pisistratids left the democratical party which had first raised them to power

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XI.

B. C. 510.
Hippias
quits At-
tica.

¹ Andocides De Myst. § 106.

² Andoc. De Myst. § 78.

³ Plin. N. H. xxxv. 9. See Wagner ad Chronicon Parium, ep. 55.

⁴ Athen. xv. p. 695.

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XI.

B. C. 508.

Institutions
of Cleis-
thenes.

without a leader. The Alcmaeonids had always been considered as its adversaries, though they were nevertheless opposed to the faction of the nobles, which seemed at this time to have been headed by Isagoras. It was still powerful, not only in its wide domains, but in the influence derived from birth, which was strengthened by the various ties, civil and religious that united the old subdivisions of the tribes. Cleisthenes found himself, as his party had always been unable to cope with it; he resolved therefore to shift his ground, and to attach himself to that popular cause, which Pisistratus had used as the stepping stone of his ambition. His aims however were not confined to a temporary advantage over his rivals; he planned an important change in the constitution which should for ever break the power of his whole order, by dissolving some of the main links by which their sway was secured. For this purpose, having gained the confidence of the commonalty and obtained the sanction of the Delphic oracle, he abolished the four ancient tribes, and made a fresh geographical division of Attica into ten new tribes, each of which bore a name derived from some Attic hero. The ten tribes were subdivided into districts of various extent called *demes*, each containing a town or village, as its chief place. According to Herodotus there were at first but a hundred of these townships, ten in each tribe: but as in later times they amounted to upwards of 170, and there are no distinct traces left in history of the change by which so great an addition was made to the original number, the accuracy of this statement has been doubted. On the other hand it has been thought to afford ground for concluding that the tribes of Cleisthenes did not include the whole of Attica.¹ This is one of the questions which depends entirely on the view we take of the ancient

¹ Niebuhr, ii. p. 806. See Appendix I.

tribes. But it seems to be at least possible that changes may have taken place after the time of Cleisthenes in the interior of Attica, which made it convenient to divide many of the demes.¹ It is more difficult to explain the origin of the transposition, through which demes belonging to the same tribe are found at opposite extremities of Attica. Cleisthenes appears to have preserved the ancient phratries²; but as they were now left insulated by the abolition of the tribes to which they belonged, they lost all political importance, and retained no other office than that of watching over the legitimate succession of their members, and registering their title to their hereditary civil rights. All the political functions previously discharged by the subdivisions of the ancient tribes, particularly those connected with the demands of the state on the property of the citizens³, were now transferred to the newly incorporated townships, each of which was governed by its local magistrate, the *demarch*, and held its assemblies for the transaction of its peculiar affairs, and for ascertaining and recording the number of its members. It was necessary for every citizen, at least for all who were not natives of Athens itself, to be entered in the register of some township, which was the foundation of all his political rights and duties, as admission into the phratries was of those which belonged to him in his private capacity. Cleisthenes at the same time increased the strength of the commonalty by making a great many new citizens, and he is said to have enfranchised not only aliens — and these both residents and adventurers from abroad — but slaves⁴: a step,

¹ See Appendix I.

² For a contrary opinion of Platner, see Appendix I.

³ The *nameraries*.

⁴ Aristot. Pol. iii. 1. 10. πολλοὺς ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους. As this reading gives no sense, most of the commentators insert another καὶ after δούλους. But it seems clear that the slaves could not have been mentioned between the two classes of free foreigners. Niebuhr transposes καὶ δούλους after

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to which it would seem he could only have been urged by the exigencies of his position, which may have forced him to purchase such support on such terms ; and in that case it proves the strong hold which the opposite party kept on a great body of the people, and which it was the object of his other measures to loosen.

We are too little acquainted with the machinery of the system which Cleisthenes broke up, to form a very distinct notion of the importance of his innovation : but we know enough to convince us that it was not, as Herodotus imagined, capricious, or prompted by the mere love of change. It had the effect of transforming the commonalty into a new body, furnished with new organs, and breathing a new spirit, which was no longer subject to the slightest control from any influence, save that of wealth and personal qualities, in the old nobility. The whole frame of the state was reorganised to correspond with the new division of the country. The Senate of the Four Hundred was increased to Five Hundred, that fifty might be drawn from each tribe, and the rotation of the presidency was adapted to this change, the fifty councillors of each tribe filling that office for thirty-five, or thirty-six, days in succession, and nine councillors being elected one from each of the other tribes to preside in the Council, and the Assembly of the People, which was now called regularly four times in the month, certain business being assigned to each meeting. The *Heliaea* was also distributed into ten courts : and the same division henceforth prevailed in most of the public offices, though the number of the archons remained unchanged. To Cleisthenes also is ascribed the formal institution of the *ostracism*¹,

μετοίκους, and interprets the account in a sense conformable to his peculiar hypothesis (II. p. 305. note 2.) Goettling would either strike out *δοῦλους*, or change it to *πολλούς*.

¹ *Ælian*. V. H. xlii. 23. and *Perizonius*.

a summary process, by which the people was enabled to rid itself of any citizen who had made himself formidable or suspicious, without any proof, or even imputation, of guilt, and though his influence was the legitimate fruit of superior ability or merit. Solon had enacted that no law relating to the rights of individual citizens (in the nature of the Roman *privilegium*), should be passed by less than a majority of 6000 voices. But the power tacitly conferred by this restriction was now expressly defined or enlarged, so as to permit not merely an absolute but a relative majority of the same number, by secret votes, to send any obnoxious citizen into exile for ten years. Such an expedient marks the weak and unsettled state of a government which could find it necessary for its safety ; but, repugnant as it is to the abstract principles of justice, and only to be palliated by the peculiar dangers to which a Greek democracy was exposed, and though it was often mischievously abused, it may be questioned whether it was not a salutary precaution, not only as it proved a timely check on the ambition of aspiring individuals, but as it allayed or gave vent to the public uneasiness, which might otherwise have broken out into violence and bloodshed.

These changes, and the influence they acquired for their author, reduced the party of Isagoras to utter weakness, and they saw no prospect of maintaining themselves but by foreign aid. Isagoras had courted the favour of Cleomenes, when he came on his last expedition ; as it was reported, by overlooking his familiarity with his wife. He now solicited his assistance, and at his suggestion the Spartan king sent a herald to Athens, to revive the old imputation against the Alcmaeonids, and to require the expulsion of the *accursed* race. Cleisthenes, against whom the attack was principally directed, either dreading the

His Expul-
sion and
Return.

CHAP.
XI.

cry which had so often proved disastrous to his house, or unwilling to expose his country to invasion on his own account, withdrew from Athens; but Cleomenes, encouraged rather than appeased by this concession, soon followed his herald to take advantage of it, and to reduce the Athenians under the dominion of Isagoras. He brought but a small force with him; yet the people, dismayed by the absence of their leader, suffered him at first to act as if he was absolute master. He began by banishing seven hundred families designated by Isagoras, and then proceeded to suppress the Council of the Five Hundred, and to lodge the government in the hands of Three Hundred of his friend's partisans. When however the councillors resisted this attempt, the people took heart, and, Cleomenes and Isagoras having occupied the citadel, rose in a body, and besieged them there. As they were not prepared to sustain a siege, they capitulated on the third day: Cleomenes and Isagoras were permitted to depart with the Lacedæmonian troops, but they were compelled to abandon their adherents to the mercy of their enemies. All were put to death, and Cleisthenes and the seven hundred banished families returned triumphantly to Athens.

Spartan In-
vasion of
Attica.

It was soon heard that Cleomenes was making active preparations to avenge his humiliating defeat, and to restore Isagoras. The Athenians in their first alarm sent envoys to Sardis, to conclude an alliance with Persia, or rather to seek its protection. As this embassy was not attended with any immediate effect, it will be more fitly noticed when we come to the history of the events which led to the Persian war. Cleomenes having collected all the forces he could raise in Peloponnesus, and being joined by his colleague Demaratus, invaded Attica on the side of Eleusis, while the Thebans, who had concerted their operations with him, took the towns of Cœnoe, and Hysiaë on the

northern frontier, and the Chalcidians, crossing over from Eubœa, ravaged the eastern coast. The Athenians, for the present neglecting these new enemies, marched with all their forces against the Spartans. But before battle was joined, the Corinthians, ashamed of being made the instruments of Cleomenes in an unjust quarrel, quitted the army and returned home, and Demaratus, perhaps on the ground that he had not been informed of the object of the expedition, refused his concurrence. The rest of the Peloponnesian allies, seeing the two kings at variance, followed the example of the Corinthians, and Cleomenes was compelled to abandon his enterprise. His resentment against his colleague produced important consequences; the immediate effect of their disagreement was a law which the Spartans passed, that their two kings should never in future take the field together. The Athenians, now at liberty to punish the aggression of their northern neighbours, marched toward the Euripus to attack Chalcis. In Bœotia they were met by the Thebans, whom they defeated with great slaughter, and took 700 prisoners. The same day they crossed the Straits, and won a victory over the Chalcidians, from which they reaped a very important advantage. It enabled them, after they had consecrated a tract of land in the Lelantian plain to Athené, to parcel out the remaining estates of the great Chalcidian landowners among 4000 Attic colonists¹, who still retained their connection with Athens, and as often as they would might exercise their franchise there. This addition to the Attic territory was the more valuable, because, while it provided so many families with a maintenance, it afforded means of raising a body of cavalry, the force in which Attica was most deficient. The fetters in which the Theban and Chalcidian prisoners groaned, till they were

Victories of
the Athe-
nians.

¹ Ælian. V. H. vi. 1.

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ransomed, were hung up on the walls of a temple in the citadel, as a monument of Athenian valour, and a brazen chariot was dedicated to Athené as a tenth of the ransom, with an inscription commemorating this first achievement of the emancipated commonwealth. The event draws a remark from Herodotus worthy to be quoted. "The Athenians then," he says, "grew mighty. And it is plain, not in one matter only, but in every way, that liberty is a brave thing: seeing that the Athenians, so long as they were lorded over, were no whit better men at feats of arms than any of their neighbours, but as soon as they were rid of their lords, they got far ahead. This therefore shows that, while they were kept under, they cared not to conquer, as men toiling for a master; but, when they were set free, none grudged his labour for his own good."

The Thebans burnt to revenge their disgrace, but, disheartened by their late defeat, they betook themselves to the Delphic god for advice. By the usual course of an unintelligible oracle, and an ingenious interpretation, they were directed to seek aid from Ægina, which at this time had attained to its highest pitch of prosperity, and was crowded with an industrious population, enriched by commerce, and adorned with the finest works of early art. They bore a mortal grudge against the Athenians from the recollection of what they had done and suffered in an old quarrel that had arisen between the two states on the subject of Epidaurus, and they now readily promised their aid to the Thebans, and, while the latter renewed their hostilities on the northern frontier, crossed over with a squadron of galleys of war, landed on various parts of the Attic coast, plundered many of the maritime towns, and did great damage. The Athenians were preparing to retaliate without delay on Ægina, in spite of an oracle, dictated apparently by a cautious policy, rather than by any unfriendly

spirit, which had them put off their vengeance for another generation, when their attention was diverted from this quarter by intelligence of a new danger. The Spartans had by this time detected the fraud that had been practised on them through the contrivance of Cleisthenes by the Pythian priestess, and deeply regretted that they had been induced to ruin their old friends the Pisistratids for the sake of a thankless people. Their regret was embittered by the discovery of some ancient predictions, which Cleomenes professed to have found in the citadel of Athens, when it was abandoned by the Pisistratids, and which threatened Sparta with manifold injuries from the Athenians. Seeing then, Herodotus observes, that the Athenians were growing powerful, and were by no means willing to submit to them, and reflecting that if they were left at liberty they would become a match for Lacedæmon, but that if they were made to stoop to a tyranny, they would be weak and submissive, for these reasons they sent to Sigeum, where Hippias was then dwelling, and invited him to Sparta. When he arrived, they summoned a congress of deputies from their Peloponnesian allies, and in their presence lamented the wrong they had done to the Pisistratids, and the hurt which had thence ensued to themselves, and proposed, as the only means of curbing the growing insolence of the Athenian people, that all should unite their forces in an expedition against Attica, for the purpose of restoring Hippias to the station from which they had deposed him. The greater part of the allies however appear to have perceived, that, though it might well suit the interest of Sparta to keep Attica subject to a creature of her own, they should reap no fruit but shame from the part they were called upon to take in this act of injustice. No one however ventured to declare his dissent, till the Corinthian deputy Sosicles, in vehement language,

Hippias at
Sparta.

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The Spar-
tans baffled
by their
Allies.

remonstrated with the Spartans on their inconsistency, in establishing at Athens a form of government directly contrary to the spirit of their own institutions, and recited the calamities which Corinth had endured under the tyranny of Periander. His eloquence encouraged the other deputies to declare their sentiments, and all with one accord loudly exclaimed against the Spartan proposal. The Spartans were forced to yield to the unanimous wishes of their allies, and to abandon their design. Hippias, before the congress broke up, is said to have prophesied, that the time would come when the Corinthians would have the greatest cause to regret that they had saved Athens from the Pisistratids. He soon after returned to Sigeum, and thence proceeded to the court of Darius, where he remained for many years, nourishing hopes which were destined to be signally disappointed. But, before we begin to relate the events by which he was brought once more to Attica, it will be necessary to turn for a while from Greece itself, to take a view of the state and progress of the Greeks in other parts of the world.

CHAPTER XII.

THE COLONIES OF THE GREEKS, AND THE PROGRESS OF
ART AND LITERATURE FROM THE HOMERIC AGE TO
THE PERSIAN WAR.

*Legends of the mythical Colonies. — Æolian Migration. —
Ionian Migration. — Dorian Colonies. — Greek Colonies in
Italy ; in Sicily. — Cyrene. — Relation of the Colonies to
the parent States. — Political Institutions of the Colonies. —
Revolutions of Cyrene. — Political Union of the Colonies. —
Ionian Confederacy. — Lycian Confederacy. — Factions of
Miletus. — Progress of Civilisation. — Milesian Colonies. —
Commerce of the Ionians. — Opening of Intercourse with
Egypt. — Cultivation of the Arts. — Architecture. — Paint-
ing. — Statuary. — Poetry. — Hesiod. — Epic Dialect. —
Cyclic Poets. — Lyrical Poetry. — Origin of Prose Com-
position. — History. — Philosophy. — The Ionian School.
— The Eleatic School. — Philosophical Literature. — Em-
pedocles. — Pythagoras. — Pythagorean Philosophy. — In-
stitutions of Pythagoras ; his Pretensions. — Pythagoras
at Croton. — Object of his Society. — Religion of Pythago-
ras ; his political Views ; Constitution of his Society ; his
Influence at Croton. — Parties at Sybaris. — Destruction
of Sybaris. — Suppression of the Pythagorean Society.*

THE history of the Greek colonies is connected but
partially, and in varying degrees, with that of the
mother-country. A complete description and enume-
ration of them would be foreign to our present pur-
pose. But a general survey of them is necessary to
give an adequate conception of the magnitude of the
Grecian world, when, dilated beyond its original
bounds, it comprised extensive tracts of coast on the
seas inclosed by the three ancient continents ; and a
sketch of the most prominent features of their ordi-
nary condition, and relations to their parent states, is

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requisite to place them in the proper light, and will contribute to illustrate the Greek character, and their habits of thinking and feeling. Some of them however will demand more particular notice, partly on account of the effects produced by them on the course of events in Greece, and partly on account of the impulse which they gave to the intellectual progress of their nation, and of the human race.

Legends of
the mythical
Colonies.

We pass over the doubtful legends of the colonies planted by several of the heroes on or after their return from the siege of Troy, as by Agamemnon and Calchas on the coast of Asia, by the sons of Theseus in Thrace, by Ialmenus in the Euxine, by Diomed Philoctetes, Epeus, Menestheus, and others in Italy by other less renowned adventurers in Africa¹, and by the never-resting wanderer Ulysses in the remote regions of the West. We have already intimated that, though it is impossible to distinguish between truth and falsehood in these stories, they appear not to have been wholly groundless. But the earliest Greek colonies which can safely be pronounced historical, were those which issued out of the event, or rather the series of events, commonly called the *Æolian* migration. This has generally been considered as the first of the great movements produced by the irruption of the *Æolians* into *Bœotia*, and of the *Dorians* into *Peloponnesus*. *Achæans*, driven from their homes, and seeking new seats in the East are believed to have been joined in *Bœotia*, through which they were passing to their place of embarkation by a part both of the ancient inhabitants of *Bœotia* and of their *Æolian* conquerors. The latter seem to have been predominant, not in numbers, probably but in influence; for from them the migration is said to have been called the *Bœotian*, as well as the *Æolian*. The emigrants were headed by chiefs who claimed

Æolian
Migration.¹ Diodor. xx. 57.

descent from Agamemnon¹, and the main body embarked at the port of Aulis, from which he had led the Greek armament against Troy. They took the same direction, and settled first on the isle of Lesbos, where they founded six cities. Other detachments occupied the opposite coast of Asia, from the foot of Ida to the mouth of the Hermus. That this was the real origin of the greater part of these Æolian settlements, there is no reason to doubt; but it does not seem necessary on this account to reject the tradition that a migration from Peloponnesus toward the East had begun before the Dorian conquest. Orestes himself was sometimes said to have led an Achæan colony to Lesbos, or to Tenedos; according to others he only began the expedition, and died in Arcadia; but it was prosecuted by his son Penthilus, who reached Thrace. Archelaus, son of Penthilus, crossed the Hellespont, and Gras, the son of Archelaus, first conquered Lesbos. Another band, conducted by Cleves and Malaus, likewise descendants of Agamemnon, is said to have set out about the same time with that of Penthilus, but to have been long detained in Locris, near mount Phricium. On its arrival in Asia, it found Pelasgians still in possession of the coast, but reduced to great weakness by the Trojan war. The invaders at length took their chief town Larissa, by means of a fort built in its neighbourhood, which, as a city, preserved the name of Neon Teichos (Newcastle.) They then founded Cuma, which from their sojourn near the Locrian mountain, obtained the epithet Phriconis, and became the principal of the Æolian cities on the continent.

The inference which we should be inclined to draw from these accounts is, that the Æolian migration

¹ An Agamemnon, king of Cuma, is mentioned by Pollux, ix. 83., whose daughter Demodicé was said by some authors to have married Midas the Phrygian, and to have coined the first money.

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may not improbably be regarded as, in its origin, a continuation of the earlier enterprises of the Achæan chiefs against the same part of Asia, or, at all events as an effect, not of necessity, but of the attractive influence of the rich and beautiful land from which the heroes of a former generation had returned laden with spoil and glory. But it would seem that for more than a century after the arrival of the first colonists, new adventurers continued to flock in driven from home, as well as attracted by the distant region. The ancient Æolian cities on the main-land, those of Æolis, as it was sometimes called, amounted to eleven: but about thirty others were founded or occupied by Cuma and Lesbos in the territory of Priam, which the Lesbians seem to have claimed as legitimate heirs to the conquests of Agamemnon.

Ionian
Migration.

Southward, from the Hermus to the Mæander, a tract which, in the opinion of Herodotus, if not so exuberantly fruitful as the vale of the Caïcus, and the adjacent plains of Æolis, enjoyed a still happier climate, fell to the lot of the adventurers who embarked in the *Ionian* migration. They were mostly Ionians, who, when dislodged by the Achæans from their seats on the Corinthian Gulf, took refuge in Attica, and probably assisted in repelling that invasion of the Dorians in which Codrus devoted himself for his country. Here they seem to have been joined by other fugitives and soldiers of fortune from various parts of Greece, in particular by a considerable band of Phocians. Attica could not afford a permanent abode for these strangers, and a dispute which arose after the death of Codrus, about the succession to the throne, gave them leaders from the royal family, and perhaps hastened their departure. Medon, the heir apparent, was lame; and his brother Neleus contended that this defect disqualified him for reigning. But when the Delphic oracle decided in favour of Medon,

Neleus, with several of his brothers and of their Pylian clansmen, put himself at the head of the emigrants.¹ In their passage across the Ægean many formed settlements in the Cyclades and other islands, and in process of time Delos became a common sanctuary of the Ionian race. The Asiatic coast, henceforth called Ionia, and the neighbouring islands of Chios and Samos, were at this time inhabited by tribes of various origin, some of which, as the Carians, the Leleges, and the descendants of the Cretan colonists, had been long in possession of the country, while others had been recently driven from Greece by causes similar to those which produced the Ionian migration. The new invaders appear readily to have united with all but the Carians and the Leleges, who were commonly expelled or exterminated. Twelve independent states were gradually formed, which, notwithstanding the widely different elements of which they were composed, a diversity no doubt connected with that of the dialects which they spoke in the time of Herodotus, all assumed the Ionian name, and were regarded as parts of one nation. Herodotus thinks that they were designedly confined to this number, which was that of the Peloponnesian towns abandoned to the Achæans, and which appears to have prevailed from the earliest times in the Ionian institutions; yet we shall see reason for doubting whether they were not accidentally reduced to it.

These twelve colonies were *Samos*, *Chios* (the chief town in each bore the name of the island), *Miletus*, *Myus*, *Priene*, *Ephesus*, *Colophon*, *Lebedus*, *Teos*, *Erythræ*, *Clazomenæ*, and *Phocæa*. The accounts left to us of their foundation are scanty, and not always easily reconciled. We shall notice some of them to show the mixed character of the population. Herodotus seems to consider Miletus as the place where the

¹ Paus. vii. 2. 1. & 3. Tzetzes Chilliad. xiii. Hist. 468. Ælian. V. H. viii. 5.

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original settlers might boast of the purest Ionian blood. This was the seat chosen by Neleus himself. His followers massacred all the males whom they found there, Carians according to Herodotus, and forced the women to become their wives.¹ Herodotus does not mention the Cretans, who, according to Ephorus, inhabited the old town of Miletus, while Neleus fixed on a site nearer to the sea, commanding four harbours, all since filled up by the depositions of the Mæander, one of which was capable of containing a fleet. Myus and Priene were also wrested from the Carians, the former by Cydrelus, a bastard son of Codrus: in Priene the Ionians, headed by Æpytus, son of Neleus, are said to have been associated with Thebans, led by Philotas, who are perhaps no other than the Cadmeans mentioned by Herodotus among the foreign tribes who shared the Ionian conquest. The same dialect was spoken in these three towns. Androclus, son of Codrus, led his followers to Ephesus, which was inhabited chiefly by Leleges and Lydians, who were expelled by the Ionians. But the temple of the goddess (probably of Asiatic origin) in whom the Greeks recognised their Artemis, afforded an asylum to a considerable number of suppliants, among whom were women said to have sprung from the Amazons, its reputed founders. Colophon was in the possession of Cretans, who had taken the place of the earlier Carian population. With them the Ionians, under Damasichthon and Promethus, sons of Codrus, agreed to dwell on terms of equality. Another son of Codrus, Andræmon or Andropompus, drove the Carians out of Lebedus. Strabo seems to intimate,

¹ Niebuhr (l. p. 133.) considers this as an example of the ordinary practice of the early Greek colonists. Herodotus (l. 146.) seems to speak of it as an unusual case, and adds that the women transmitted the resentment with which they viewed their rude lovers to their daughters, whom they bound by oaths, never to share their meals with their husbands, nor to salute them by their names; perhaps a legendary explanation of some peculiar features in the relations between the sexes at Miletus.

that he was obliged to take up a position at a neighbouring place called Artis, before he could make himself master of the town.¹ Teos had been previously occupied by Minyans from Orchomenus, led by a chief called Athamas, who is said to have been a descendant of the ancient hero of that name. They were intermingled with the Carians; and the Ionians, on their arrival, were peaceably admitted to a share in the colony, which not long after received a fresh band of adventurers from Attica, commanded by chiefs of the line of Codrus, and another from Bœotia. It seems to have been later before Erythræ became a member of the Ionian body: for Cnopus, or Cleopus, son of Codrus, is said to have settled there with a band of followers collected from all the Ionian cities. He found, it is said, a population composed of Cretans, Carians, Lycians, and Pamphylians², with whom he formed an amicable union.

All these towns were in existence, some perhaps flourishing, before the Ionian migration; but Clazomenæ and Phocæa owed their origin to that event. Clazomenæ was founded by Ionian wanderers, mingled with a larger body of emigrants, who had quitted Cleonæ and Phlius after the Dorian invasion: a coalition indicating a national affinity, which is confirmed by the early history of Peloponnesus. Phocæa, lying at the northern extremity of Ionia, was built on ground obtained by compact from the Cumæans, by a colony of Phocians. They had been furnished with the means of transport by two Athenians, Philogenes and Damon, who shared their fortunes. Yet the Ionians would not acknowledge them as brethren,

¹ xiv. p. 633. καταλαβόμενος τόπον τινὰ Ἄρτιν.

² Pausanias tells us (vii. 3. 7.) that the Carians had settled as friends, the Lycians as kinsmen, of the Cretans, who were believed to have been followers of Erythrus son of Rhadamanthys; and that the Pamphylians were Greeks who had wandered with Calchas after the fall of Troy. Their name probably marked a tribe composed of many races.

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until they had accepted princes of the line of Codrus from Erythræ and Teos.

It is difficult to determine what share the Ionians from Attica had in the population of Chios. The poet Ion, a native of the island, and contemporary of Herodotus, related, that at the time of the migration it was inhabited by Carians, Abantes from Eubœa, and Cretans, all governed by a prince named Hector, who, though of Eubœan origin, made war on the Carians and Abantes, and expelled them from the island; after which he was admitted into the Ionian confederation.¹ Strabo on the other hand says, that Egertius led a mixed multitude to Chios, but does not mention the quarter from which it came. It seems most probable that the island received colonists from Erythræ, which lay on the opposite coast, as we find it taking a part in the revolutions of Erythræ², and as they were distinguished from all the other Ionian cities by a peculiar dialect. We do not find any more distinct account of the mode in which Samos attained to the same rank: though in other respects its early history seems somewhat clearer. It had received an Ionian colony originally sprung from Epidaurus, which shared it with its ancient inhabitants, the Leleges. The Ephesians under Androclus made war on the new settlers, and succeeded in driving them out of the island. A part crossed the sea to Samothrace, (which according to some authors derived its name from them, having been before called Dardania,) and there united with the Tyrrhenian Pelasgians: but another body seized a place called Anæa, on the opposite shore of Asia, and there waited for an opportunity of returning to Samos. They found

¹ Paus. vii. 4. 9.

² Athenæus, vi. p. 259., from Hippias, an Erythræan author, who related that Cnopus was murdered at sea by some false friends, who with aid afforded by the tyrants of Chios, Amphiclus and Polytecus, established an oppressive oligarchy at Erythræ, which was afterwards overthrown by Hippotes brother of Cnopus.

means of doing so ten years after, and ejected the Ephesians. It must have been after this event that they took their place in the Ionian body, to which indeed their origin gave them a claim, though they were not governed by Attic princes, but by the descendants of the old Epidaurian kings. It was perhaps a necessary concession to the power and importance of the island. We are the less entitled to suppose that any other Ionians were blended with them, as the dialect of Samos was peculiar to itself.

To these twelve cities another was subsequently added, which has had the extraordinary fortune to retain its name and its prosperity to the present day. This was Smyrna: according to Herodotus originally an Æolian colony, treacherously seized by a body of exiles from Colophon: but another account, resting apparently on better authority, represents it as first founded by Ionians from Ephesus, where a part of the ancient town once bore the name of Smyrna.¹ It was wrested from these settlers by the Æolians, and

¹ Strabo, xiv. p. 633. Compare K. O. Müller, *History of the Literature of ancient Greece*, c. v. § 2. The Æolian origin of Smyrna is maintained by Welcker, (*Der ep. Cycl.* p. 142.) who suspects that Strabo's account of the origin of the name is an inversion of the genuine tradition, and Bode (*Gesch. der Hellenischen Dichtkunst*, pp. 250. 252.). The principal testimony to which they appeal, beside that of Herodotus, l. 149., is the poetical fragment in Herodot. *De Vita Homeri*, 14. where the λαοὶ Φρίκωνος, that is, *Cumani ex Locrensi monte Phricio progressi*, are said to have been the founders: ἐπύργωσαν Αἰολίδα Σμύρνην. This may be a sufficient proof, that at an early period — how early who can say? — the Æolians claimed Smyrna as their colony. Welcker also alleges the authority of Mimnermus. But this can hardly be allowed to weigh more with us than it did with Strabo, who quotes the lines in which Mimnermus speaks of the Æolian Smyrna in the same passage (xiv. p. 634.) where he himself relates that Smyrna was a colony of Ephesus. The language of writers in the Alexandrian period, as Callimachus in *Athen.* vii. p. 318. B. cited by Bode, can hardly add any strength to the testimony of the elder authors. Velleius, l. 4., does not say of Smyrna, as Welcker seems to interpret his words, that it was founded by a colony from Lesbos. He only says: *Æolii . . . claras urbes condiderunt Smyrnam, Cymen, Larissam, Myrinam, Mitylenemque, et alias urbes quæ sunt in Lesbo insula.* Still it must be owned that all this forms an imposing mass of evidence. Nor have I any thing to oppose to it but the fact, indisputably attested by Callinus, that either the whole or at least a large part of Ephesus was anciently called Smyrna. I do not see how this is to be accounted for otherwise than as Strabo explains it; especially as Herodotus expressly relates that the Æolians who were expelled from Smyrna were distributed among the eleven remaining Æolian cities. Athenæus, xv. p. 688. C. remarks: *μυρρα ἡ σμύρνα παρ' Αἰολεῦσι, ἐπειδὴ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν μύρων διὰ σμύρνης ἐσκευδίζετο.*

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B.C. 1049.

the Colophonian refugees, though they acquired it by violence, might be considered as asserting a rightful claim. It is perhaps only a distorted form of the same account, which describes Smyrna as having succeeded to the place of a town called Melite, the thirteenth of the list, which was destroyed by the common consent of the other twelve.¹ But the whole story raises a doubt as to the reason assigned by Herodotus for the number of the Ionian states.

Dorian
colonies.

The south-west corner of the Asiatic peninsula, and the neighbouring islands, were occupied nearly at the same period by colonists of a different race. Several of the *Dorian* conquerors themselves were drawn into the tide of migration, and led bands, composed partly of their own countrymen, and partly of the conquered Achæans, to the coast of Asia. The most celebrated of these expeditions is that which we have already had occasion to mention, of the Argive Althæmenes, who, leaving one division of his followers in Crete, proceeded with the rest to Rhodes, where, according to a legend which probably arose out of this colony, the Heracleid Tlepolemus had founded the cities of *Lindus*, *Ialysus*, and *Camirus*, before the Trojan war. About the same time *Halicarnassus* was founded by Dorians from Træzen, and *Cnidus*, on the same coast, by others from Laconia: a third band from Epidaurus took possession of the island of *Cos*, which rivalled its parent in the worship of Esculapius. These six colonies formed an association, from which several others of the same race, and in their neighbourhood, were excluded, and which, after Halicarnassus had been compelled to withdraw from it, was distinguished by the name of the Dorian *pentapolis*. Rhodes was probably the parent of most of the Greek colonies on the south coast of Asia Minor, several of which were ascribed to Argos, from which she herself sprang.

¹ Vitruvius, iv. 1.

She may also have contributed to form the Greek population of *Lycia*, a race renowned for its heroic valour, and for the wisdom of its political institutions; though there is no reason to question its Cretan origin, and its early connection with Greece, which appears both in the Homeric story of Bellerophon, and in the legend that the country owed its name to Lycus, son of the Attic king Pandion. We even find traces of Greek adventurers far inland, in Pisidia, where the Leleges formed part of the ancient population, and Selge, the most considerable of the Pisidian towns, and Sagalassus, boasted a Laconian origin.¹

To the same period, the century following the Dorian conquest, may probably be referred the Greek colonies in Cyprus, though most of them claimed a much higher antiquity, and ascribed their foundation to the heroes who had fought at Troy: as Paphus to the Arcadian Agapenor, Amathus and others to followers of Agamemnon, Soli to the sons of Theseus, Salamis to Teucer, whose son Ajax was believed to have founded the temple of Jupiter at Olbe, in the mountains of Cilicia, where the priests, who were also princes of the surrounding district, long assumed the names of Ajax, or Teucer.²

We must here drop the history of the Asiatic colonies, to which we shall shortly return, to observe their condition and progress. A long interval seems to have elapsed before the state of the mother country gave occasion to new migrations, and then they took for the most part an opposite direction. It was in the course of the century following the beginning of the Olympiads, that the Greeks established themselves on the coast of Sicily, and spread so far over the south of Italy, that it acquired the name of Great, or the Greater, Greece. These colonies, like those of

Greek colonies in Italy.

¹ Strabo, xii. p. 570. *Σέληνη καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐκτίσθη πόλις καὶ ἔτι πρότερον ὑπὸ Κάλχαντος.* On Sagalassus see Müller, *Dorians*, i. 6. § 11.

² Strabo, xiv. p. 672.

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Asia, were of various origin, some Æolian or Achæan, some Dorian, some Ionian. The Ionians led the way; and the city of Chalcis in Eubœa, perhaps originally inhabited by an Ionian race, but which is said to have received Athenian settlers both before and after the Trojan war, sent out, if not the first Greek adventurers who explored the Italian and Sicilian coast, yet the first who were known to have gained a permanent footing there. Indeed, according to a generally received tradition, *Cuma*, in the part of Italy afterwards called Campania, was founded by a Chalcidian colony, in the middle of the century following the return of the Heracleids; and one of the dates assigned for its foundation would even make it precede that of the Æolian Cuma, from which the Campanian city was believed to have derived both its name and a part of its population. It seems better to suppose that its antiquity has been greatly exaggerated, than that it owed its name to a third Cuma in Eubœa, which is otherwise totally unknown. But it is singular that, according to the common calculation, for three centuries no adventurers followed in the same track; and that even then, if we may believe Ephorus, the first Greek settlement in Sicily was the result of a fortunate chance, which revealed the richness of the country, and the weakness of its inhabitants, to Theocles, an Athenian, who was driven upon its coast. Till then the Greeks are said to have been deterred no less by the ferocity of the islanders, than by the Etruscan pirates who infested their waters. On his return to Greece, Theocles first endeavoured to induce his fellow citizens to send out a colony to Sicily, and when he failed in this attempt, addressed himself to the Chalcidians, with whom he was more successful.¹ Chalcis was at this time, as for more than two centuries afterward, under the government

¹ Strabo, vi. p. 267.

of the great landowners, who seem to have had political motives for encouraging emigration among the poorer citizens. It had perhaps already planted several colonies in the peninsula, which, with the three branches that it throws out toward the south-east, forms so remarkable a feature in the aspect of the Ægæan sea, and which hence acquired the name of *Chalcidicé*, though a considerable part of its Greek population was derived from Eretria, the neighbour and rival of Chalcis. The isle of Naxos also took a part in the colony which Theocles led from Chalcis to the west: a part so important, that the name of *Naxos* was given to the town which it founded on the eastern coast of Sicily, though Chalcis was acknowledged as its parent. The date of this event may be most probably fixed at Ol. xi. 2. B. C. 735.¹

Sicily was at this time inhabited by at least four distinct races: by Sicanians, whom Thucydides considers as a tribe of the Iberians, who, sprung perhaps from Africa, had overspread Spain and the adjacent coasts, and even remote islands of the Mediterranean; by Sicels, an Italian people, probably not more foreign to the Greeks than the Pelasgians, who had been driven out of Italy by the progress of the Oscan or Ausonian race, and in their turn had pressed the Sicanians back toward the southern and western parts of the island, and themselves occupied so large a portion of it as to give their name to the whole. Of the other races the Phœnicians were in possession of several points on the coast, and of some neighbouring islets, from which they carried on their commerce with the natives. The fourth people, which inhabited the towns of Eryx and Egesta, or Segesta, at the western end of the island and bore the name of Elymians,

In Sicily.

¹ This however cannot be safely inferred from Conon. 20. There is no proof that Conon's Theoclus is, as Raoul Rochette assumes (*Hist. des Col. Gr.* iii. p. 202.) the same person with Theocles the founder of Naxos.

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was probably composed of different tribes, varying in their degrees of affinity to the Greeks; though we cannot adopt the Greek legend, which represented them as fugitives from Troy, mixed with Phocians, or with followers of Philoctetes; and Thucydides himself seems to mark the uncertainty of the tradition, when he observes that the Chalcidians under Theocles were the first Greeks who gained a footing in Sicily.

The Sicels and the Phœnicians gradually retreated before the Greeks, whose colonies, in the course of a century, covered the eastern and southern sides of the island. But the Sicels maintained themselves in the inland and on the north coast, and the Phœnicians, or Carthaginians, who succeeded them, established themselves in the west, where they possessed the towns of *Motya*, *Solus*, and *Panormus*, destined, under the name of *Palermo*, to become the capital of Sicily. The Chalcidians of Naxos soon after planted the new colonies of *Leontium* and *Catana*, and the two cities which command the straits were also of Chalcidian origin. The peculiarly advantageous site of *Messina* had before attracted the Sicels, who, from the form of its harbour, gave their town the name of *Zanclé* (a sickle). It was then seized by pirates from the Italian Cuma, who were afterwards strengthened by new adventurers from Chalcis. *Rhegium* is said to have been founded, under the immediate direction of the Delphic oracle, by a band of Chalcidians, who had been consecrated to Apollo, after the manner of the Italian *Sacred Spring*, to avert a famine, and were joined by Messenian exiles forced to quit their country on the fall of Ithomé.¹

But the Greek cities in Sicily which rose to the

¹ Strabo and Heraclides assign a different epoch and motive for this Messenian migration, which they refer to the civil dissensions in Messenia which preceded the first war. But the Messenians who went into exile as partisans of Androclus, seem from Paus. iv. 14. 3. (quoted by Müller, *Dor.* i. 7. 9.) not to have left Peloponnesus.

highest pitch of prosperity and renown, were of Dorian foundation. Of these *Syracuse* was founded the year after *Naxos* by Corinthians under a leader named *Archias*, a *Heracleid*, and probably of the ruling caste, who appears to have been compelled to quit his country, to avoid the effects of the indignation which he had excited by a horrible outrage committed in a family of lower rank.¹ He was accompanied by another *Heracleid*, *Chersicrates*, whom he left with a division of his followers in the island of *Corcyra*, then inhabited by *Liburnians*, and by a colony of *Eretrians*, who were expelled by the Corinthians. *Corcyra* was only one, though the most important of a series of colonies planted by Corinth on the eastern coast of the Adriatic and the Ionian sea. *Syracuse* became in course of time the parent of other Sicilian cities, among which *Camarina* was the most considerable. *Megara*, which had not long become independent of Corinth, followed her ancient sovereign in this field of enterprise, though, as her position naturally directed her attention to an opposite quarter, her most flourishing and celebrated colonies lay on the coasts of the Propontis and the Bosphorus, where, about a century after the foundation of Rome, she planted the future rival of the eternal city, *Byzantium*. In Sicily, Megarian adventurers, after many vicissitudes, succeeded in establishing themselves at *Hybla*, which was betrayed to them by a Sicel chief, and was henceforth called the *Hyblæan Megara*, but became most famous as the mother of the aspiring and ill-fated *Selinus*. (B. c. 628.) Forty-five years after *Syracuse* *Gela* was founded by a band collected from Crete and Rhodes, chiefly from Lindus, and about a century later (B. c. 582) sent forth settlers to the banks of the *Acragas*, where they built *Agrigentum*. *Himera*, long the only Greek city on the north side

¹ Plutarch, *Am. Narr.* ii.

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of the island, was peopled by a colony composed of Chalcidians from Zanclé, and of Dorians, exiles from Syracuse.

Within a half a century after the Greeks first set foot in Sicily, they founded most of the great cities in the south of Italy. The rivals *Sybaris* and *Croton* were both of Achæan origin, though in the former the Achæan colonists were accompanied by Træzenians, whom they afterwards expelled, and the latter received settlers from Laconia, who may have been accompanied by some Dorians. Such seems also to have been the case with *Locri*, called, from the neighbouring promontory, Zephyrium, the *Epizephyrian*. The ancients themselves were not agreed whether it was founded by the Locrians of Opus, or by those of the Crissæan gulf. It seems clear that it owed a part of its population to the aristocratical jealousy of the parent state, which excluded the offspring of marriages contracted between parties of unequal birth, from the enjoyment of political rights.¹ At Locri also the Achæans, and perhaps the Dorians, of Laconia, took a share in the colony. *Tarentum*, occupied, on the occasion already related, by Laconian settlers at the end of the first Messenian war, seems to have been still earlier peopled by a Hellenic race, though they are variously described as Cretans, or Achæans. Subsequently Sybaris invited a new colony of Achæans to take possession of Metapontum, which, according to the common Greek tradition, had been before founded, in the general dispersion of the Return from Troy, by followers of Nestor: Ephorus, perhaps on better historical ground, related that its first founder was a chief named Daulius, who ruled at Crissa. The

¹ See Heyne, *Opusc.* ii. p. 46. The new fragments of Polybius (Mal. ii. p. 384.) represent the Locrians to have been allies of Sparta in the first Messenian war, which is also intimated by Eustathius on Dion. p. 364. But it does not appear how they otherwise confirm the participation of Sparta in the colonisation of Locri, as Müller remarks in a note, vol. i. p. 146. of the English translation.

dominion of the Greeks in this region was extended and secured by several flourishing colonies of the greater cities, among which *Posidonia* (Pæstum), by its ruins, still attests the ancient power and magnificence of Sybaris.

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B. C. 632.

In the latter half of the seventh century before our era, a country perhaps still richer and more delightful than any hitherto mentioned was opened to the Greeks. We have already given an account of the migration in which Theras led a colony, chiefly of the Minyan race, from Laconia to the island then called Callisté, which is said from him to have taken the name of Thera.¹ We do not venture, amid the contradictory statements of the ancient authors on a subject in its own nature obscure, to determine the causes which, between four and five centuries later, induced Battus, one of the principal citizens of Thera, to undertake an expedition to the north coast of Africa. One account represents his enterprise as the result of civil discord²; and this, though seemingly at variance with the traditions of the two places where the truth might have been supposed to be best known³, is not more inconsistent with them than they are with each other, and differs from them chiefly in the most marvellous and improbable particulars of the story. Our curiosity might be more reasonably excited to inquire, how it happened that no Greek colonists had taken the same course before. A rumour at least of the fertility of Libya had reached the Greeks in the time of Homer, as appears from the fable of the Lotus-eaters, and from the manner in which he speaks of it in describing the wanderings of Menelaus. Yet in the legend of Battus it is supposed to have been still an unknown country at

Cyrene.

¹ The change of name has also been accounted for by the supposition, that Calliste was a corruption of a Phœnician word, signifying the chase, which is also the meaning of the Greek name Thera.

² Schol. Plind. Pyth. iv. 10.

³ For the traditions of Thera and Cyrene, see Herod. iv. 150—157.

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Thera, when he embarked on his expedition, and to have been discovered only under the especial guidance of the Delphic oracle. The part of Africa where the Theræans finally settled, after a short sojourn on a small island near the coast, was the singular table-land which arises on the eastern border of the greater Syrtis. Inclosed between the sea and the desert, and defensible on the side where it is least difficult of access, this favoured region seems destined by nature for the seat of a powerful maritime state. Blest with inexhaustible sources of wealth, and with a pure and temperate air, it seemed, beyond almost every other shore of the Mediterranean, to invite the industry of a people like the Greeks to draw forth its manifold treasures. But it is still more remarkable that it appears to have been also overlooked or neglected by the Phœnicians: perhaps because their attention was early drawn from Sicily to the opposite coast of Africa, and thence to the west of Europe. At the distance of ten miles from a part of the coast which, with a little aid of art, afforded a commodious harbour, near the gushing spring of *Cyré*, the Greeks founded *Cyrene*, and soon converted the adjacent land into a luxuriant garden, while they extracted from its rocky basis the materials of imperishable monuments. Cyrene became, as Pindar expresses it, the root of other cities; perhaps of several which have been forgotten. Four of them — its port *Apollonia*, *Barcé*, *Tauchira*, and *Hesperis*, which seemed by its fortunate position to rival or realise the fabulous garden of the Hesperides — composed, with the capital, what in later times was called the Cyrenaic *pentapolis*.

The tribes which preceded the Greeks in the possession of this region appear to have made room for them without any struggle: they are even said to have served as guides to the new settlers, whom they probably found useful neighbours, as a European

colony would be to the Bedouins who now range over the same tracts. But their habits must have kept the two races completely apart from each other: and the legend of the sons of Antenor, who had accompanied Helen from Troy, and terminated their wanderings in the vicinity of Cyrene, where they afterwards received religious honours, may have been founded simply on the relation subsisting between the Greeks and the friendly barbarians, in whose land they had peaceably fixed their seats.¹ Afterward however, in the reign of second Battus, grandson of the first, the colony was increased by a great influx of adventurers from various parts of Greece, who were invited by the Cyrenæans, under the sanction of the Delphic oracle, to share the fertile soil. But these new settlements could not be made without encroaching on the neighbouring Libyans, who, too weak to defend their territory, sought aid from Egypt. The Egyptian king Apries sent them succours; which however were repulsed by the Greeks with a terrible slaughter, and the Greek dominion was firmly established in Cyrenaica.

We have not yet surveyed the whole extent of the colonies founded by the Greeks during this period. But as those which remain to be mentioned will be included in the view which we are about to take of the progress of the Asiatic Greeks, it may be most convenient to pause here, for the purpose of making a few remarks on certain general features of the Greek colonies. The points we mean to touch upon are the relation in which the colonists mostly stood to the parent state, and the political forms which arose out of their new condition.

The migrations of the Greek colonists were commonly undertaken with the approbation and encouragement of the states from which they issued;

Relation of
the colonies
to the pa-
rent states.

¹ Pindar Pyth. v. 78. and Thirge, Cyrene, p. 79. The sons of Antenor may have been looked upon as the type of friendly natives in a foreign land.

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and it frequently happened that the motive of the expedition was one, in which the interest of the mother country was mainly concerned: as when the object was to relieve it of superfluous hands, or of discontented and turbulent spirits. But it was seldom that the parent state looked forward to any more remote advantage from the colony, or that the colony expected or desired any from the parent state. There was in most cases nothing to suggest the feeling of dependence on the one side, or a claim of authority on the other. The sons, when they left their home to shift for themselves on a foreign shore, carried with them only the blessing of their fathers, and felt themselves completely emancipated from their control. Often the colony became more powerful than its parent, and the distance between them was generally so great as to preclude all attempts to enforce submission. But though they were not connected by the bands of mutual interest, or by a yoke laid by the powerful on the weak, the place of such relations was supplied by the gentler and nobler ties of filial affection and religious reverence, and by usages, which, springing out of these feelings, stood in their room, and tended to suggest them where they were wanting. Except in the few cases where the emigrants were forced, as outcasts, from their native land, they cherished the remembrance of it as a duty, prescribed not merely by nature, but by religion. The colony regarded its prosperity as mainly depending on the favour of the tutelary gods of the state to which it owed its birth. They were invited to share the newly conquered land, and temples were commonly dedicated to them in the new citadel, resembling as nearly as possible, in form and position, those with which they were honoured in the mother-country: their images here renewed the old model; and it is not improbable that the priests who mi-

registered to them were sometimes brought from their ancient seats.¹ The sacred fire, which was kept constantly burning on the public hearth of the colony, was taken from the altar of Vesta in the council-hall of the elder state. The founder of a colony, who might be considered as representing its parent city, was honoured after his death with sacred rites, as a being of a higher order; and when the colony in its turn became a parent, it usually sought a leader from the original mother-country, to direct the planting of the new settlement. The same reverential feeling manifested itself more regularly in embassies and offerings sent by the colony to honour the festivals of the parent city, and in the marks of respect shown to its citizens who represented it on similar occasions in the colony. But the most valuable fruit of this feeling was a disposition to mutual good offices in seasons of danger and distress.

With regard to the position of the colonists in their new country, it must be observed, that they almost every where established themselves as conquerors, in a land already inhabited and cultivated, and partially if not entirely dispossessed its ancient owners. The terms on which they might live with those of the old inhabitants who were suffered to remain, would depend on an infinite variety of circumstances. But in general it may be safely presumed, that even where the first people was not reduced to bondage or to absolute subjection, the conquerors would maintain a superior station in their political institutions. But between these classes many other gradations of rank were frequently introduced by the accession of new adventurers, who, though willingly received, could

Political
Institutions
of the
colonies.

¹ The existence of this custom however rests only on an assertion of the scholiast of Thucyd. i. 25., which may have been no more than an erroneous inference from his author's words; but it is in some degree confirmed by analogy, and perhaps by what Tacitus (Ann. ii. 54.) says of the priesthood at Claros, which has been referred to this usage.

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seldom be admitted on a footing of perfect equality with the first settlers. On the other hand, the maritime position and pursuits of the colonies, and the very spirit in which they were founded, was highly unfavourable to the permanence of an aristocratical ascendancy. A powerful and enterprising commonalty soon sprang up, and the natural tendency of the state toward a complete democracy could seldom be restrained, except by the adoption of a liberal standard of property, as the measure of political rights.

Revolutions
of Cyrene.

As in the period of the early migrations which followed the return of the Heracleids, the monarchical form of government was almost every where prevalent in Greece itself, it was probably very generally established in the colonies.¹ But the causes just noticed, incident to their peculiar situation, tended, in the first instance, to restrict the power of the hereditary chiefs, and gradually to reduce it to a mere shadow, which itself finally disappeared. The history of Cyrene affords a remarkable illustration of the manner in which this change may have been effected in many other cases which are not recorded. The kingly government had been preserved in the isle of Thera long after it had been almost universally abolished elsewhere among the Greeks. The same form was retained at Cyrene for some generations without any diminution of the royal authority. But after the great addition to the numbers of the colony, made, as we have mentioned, in the reign of the founder's grandson, the second Battus, the people seem to have become dissatisfied with the existing institutions. This disposition perhaps found no opportunity of manifesting itself with effect under his successor, Arcesilaus II., who was involved in a do-

¹ Bode (l. p. 216.) thinks that *royalty in the heroic sense of the word was never introduced into the colonies*, meaning perhaps no more than is stated in the text.

mestic quarrel, which occasioned a revolt of his Libyan subjects, from whom he suffered a disastrous defeat; and he was soon after murdered by one of his brothers. His son and heir, Battus III., was lame; and this defect afforded an occasion, or pretext, for a great political change, the need of which must have been generally felt before. The Delphic oracle was consulted on the means of remedying the disorder of the state; and under its sanction a citizen of Mantinea, named Demonax, pointed out no doubt by his previous reputation, was invited to assume the office of mediator,—in other words, to frame a new constitution. He began by determining the respective rights of the old and the new colonists, and distributed them into three tribes, of which the descendants of the original settlers formed the first, probably with some peculiar privileges. He then proceeded to deprive the king of all his substantial prerogatives, leaving him only the ensigns of royalty, a domain, and certain priestly offices. This part of the work of Demonax indeed was destroyed in the following reign by a counter-revolution, effected with the aid of foreign auxiliaries, and the government then became in fact a tyranny: but this accidental result does not affect the case, as an example of a general tendency, and of the mode of its operation.

The Greek colonies which covered so large a part of the coast of Asia Minor, though comprising a great number of tribes very distantly related to each other, were distributed, as we have seen, into three principal masses, each bearing a name indicating a supposed unity of descent. The Ionians moreover recognised Athens as a common parent: a relation which could not be claimed in so strict a sense either by Thebes with regard to the Æolians, or by Argos, or Sparta, with regard to the Dorians. In each case however the feeling, or the assumption, of a national affinity

Political
union of the
colonies.

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was strengthened by an unbroken geographical connection: and it might have seemed an almost inevitable consequence of such proximity of origin and position, that even if the three main divisions were kept apart from one another, each in itself should have formed a compact political body. But causes similar to those which kept the European Greeks asunder operated here to the same effect: and at the time of the migration there was no power in the neighbourhood of the new colonies formidable enough to suggest the thought of a permanent combination of their forces. In fact it does not appear that any political union, properly so called, was ever established even among the cities of the same name: the nearest approach to one consisted in periodical meetings, founded simply with a religious object, for the celebration of festivals in honour of a tutelary god, but which afforded an opportunity for political deliberation, when occasion called for it. With regard to the Æolians however, it is not certain that they possessed even such a centre of union: and it is on the ground of analogy only, and not on direct evidence, that they have been supposed to have held annual assemblies near a temple of Apollo, the seat of an ancient oracle, at Grynium.¹ The fact is left rather suspicious by the silence of Herodotus, who mentions the periodical meetings of the Dorians and Ionians. Those of the Dorians took place near the temple of Apollo, who derived his epithet from the Triopian head-land, where it stood: games were celebrated within the sacred precincts; and the victors were enjoined to dedicate their prizes, bronze tripods, to the god. It was the breach of this ordinance which caused the separation of Halicarnassus from the five cities, which with it formed the original Dorian *Hexapolis*. We may hence infer how slight

¹ Strabo, xiii. p. 622. Paus. i. 21. 7.

the connection must have been. The meetings of the Ionians were held in a spot at the northern foot of mount Mycale, called from its destination — that of receiving the whole Ionian body — Panionium, and consecrated to the national god, Poseidon. In them too the religious or festive object was almost exclusively predominant. Yet it would appear that in early times there was among the Ionians a tendency of disposition and of circumstances toward a closer union than subsisted among either their northern, or their southern neighbours. All the Ionian cities, except Samos, were ruled, as we have seen, by princes of the house of Codrus, and this was made an indispensable condition of admission into the confederacy. But there is also some ground for believing, that the eldest prince of this house enjoyed a supremacy over the rest. Strabo relates, on the authority of Pherecydes, that Ephesus was anciently the capital of Ionia, as the seat of Androclus, who was considered as the common leader of all the Ionian settlers: and he mentions that, even in his own day, there were at Ephesus descendants of the ancient kings, who were distinguished by certain ensigns of royalty, and exercised some sacred functions which were originally attached to it. No great stress indeed can be laid on this fact: for similar vestiges may have been long preserved in the other Ionian cities, and have disappeared only when the privileged line became extinct. But the active interference of Androclus in the affairs of other Ionian cities may be allowed strongly to confirm this statement of Pherecydes: and when we find him dislodging the Epidaurians from Samos, and afterwards protecting Priene against the Carians — the enterprise which cost him his life — he may seem to be acting as chief of the whole body. But undoubtedly the Ionian cities were soon completely insulated: and Miletus in particular, even if Neleus

Ionian con-
federacy.

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Lycian confederacy.

was really the younger brother, would not have long borne the superiority of Ephesus, which it soon greatly surpassed in wealth and power. No provision was made either for defence against foreign enemies, or for the maintenance of internal tranquillity: there was no common treasure, nor tribunal, nor magistrate, nor laws. Yet it may have been very early, though the time is uncertain, that the Lycians set an example of the manner in which the advantages of a close federal union might be reconciled with mutual independence. They distributed their twenty-three cities into three classes: the cities of the first rank possessed each three votes, those of the second two, those of the lowest one, and each contributed to a common fund in proportion to its weight in the common council. This was held, not in any fixed place, so as to raise one city to the rank of a capital, but in one appointed for the time by common consent. A supreme magistrate and other officers were here elected: and a court was instituted for the decision of all disputes that might arise between members of the confederacy: the cities contributing in proportion to their rank to fill the places in the national judicature and magistracy: in the same assemblies were discussed all questions relating to peace and war, and the general interests of the united states. Had the Greeks on the western coast of Asia adopted similar institutions, their history, and even that of the mother country, might have been very different from what it became.

But whatever ill effects may be attributed to their want of union, it does not seem immediately to have checked the growth, or to have diminished the prosperity of the several cities. They may perhaps have shot up the more vigorously and luxuriantly from the absence of all restraint. This advantage undoubtedly also resulted from the abolition of the monarchical form of government, which probably took

place every where within a few generations after the first settlement, though the good was balanced by great evils. From the scanty fragments remaining of the internal history of the Asiatic colonies it may be collected that they passed through the various stages of which we have given an outline in a preceding chapter, and that they suffered much from intestine discord. Thus it is related that Miletus, after the overthrow of a tyrannical dynasty, was split into two factions, designated by names which seem to indicate an oligarchy and a commonalty.¹ The former gained the ascendant, but was forced to take extraordinary precautions to preserve it. Again we read of a struggle between the wealthy citizens and the commonalty, accompanied with the most horrible excesses of cruelty on both sides.² It is uncertain whether this is the period to which Herodotus refers, when he speaks of a civil war which lasted for two generations at Miletus, and reduced it to great distress, and was at length terminated by the mediation of the Parians, who seem to have committed the government to those landowners who had shown the greatest moderation, or had kept aloof from the contest of the parties.³ These convulsions took place within the same period in which Miletus rose to the summit of her greatness as a maritime state, and in which her colonies and her commerce were extending the limits of the Grecian world, and opening an intercourse between its most distant regions. How far political changes were connected with the prime spring of that wonderful activity which was displayed by the Asiatic Greeks,

¹ Plut. Qu. Gr. 32. Πλουτῖς (Πλουτῖς?) and Χειρομάχα. The oligarchs held their councils on shipboard.

² Athen. xii. 524. from Heraclides Ponticus. Here the commonalty bears the name Γέφυγες — that of the remnant of the ancient Teucrians in the Troas. Strabo, xiii. p. 589. Herod. vii. 43. Athen. vi. 256. — They are a rustic population, and crush the children of their adversaries to death on their threshing-floors; the opposite party revenges itself by burning them alive with their children.

³ Herod. v. 28.

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more especially the Ionians, in the seventh and sixth centuries before our era, can only be conjectured. It seems probable that the fall of the ancient aristocracies which succeeded the heroic monarchy, and the emulation between a growing commonalty, and an oligarchy which grounded its political claims solely on superior wealth, were conditions, without which the Ionian genius would not have found room to expand itself so freely. On the other hand the inferior degree in which the Dorians and Æolians were animated with the spirit of commercial adventure, may have been owing to their political institutions, not less than to a difference in their national character. It is however certain that in the two centuries just mentioned the progress of mercantile industry and maritime discovery was coupled with the cultivation of the nobler arts, and the opening of new intellectual fields, in a degree to which history affords no parallel before the beginning of the latest period of European civilisation.

Progress of
civilisation.

Among the secondary impulses which forwarded this progress, one may be thought to have proceeded from the mother country. Thucydides fixes the beginning of the seventh century B. C. as the epoch of a considerable improvement in the art of ship-building, which was first adopted at Corinth, and was imparted by a Corinthian named Ameinocles to the Samians. It seems to have been after this epoch, yet not much later, that the Milesians began to plant a series of colonies on the eastern coast of the Propontis, though Cyzicus, the most important of them, is referred to an earlier origin.¹ The rivalry of the

¹ Eusebius gives two dates, B.C. 756 and B.C. 675. Mr. Clinton, F.H. 1. a. 756 and 675, supposes the first to belong to a Milesian, the second to a Megarian colony, mentioned by Lydus de Mag. iii. 70. ; where however, unless we adopt the conjecture *οἰκίσαιτες*, it may be doubted whether there is sufficient authority for saying that Cyzicus was founded by the Megarians. The planting of other Milesian colonies in the neighbourhood, which took place nearly at the same time, as Abydos, Priapus, and Proconnesus, seems to render it probable that Miletus had at least a share in the second settlement of Cyzicus.

Phocæans, who founded Lampsacus on the same coast, and that of the Megarians, who occupied the most advantageous positions on the European shore, may have urged them to push forward into a wider field of enterprise, and to explore the coasts of the long dreaded sea, which was supposed to have been traversed many centuries before by the Argonauts, but seems to have been now first opened for ordinary navigation by the Milesians. To them is attributed the glory of having changed its name from the Inhospitable to the Hospitable, the *Euxine*; and it was to the struggles which they had to maintain with the barbarous hordes on its coasts that they owed their once proverbial reputation for valour.¹ Here they planted the greater part of their numerous colonies, which, according to Pliny, amounted to no less than eighty, and, according to Strabo, lay almost exclusively on the Propontis and the Euxine. These colonies, unlike most of those hitherto mentioned, were undoubtedly founded with a distinct view to commercial advantages, and probably remained for a time in close connection with the parent city. And there is some ground for believing, that during the same period Miletus was regarded as the common protectress of the Greek settlers in this region. Hence perhaps the parental title, a valued distinction, may in some instances have been transferred to her, and her fecundity may have been exaggerated at the expense of some of the other cities which established colonies on the same coast. Thus Strabo attributes to Miletus the foundation of the Pontic *Heraclea*, the most western of the Greek colonies on the Asiatic side of the Euxine: and adds that the settlers reduced the Mariandynians, the ancient inhabitants, to a state of bondage exactly resembling that of the Spartan helots. But this very fact strongly confirms the tes-

Milesian
Colonies.¹ Πάλαι ποτ' ἦσαν ἄλκιμοι Μιλήσιοι. Athen. xii. 26.

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timony of other writers, who describe Heraclea as a Megarian colony¹, in which we may expect to find Dorian institutions. The earliest Milesian settlement seems to have been planted much farther eastward: for *Sinope*, though its history is involved in great obscurity, has apparently the best claim to this precedence.² It became in its turn the mother of several flourishing cities. *Amisus*, on the same coast, is also assigned to the Milesians by Strabo, on the authority of Theopompus, but perhaps with no better ground than Heraclea; other authors ascribe it to the Phocæans, and fix the epoch of its foundation four years previous to that of Heraclea.³ Yet it is not absolutely certain that the southern side of the Euxine was the earliest occupied by the Greek colonists; and it is possible that before they had circumnavigated that great projection of the Asiatic coast which terminates toward the north in cape Carambis, they may have been carried across to the Tauric Chersonesus, which became in later times one of the principal granaries of Greece, and the seat of a powerful state.

Commerce
of the
Ionians.

The Euxine had already lost a part of its terrors before any Greek navigator ventured to explore the recesses of the Adriatic, or to launch out beyond Sicily into the western seas. The Phocæans had the glory of opening these new tracks of commerce, in which however they were soon followed by bold and active rivals. In the Adriatic they were probably attracted to the mouth of the Po, by the lucrative traffic in amber, for which this river — which at

¹ Scymnus, Fr. 230. Bœotians also took part in it.

² Scymnus, Fr. 210., speaks of a Milesian, named Ambron, as the first founder after the mythical times, or, at least, as having been cut off, before he had accomplished his undertaking, by the Cimmerians. While this people was overrunning Asia, in the reign of the Lydian king Ardys, between 678 and 629 B.C., a new colony seems to have been founded with better success by Milesian exiles. According to some accounts they were headed by a Coan named Critias, or Critines. Steph. B. *Σινώπη*. Eustath. on Dionys., p. 772.

³ Scymnus, 181. Not *forty* years, as is stated both by Raoul Rochette (Col. Gr. iii. p. 334.) and by Mueller (Orchom., p. 291.).

length was identified with the fabulous *Eridanus*, the scene of the fall of Phæthon, over which his sisters dropped their glittering tears¹ — had long been a real channel. The date of their first adventure in the Adriatic cannot be precisely fixed: but it was probably not later than the beginning of their voyages to the western coasts of Italy, where, early in the seventh century B. C., they gained access to Etruria, and, as appears from the story of Demaratus, were soon followed by the Corinthians. Herodotus also seems to ascribe the still more important discovery of Iberia and Tartessus—the Delta of the Guadalquivir—to the Phocæans. But perhaps he may only mean that their example encouraged other adventurers, who finally outstripped them. For in the thirty-fifth Olympiad a fortunate Samian, named Colæus, reached Tartessus, and found, as Herodotus says, a virgin mart, from which he carried home the most profitable cargo ever imported by a Greek merchant. But if the Samian led the way, the Phocæans did not long remain behind; and they acquired so great favour with the Tartessian king Arganthonius, that he is said to have invited the whole people to leave Ionia, and settle in his dominions. The Rhodians appear very early to have pursued the same direction; though we must reject, as a fabulous legend, the statement that they visited the coasts of Spain, many years before the Olympiads, and even settled in the Balearic isles soon after their return from Troy. But there is no reason to doubt that they founded Parthenope, perhaps in conjunction with the Cumæans, as its later name Neapolis was derived from a new colony of Chalcidians and Athenians. Hence we may the more readily believe that they established themselves at Rhode, or Rhodos (Rosas in Catalonia), before the

¹ Hyginus, F. 154.

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Phocæans had gained a footing on the neighbouring coast at Emporiæ (Ampurias); and we may even suspect that the Rhone (Rhodanus) was named after them. If so, they must here also have preceded the Phocæans, who about 600 B. C. founded their most celebrated colony, Massilia¹—perhaps on Ligurian ground, where they maintained themselves with the aid of the Celtic tribes, whose good-will they gained and requited, by diffusing among them the arts of civilised life, and Grecian usages and letters. Miletus however did not neglect the commerce of the west: her fleeces, which were of singular fineness, supplied the luxury of Sybaris with clothes, carpets, and tapestry, and became the occasion of so close an alliance between the two cities, that the Milesians displayed their grief for the fall of Sybaris by a public mourning.

Opening of
intercourse
with Egypt.

Nearly at the same time that the Phocæans were making their first excursions in the west of the Mediterranean, the country from which, according to general belief, Greece had in ancient times received the germs of her arts, religion, and civility, but which had long been jealously closed against foreign settlers, was thrown open for permanent and friendly intercourse to the Greeks. About 650 B. C. a band composed of Ionians and Carians chanced in the course of a piratical expedition to land on the coast of Egypt, and were induced by great offers to enter into the service of Psammetichus, who established himself on the throne by their aid. He not only rewarded them with a grant of lands on the Nile, but gave all their countrymen free access to his dominions²; and, to

¹ That the Phocæans founded Massilia before their city was taken by the Persians, has been demonstrated, perhaps more elaborately than was necessary, by A. Dederich in an essay in the *Rhein. Mus.* iv. 1. *Ueber die Gründung von Massilia.*

² This account of the matter in Herod. ii. 154. is no doubt substantially correct, and yet it may not be a sufficient ground for rejecting the date assigned by Eusebius to the foundation of Naucratis, which according to him was founded by

promote their commerce with his subjects, consigned a number of Egyptian boys to their care, to be instructed in the Greek language, so as to form a permanent class of interpreters. His successors adhered to the same policy; and thus Greeks of various classes were drawn to Egypt, in the pursuit of knowledge as well as of gain. Of the impression produced on an inquisitive and intelligent Greek by the sight of this wonderful land, which even by its ruins, and in its lowest state of degradation, has never ceased to inspire astonishment and awe, we are able to judge from the testimony of Herodotus. Even if the effects of the intercourse between the two nations had been limited to those of a purely material traffic, they would have been incalculably great; because to this traffic Greek literature was indebted for one of the most important outward conditions of its development—a cheap and commodious material for writing, which was supplied by the Egyptian papyrus; but undoubtedly these effects did not terminate here; though it is difficult to estimate them, and the opinions of learned men are divided as to their nature and extent.

Though we have not yet brought the political history of the Asiatic colonies down to the period at which we dropped that of the mother country, just before the beginning of the great struggle between Greece and Asia, as the present seems to be the most suitable place for taking a view of the progress of art and literature, which was so intimately connected with the rise of those colonies, we shall not scruple, for the sake of continuity, to trace it down to the Persian war.

Milesians, Ol. vi. 4., confirmed by the story in Athenæus, xv. c. 18. Dr. Soldan in an instructive article of the Rhein. Mus. (iv. p. 126.) entitled *Naukratis*, has shown that the passage of Eusebius *construxeruntque urbem in Ægypto Naukratim* is an interpolation, and that Naukratis was not founded before the reign of Psammetichus.

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Cultivation
of the arts.

We have seen that several arts, subservient either to the enjoyment of the great and affluent, or to the uses of religion, had been cultivated by the Greeks before the time of Homer with a considerable degree of activity and success: and it may easily be conceived that their progress kept pace with the advance of public and private prosperity. The increase of wealth and refinement appears to have been much more rapid in the Asiatic colonies, particularly in Ionia, than among the Greeks of the mother country, where it was not equally favoured by nature, and was long checked by the troubles which followed the Dorian conquest. The Ionian cities were probably at an early period distinguished by a degree of luxury before unknown to the Greeks; and hence Lycurgus is said to have visited them in order to observe the contrast between their magnificence and the Cretan simplicity.¹ The same fact is indicated by the legend, that the daughter of Neleus, the founder, was seduced by one of the barbarians², and is most probably the ground of the picture which Homer has drawn of the Phæacians, in whom it is scarcely possible to avoid recognising his Ionian countrymen. About the beginning of the Olympiads, the fall of Magnesia on the Mæander was ascribed by poets of the same century to the prevalence of effeminate habits.³ We have seen however that the Ionians did not abandon themselves to indolence, and the active spirit which led them to pursue their commercial adventures into unknown regions, found employment at home in the arts by which their private and public life was cheered and adorned. Among the cities of Greece perhaps Corinth alone can be compared to them. There the overthrow of the Bacchiads was attributed to their luxury, which probably formed a

¹ Plut. Lyc. 4.

² Tzetzes ad Lyc. 1385. Eudocia, p. 145.

³ Athen. xii. c. 29.

contrast to the plainness and frugality that prevailed in the other Dorian states. But though the Dorian character and institutions were adverse to luxury, they did not exclude the highest degree of magnificence in works either consecrated to the gods, or designed for the service of the state. And hence even where, as at Sparta, the Dorian freemen were not permitted themselves to cultivate any of the arts, artists of various kinds were well received, and found abundant employment; and schools of art occur more frequently in Dorian than in Ionian cities. The first steps in the arts of drawing, of painting, of moulding figures in clay, were commonly attributed to the Corinthians, who, as they afterwards gave their name to one of the three orders of architecture, made the earliest improvement in the form of the Doric temple.¹ But Sicyon disputed the honour of some of these inventions with Corinth, and was more celebrated than her wealthier neighbour for her school of sculpture. Those of Argos and Lacedæmon, of Rhodes and Crete, and above all, of Ægina, were fruitful and renowned, while that of Athens, though it boasted Dædalus as its founder, and transmitted his art in an uninterrupted succession of families, seems to have been barren in great works, as it was in illustrious names. But the Ionians were not behindhand either in the richness of their productions, or in the glory of new inventions. They began early to vie with one another in the magnitude and splendour of their sacred buildings, and consequently in all the arts which served to adorn them. The temple of Heré at Samos, the largest of all that Herodotus had seen, appears to have been begun in the eighth century B. C., or early in the seventh. It was built in the Doric style, which soon after generally gave way in the Asiatic temples to the lighter Ionic. Its architect Rhæcus, a native of the island,

Architec-
ture.¹ See Boeckh on Pindar, O. xiii. p. 214.

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Painting.

was the father of Theodorus, who was equally celebrated as the builder of the Lemnian labyrinth, and the author of several memorable inventions. The most important was the art of casting metal statues, which before had been formed of pieces wrought with the hammer, and nailed together. Theodorus exerted his ingenuity in overcoming the difficulties presented by the nature of the ground, on laying the foundation of the great temple of Artemis at Ephesus.¹ It would seem too that the art of painting had made considerable progress in Ionia, while it was in its first rudiments at Corinth, if we may believe the account, that a picture of Bularchus was purchased at a high price in the eighth century by the Lydian king Candaules², and can reconcile this fact with the Corinthian tradition, that the earliest essays in colouring were made by Cleophantus, at the time of the overthrow of the Bacchiads.³

Statuary.

It will not be expected that we should enter into the history of the fine arts in their various branches, or that we should fill our pages with the names of the masters, and with the accounts preserved by the ancients of their works. Our object is only to point out the connection between the progress of these arts, and that which the Greeks made during the same period in other spheres of intellectual exertion. And for this purpose it will be sufficient to observe the manner in which one art—the most important, as an indication of the genius of the people, of all those which were occupied with the creation of visible forms—which, to avoid the reference to the nature of its

¹ Diog. L. ii. 103. He suggested the use of charcoal for this purpose.

² Plin. N. H. vii. 39.; xxxv. 34. It represented the destruction of Magnesia on the Mæander, probably that which it suffered from the Cimmeric tribe, the Treres, about Ol. xviii. Candaules is said to have paid its weight in gold. On the ground of this fact Heffter (*Götterdienste auf Rhodus*, p. 38.) would vindicate the genuineness of the Anacreontean poem xxxviii. (15 in Bergk's *Poeta Lyrici*) which contains an allusion to the Rhodian school of painting.

³ Plin. N. H. xxxv. 5. He, or another artist of the same name, was said to have followed Demaratus into Italy.

materials implied in the word sculpture, is better termed statuary, rose within this period nearly to the summit of its perfection. We have already, in our view of the Homeric age, had occasion to notice a very difficult question, relating to the origin of this art: the uncertainty whether it sprang up, and was gradually formed, in Greece, or was introduced from the East in a stage of comparative maturity, at which it remained for centuries, fixed by the control of religion. It happens by a singular coincidence that the epoch at which the Greeks opened or renewed their intercourse with Egypt, was also that in which statuary was on the point of breaking through its ancient restraints, and of entering on a new career, in which it arrived, within little more than another century, at its highest point of attainable excellence. It is not surprising that two facts which in time came so nearly together, should have been thought to be related to each other as cause and effect. And hence it may seem a probable opinion that the Greek artists, as soon as they were able to visit Egypt, were instructed by the Egyptians in various technical processes which had been long familiar to them, but hitherto unknown to the Greeks, and that by this fortunate assistance Greek art advanced at once from a degree of extreme rudeness to the same level which it had attained in Egypt through the persevering labour of numberless generations. There is a celebrated story, which has been thought to confirm this opinion; that the Samian Theodorus, and his brother Telecles, having studied in Egypt, on their return made a statue of Apollo, in such exact conformity to the rules which they had learnt, that the one half, which Telecles executed at Samos, tallied with the other, on which his brother had been employed during the same time at Ephesus, as exactly as if the whole had been the

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work of one artist.¹ But if the truth of this story was certain, the inference would lose all its force, if, as there are strong reasons for believing, the two brothers flourished in the eighth century B. C.²; and we should then be driven to a supposition, which the language of Herodotus seems directly to contradict³: that Egypt had been visited by Greek artists before the reign of Psammetichus. Independently however of the evidence which the Homeric poems afford, to elevate our conceptions of the earlier state of Greek art, descriptions have been left to us of several elaborate works, which, though their date cannot perhaps be precisely ascertained, appear to belong to the period preceding the opening of a regular intercourse with Egypt, and would prove that the Greeks cannot have been much indebted to the Egyptians during this period for instruments or processes of art. A tenth of the profits made by Colæus in his voyage, which we have already mentioned, to Tartessus, was dedicated, probably not long after, to Heré, in the shape of a huge vessel of brass, adorned with figures of griffins round its border, and supported by three colossal statues.⁴ The magnificent coffer of cedar wood covered with groups of figures, some of the same wood, others of ivory, others of gold, which was consecrated at Olympia by the Cypselids, was said to be the very same in which the infant Cypselus had been concealed from the search of the Bacchiads, and, if so, had been no doubt long one of the family treasures.⁵ The colossal throne of Apollo at Amyclæ, which was constructed for the Spartans by a company

¹ Diodor. i. 98.

² On the age of the brothers, see Thiersch, *Epoch.* p. 181. not. 94. On the story itself, p. 51. not. 42.

³ It is not clear how Thiersch, who maintains the probability of the story, gets rid of this difficulty; since he seems to admit (p. 27. n. 15.) that the ancient intercourse which he believes to have existed between Greece and Egypt was suspended between the time of Homer and the reign of Psammetichus.

⁴ Herod. iv. 152.

⁵ Paus. v. 17. 5.; and Thiersch, p. 167. n. 66.

of artists from Magnesia on the Mæander, and was richly adorned with sculptures, seems with great probability to be referred to the eighth century B. C., in which, after Magnesia had been destroyed by the Cimmerians, these artists may have taken refuge, and sought employment, in Greece.¹

It seems at all events certain that there were other causes, which operated much more efficaciously than the intercourse with Egypt, to urge the rapid progress of statuary in the century preceding the Persian wars. Among these causes might be mentioned the preference which was generally given to brass and marble over the ancient material, wood, which henceforth, when employed, was commonly overlaid with more precious substances, as ivory and gold. This change arose in part out of the invention of Theodorus, which gave a new command over the metals. The use of marble for statues is said to have been introduced in the fiftieth Olympiad by two Cretan artists named Dipœnus and Scyllis, but was probably most promoted by the closer alliance with architecture into which statuary began to be brought, and by the increased sumptuousness of the temples, in which, as in that of Delphi, when rebuilt by the Alcmaeonids, marble frequently took the place of ordinary stone. It may however be conceived, that the technical rules taught by the Egyptians had first enabled the Greeks to treat the harder material with ease and freedom. But this substitution, though an important step, did not of necessity involve any change of style, and would not of itself have prevented the art from remaining stationary at the stage to which it had been carried by the Egyptians themselves. A cause of still greater efficacy was the enlargement which it experienced in the range of its subjects, and the consequent multiplicity of its productions. As long as

¹ Thiersch, p. 176. n. 83.

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statues were confined to the interior of the temples, and no more were seen in each sanctuary than the idol of its worship, there was little room and motive for innovation; and on the other hand there were strong inducements for adhering to the practice of antiquity. But insensibly piety or ostentation began to fill the temples with groups of gods and heroes, strangers to the place, and guests of the Power who was properly invoked there. The deep recesses of their pediments were peopled with colossal forms, exhibiting some legendary scene, appropriate to the place or the occasion of the building. The custom, which we have already noticed, of honouring the victors at the public games with a statue — an honour afterward extended to other distinguished persons — contributed perhaps still more to the same effect. For, whatever restraints may have been imposed on the artists in the representation of sacred subjects, either by usage or by a religious scruple, were removed when they were employed in exhibiting the images of mere mortals. As the field of the art was widened to embrace new objects, the number of masters increased: they were no longer limited, where this had before been the case, to families or guilds: their industry was sharpened by a more active competition and by richer rewards: as the study of nature became more earnest, the sense of beauty grew quicker and steadier; and so rapid was the march of the art, that the last vestiges of the arbitrary forms which had been hallowed by time or religion had not yet every where disappeared, when the final union of truth and beauty, which we sometimes endeavour to express by the term *ideal*, was accomplished in the school of Phidias.

Poetry.

The same observant and inquisitive spirit which was the inmost spring of this new life in the world of art, gave birth about the same time to new branches

and forms of poetry. The first period of Greek poetry which is known to us otherwise than by tradition, is entirely filled by the names of Homer and Hesiod. When these names are regarded as representatives of a period, they may not improperly be coupled together, as they are by Herodotus, and in the legend which describes the two poets as engaged in a poetical contest. But the works which have been transmitted to us under their names, lead to the conclusion, that the name of Homer marks the beginning, that of Hesiod the close, of the period. This however is not the sole, or the main, distinction between them ; it may rather be said that they approach one another only in the outward forms of versification and dialect, but in other respects move in two totally different spheres. The Homeric poems therefore stand, throughout the whole of this period, completely alone. Yet it cannot be imagined that they exhibit more than a very small part of its poetical produce : and the silence of history as to the rest would be surprising, if it were not probable, not only that the names of many contemporary bards have been lost in the lustre of Homer's, but that their works frequently served as a basis for celebrated labours of subsequent poets, and hence were soon neglected and forgotten.

The collection which passes under the name of Hesiod Hesiod. contains works or fragments of many different authors ; and though there may not be sufficient reason for denying that the name properly belonged to one eminent person, yet it seems clear that it was extended to many others of less note. Thus much appears to have been generally admitted by the ancients ; and in the great number of works attributed to Hesiod, one only was held to be genuine by the inhabitants of the district in which he is believed to have lived.¹ We are thus led to consider him as a

¹ Paus. ix. 31. 4.

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poet who exercised an influence similar to that of Homer over his contemporaries and posterity, or as the founder of a poetical school, and to inquire by what means he obtained such influence, and what was the character of his school. In the same poem, which was alone recognised by his contrymen, the poet has given some account of his private condition, by which it appears that he was a native of the Bœotian village of Ascra, at the foot of Helicon, to which his father had migrated, for the sake of bettering his fortune, from Cuma in Æolis. It has been suspected¹, not on very solid ground, that the harsh epithets which he applies to his native village were prompted by resentment at some wrong which he had suffered in the division of his small patrimony, about which he had a dispute with his brother. In another poem he describes himself as tending a flock on the side of Helicon. Unless we entirely reject the authority of these passages, we must believe that he was born in a humble station, and was himself engaged in rural pursuits; and this perfectly accords with the subject of the poem which was unanimously ascribed to him, the Works and Days, which is a collection of reflections and precepts relating to husbandry and the regulation of a rural household. We have perhaps only some disjointed portions of the original work, interpolated with passages which did not belong to it. But what we have is sufficient to afford a distinct notion of the spirit and character of the whole, and it excites our surprise and curiosity as to two points. Nothing can be conceived much more homely, or more sparingly enlivened with poetical ornaments, than this didactic work, which nevertheless appears to have been the sole or the main basis of Hesiod's reputation. That it should have raised him to such celebrity, is the more remarkable, as the subject itself

¹ By Götting, in his edition of Hesiod, p. iv.

was not one which possessed any dignity or attraction in the eyes of the warlike races which became the lords of Greece after the Return of the Heracleids. In the dull fiction indeed which describes a contest between Homer and Hesiod, the prize is awarded to the latter, on the ground that he had dedicated his strains to the encouragement of rural and peaceful labours, not to the description of battles and carnage. But when we remember that at Thespiæ, to which the poet's birthplace was subject, agriculture was held degrading to a freeman¹, and how contemptuously the Spartan Cleomenes spoke of Hesiod as the helot's poet, in contrast with Homer, the delight of the warrior², we may conceive with how little favour such a production as the *Works and Days* was likely to be received by the wealthy and powerful among the poet's contemporaries. — Another difficulty arises, if we suppose that this was not his only work, and that, even if the others which have come down to us under his name did not proceed directly from him, they nevertheless represent the real themes of his song. The most considerable of them, the *Theogony*, turns upon subjects which might have been thought the most foreign of all to the poet of the plough. It ascends to the birth of the gods and the origin of nature, and unfolds the whole order of the world, in a series of genealogies, which personify the beings of every kind contained in it. In a third poem, of which only a few fragments remain, the poet has not taken a flight quite so lofty; but still, in a vein not more pastoral, he assigns the birth of the most illustrious heroes to the mortal mothers who drew the inhabitants of Olympus down to the earth. Some explanation is necessary to account for the choice of arguments apparently so incongruous; and the most satisfactory seems to be that which is suggested by

¹ Heracl. Pont. 42.

Plut. Apoph. Lac. Cleom. 1.

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the legends of the poet's parentage and education. It was on Helicon, the ancient seat of the Thracian Muses, that he was born and bred, and the genealogy, which traced his origin, through a long line of their favourites and worshippers, to Apollo himself, may be looked upon as a pleasing veil of an interesting truth. He was the poet, not of the Bœotian conquerors, but of the people, of the peasantry; which though overpowered by a foreign race, preserved its ancient recollections, and a rich treasure of sacred and oracular poetry. For this people he collected, in a fuller perhaps and a more graceful body, the precepts with which the simple wisdom of their forefathers had ordered their rural labours and their domestic life. From the songs of their earlier bards, and the traditions of their temples, he probably drew the knowledge of nature and of superhuman things, which he delivered in the popular form of the Theogony; and this subject naturally brought him to the birth of the heroes, which connected his poetry with the chivalrous epic of Homer. His fame became thus established as a teacher of divine and human wisdom, and his name represents the whole poetical growth of the Bœotian and Locrian schools—for Locris likewise claimed him by the legend of his death and his grave¹—from the Trojan war to the beginning of the Olympiads.

Epic
dialect.

If this explanation is sufficient to account for the contrast between Homer and Hesiod in the choice of their subjects, it may also serve to throw some light on another point no less obscure: their resemblance in that peculiar form of the Greek language which continued ever after to be appropriated to the use of epic poetry. This resemblance between two poets so near to each other in time, and so widely separated

¹ Paus. ix. 31. 5. Plut. Sep. Sap. Conv. 19. See Welcker in Jahn's *Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pädagogik*, ix. p. 139., and on the other hand, Nitzsch *De Hist. Hom.* i. p. 119. foll.

by situation, and still more by their genius and aims, may be considered as an indication of the common origin from which their poetry was derived. It was probably among the countrymen of Hesiod, by the labours of the bards from whom he is said to have sprung, in the oracular shrines of Helicon and Parnassus, that the epic style was formed, and hence passed over into Asia with the Ionians, while it was preserved in Bœotia and the rest of Greece, unaffected by all the political convulsions, and consequent changes of dialect, which took place after the Trojan war.¹

The two centuries following the beginning of the Olympiads were still very rich in epic song; and this may be considered as the close of that poetry which issued in natural and unbroken succession from the schools of Homer and Hesiod, though it was revived from time to time in every subsequent age of Greek literature. The epic poets of the period just mentioned, or a part of them, are usually comprehended under the title of the Cyclics, or poets of the Cycle, terms probably of late invention, and the precise meaning of which has been the subject of much dispute. It seems however most probable that the word Cycle denoted a collection of epic poems, the subjects of which were confined to a certain range of time, and were so distributed as to form one compact body, though there is no reason to think that the design of such a whole entered into the mind of any one of the authors. The period over which their subjects were spread began with the union of Heaven and Earth, or the origin of all things, and ended with the latest adventures of Ulysses in Ithaca, the close of the heroic age. The poems themselves are all lost; but

Cyclic
poets.

¹ See F. Thiersch in *Denkschriften der Münchener Akademie* 1813: and compare an essay of Klausen, *Ueber Hesiodus Gedicht auf die Musen* in the *Rhein. Mus. f. Philologie*, lli. p. 465.

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the titles of between twenty and thirty have been preserved, and in a few instances a short account of their contents.¹ The works thus distinguished were those which related to the story of Troy, and were manifestly designed to fill up the blanks left by the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Thus one poet² sang of the events which took place between the death of Hector and that of Achilles: another³ supplied those of the interval which followed down to the burning of Troy: a third⁴ carried the heroes to their homes; while a fourth⁵ went back to the secret origin of the fatal feud, the counsel of Jupiter to lighten the earth, which groaned under the numbers and the arrogance of mankind, and showed how his purpose was accomplished, through the weakness of Helen, the treachery of the Trojans, and the union of the Greeks. The whole Cycle was conceived by the Greek critics to depend entirely on Homer: it was sometimes said to be his work⁶; and some of the principal poems were expressly ascribed to him⁷; and even where, as happened in a few cases, chiefly those of the poets of what may be called the Trojan Cycle, the name of the real author had been preserved from oblivion, he was sometimes represented as Homer's disciple, or son-in-law.⁸ Yet it seems to have been only on the poets of the Trojan Cycle that Homer exerted any direct influence. The others chose their ground in the wide field which lay open to them, probably with as little reference to him as to one another, and some of them may perhaps be more properly regarded as disciples

¹ See Wüllner *De Cyclo*, or Kreuser, *Rhaps.* p. 179—190.

² Arctinus of Miletus in the *Æthiopis*.

³ Lesches of Mitylene in his *Little Iliad*.

⁴ Augias or Hagias of Træzen in his *Nóστροι* (Returns), the only epos perhaps known under that name (Nitzsch, *De Hist. Hom.* i. p. 116.), though there were several on the same subject.

⁵ Stasinus or Hegesias (or Dicæogenes? Aristot. *Poet.* 16.), in the *Cypria*. Compare Athenæus, xv. 30.

⁶ Procl. *Galsf.* p. 468.

⁷ Paus. ix. 9. 5. Herod. ii. 117. iv. 32.

⁸ As Stasinus, Arctinus, Crcophylus.

of Hesiod, since we find that their poems were chiefly filled with heroic genealogies.¹ The legends of Argos, of Corinth, of Thebes, and Orchomenus, the adventures of Hercules, of Theseus, and the Argonauts, supplied abundant materials for all. The remark of a Greek critic², that the poems of the epic cycle were valued by most readers, not so much on account of their excellence, as for the connection of their contents, though it does not imply that they were deficient in poetical merit, may intimate that the poetical interest, which in the Homeric works is predominant, if not exclusive, was in them subordinate to one of a different kind, which concerned the succession of events.³ And in this sense the Cycle may be considered as a prelude to history, and as an indication of a tendency to historical research, which however did not manifest itself more distinctly till near the close of this period.

As the principal parts of the mythical outline were gradually filled up, and the public taste began to be satiated with subjects similar in their kind, and treated with a great uniformity of tone and style, the poetical genius of the nation took a new direction, and though it did not abandon the epic field, yet both ranged over it with greater freedom, and explored many fresh regions. The period in which the lyrical poetry of the Greeks was carried to its highest perfection includes the last stage in the career of the epic Muse. After the beginning of the Olympiads the Cycle seems to have become less and less attractive, while for upwards of three centuries a series of great masters of lyric song were continually enlarging and

Lyrical
poetry.

¹ As Asius of Samos, Eumelus of Corinth, Cinætho the Laconian, Chersias of Orchomenus.

² Proclus. p. 378. Gaisf.

³ But compare Welcker, *Ep. Cyclus*, p. 31., who thinks that Proclus meant to say that these poems were read, for the sake of the light which they threw on various subjects, by many who did not discern their intrinsic excellence.

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enriching the sphere of their art. Their names were not obscured, like those of the Cyclic poets, by the lustre of Homer's; but of their works, those of Pindar excepted, only a few scanty fragments remain, to justify the admiration they excited. Yet even these fragments would be sufficient to confirm the unanimous judgment of antiquity, if its authority left room for any doubt, and to afford the melancholy conviction, that the loss we have suffered in the masterpieces of Greek lyrical poetry is, in a literary point of view, not inferior to any which we have to deplore in the whole range of ancient literature. The extant works of Pindar, admirable as they are, neither compensate for this loss, nor enable us to estimate its full extent. Even if it was certain that his genius was unequalled, still it could not replace the freshness which we might expect to find in the earlier gushes of the lyric vein, nor the peculiar character which distinguished each of the other poets, nor that which belonged to the several schools formed by the great tribes or branches of the nation; and which, if we had been permitted to compare the happiest productions of the Æolian, the Dorian, and the Ionian lyre, would undoubtedly have added much to the charm of each. And the Theban poet himself is only known to us by works of one class out of a great number, each of which must have exhibited a different exertion of his powers, and have heightened their effect by variety and contrast. But we have perhaps still more to regret in a historical point of view. For what we have lost in the Greek lyrical poetry is nothing less than a most lively and faithful picture of the whole life of the nation, political, religious, and domestic, from the greatest to the minutest features, for two or three most interesting centuries, during which we are very scantily supplied with information from other sources. This will perhaps be the better understood,

if we cast a look at the nature, origin, and progress of this species of poetry. It was the expression of the thoughts and feelings belonging to the various occasions of life, public and private, sacred and profane, or to the poet's individual character and situation ; in all cases however designed, not, like the lyrical poetry of modern times, for the enjoyment of solitary readers, but to awaken the sympathy of some, larger or narrower, social circle. In this sense a lyrical poetry undoubtedly existed among the Greeks from the earliest times, partly sacred, partly popular. The former probably did not differ, in its metrical form, from the epos, which in this respect appears to have adhered to the model of the ancient hymnody. The popular poetry was undoubtedly free from the fetters of art, as it borrowed none of its aids. But the period between the beginning of the Olympiads and the Persian wars was one of great excitement, of growing refinement, and of manifold innovations. New dynasties, and new forms of government, were continually springing up: commerce was spreading, wealth and luxury increasing; discoveries and inventions were rapidly multiplied. All these changes ministered fresh occasions and subjects for lyric song, and the poets who cultivated it vied with each other in the variety of forms which they applied to them.

In the Dorian states poetry and music were generally looked upon, principally, if not exclusively, as instruments of education, and hence the watchfulness with which their character was regulated by the magistrate, or the law. The themes of the poets were chiefly religious, martial, and political: in Crete and at Sparta the spirit of the laws, and the maxims of the constitution, were delivered in verse. Thus Lycurgus, though by an anachronism, was said to have employed the services of the Cretan poet Thaletas ;

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and Tyrtæus and Terpander really seconded the views of the legislator, by describing and commending his institutions. Though the Spartans themselves perhaps disdained the labour of poetical composition, they were keenly sensible of the charms both of music and poetry, and warmly encouraged such foreign poets as were willing to adapt their strains to Spartan principles. Archilochus was excluded because he did not fulfil this condition : but Alcman, though of Lydian origin, earned a rank next to that of a Spartan citizen by his genius, which may still be discerned in the scanty fragments of his works. Here, as elsewhere, emulation was kindled by solemn contests, which took place at certain festivals, for the display of poetical and musical talents.

The tyrants likewise cherished the lyric Muse, though in a different manner, and from different motives. We are not indeed prepared to adopt the opinion of a modern author¹, who thinks that they strove to wean the taste of their subjects from the heroic poetry, because it celebrated the old legitimate monarchy. Without any such grounds of policy, they were the natural patrons of the lyrical poets, who cheered their banquets, applauded their success, and extolled their magnificence. We have already observed in a preceding chapter, that the Olympic and other public games afforded constant themes for poetical panegyrics, which delicately interwove the praises of the victor with those of his ancestors, his country, its gods and heroes. This was only one of the numerous occasions for the exertion of poetical powers supplied by the enterprising and liberal spirit of these fortunate usurpers, who took the lead in the favourite pursuits of their age. But all the main epochs and leading situations in the life of the great were deemed to need the aid of song to enliven and

¹ Wachsmuth, iii. 397.

adorn them. The war-march, the religious and convivial procession¹, the nuptial ceremony, the feast, and the funeral, would have appeared spiritless and unmeaning without this accompaniment.

This however was only one side of the spacious and richly varied lyrical field. On this side its limit, by which it bordered on the epic, may be said to have been occupied by the great choral compositions, which embodied many high subjects of heroic song in a new shape; were early carried to perfection by the art of Arion and Stesichorus; and, uniting the attractions of music and action with those of a lofty poetry, formed the favourite entertainment of the Dorian cities. This appears to have been the germ, out of which, by the introduction of a new element — the recitation of a performer, who assumed a character, and perhaps from the first shifted his mask, so as to exhibit the outlines of some simple story in a few scenes parted by the intervening song of the chorus — Thespis and his successors gradually unfolded the Attic tragedy. On the other hand there was a great mass of lyrical poetry, which only breathed the thoughts and feelings of individual minds. This kind, which may be called the sentimental lyric, was chiefly cultivated in the Ionian and Æolian states. In this the resentment of Archilochus, Hipponax, and Alcæus, kindled by private or public quarrels, found vent in bitter sarcasm or open invective. The delights of the senses awakened strains of almost delirious rapture in Anacreon and Ibycus; while the recollection of their fugitive nature melted Mimnermus into a sadness, perhaps too gloomy to be pleasing. It is remarkable that the elegy, which he adopted as the organ of his voluptuous melancholy, and which in later times was almost exclusively dedicated to similar purposes, had been invented by another Ionian poet, Callinus, as the

¹ Κῶμος.

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vehicle of martial and patriotic enthusiasm. But the tenderness of Sappho — whose character has been rescued, by one of the happiest efforts of modern criticism, from the unmerited reproach under which it had laboured for so many centuries¹ — appears to have been no less pure than glowing. It is not merely her poetical celebrity, nor the exquisite beauty of the little that has been left to justify it, that excites our regret for the rest of her works. Had they been preserved, we should probably have been enabled better to understand the nature of the influence which she exerted over her female contemporaries, and might have obtained an insight into a side of Greek society — the intercourse of intelligent and accomplished women — which from its obscurity has been very little observed. The list of Greek poetesses², who, as might have been expected, cultivated scarcely any but the lyrical vein, was by no means scanty, and included several very celebrated names, which unhappily are to us nothing more. During the same period a considerable body of didactic poetry, under various forms, of fable, proverb, pithy sentences, or longer moral lessons, indicated the growing tendency of the age to habits of observation and abstraction, and marked the connection between its poetical and philosophical spirit.

Origin of
prose com-
position.

The early Greek poetry was designed, as we have already observed, for exhibition, more or less public, and it was late before any one appears to have thought of writing, without any view to recitation, for the satisfaction of individual readers. This could only be the case when instruction, not pleasure, was the immediate end proposed; and hence the rise of a prose literature among the Greeks coincides with that of historical in-

¹ By Welcker, in his little work (published 1816), *Sappho von einem herrschenden Vorurtheil befreit*.

² See that of Tatian. c. Græcos, c. 33.

quiry and philosophical speculation. When the object of the authors was no longer to work on the feelings and the imagination, but simply to convey knowledge or reasonings, they naturally adopted the style of familiar discourse, which was gradually ennobled and refined, till in the art of composition it equalled the most elaborate productions of the national poetry. If we may rely on the tradition of later times as to a point which must have been always obscure, Pherecydes, a native of the Isle of Syros, who flourished about the middle of the sixth century B. C., was the first prose-writer¹: his work seems to have been partly mythical, partly philosophical. Cadmus of Miletus is said first to have applied prose to a historical subject.

When however we speak of a rising spirit of historical inquiry in the period preceding the Persian wars, we must be careful to limit our notions on this head with due regard to the character of the people, and the circumstances of the age. The first essays at historical composition among the Greeks appear to have been subordinate on the one hand to poetry, on the other to the study of nature. The works of the early historians, so far as we can judge of them from the general accounts of Strabo and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and from the fragments, or slight notices, which have been preserved of their contents, seem to have been in part professedly mythological, and to have given, perhaps in a more connected form, and with some traditional supplements, the substance of a large portion of the epic cycle.² It is apparently to this class that Strabo alludes³, when he says, that Cadmus, Pherecydes, and Hecataeus, only got rid of

¹ Plin. N. H. vii. 57. Apuleius Flor. p. 130. ed. Bip. But Anaximander, who flourished a little earlier, is perhaps better entitled to the honour; and if Polyzelus the Messenian, the father of the poet Ibycus, wrote his history in prose (Suidas Ἱστορικὸς), his claims would be still stronger.

² Müller, *Proleg. z. e. w. Mythol.* p. 93.

³ l. p. 34.

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the metrical restraints of their poetical predecessor but in other respects adhered to them so closely, as even to retain the character of their diction. But there was another, and perhaps a larger class of work which might have been more properly referred to the head of geography or topography than to that of history, in which the description of a country, or a city served as a thread to connect its traditions. It must have been this class that Dionysius had in view when he spoke of the historians who preceded Herodotus, as confining themselves to local limits, and contenting themselves with simply recording the legends, whether sacred or profane, of each region or district, however incredible, in a style which, though concise and artless, was clear and not ungraceful. Though we must not construe this language so strictly as to suppose, that these historians never interpose their own judgment on the matters which they related, it is certain that the faculty of historical criticism which indeed was never very generally awakened among the Greeks, and never attained any high degree of vigour, was long almost entirely dormant. In the selection and arrangement of their materials, they were probably governed, in most cases, by no higher principle than the desire of gratifying patriotic vanity or the popular taste for the marvellous. But whenever they aspired to the more difficult and glorious task, of unravelling any of those mythical webs which must often have perplexed them, they could scarcely fail to aggravate the real confusion, by a false show of an artificial harmony and order. It is doubtful how far they commonly descended into the late political vicissitudes of the countries which they described. But before the Persian wars the Greeks did not suspect the importance of their own history, and it was not till long after that either its higher

¹ De Thucyd. Jud. v.

interest, or its practical uses began to be distinctly understood.

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Philosophy.

Philosophy may perhaps be said to have begun to dawn among the Greeks in the earliest period to which their history or their legends go back. For not only do the subjects on which the men commonly distinguished as the first Greek philosophers, speculated, appear to have been in a great measure the same with those which employed the meditations of the ancient sages, but the remains which have been preserved to us among the works of Hesiod—if we may venture to view them in this light — of those early essays in thinking, discover traces, though under a poetical or mythical form, of a system, or at least of a connected investigation of causes and effects. Still the sixth century B. C. has justly been considered as the period in which Greek philosophy took its rise, because then for the first time it began to be separated from poetry and religion, with which it had been before blended: it was then first cultivated by men who were not bards, or priests, or seers: it was exhibited in a natural form, without any artificial ornament or disguise; and it continued thenceforward to unfold itself in a steady and uninterrupted progress. The character of this age, in its relation to philosophy, is marked by the fame of the Seven Sages, who were variously enumerated¹, and became the subject of several pleasing legends, among which the most celebrated is that of the golden tripod, which, having been drawn up out of the sea, was, by command of the oracle, to be given to the wisest, and after it had been offered to each of the

¹ According to Diæarchus (Diog. La. i. § 41.) there were only four names which were universally admitted: Thales, Bias, Pittacus, Solon. Hermippus reckoned up thirteen more, from which the remainder of the Seven were selected by various authors. Among them may be noticed the Spartan Aristodemus, to whom Diogenes refers the lines of Alcæus, which Niebuhr (vol. i. not. 1007.) believed to have related to the ancient Heracleid. It seems indeed evident that the poet is not speaking of a contemporary. Compare Zenobius vi. 43. with Schott's note, where it is erroneously stated that Laertius assigns the apophthegm (χρήματ' ἀνὴρ) to Thales.

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seven, and modestly declined by them, was dedicated to the Delphic, or Didymæan, god. The men who gained such renown were all actively engaged in the affairs of public life, as statesmen, magistrates, or legislators¹; and the sayings ascribed to them breathe a purely practical wisdom, apparently drawn from their commerce with the world, rather than from any deep meditation on the nature of man. Their celebrity may perhaps be more properly considered as indicating the novelty and rudeness, than the prevalence, of philosophical reflection.

It can excite no surprise that in a period such as we are now reviewing, when thought and inquiry were stimulated in so many new directions, some active minds should have been attracted by the secrets of nature, and should have been led to grapple with some of the great questions which the contemplation of the visible universe suggests. There can therefore be no need of attempting to trace the impulse by which the Greeks were now carried toward such researches, to a foreign origin. But it is an opinion which has found many advocates, that they were indebted to their widening intercourse with other nations, particularly with Egypt, Phœnicia, and the interior of Asia, for several of the views or doctrines which were fundamental or prominent parts of their early philosophical systems. The result however of the maturest investigation seems to show that there is no sufficient ground even for this conjecture.² On the other hand it is clear that the first philosophers were not wholly independent of the earlier intellectual efforts of their own countrymen, and that, perhaps unconsciously,

¹ Nitzsch *De Hist. Hom.* l. p. 157. : *Multis sæpe controversiis viri ex aliis populis clariores adhibiti sunt* (cf. Zenob. ii. 67. M. 86.). *Neque septem illi alia magis ratione sapientiæ nomen præcipuum consequuti sunt quam ejusmodi consiliis publicis.*

² We allude to Ritter (*Geschichte der Philosophie*), who (l. p. 159—173.) has weighed all the arguments which have been alleged in behalf of this opinion with an even hand.

they derived the form, if not, in part at least, the substance of their speculations, from the old theogonies or cosmogonies. We do not mean to enter into the discussion of subjects which properly belong to the history of philosophy, and must therefore confine ourselves to a few general observations on the character, tendency, and influence of the philosophical schools which preceded that of Athens.

The eldest of these schools — called the Ionian, because, with one or two exceptions¹, the philosophers who belonged to it were natives of Ionia — may be said to have been founded by Thales of Miletus, a contemporary of Solon, inasmuch as he introduced a method which, notwithstanding great diversities in their theories, was retained by his successors. But how far any personal intercourse existed among them, is extremely uncertain, though, on the authority of some writers of little credit, they have been commonly represented as forming an unbroken chain of teachers and scholars. The point in which they agreed was, that they fixed their attention on a primeval state of things, to which they mounted by such steps as they could find, and from which they endeavoured to deduce the later order of nature. This feature, which was common to their systems, seems to betray the influence of the poetical cosmogonies, from which it was probably borrowed, though the mythical form was discarded. Whether it was from the same source that Thales derived the distinguishing tenet of his

The Ionian
school.

¹ Diogenes of Apollonia in Crete, and Archelaus, of whom it is uncertain whether he was a Milesian or an Athenian. This indeed would make no difference, and the epithet commonly given to the school itself would be improper, if, according to a strange fancy broached by Kreuser in his work on the Rhapsodists, p. 205., Miletus is not to be regarded as an Ionian city, because there was a legend, that, about the time of Minos, it received a colony, perhaps of Dorians, from Crete. Admitting the fact, we might prove by parity of reasoning, that there was no really Dorian state in Peloponnesus, where the early inhabitants all belonged to different races. With like acuteness (if he does not contradict himself in the same page) Kreuser, in his antipathy to the Ionians, would deprive them of all share in the glory of their most illustrious citizens, who, like Xenophanes and Anacreon, migrated to other regions.

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philosophy, according to which *water*, or some liquid element, was the origin of all things, is much more doubtful. But it is still less probable that he adopted this dogma from an Oriental mythology, though his personal connection with Phœnicia, whence his family is said to have sprung, has been supposed strongly to favour this suspicion. Aristotle¹ — it would seem much more judiciously — considers it as the result of some very simple observations on the uses of moisture in the nourishment of vegetable and animal life, which were probably connected with a traditional belief, that the earth rested on an abyss of waters², bounded by the river ocean, the immediate cause of earthquakes, which were therefore ascribed to the power of Poseidon. It seems to have been by a similar process that, half a century later, Anaximenes of Miletus was led to substitute a new principle for the liquid element of Thales. To him *air*, as it encompassed and sustained the earth and the heavenly bodies which float in it, appeared also as the universal source of life — the breath of the world, which animates all the beings that live in it. And it was apparently by an analogy of the same kind that *fire* — not the visible element, but some more subtle fluid — was preferred for the same purpose by the Ephesian Heraclitus, who, in other respects, stands apart from the other philosophers of the school: an original thinker, who, by a peculiar and ingenious theory, endeavoured to reconcile the constant flux of all sensible objects with the permanency of a single intelligible substance. To him the order of nature appeared as the momentary equipoise of conflicting impulses, which he illustrated by the tension of the bow and the lyre, or by an image which, singularly enough, occurs also in the philoso-

¹ Met. i. 3.

² Plut. De Pl. Phil. iii. 15. Orig. Phil. i. Sir J. Herschel (*Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy*, p. 107.) suggests a different occasion.

phical poetry of India, as the *play* of the Infinite Being from whom all things proceed, and to whom, in successive periods, all things return. His followers seem to have formed a separate sect, and his opinions to have exerted considerable influence on some of the later schools, as they present a remarkable coincidence with one of the most recent theories of modern science.¹

It is scarcely possible to refrain from smiling at the boldness with which these first adventurers in the field of speculation, unconscious of the scantiness of their resources or of the difficulty of the enterprise, rushed at once to the solution of the highest problems of philosophy. But to temper any disdainful feeling which their temerity may excite, it should be remembered that, without the spirit which prompted this hardihood, philosophy would probably never have risen from its cradle. The direction which it took toward outward objects was the most conformable to the natural tendency of the human mind, and to the peculiar character and genius of the Ionian race. And, that we may not undervalue the importance of these early attempts, or turn away from them with indifference, on account of their intrinsic futility, it may be proper to cast a look on the results to which they led, on the manner in which they affected the views of subsequent inquirers, and the influence they exerted on the public mind. With regard to the study of nature indeed, the utmost perhaps that can be said in their favour is, that they did not materially check, confine, or pervert it. Most of these early philosophers were diligent, as well as sagacious, inquirers—a praise which has been bestowed on them by one of the most eminent of our own day²—and

¹ La Place's *état primitif* (*Système du Monde*, p. 433.) comes near to the ἀρχή of Heraclitus on the one side, as the πῦρ τεχνικόν of the Stoics did on the other.

² Sir J. Herschel (*Discourse*, p. 107.) But the remarks in the next page, so

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enriched the knowledge of their age with some important discoveries; and though their explanations of natural phenomena are often extremely rude, it does not appear that they attempted to accommodate their observations to their systems, which indeed were probably not so mature as to require such a sacrifice. But in another point of view these systems were pregnant with more important consequences. Thales evolved his world out of a single simple substance, to which he attributed the power of passing spontaneously through the various transformations necessary for the multiplicity of natural productions. But he does not seem to have attempted accurately to define the nature of these transformations. And so most of his successors, who set out from a similar hypothesis, contented themselves with some vague notions, or phrases, about the successive expansions or contractions of the original substance. But as the contemplation of animal life had led Anaximenes to adopt air as the basis of his system, a later philosopher, Diogenes of Apollonia, carried this analogy a step further, and regarded the universe as issuing from an intelligent principle, by which it was at once vivified and ordered — a rational, as well as sensitive soul — still without recognising any distinction between matter and mind. Much earlier however Anaximander of Miletus, who flourished not long after Thales, and is generally considered as his immediate disciple, seems to have been struck by the difficulty of accounting for the changes which a simple substance must be supposed to undergo, in order to produce an infinite variety of beings. He found it easier, in conformity with some of the ancient cosmogonies, to conceive the primitive state of the universe as a vast chaos — for which he had no other

far as they impute unphilosophical motives, of vanity or ambition, to these same inquirers, will not be readily adopted by any one who is conversant with the history of Greek philosophy.

name than the Infinite — containing all the elements out of which the world was to be constructed by a process of separation and combination, which however he considered as the result of a motion, not impressed on it from without, but inherent in the mass. This hypothesis, which tended to give an entirely new direction to the speculations of the school, seems to have been treated with a neglect which it is difficult to explain, and which has raised a suspicion that some less celebrated names may have dropped out of the list of the Ionian philosophers.¹ But a century after Anaximander, Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ revived his doctrine with some very fanciful additions, and one very important change. He combined the principle of Anaximander with that of his contemporary Diogenes, and acknowledged a supreme mind, distinct from the chaos to which it imparted motion, form, and order. The pantheistic systems of the Ionian school were only independent of the popular creed, and did not exclude it. The language of Thales and Heraclitus, who declared that the universe was full of gods², left room for all the fictions of the received mythology, and might even add new fervour to the superstition of the vulgar. But the system of Anaxagoras seems to have been felt to be almost irreconcilable with the prevailing opinions, and hence, as we shall find, drew upon him hatred and persecution.

While philosophy was thus cultivated in Ionia, two schools arose in the western colonies, of widely different characters, though both were founded by Ionians, and one in the seat of an Ionian population. This was the Eleatic, which took its name from the town of Elea, or Velia, on the western coast of Southern Italy, a settlement of the Phocæans, the origin of

The Eleatic
school.

¹ Ritter, i. p. 289. But see Brandis in the Rhein. Mus. iii. p. 118. fol.

² According to Aristotle De Anim. i. 5., this was the very expression of Thales. Heraclitus conveyed the same thought in another form, when he bad his guests enter, saying, *Here too are gods.* Aristot. De part. anim. i. 5.

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which will be hereafter noticed, and to which Xenophanes, the founder of the school, migrated, it is believed, about 536 B. C. from his birthplace Colophon. We mention it first, because it seems to have been connected, though by a polemical relation, with the school of Thales, and its history, in one important point, presents a contrast to that of the Ionian philosophy. For the Eleatic began, where the other ended, with the admission of a supreme intelligence; and it even seems probable, that Xenophanes was guided in the formation of his system by a religious, rather than by a purely philosophical interest. As Thales saw gods in all things, so it may be said that Xenophanes saw all things in God. Aristotle described his predominant thought, or feeling, with remarkable liveliness and simplicity, by saying, that he gazed upon the whole heaven and said, that the One Being was the Deity.¹ The changes which Thales attributed to the One Being appeared to him inconsistent with the character of the Deity, and unintelligible in themselves. He found it impossible to conceive that any thing could come into being, or could cease to be. Nevertheless it does not appear that he absolutely denied the reality of external objects, or regarded their varying aspects as mere illusions. But the precise mode in which he attempted to reconcile their multiplicity and manifold transformations with the unity and unalterable identity of the Deity, who, though all mind, was still one with the world, is a point which cannot be determined from the fragmentary remains of his works, and on which we are left to form uncertain conjectures. If, as some accounts might lead us to believe, he for this purpose made a distinction between the senses and the reason, he would have the honour of opening a new and very important field of speculation, as the earliest inquirer

¹ Met. i. 5. εἰς τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἐν εἶναί φησι τὸν Θεόν.

into the faculties of the human mind. And at all events he suggested the distinction, which was more strongly insisted on by his follower Parmenides. Xenophanes was not so immersed in his ontological speculations as to neglect the study of nature, and had formed a system, which seems not to have been very far removed from that of Thales, as he was led by geological observations to similar conclusions on the primitive state of the world.¹ He was the first Greek philosopher who openly rejected the popular superstition, which he referred to its true source, the tendency of man to assimilate the objects of his worship to his own nature, and he inveighed against Homer and Hesiod, for attributing to the gods actions unworthy of the divine character. He also attacked several doctrines of his philosophical contemporaries or predecessors², and seems to have satisfied himself better in refuting their opinions than in establishing his own.

Parmenides, a native of Elea, whose early youth seems to have coincided with the advanced age of Xenophanes, though it is not certain that he received his personal instructions, pursued the same direction. But he set out, not like Xenophanes, from the idea of deity, but from the notion of being; he expressly grounded his system on the distinction between sense and reason, as means of arriving at truth, and on the one hand went so far as to deny the reality of time, space, and motion, while on the other hand he admitted

¹ He supported his opinion, that earth and sea were once mingled in one mass, by referring to sea-shells found in midland regions and in the bowels of mountains, to the impressions of fish in the quarries of Syracuse, and to similar phenomena observed in the isle of Paros, and elsewhere. Origen. Phil. 14. This seems to imply that no preceding philosopher had made the same use of the like observations. See above, p. 148. not. 2.

² Ritter (i. p. 452.) finds an allusion to Pythagorean doctrines, where it would seem that Xenophanes might have had Anaximander's *ἀείρον* in view. The Pythagorean tenets which he is supposed to have controverted, even if they were formed so early, seem, according to Ritter's own observation (p. 356.), to have been kept longer secret.

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so much of a real foundation for the appearances of nature, as rendered them not unworthy of attention, and even constructed a peculiar physical theory to explain them. But it is to be lamented that in his case, as in his master's, we are left in the dark as to his mode of reconciling these seemingly inconsistent views. His fellow-citizen, friend, and disciple, the courageous and unfortunate Zeno, and Melissus of Samos, who united great military talents and experience with his philosophical pursuits, chiefly exercised their dialectic subtlety in combating both the dogmas of other philosophers and the opinions of the vulgar, and though there is no reason to doubt that they were earnest in search of truth, they seem too often to have descended to sophistical paradoxes, which need all the indulgence that can be claimed for an early stage of science. Zeno himself was sometimes ranked among the Sophists, whose pernicious influence we shall hereafter have occasion to notice, and thus the Eleatic school, which in its outset was distinguished by a religious philosophy, insensibly contracted a close affinity with a class of men, who laboured to destroy both philosophy and religion.

Philosophical literature.

We may here mention a remarkable feature in the history of the early philosophical literature, which corresponds to the character of the several schools and systems. Of Thales it is not certainly known whether he wrote any thing, nor whether some verses — about two hundred — which were attributed to him, contained an account of his physical doctrines, or were merely a collection of practical maxims and precepts, such as were ascribed to all those who were numbered among the Seven Sages. His younger contemporary Anaximander unfolded his theory in a prose work, and his example appears to have been followed by all the philosophers of the same school. The specimens left of their writings show that their loss is to be regretted in

a literary point of view, as well as on account of the information which they would have afforded. Their style seems to have resembled that of the early historians: its simplicity was relieved by the bold poetical images in which their thoughts were frequently veiled. On the other hand, Xenophanes and Parmenides explained and defended their systems in verse, which scarcely deserves the name of poetry, though the former was the author of several moral elegies, which were not deficient in poetical merit, and of a historical epic, perhaps the first of its kind, on the foundation of Colophon, and the migration to Elea. The remains of the philosophical poems breathe a strain of oracular solemnity and obscurity, and to contemporary readers must have supplied the absence of all purely poetical appeals to the imagination and the feelings, by the interest of new and mysterious trains of thought, struggling in vain for an adequate expression. But a metrical vehicle did not so well suit Zeno's dialectic genius, and he adopted a more appropriate instrument of controversy in the dialogue, which in his hands was probably a very dry form, and utterly destitute of the attractions which were afterwards imparted to it by the highest efforts of Attic eloquence.

The Eleatics appear likewise to have suggested some features of the system framed about the middle of the fifth century by Empedocles of Agrigentum, which he also unfolded in a poetical form. It neither has so much philosophical interest, nor exerted such influence in after times, as to demand notice here. In another point of view—as a man who combined philosophy with religion and an ascetic morality, assumed a priestly character, possessed an insight into some secrets of nature unknown to his contemporaries, and by all these means acquired a powerful ascendant over them, and was regarded with a religious awe—Empedocles belongs to the same class with Epimenides

Empedo-
cles.

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and Pythagoras, the founder of the second, and the most celebrated, of the western schools, which indeed might perhaps claim precedence by a few years of the Eleatic.¹ We have reserved it for this place, both as less intimately connected with the Ionian schools, and because it will lead us to take a view of the political condition of some of the Greek cities in Italy which we have already mentioned.

Pythagoras.

The history of Pythagoras is obscured by a cloud of legends, through which little can be distinguished beyond the leading outlines of his life and character. He was a native of Samos, born about B. c. 570, and by his mother's side is said to have been connected with one of the most ancient families in the island. But his father Mnesarchus was generally believed to have been a foreigner and not of purely Greek origin, though it was disputed whether he was a Phœnician, or belonged to the Tyrrhenians of Lemnos or Imbrus, to a branch therefore of the Pelasgian race. Like uncertainty hangs over the early life of Pythagoras, the sources of his knowledge, or the aid he received in the cultivation of his mind. But there seems to be no reason to doubt that he travelled in the East, at least in Egypt, and that he derived some instruction from Pherecydes of Syros, if not from Anaximander.² To

¹ He was commonly classed among the Pythagoreans (see Sturz, Empedocles, § 3.). But Ritter has established his connection with the Eleatics by a careful comparison of his remains with those of Parmenides. Perhaps the other opinion was suggested by the resemblance between his character and that of Pythagoras. Yet beside his doctrine concerning the soul, his Sphere-god, which absorbs and assimilates portions of the realm of strife, and his two opposite principles, which are subordinate to a higher unity, seem to come nearer to some peculiar features of the Pythagorean philosophy. By others again, both ancients and moderns (as Reinhold *Geschichte der Philosophie*, i. p. 66.), he has been assigned to the Ionian school, as a disciple of Anaxagoras. He may probably be looked upon as the first author of an eclectic system. But see Brandis in the essay above referred to, p. 123. fol.

² Apollon. ap. Porphy. De Vit. Pyth. 2. Tradition indeed can have but little weight on a point of this nature. But as to Pherecydes the ancients appear to have been unanimous. As to Anaximander, and Thales, who is also mentioned among the teachers of Pythagoras, our belief must rest chiefly on the probability—whatever it may be—that he became acquainted with the persons most eminent for knowledge and wisdom in his day. With regard to Pherecydes the tradition may seem to be confirmed by another, according to which he was the first Greek

his stay in Egypt he was most likely indebted not so much for any positive knowledge or definite opinions as for hints which roused his curiosity, and impressions which decided the bias of his mind. In the science of the Egyptians he perhaps found little to borrow; but in their political and religious institutions he saw a mighty engine, such as he might wish to wield for nobler purposes. It is equally credible that he was initiated in several of the most ancient Greek mysteries, even if there should be no ground for the conjecture, that he inherited some secrets of a mystic lore from Pelasgian ancestors.¹ We may here remark that among the various opinions which have been entertained by the learned as to the Greek mysteries, none seems more probable than that which holds them to have been the remains of a worship, which preceded the rise of the Hellenic mythology and its attendant rites, grounded on a view of nature less fanciful, more earnest, and better fitted to awaken both philosophical thought and religious feeling. It is extremely doubtful how far they were ever used as a vehicle for the exposition of theological doctrines differing from the popular creed. But it seems not improbable that in the century which followed the opening of a regular intercourse between Greece and Egypt, some attempts were made to connect the mystic legends, which were either exhibited in mimic shows, or conveyed in hymns, with a sort of speculative system, which may here and there have contained some features derived from the East; and that the authors of this new

who taught the immortality of the soul. But no traces of an intercourse with Thales or Anaximander can be discovered in any of the doctrines ascribed to Pythagoras, and therefore the question is one which it is equally unimportant and difficult to decide. This is still more the case as to the other alleged teachers of Pythagoras, as Blas of Priene, and obscure names, such as Creophilus and Hermodamas. Ritter has made some judicious remarks on this subject in his *Geschichte der Pythagorischen Philosophie*, p. 15. foll.

¹ Ritter i. p. 350. But the story of the mystagogue Aglaophamus, who is said to have admitted him to the Orphic mysteries at Libethra, where he learned the rudiments of his arithmetical theology, is perhaps a fable not much more ancient than the time of Iamblichus. See Lobeck *Aglaoph.* p. 723.

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learning endeavoured to recommend it by the authority of Orpheus, and other venerable names Thracian, Lycian, or Hyperborean bards and prophets. It was now perhaps that the views of the initiated began to be extended beyond the present life, and that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul was made a basis for the assurance of higher privileges than had before been held out to them. Whether it was from a domestic or a foreign source that Pythagoras drew the peculiar form of this doctrine which he adopted — that of a transmigration of souls — we cannot determine; Pindar's allusions seem to indicate that in his time it had been long familiar to the Greeks.¹

Pythagorean philosophy.

Pythagoras is said to have been the first Greek who assumed the title of a philosopher. If this was so, he probably did not intend, as has been commonly imagined, to deprecate the reputation of wisdom, but to profess himself devoted to the pursuit of it; though on the other hand the well-known story which explains the origin of the name, suggests an entirely false notion of his view of life, so far as it implies that he regarded contemplation as the highest end of human existence.² His ardent thirst of knowledge he shared with many of his contemporaries; but he was distinguished by his strong bent for mathematical studies and for all connected with them. Several remarkable discoveries in geometry, music, and astronomy are attributed to him³, and his whole philosophy was the result of this predilection. We are the less inclined to enter into an explanation of his system, as it is almost certain that he never committed it to writing, and it is extremely difficult, in the doctrines which

¹ See Dissen. on Pindar Ol. II. 68. and Fragm. Thren. 4.

² The philosopher is like the spectator at the Olympic games, who, while others are attracted by ambition or gain, comes only to gratify a liberal curiosity. See Cicero Tusc. Disp. v. 8. and Davis's note.

³ See Professor Powell's *History of Natural Philosophy*, p. 19—21.

are called Pythagorean, to distinguish what belongs to him, and what to his disciples and their followers. We can only venture to make a few remarks on its character and tendency, so far as they may be collected with some degree of safety. It seems clear that Pythagoras not only conceived that *numbers* represented the essence and properties of all things, but attributed to them such a real objective existence as rendered them capable of serving as materials or elements in his construction of the universe; a process, of which no satisfactory account has yet been given, which does not imply that he confounded, first a numerical unit with a geometrical point, and then this with a material atom.¹ He thus on one side pointed the way to the physical theory afterwards maintained by Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, though it is by no means certain that this was the source from which it was derived. But it is extremely improbable that either he, or any of his followers, ever caught a glimpse of the atomic theory of modern science. On the other hand he seems to be justly chargeable with a large part of the absurdities and superstitions which claimed the sanction of his name in the latest period of Greek philosophy, and which exerted such a powerful and mischievous influence over the opinions of many succeeding ages. For, innocent as he may have been of such an intention, he probably opened a

¹ This remark has been considered, by an author very much better qualified to pronounce on the merits of the Pythagorean philosophy, as a *criticism* which appears to place systems of physical philosophy under requisitions too severe (Whewell, *History of the Inductive Sciences*, i. p. 63.). But it was meant simply to express the impression that had been left on my mind by the most elaborate explanations I had seen of the system of Pythagoras. And it appears that Aristotle experienced a like difficulty, and attributed the same defect to the Pythagorean system. See *Metaph.* xiv. 2. (πόθεν χρὴ πιστεῦσαι ὡς ἔστι τοιοῦτος ἀριθμός; i. e. has objective existence. Compare Brandis in the *Rhein. Mus.* ii. p. 218., and *Geschichte der Griechisch-Römischen Philosophie*, i. p. 446.) and xiv. 3. κατὰ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα, ἐκ μὴ ἐχόντων βάρος μηδὲ κουφότητα ἔχοντα κουφότητα καὶ βάρος, δοίκασι (sc. οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι) περὶ ἄλλου οὐρανοῦ λέγειν καὶ σωμάτων, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, and toward the end of the chapter: ἐπειδὴ κοσμοποιοῦσι καὶ φυσικῶς βούλονται λέγειν, δίκαιον αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζειν τι περὶ φύσεως, ἐκ δὲ τῆς νῦν ἀφεῖναι μεθόδου.

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door for all these chimeras, not only in the mysterious virtue which he attributed to numbers, but likewise in the still more abstruse speculations by which he ascended to the first principles of number itself, in which he discovered a contrast variously expressed by his followers as one between light and darkness, or between good and evil, and perhaps equivalent to that between mind and matter, reason and sense.¹ These opposite principles were represented indeed as subordinate to a higher unity, but also as issuing out of it. And thus the First Cause itself was drawn into the conflict, and engaged in a struggle with its own original imperfection.

It is not improbable that the philosophy of Pythagoras would have been more sober, and might not have been the occasion of so many incoherent dreams, but for the symbolical and mystic veil which he threw over it, and which was perhaps necessary for the success of his plans, though it could not secure them against the revolution by which they were at last frustrated. For the history of the human mind his institutions are perhaps less interesting than his philosophy; but for the history of Greece his philosophy is chiefly important as it throws some light on the character of his institutions. The accounts which have been preserved of their origin and their fate, though perplexed by many contradictions, serve for a time to break the obscurity which commonly rests upon the affairs of the Greek cities in Italy.

Institutions
of Pythagoras.

Pythagoras is generally believed to have found Polycrates ruling at Samos on his return from his

¹ Aristotle, *Met.* l. 5. enumerates ten pairs of these opposite principles, which according to some Pythagoreans, on account of the virtue ascribed to the number ten, included all or the most important elements of the universe. We subjoin the list, which may give some notion of the character of the system, and of the ease with which it might adapt itself to the most fanciful combinations. They are: Limit and Unlimited; Odd and Even; One and Many; Right and Left; Male and Female; Still and Moved; Straight and Curve; Light and Darkness; Good and Evil; Square and Oblong. These, as the ancients perceived, are only ten different aspects of one vague idea.

travels in the East, and his aversion to the tyrant's government was sometimes assigned as the motive which led him finally to quit his native island. If there was any foundation for this story, it must probably be sought, not in any personal enmity between him and Polycrates — who is said to have furnished him with letters of recommendation to Amasis — but in his conviction, that the power of Polycrates would oppose insuperable obstacles to his designs. For it seems certain that before he set out for the West he had already conceived the idea to which he dedicated the remainder of his life, and only sought for a fit place, and a favourable opportunity, to carry it into effect. We however find intimations, that he did not leave Samos until he had acquired some celebrity among the Asiatic Greeks¹, by the introduction of certain mystic rites, which Herodotus represents as closely allied to the Egyptian, and to those which were celebrated in Greece under the name of Orpheus as their reputed founder. But as we cannot believe that the establishment of a new form of religion was an object that Pythagoras ever proposed to himself apart from his political views, we could only regard these mysteries, supposing the fact ascertained, in the light of an essay or an experiment, by which he sounded the disposition or the capacity of his countrymen for the reception of other more practical doctrines. The fame of his travels, his wisdom, and sanctity, had probably gone before him into Greece, where he appears to have stayed some time, partly perhaps to enlarge his knowledge, and partly to heighten his reputation. It was no doubt for the former purpose that he visited Crete and Sparta, where he found a model of government and discipline more congenial to his

¹ Ritter infers this from the story that Zamolxis had served Pythagoras in Samos (Herod. iv. 95.), and also from the fact, that the fame of his learning had reached Heraclitus. Neither argument is decisive.

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habits of thinking, than he could have met with any where else but in Egypt or India. If, as is highly probable, he stopped on the same journey at Olympia and Delphi, it was perhaps less from either curiosity or devotion, than from the desire of obtaining the sanction of the oracles, and of forming a useful connection with their ministers. Thus we are told that he was indebted for many of his ethical dogmas to Themistoclea of Delphi, probably the priestess. The legends about his appearance at Olympia — where he is said to have shown a thigh, like the shoulder of Pelops, of gold or ivory, and to have fascinated an eagle as it flew over his head — may very well be connected with this journey, and would indicate that he was looked upon as a person partaking of a superhuman nature, and as an especial favourite of Heaven. How far he excited or encouraged such a delusion, is, as in all such cases, very difficult to determine; but it seems unquestionable, that he did not rely solely on his genuine merits and acquirements, but put forward marvellous pretensions, which, he must have been conscious, had no real ground, and which, we must suspect, were calculated to attract the veneration of the credulous. The most famous of these was the claim he laid to the privilege — conferred on him, as he asserted, by the god Hermes — of preserving a distinct remembrance of many states of existence which his soul had passed through; an imposture attested by his contemporary Xenophanes, who, as his character in this respect stands much higher than that of Pythagoras, appears to have treated it in his elegies with deserved ridicule.¹

His pretensions.

Pythagoras at Croton.

What were the precise motives which induced him finally to fix his residence among the Italian Greeks,

¹ Diog. viii. 36. Pythagoras is represented as interceding for a dog which was howling under the lash, on the ground that he recognised the voice of a deceased friend, whose soul had migrated into the animal.

and particularly at Croton, is only matter for conjecture. The peculiar salubrity of the air of Croton, its aristocratical government, a state of manners which, though falling far short of his idea, was advantageously contrasted with the luxury of Sybaris, might suffice to determine his choice, even if there were no other circumstances in its condition which opened a prospect of successful exertion. In fact however the state of parties in Croton at the time when he arrived there, seems to have been singularly favourable to the undertaking which he meditated. Causes of discord were at work there, as in most of the neighbouring cities, very similar to those which produced the struggle between the patricians and the plebeians at Rome. There was a body, called a senate, composed of a thousand members, and probably representing the descendants of the more ancient settlers, invested with large and irresponsible authority, and enjoying privileges, which had begun to excite discontent among the people. The power of the oligarchy was still preponderant, but apparently not so secure as to render all assistance superfluous. The arrival of a stranger, outwardly neutral, who engaged the veneration of the multitude by his priestly character, and by the rumour of his supernatural endowments, and was willing to throw all his influence into the scale of the government, on condition of exercising some control over its measures, was an event which could not but be hailed with great joy by the privileged class. And accordingly Pythagoras seems to have found the utmost readiness in the senate of Croton to favour his designs.

The real nature of these designs, and of the means by which he endeavoured to carry them into execution, is a question which has exercised the sagacity of many inquirers, and has been variously solved, according to the higher degree of importance which

Object of
his society

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Pythagoras has been supposed to have attached to religion, or to philosophy, or to government. But it seems clear that his object was not exclusively, or even predominantly, religious, or philosophical, or political, and that none of these objects stood in the relation of an end to the other two, as its means. On the other hand we cannot be satisfied with the opinion of a modern author¹, that the aim of Pythagoras was to exhibit the ideal of a Dorian state. This is perhaps in one sense more, and in another less than he really attempted, and the opinion seems to affect the character of the Dorians rather than the views of Pythagoras. His leading thought appears to have been, that the state and the individual ought, each in its way, to reflect the image of that order and harmony by which he believed the universe to be sustained and regulated; and he only expressed the religious side of this thought, when he said, that the highest end of human existence was to follow or resemble the Deity. But he was aware that this sublime idea can never be fully embodied in this sublunary world, and that a wise man will be content with slowly approaching the unattainable mark, and in working upon others will adapt his exertions to the circumstances in which he is placed, and to the imperfection of those whom he has to deal with. He had before him the example of Lycurgus, and, still nearer, those of Zaleucus and Charondas, who had legislated, not many generations earlier, the one for Locri, the other for Catana, on principles so agreeable to his own, that in the traditions of later times they were numbered among his disciples. This however was probably something more than the state of affairs which he found at Croton would have permitted him to undertake, and yet less

¹ Müller *Dor.* iii. 9. 15. He goes beyond F. Schlegel, who, in his essay on Plato's Diotima (*Werk.* iv. p. 109.), had noticed the Dorian character of the Pythagorean institutions.

than he might hope to accomplish by different means. He did not frame a constitution or a code of laws ; nor does he appear ever to have assumed any public office. He instituted a society — an order we might now call it — of which he became the general. It was composed of young men carefully selected from the noblest families, not only of Croton, but of other Italiot cities. Their number amounted, or was confined, to three hundred ; and if he expected by their co-operation to exercise a sway, firmer and more lasting than that of a lawgiver or a magistrate, first over Croton, and in the end over all the Italian colonies, his project, though new and bold, ought not to be pronounced visionary or extravagant.

According to our view of this celebrated society, it is not surprising that it should have presented such a variety of aspects, as to mislead those who fixed their attention on any one of them, and withdrew it from the rest. It was at once a philosophical school, a religious brotherhood, and a political association ; and all these characters appear to have been inseparably united in the founder's mind. It must be considered as a proof of upright intentions in Pythagoras, which ought to rescue him from all suspicion of selfish motives, that he chose for his coadjutors persons whom he deemed capable of grasping the highest truths which he could communicate, and was not only willing to teach them all he knew, but regarded the utmost cultivation of their intellectual faculties as a necessary preparation for the work to which he destined them. His lessons were certainly not confined to particular branches of mathematical or physical science, but were clearly meant to throw the fullest light on the greatest questions which can occupy the human mind. Those who were to govern others were first to contemplate the world, and to comprehend the place which they filled in it. The Pythagorean phi-

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losophy may indeed appear singularly foreign to the business of a statesman; but we know that some of the greatest both in ancient and modern times have been nourished in such speculations, and the effects of the exercise are not to be measured by the importance of the scientific results.

Religion of
Pythagoras.

It is certain that religion was intimately connected with the institutions of Pythagoras, and it may not be too much to say¹, that it was the centre in which they rested, or the corner-stone of the whole fabric, and the main bond of union among his followers. But it is by no means clear, either what kind of religion it was, or in what manner it acted. And its importance may have been the cause of this obscurity; for it is highly probable that the secrecy in which the proceedings of the fraternity were enveloped, related not to its philosophical doctrines, nor even to its political designs, but to its religious observances. In what relation however this mystic religion stood to that of the public temples, is very doubtful. Pythagoras is said to have inveighed, as bitterly as Xenophanes, against Homer and Hesiod, for degrading their divine personages², but he professed the highest reverence for the objects of the popular superstition. It is true that he reduced the gods to so many numbers: but this was a theological nicety, and did not concern the multitude which saw him bow at their altars. There is no reason to think that these mysteries conveyed any doctrines inconsistent with the common opinions. It is most probable, and the story which was current among the Greeks on the Hellespont about the imposture of Zamolxis seems to confirm this conjecture³, that the chief object of the mysteries was to inculcate the dogma of the immortality

¹ With Ritter, in both the works above referred to.

² Dlog. Laert. viii. 21. On the other hand see Porph. De V. P. xxxii.

³ Her. iv. 95. Compare the story told by Hermippus in Dlog. viii. 41.

and migrations of the soul, which might be easily applied to the purpose of strengthening a generous enthusiasm. But there can be no doubt that religion was made to hallow all the relations into which the associates entered, that it cemented their mutual attachment, and exalted their veneration for their master. It is also important to observe that the mysteries appear to have been open, though perhaps not in their last stage, to persons who were not members of the political society. Thus women seem to have been admitted to them, and hence we find a long list of female Pythagoreans. It is easy to imagine how much the influence of the institution must have been enlarged by such an accession.

Whether Pythagoras had formed any definite political theory, is another disputable point. It is not even certain that he wished to see his disciples placed in public offices, though the state was to be their proper and highest sphere of action — much less that he designed they should constitute a separate body clothed with legal authority. His preference of one form of government to another probably depended on the facility with which it lent itself to his views; but that in general his sentiments were rigidly aristocratical could scarcely be doubted, even if there were no direct evidence of the fact.¹

His political
views.

The candidate who sought admission into the order, if his first appearance satisfied the eye of the master, who is said to have placed great reliance on his judgment of physiognomies², had to pass through a period of probation and discipline. Various accounts are given of the term and the rules of this noviciate, and of the classes into which the disciples were distributed.³

Constitu-
tion of his
society.

¹ One is rather surprised at the tone of uncertainty with which Ritter (i. p. 352.) expresses himself on this point.

² Gell. N. A. i. 9.

³ The most general distinction seems to be that between the *Exoteric* and *Esoteric*: some authors believed that the same distinction was expressed by the

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It seems to be plainly implied by all the traditions on the subject, that for a time at least they exchanged their domestic habits for a new mode of life, which was regulated in its minutest details by the will of Pythagoras. In these regulations he may have been guided by the Dorian practice, which he is said to have witnessed in Crete and Sparta; though the attention which he paid to music and gymnastics, as the two main elements of education, was both conformable to national usage, and might have resulted spontaneously from his philosophical views. No dependence can be placed on the stories which are told of the abstinence which he is said to have prescribed.¹ To preserve the vigour of body and mind by strict temperance, was no doubt his first object; but it is probable enough that he also restricted the diet of his followers by several prohibitions, which had no other than a symbolical meaning, and were intended to impress some moral or religious truths. It must however be observed that, among his other accomplishments, he was famed for his medical skill, and he has even been thought to have founded the first scientific school of medicine², which before his time had been almost exclusively cultivated by the priesthood of certain temples, which were frequented for the sake of miraculous cures. And his character might incline him to follow many fanciful analogies in the regulation of

terms *Pythagorist* and *Pythagorean*. These terms only signify certain gradations, without marking the nature of the subject as religious, philosophical, or political. Whereas others spoke of a division into *sebastici*, *politici*, and *mathematici*, or a class of religion, a class of politics, and a class of science; but to this they added three gradations: *Pythagorici*, *Pythagorei*, *Pythagoristæ*, according to the more or less familiar intercourse enjoyed with the master. Ritter conceives that the distinction of classes related only to the religious mysteries. Yet there seems to be nothing improbable in such a scale of degrees in philosophy as Gellius describes (i. 9.) under the names, *Acustici*, *Mathematici*, *Physici*.

¹ Some authors represent him as forbidding all animal food, others all kinds of fish, others beans; whereas Aristoxenus, a writer of great credit, asserted that he preferred beans to all other vegetables. It seems probable that he only interdicted certain parts of animals, and certain kinds of fish, and perhaps of pulse.

² Wachsmuth H. A. iii. p. 487. Schlosser, l. i. p. 399., supposes him to have founded a school of medicine at Croton.

diet, which is represented as the main point to which he applied his art. If his disciples shared their ordinary meals together, after the Spartan custom, we can be at no loss to account for the fabulous exaggeration, by which they are said to have thrown all their possessions into a common stock. Their union was more intimate than that of kindred; according to some authors it excited the jealousy of their relatives, who saw themselves treated comparatively as strangers¹; and many interesting anecdotes are related of the purity and constancy of their friendship. We can readily believe that the Three Hundred, who were admitted to the last secrets, religious, philosophical, and political, that their master had to unfold, were bound together and to him by an oath, which was perhaps invested with peculiar solemnity by its mysterious form.² It was a precept ascribed to Pythagoras to show respect to an oath, to be slow in taking it, and steadfast in keeping it.³

The ambition of Pythagoras was assuredly, as we have already remarked, truly lofty and noble: he aimed at establishing a dominion which he believed to be that of wisdom and virtue, a rational supremacy of minds enlightened by philosophy and purified by religion, and characters fitted to maintain an ascendant over others by habits of self-command. Yet the failure of his undertaking, which however must not be considered as a total one, seems to have been owing not altogether to the violence and malignity of the passions which he had to contend with, but in part also to the weakness and rudeness of the instruments which he employed. He found or thought himself compelled to become a party in a contest, where the right certainly did not lie all on one side. We are informed

¹ Iamblich. De P. V. 255.

² The τετρακτύς.

³ Iambl. 144. Those who quitted the society were accounted as dead. Origen c. Celsum, II. 12. οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι κενοτάφια φκοδόμεουν τοῖς μετὰ τὸ προτραπῆναι ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν παλινδρομήσασιν ἐπὶ τὸν ἰδιωτικὸν βίον.

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ence at
Croton.

that at first he obtained unbounded influence over all classes at Croton, and effected a general reformation in the habits of the people, and that in other Italian cities he gained such a footing as enabled him either to counteract revolutionary movements, or to restore aristocratical government where it had given way to tyranny or democracy. The senate of Croton is said to have pressed him to guide it with his counsels¹; which may signify that he was invited to accept the office of a chief magistrate, or even a dictatorial authority. But he seems always to have remained in a private station, and the conjecture that his Three Hundred formed a legal assembly, which was raised above the Senate², is the more improbable, because they are said to have included several citizens of other states.³ Yet they had gained a predominance, both at Croton and elsewhere, which had perhaps excited both the hostility of the party whose interests they opposed, and the jealousy of that which they espoused, long before the event which was the immediate occasion of their ruin. We do not venture to decide what foundation there may have been for the charge which was brought against them, of attempting to abolish the popular assembly, which seems from the first to have been very narrowly limited in its powers. But the charge would not be refuted by any professions of attachment to the ancient constitution, which they may have made when innovations were proposed on the side of democracy⁴, even if it related to the period preceding their final breach with the commonalty. It would seem however that they fell

¹ Val. Max. viii. 15. E. 1.² Niebuhr *Hist. of Rome*, i. p. 158. (transl. of ed. 3d) conjectured that the three hundred Pythagoreans were the senate. He could scarcely mean that they superseded the Thousand.³ Iambl. 241.⁴ Iambl. 257. Yet great stress is laid on this fact by Kriech, *De Societatis a Pythagora conditæ Scopo*, p. 88.

chiefly through an overweening confidence in their own strength.

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Parties at
Sybaris.

The civil dissensions of Sybaris had at length come to a head, and broke out in a general insurrection against the oligarchs, who probably drew the supplies of their proverbial luxury from encroachment, either violent or fraudulent, on the popular rights. The insurgents headed by a leader named Telys, who was most likely a member of the ruling class and had some private animosity to gratify, did not observe the modesty of the Roman plebeians. They not only compelled their lords, to the number of five hundred, to quit the city¹; but, when the exiles had taken refuge at Croton, sent an insolent message to demand that they should be surrendered. Pythagoras is said to have exerted his influence with the senate and the people of Croton, to induce them to reject this imperious requisition; and on this occasion he must have had the good feelings of all parties on his side. It would indeed be a strong indication of the progress of discontent at home, if on such a point he had any opposition to encounter. The summons however was resisted, and Croton accepted the challenge which accompanied it, and armed for war. Sybaris is said to have sent three hundred thousand men, perhaps her whole serviceable population, into the field. The forces of Croton amounted to no more than a third of this number; but they were commanded by Milo, a disciple of Pythagoras, who seems to have united the abilities of a general with the bodily strength for which he was celebrated above all his contemporaries. They were also animated by the presence of Callias, a seer sprung from the gifted lineage of Iamus, who came over to them from Sybaris, with tidings that

¹ It is possible that these may be the Træzenians mentioned by Aristotle Pol. v. 2. 10. But it is not so clear from the context as Wesseling (on Diod. xii. 9.) represents.

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B.C. 510.

Destruction
of Sybaris.B. C. 504.
Suppression
of the Py-
thagorean
society.

their enemies were threatened by adverse omens¹; and there was a tradition that they were exasperated by the cruel fate of thirty of their citizens, who had been sent on an embassy to Sybaris, and were barbarously murdered there.² The spirit thus infused into them would better explain the issue of the conflict than either the prowess of Milo, to which Diodorus absurdly attributes it, or the singular stratagem by which they were reported to have thrown the enemy's cavalry into disorder.³ The two hosts met on the banks of the Trionto, and victory declared itself for Croton. It was probably after the battle that a reaction, which if it had happened sooner must have put a stop to hostilities, took place at Sybaris, in which Telys and his principal partisans were massacred at the altars.⁴ But this sally of revenge or despair came too late to save the unfortunate city from its doom. The conquerors advanced with irresistible force, and resolved to sweep Sybaris away from the face of the earth. She was emptied of her remaining inhabitants, sacked, and razed to the ground, and a river (the Crathis) was turned through the ruins, to obliterate all traces of her departed greatness.⁵

The senate of Croton, and the Pythagorean associates, seem to have been elated with this victory, and to have fancied that it was the triumph of their cause, and that they alone were to reap its fruits. When the question arose as to the distribution of the spoil, and of the conquered land⁶, they insisted on retaining the whole in the name of the state, and

¹ Her. v. 44. The Sybarites consoled themselves with the belief that their conquerors had been also aided by the arms of Dorieus, the younger brother of the Spartan king Cleomenes.

² Phylarchus in Athen. xii. p. 521. D.

³ Aristotle in Athen. p. 520. D. Their horses were trained to dance to the flute, and were attracted by a band of flute-players into the enemy's lines.

⁴ Heracl. Pont. in Athen. p. 521. F.

⁵ Strabo, vi. p. 263.

⁶ It seems clear that the conquered land was the principal subject of contention. The many desired *τὴν δορύκτητον κατακληρουχθῆναι*, according to Apollonius in Iamblichus, 255.

refused to concede any share to those who had earned it all by their toil and blood. It may have been now that they thought they saw a favourable opportunity of silencing all opposition by suppressing the popular assembly. But if this was the case, they probably miscalculated the effects of the public success, which may have raised the spirits of their domestic adversaries as high as their own. The commonalty was not awed, but only irritated by the attempt. Its fury was directed against the society, chiefly it is said by Cylon, a noble and wealthy man, who is believed to have been rejected by Pythagoras, when he sought to be admitted among his followers. A tumult took place, in which the populace set fire to Milo's house, where the Pythagoreans were assembled. Many perished, and the rest only found safety in exile. It is not clear whether Pythagoras himself was at Croton during this commotion; the general belief seems to have been that he died, not long after, at Metapontum.¹ The rising at Croton appears to have been followed by similar scenes in several other Italian cities, as at Caulonia, Locri, and Tarentum, which would prove the extensive ramifications of the order, and that it every where disclosed the same political character. Many of the fugitives took refuge in Greece, but confusion and bloodshed continued to prevail for many years in the cities, which had been seats of the society. Tranquillity was at length restored by the mediation of the Achæans of the mother country, and sixty of the exiles returned to their homes. But their presence seems to have given rise to fresh troubles, perhaps through their opposition to the democratical institutions which Croton and other cities adopted from Achaia²; and at a later period we find some

¹ According to Tzetzes, Chil. xi. Hist. 366. of hunger, after a fast of forty days, in the sanctuary of the Muses.

² Polyb. ii. 39.

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celebrated Pythagoreans in Greece, who had been driven out of Italy by their political adversaries, while others remained there, and endeavoured with partial success to revive the ancient influence of the order.¹

¹ On the history of Pythagoras and his society the principal sources of information are the accounts of his life in Diogenes, Porphyrius, and Iamblichus, which however require to be read with great caution. They are carefully sifted by Ritter in the two works above mentioned. On the political character of the society there are some excellent remarks in Welcker's *Introduction to Theognis*, p. xlv.—1. This is also the main subject of Kriecher's Essay *De Scopis*, &c., which, though written with a strong bias, will convey more information than Micali's diffuse and rhetorical narrative. We cannot close this slight sketch of the vast and deeply interesting subject treated in the present chapter, without expressing our regret that it has not yet employed some able hand in a separate work worthy of its magnitude and importance. M. Raoul Rochette's history, we are compelled to say, notwithstanding our respect for its industrious and intelligent author, will be chiefly useful to his successor, as an example of almost all the faults which he ought to avoid. At least one half of it is a mass of the dullest and most unpoetical fictions, expanded into the empty form of a political history; and in the remainder we should seek in vain for any of the facts which alone render the subject interesting. No view of any social relations enlivens the dry investigation of dates, events, and persons. This however is not to be considered as a defect, but as a limit which the author prescribed to himself. But it is to be hoped that some one will be found to undertake and accomplish something more and better. Perhaps a greater number of particular histories — *monographies* as the Germans call them — is wanted to prepare a foundation.

CHAPTER XIII.

AFFAIRS OF THE ASIATIC GREEKS TO THE YEAR
B. C. 521.

Rise of the Lydian Monarchy. — Irruption of the Cimmerians. Gyges makes war upon the Ionians. — Alyattes attacks Miletus. — Accession of Cræsus. — Cræsus subdues the Ionians. — Prosperity of Cræsus. — The Medes and Persians. — Cyrus dethrones Astyages. — Makes War upon Cræsus. — Capture of Sardis. — Cyrus makes War on the Ionians. — Heroism of the Phocæans. — And of the Teians. — The Persians subdue Asia Minor. — Death of Cyrus. — Condition of Egypt. — Cambyses invades Egypt. — Enterprises of Cambyses. — Polycrates. — Spartan Expedition to Samos. — Death of Polycrates. — Revolutions at the Court of Persia. — Darius Hystaspis mounts the Throne. — His Institutions. — Their Defects. — Persian Manners.

WHILE the Greek colonies on the coast of Asia were flourishing in freedom, commerce, wealth, arts, and arms, a power was growing up by their side, which, strong in their disunion, gradually encroached on their territory, and in the end crushed their independence. Between the foot of mount Tmolus and the river Hermus, on the right bank of the torrent Pactolus, rises a lofty hill, looking down on a broad and fruitful plain, into which the vales of the Hermus and the Caystrus open toward the East. This hill, steep on all sides, on one precipitous, had been from very early times the citadel of a race of kings who reigned over the surrounding region, and the city of Sardis had sprung up at its foot. The people whose capital Sardis had become in the period when Grecian history begins to be genuine and connected, were the Lydians; but

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Rise of the
Lydian
monarchy.

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their settlement in this tract was comparatively recent: for some generations after the Trojan war the Mæonians, apparently a Pelasgian tribe, occupied the same seats; and the Lydian monarchy seems to have been founded on a conquest, by which the ancient inhabitants were either expelled or subdued. This revolution however is nowhere expressly recorded: it can only be inferred from the silence of Homer as to the Lydians, from the probability that the Mæonians, as most of the other tribes that were scattered over the western side of Asia Minor before the Trojan war, were more nearly allied to the Greeks than the Lydians, and finally from the certain fact, that in the period to which the Lydian conquest of Mæonia, if admitted, must be referred, great changes frequently occurred in the population of this part of Asia.¹ Herodotus only explains the later name of the country, by relating that the Mæonian people came to be called Lydians after Lydus son of Atys; but according to his calculation this event must have happened before the Trojan war: for the dynasty of the Heracleids, which succeeded the descendants of Lydus, is said to have reigned five hundred years, before it gave way to that of the Mermnadæ, the beginning of which precedes the seventh century before our era. It is probable, though only to be received as a conjecture, that the accession of this last dynasty ought to be considered as the real foundation of the proper Lydian monarchy, and that this is the historical substance of the tradition, that Gyges, the first of the Mermnadæ, dethroned his master Candaules. He is said to have been aided by Carian auxiliaries, and the Carians looked upon the Lydians as a kindred race, and acknowledged Lydus as the brother of Car, as well as of Mysus.

¹ See Völcker in the *Rhein. Mus. für Phil.* i. p. 198. foll. *Ueber Spuren ausländischer Götterkulte bei Homer.*

It is however more certain and more important, that with the commencement of this new dynasty a new period opened for the Asiatic Greeks. Hitherto the inland regions had been continually disturbed by the irruption of Thracian and other barbarous hordes, some of which permanently established themselves, while others passed like a tempest over the land. The fiercest of these were the Treres and the Cimmerians, who are so described as to make it doubtful whether they were distinct nations or branches of the same race. The fragments preserved of the most ancient elegiac poetry express the terror with which the Ionians, and Ephesus in particular, viewed the approach of the Cimmerians, who had taken Sardis, and were encamped with their waggons on the banks of the Caystrus, when the Ephesian poet Callinus earnestly implored Jupiter to save his native city from their ferocious host. At a later period, in the reign of Candaules, Magnesia on the Mæander was utterly destroyed by the Treres, and the cruelty of the savage invaders made the calamity of the ruined city proverbial: but their inroad was only transient, and the next year the Milesians took possession of the vacant site. The Cimmerians however afflicted the peninsula during a longer term, and issuing from their strongholds in the mountains of Paphlagonia, more than once overran the fertile plains of the south. In the reign of Ardys, the successor of Gyges, they again took Sardis, all but the citadel; they were perhaps called away by tidings which they may have heard of the still fiercer Scythians, who had entered Asia, it is said, in pursuit of them, along the shores of the Caspian. The grandson of Ardys, Alyattes, was powerful enough finally to deliver Asia from the Cimmerians, about the same time that it was freed by the Medes from the presence of the Scythians.

In the mean while the kings of Lydia were growing

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B.C. 612.

Gyges
makes war
upon the
Ionians.Alyattes
attacks
Miletus.

more and more formidable to their Greek neighbours. The people was warlike, yet conversant in the arts of peace, and ready to profit by Greek inventions, as well as to blend Greek usages with their native Asiatic manners. The country was rich, especially in the precious metals, and it was from the Lydians that the Ionians first learned the art of coining them. It is possible that they were also indebted to them, if not for the art, for the earliest materials of writing. The farther the Lydians pushed their conquests into the heart of Asia, the more impatient they naturally grew of being separated from the sea, and the more ambitious of subjecting the flourishing cities on the coast to their empire. The incursions of the northern barbarians long thwarted their plans, and for a time preserved the independence of the Greek colonies; but when they had rid themselves of this obstacle, there was no power in the west of Asia that could any longer bar their progress. Gyges is said to have taken Colophon, and to have invaded the territories of Smyrna and Miletus. He made himself master of the whole of the Troas, and the Milesians were obliged to obtain his permission before they founded Abydus on the northern extremity of that region.¹ His son Ardys prosecuted the war, and made himself master of Priené. The third king Sadyattes bent his attacks chiefly against Miletus, and his successor Alyattes continued these hostilities. They were not however carried on so as either to threaten the safety of the city, or to inflict any deep wound on her prosperity. During eleven successive years, five of which belonged to the reign of Alyattes, the Lydian army marched every summer into the Milesian territory, to the sound of festive music, as if for purposes of revelry.² It

¹ Strabo, xiii. p. 590.² Herod. i. 17. ὑπὸ συρίγγων τε καὶ πηκτίδων καὶ αὐλοῦ γυναικῆτος τε καὶ ἀνδρηῆτος. Pindar (Athen. xiv. 37.) said of Terpander that he invented the βάρβιτος :

Πρῶτος ἐν δέλπνοισι Λυδῶν

Ψαλμὸν ἀντίφθογγον ὑψηλᾶς ἀκούων πηκτίδος.

But compare Athen. xiv. p. 627. d.

wasted the fruits of the husbandman's labour; but left the houses standing, that he might not be deterred from tilling the land. Beyond this, except when they ventured to meet the enemy in the field, the Milesians suffered no harm: their town was secure from attack, and the sea supplied them with provisions in abundance. It is probable however that the Lydian kings reckoned on the effect these inroads might produce in disposing the citizens, when they should grow weary of a lingering war that deprived them of the enjoyment of their gardens and vineyards, to submit to their powerful neighbour. In the twelfth of these yearly expeditions an accident happened, which for a time relieved the city from this vexation. The Lydians had set fire to a field of ripe corn near a temple of Athene: the flames spread till they caught and consumed the sacred building. At the end of the campaign the king fell sick, and ascribing his illness to the sacrilege committed by his troops, listened to the admonition of the Delphic oracle, which commanded him to repair the insult offered to the sanctuary. This alarm seems to have inclined his thoughts to peace; for it is hardly conceivable that he should have been deceived by the stratagem related by Herodotus.¹ Miletus was at this time governed by Thrasybulus, who, informed of the oracle that Alyattes had received, made preparations, it is said, to play upon the envoy whom he expected from him. A herald came to demand an armistice, till the temple should be rebuilt: he was instructed to mark the signs of the famine and distress which the king believed must by this time prevail in the city: but Thrasybulus took such measures that nothing but tokens of plenty and rejoicing met his eye. When Alyattes heard the report of his messenger he is said to have been so

¹ It should not however be thought conclusive against the fact, that a similar stratagem is said to have been played off by Blas at Prien . Diog. Laert. i. 83.

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disheartened, that he not only built two new temples in the place of the one burnt, but concluded a treaty of peace and alliance with Miletus.

After this event, according to the same historian, he reigned more than fifty years, and at last died without gaining any other advantage over the Greeks than the reduction of Smyrna. But in his lifetime his two sons by different mothers, Cræsus and Pantaleon, disputed the succession, and he declared in favour of Cræsus, on whom he is said to have conferred the government of Adramyttium and the plain of Thebe.¹ It may have been at this period that Cræsus was engaged in a war mentioned by Strabo with the Bithynian prince Prusias, who founded Prusa (Brussa) at the foot of the Mysian Olympus.² We also read that Cræsus took a share in an expedition which his father made into Caria³, though with what success is not recorded. But those who would fain find historical truth in a delightful story told by Herodotus, of a visit paid by Solon to the court of Cræsus, are willing to collect from these hints, that the Athenian sage, though he could not on any reasonable calculation have seen the son of Alyattes on the throne, might have found him associated with his father in the government, and perhaps flushed with recent victory, when he warned him of the inconstancy of fortune, and disclosed to him the secret of human happiness.

Accession of
Cræsus.

Cræsus became king at the age of thirty-five (B. C. 560), and now at least, if not before, he accomplished all that his father had undertaken. He began by laying siege to Ephesus, which was then ruled by the tyrant

¹ Nic. Damasc. p. 269. ed. Tauchn. Compare Strabo xiii. p. 613. τὸ Ἀδραμύττιον· ἦν δὲ ποτὲ ὑπὸ Λυδοῖς, καὶ νῦν Πύλαι Λύδαι καλοῦνται ἐν Ἀδραμυττίῳ, Λυδῶν, ὥς φασι, τὴν πόλιν ἐκτικόντων.

² xii. p. 564. κτίσμα Προυσίου τοῦ πρὸς Κροῖσον πολεμήσαντος. The reading however is doubtful; though it seems hardly safe to substitute Κίερον on the ground of the passage in Memnon (ap. Phot. 229 b. 39 Bekk.).

³ Nic. Damasc. u. 8.

Pindarus, whose mother was a daughter of Alyattes. By his advice the citizens commended their town to the protection of their tutelary goddess, by fastening a rope between its walls and those of her temple, which stood nearly a mile off: Cræsus is said to have treated them with great lenity, but to have compelled Pindarus to resign his power to his son.¹ With like success he attacked, one after another, all the Greek cities on the continent that still retained their independence. The mildness of the terms he offered, his personal reputation, and the character of his government, may have contributed to make the conquest easy. He was satisfied with a moderate exercise of substantial power: with a tribute which was rather a sign of submission than a sensible burden: but in every other respect he appears to have permitted his new subjects to regulate their own concerns. Where the supreme authority had before been in the hands of one man, the tyrant, sure of protection, would generally be glad to maintain his station, though with a slight sacrifice of dignity, under the safeguard of a powerful prince: and probably the spirit of freedom was nowhere so active, that the secure enjoyment of the existing constitution and laws might not seem cheaply purchased by the acknowledgment of dependence on a foreigner.

When Cræsus had thus become master of the whole western coast, he began to cast a longing eye on the adjacent islands. He was preparing to raise a fleet for the purpose of subduing them, when a wise Greek diverted him from his design, by reminding him that he was about to expose his Lydians to the chances of an unequal conflict, on an element to which they were strangers. He therefore turned his views to a different side, and enlarged his dominions on the main land, till they included all the nations that dwelt westward of

¹ Herodotus does not mention either Pindarus, or the event of the siege, which can only be collected from the accounts of Ælian iii. 26. and Polyænus vi. 50.

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XIII.Prosperity
of Cræsus.

the river Halys, the Lycians and Cilicians excepted. The Lydian empire, when it had attained this compass, was the greatest and most flourishing that the Greeks had yet known, otherwise than by distant and uncertain rumour. The fame of Cræsus resounded through Greece. The streams of Lydia were believed to roll over golden sands, the bowels of the mountains to be filled with silver; and as the king's treasure was large, his hand was open; he loved the Greeks, and gladly received them at his court, respected their oracles, and enriched them with magnificent offerings, and was disposed to cultivate the friendship of their leading states. The Lacedæmonians wanted gold to adorn the image of a god, and sent to Sardis to purchase it; Cræsus gave them all they required. The Athenian Alcmaeon had befriended the king's envoys at Delphi; Cræsus invited him to his capital, and permitted him to take as much gold dust as he was able to carry out of the royal treasury, smiled at the artifice by which he contrived to make the precious burden as heavy as possible, and rewarded his ingenuity by doubling the present.¹ If the needy were attracted by the hope of experiencing this munificence, the wise also came, to see, to learn, and to teach. So either Pittacus or Bias had given the advice which deterred Cræsus from the imprudent enterprise on which he was embarking against the islanders. So it was believed, that Solon, in the course of his travels, was drawn by curiosity to Sardis, and hospitably entertained by the king; that he alone gazed without envy or admiration on the wonders of the palace, and surprised Cræsus by preferring death, after high duties well discharged, to a life brightened only by the smiles of fortune, and still subject to her frown.

¹ If we might believe Ælian. V. H. iv. 27., Cræsus during his father's life received a small present from one Pamphaes, a citizen of Prienê, and requited it, when he came to the throne, with a waggon-load of silver.

The lesson was forgotten, till the prosperity of Cræsus had roused the envy of the gods to disturb it by domestic calamities and a humbling reverse. The former do not belong to history¹; the latter was brought about by the Persians.

In the earliest times to which the Greeks could trace the course of events in Western Asia, the Aramæan, or Assyrian, race had established a powerful monarchy, the capital of which was perhaps first seated on the Euphrates, afterwards, when another tribe of the same nation gained the mastery, on the Tigris. Subsequent revolutions broke this empire into two parts: and Babylon and Nineveh became each the capital of an independent kingdom. The Medes, a people of widely different blood, manners, and religion, when they perceived that the power of the Assyrians was falling to decay through wealth and luxury, shook off their yoke, united their forces under one ruler, came down from their mountains on the south coast of the Caspian, and began in their turn to make conquests in the west of Asia. In the reign of Alyattes their dominions reached as far as the river Halys, afterwards the boundary of the Lydian empire. Nineveh trembled before the Median king Cyaxares; he was only interrupted in his designs against it by the irruption of the Scythians, who during eight and twenty years plundered the richest provinces of Asia. Cyaxares exterminated them by a treacherous massacre; but even before this event he had made himself master of Nineveh, and throughout the whole extent of the ancient Assyrian monarchy Babylon alone remained independent. A war then broke out between the Median and Lydian kings, the end of which is marked by an eclipse, which Thales had predicted.²

The Medes
and Per-
sians.

¹ See *Philological Museum*, i. p. 121., and Völcker in *Rhein. Mus. f. Phil.* i. p. 210.

² On the various dates assigned to this eclipse, see Mr. Clinton, *F. H. i.* p. 418., who prefers the opinion which fixes it in May B. C. 603.

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Through the mediation of their common allies, the kings of Cilicia and Babylon, peace was concluded, and sealed by a marriage between the daughter of Alyattes and Astyages, the son of Cyaxares.

In the reign of Astyages a new revolution changed the face of Asia : a new people rose up, and overthrew the Medes, by the same means through which they had overpowered the Assyrians, and by which almost all the changes that have befallen the Asiatic empires have been effected. The Persians occupied a mountainous land, separated by a more fertile tract from the shores of the gulf which bears their name. They were divided into several tribes, differing from each other in their habits and their rank : the greater number were wandering shepherds : three were accounted more noble than the rest, and one of these contained the house of the Achæmenids, which was regarded by the whole nation with peculiar reverence. In language and character this people was much more closely allied to the Medes than to the Assyrians. Their manners were simple and pure ; the land afforded few temptations to luxury, and the youth even of the higher classes were accustomed to plain food and a homely dress. They were trained from their childhood to ride, to draw the bow, to speak truth, and pay every one his due. They worshipped the elements, the heavens, and the orbs of day and night ; but without temples, altars, or images.¹ Each sacrificed for himself ; and when the victim was to be offered to the supreme God, it was taken up to the top of the highest hill. The only office of the priest was to accompany the rite with a prayer or a hymn.

Cyrus
dethrones
Astyages.

While the Medes were a conquering nation, the Persians submitted to them. But under Astyages the vigour of his people seems to have declined in an interval of undisturbed peace and prosperity, and

¹ See Schmieder ad Curt. iii. 3. 8.

when the Persian mountaineers took up arms with a bold and active leader at their head, they easily wrested the sovereignty from their old masters. Cyrus, the hero under whom they fought, was one of their native princes; but the circumstances of his birth, and the immediate occasion of his revolt, are concealed under a heap of fabulous and discordant traditions.¹ The dethroned king Astyages was, as we have seen, allied to Cræsus by marriage; and if this connection was not a sufficient motive to induce Cræsus to avenge the injury done to his kinsman, he had others which it might serve to cover as a pretext. The empire of Asia was at stake; he himself seemed to have as fair a prospect of winning it as an obscure and upstart race of shepherds. But if he allowed them to secure their conquest he might expect to see his own kingdom invaded by a superior power. It appeared wiser to attack in time, than to defend too late. He did not however venture on this step before he had carefully explored every avenue through which the gods afforded a glimpse of futurity to man. He sent trusty messengers round to consult the most celebrated Grecian oracles; not however with blind faith, but after he had put their prophetic virtue to the most rigorous trials. That of Delphi proved itself above all worthy of his confidence, and its answer encouraged him to prosecute his designs with the assurance of success. Yet if he had not interpreted it by his hopes, it would have left him in darkness and doubt; for it only predicted what he already knew, that his enterprise must end in the ruin of his enemy, or in his own. Grateful for the seeming favour of the god, he filled his treasury with gold and silver, and even showered munificent presents on the Delphians, who requited him with all the honours and

¹ His original and proper name was one which Strabo wrote Agradatus; that of Cyrus, which signified the sun, seems to have been the title he assumed when he mounted the throne. See Heeren *Ideen*, l. i. p. 402.

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XIII.

Makes war
upon
Crœsus.

privileges that a Greek city could bestow. He then collected an army from his subject provinces, and marched against Cyrus.

He crossed the Halys into Cappadocia, not however with the intention of pushing forward into the dominions of his adversary, but of challenging him to a conflict, and waiting for his approach. The Persian speedily came up with a superior force, swelled from the various nations that lay in his way. Before he tried the strength of Crœsus, he sent envoys to the Ionian cities, inviting them to seize the opportunity of throwing off the Lydian yoke. But they had found it too light to be anxious for a change which would only transfer them to another master, and they were deaf to his summons. A battle took place between the hostile armies: neither could claim a decided advantage; but Crœsus believed that his preparations had not been sufficient to accomplish the decree of destiny, and he resolved to return to Sardis, to assemble a larger force during the winter, and to renew his expedition in the following spring.

B.C. 546.
Capture of
Sardis.

Arrived in his capital, he despatched his envoys to the kings of Egypt and of Babylon, for both were his allies, and called upon them for succours: at the same time he requested aid from Sparta. When he had taken these measures he disbanded his army, ordering all his vassals to hold themselves in readiness for the next campaign. It never came. Before tidings reached Sardis of the motions of Cyrus, he was seen encamped before its walls. Crœsus had no force at his command but his Lydian cavalry. With this however he still tried his fortune in a desperate battle: he lost it, and was shut up in his citadel, and closely besieged by the Persians. The fortress was surprised on its strongest and least guarded side, and Crœsus, with his treasures and his kingdom, fell into the hands of the conqueror.

According to a legend which, in the form in which

it is reported by Herodotus, could only have become current among the Greeks through their ignorance of the Persian customs and modes of thinking, the royal captive was at first condemned to the flames, but finally spared.¹ Ctesias had heard something of a similar story, but he adds a fact which has all the air of truth, that a Median city near Ecbatana was assigned to Croesus for his residence: here he probably closed his chequered life.

The conquest of Lydia established the Persian monarchy on a firm foundation; an insurrection which soon after broke out there was speedily quelled, and that it might never recur, the vanquished people were deprived of their arms, and compelled to abandon themselves to the arts of peace and luxury. Cyrus had been called away to the East by vast designs, and by the threats of a distant and formidable enemy. Babylon still remained an independent city in the heart of his empire; to reduce it was his first and most pressing care. On another side he was tempted by the wealth and the weakness of Egypt: while his north-east frontier was disturbed and endangered by the fierce barbarians who ranged over the plains that stretch from the skirts of the Indian Caucasus to the Caspian: till they should be subdued or humbled his eastern provinces could never enjoy peace or safety. These objects demanded his own presence: the subjugation of the Asiatic Greeks, as a less urgent and less difficult enterprise, he committed to his lieutenants. Before he quitted Sardis he had received envoys from the Æolian and Ionian cities, who offered submission on the same terms as had been granted to them by Croesus. But the conqueror reminded them of his rejected invitation, and taunted them for their tardy acquiescence with a significant fable. *The fisher-*

¹ See Welcker in *Rhein. Mus. f. P.* xl. p. 304., who observes, that the story in Nicolaus Damascenus is not a legend or tradition, but a regular novel.

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*man stood by the sea-side and played upon his flute; but the fish would not listen, and kept still in the water. Then he took his net and drew them out on the shore, and they quivered and leaped; but it was in the agonies of death.*¹ The Greeks, when they heard that they had no choice but between war and slavery, began to prepare for resistance. But Cyrus in his anger had been politic enough to exempt Miletus from his stern demand of unconditional submission, and to content himself with the tribute she had paid to Cræsus, and thus severed her from the cause of her brethren. The other Ionians of the coast, for the islands were secure from invasion, assembled at the Panionian temple to consult for the common weal, and resolved to send ambassadors to beg assistance from Sparta. The Spartans however did not deem themselves connected with the suppliants by a tie strong enough to draw them into a contest with Persia: and they refused to take up arms in their behalf. Yet either for the sake of learning something about the Persians and the state of Ionia, or under the simple belief that their name would carry weight with Cyrus, they sent an envoy to his court, and in language rather of command than of intercession desired that he would refrain from doing harm to any Grecian city. The shepherd-king, who had never heard of Sparta, but supposed it was like the Ionian towns, a mart of busy traffic, bad the messenger return, and tell his countrymen, that Cyrus despised the threats of men who had a public place in their city set apart for the purpose of false swearing and mutual deceit. Such in his eye was the Greek *agora*: what other ends it served, what high thoughts might there spring up

¹ Her. i. 141. According to Diodorus (Mal. ii. p. 27.) it was Harpagus who received the application, and who answered it by a different story. He told the Greeks that he once sought the hand of a maiden whose father betrothed her to a more powerful person; but afterwards seeing Harpagus high in favour at court offered him his daughter. But Harpagus said, that if he accepted her now, it should be not as his wife but as his concubine.

in the minds of freemen, and be cherished by the interchange of words, and ripen into great actions — this was beyond the imagination of an eastern despot to conceive.

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Mazares, the same general — and it is worth observing that he was a Mede, not a Persian — whom Cyrus appointed to quell the insurrection of the Lydians, after he had reduced them to obedience, proceeded to punish and subdue the Ionians, who had aided them in their attempt to shake off the Persian yoke. But he only lived to take Priené, and Magnesia, and to ravage the vale of the Mæander. On his death Harpagus (likewise a Mede) succeeded to the command, and vigorously pressed the Ionian cities. His method of besieging appears to have been new to the Ionians, though it is the same which had been long used in the civilised states of Asia.¹ It consisted according to Herodotus in casting up mounds against the walls. We hear nothing of battering engines, though these too were already known in the East: and we may therefore conclude that Harpagus relied entirely on his superiority in numbers, which enabled him to raise his mounds above the walls of the city, to clear them by showers of missiles, or to effect an entrance by filling up the intervening space. The first he attacked was Phocæa. Its strong walls were of no avail against the continual labours of the Persians; their works were steadily advancing, and Harpagus sent a taunting message to the besieged, *that he would be content if they would but throw down a single battlement, and convert one dwelling into holy ground.* The Phocæans in reply asked for a day to deliberate, and desired Harpagus in the meanwhile to draw off his troops. He saw through their design, and connived at it. During the armistice he granted, they freighted their ships with the most

Cyrus
makes war
on the
Ionians.

Heroism
of the
Phocæans.

¹ 2 Sam. xx. 15. 2 Kings, xix. 32. Jerem. vi. 6. Habakk. i. 10.

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sacred and precious of their treasures, embarked with their wives and children, and steered for Chios. The Persians, when they returned, found the city empty. The Phocæans first proposed to purchase from the Chians a small group of adjacent islands called the Cænussæ. But the Chians feared lest their commerce might suffer from so close a neighbourhood of such active and enterprising rivals, and refused their consent. The Phocæans then resolved on a longer voyage, in search of a new settlement in the same western sea where they had already planted some flourishing colonies. But before they abandoned their country, they once more sailed home, and surprised and slew the Persian garrison. Then they dropped an iron bar into the sea, and swore that till it should rise up to the surface they would not return to Phocæa. Yet before they had left the Ægean, the larger half, unable to endure the loss of their native city, repented of their vow, and remained behind. The rest bent their course to Corsica, where twenty years before they had founded a town called Alalia, and settled among their kinsmen. But they were soon engaged in war with the Carthaginians and the Tyrrhenians of Agylla, and lost the greatest part of their fleet. After this disaster they took their families on board their remaining ships; a part joined their countrymen in Massilia, the rest made for Rhegium.¹ While they rested there and repaired their shattered navy, they heard of a site on the coast afterwards conquered by the Lucanians, but where at that time Sybaris was mistress. Under her protection, to the south-east of Posidonia, they founded Elea, which became, as we have seen, a celebrated seat of arts and learning, and, after its neighbours had fallen under

¹ See Dederich *Ueber die Gründung von Massilia in Rhein. Mus. f. Phil.* iv. p. 109. Their forces in the battle were not, as he states (p. 101.), equal to those of the enemy. They fought with sixty galleys; the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians, according to Herodotus (l. 166.) *ἑκατὸν ἐκρέποντες ἐξήκοντα*.

the yoke of the barbarians, long preserved the independence which its founders had bought so dearly.

The men of Teos followed the example of the Phocæans; when the mound of the Persians had risen to the top of their walls, they took to their ships, and sailed to the coast of Thrace, where some time before a band of Ionian adventurers had founded a town from which they had been afterwards expelled by the Thracians. The Teians now took possession of the vacant site; and the new city Abdera flourished like Elea, innocently renowned for a peculiar school of philosophy. Before the Persian invasion, Thales is said to have recommended Teos to the Ionians as an advantageous position for a new capital, and to have advised them to concentrate their forces there, and reduce the other cities of their confederacy to the rank of provincial towns, depending on it as the general seat of government. This scheme shocked too many prejudices and partial interests to be well received. The Ionian cities fell successively under the attacks of Harpagus; and even the islanders thought it prudent to disarm the irresistible conqueror by voluntary submission. While their new fetters were still galling them, Bias gave them a counsel similar to that of Thales: to make a common expedition, and found a single Ionian state in the great island of Sardinia. But all were not capable of the heroism of Phocæa and Teos; and when they had recovered from the disasters of the war, the Persian dominion proved perhaps not much more burdensome than that of Cræsus. The worst part of their lot was, that they were now compelled to carry the arms which they had so often turned against one another in the service of a foreign master, and to assist him in reducing freemen and Greeks under the same yoke.

After Æolis and Ionia were subdued, Harpagus pushed his conquests along the southern coast. The

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And of the
Teians.

The Per-
sians subdued
Asia M^r-

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Carians submitted without a struggle: only Pedasa, the ancient seat of the Leleges, strong by nature and in the bravery of its inhabitants, held out long after all around had yielded. The Dorians of Cnidus had also meditated resistance, and while the Persians were still detained in Ionia, had begun to dig through the neck of land, about half a mile broad, which connected their peninsula with the continent. But the undertaking was interrupted by religious scruples, and the Delphic oracle declared it contrary to the will of Jove; the work was abandoned, and Cnidus surrendered at the first summons of Harpagus. In Lycia the spirit of freedom was more resolute and reckless; the men of Xanthus marched out of their city against the Persian host, and when their little band was overpowered by numbers, and forced back within the walls, they collected their wives and children and treasures in the citadel, and set it on fire. While the flames were blazing, the husbands and fathers, having bound themselves by a solemn vow, again sallied forth, and died sword in hand. Only a few families, which happened to be absent during the siege, afterward returned to their country, and perpetuated the race of the ancient Xanthians. Caunus made a like display of unavailing courage. Whatever did not bend to the will of the conqueror, was broken and ground to dust: and after a few struggles the sovereignty of Persia was peacefully acknowledged throughout the whole of Lesser Asia.

While the lieutenants of Cyrus were executing his commands in the West, he was himself enlarging and strengthening his power in the East. After completing the subjection of the nations west of the Euphrates, he laid siege to Babylon. The voluptuous and unwarlike people were protected by impregnable walls, and provided with stores for many years; and, if we might believe the account of Herodotus, they would

perhaps have worn out the patience of Cyrus, had he not found it easier to turn the Euphrates out of its course than to force their defences. It seems doubtful however whether he stormed the city either in this or any other manner, and did not rather owe his success to some internal revolution, which put an end to the dynasty of the Babylonian kings. In Xenophon's romance Cyrus is made to fix his residence at Babylon during seven months in the year; perhaps we cannot safely conclude that this was ever the practice of any of his successors; but it is highly probable that the reduction of this luxurious city contributed more than any other of the Persian conquests to change the manners of the court and of the nation. Cyrus himself scarcely enjoyed so long an interval of repose. The protection he afforded to the Jews was probably connected with his designs upon Egypt; but he never found leisure to carry them into effect. Soon after the fall of Babylon he undertook an expedition against one of the nations on the eastern side of the Caspian; — according to Herodotus it was the Massagetæ, a nomad horde which had driven the Scythians before them toward the West — and after gaining a victory over them by stratagem he was defeated in a great battle and slain. The event is the same in the narrative of Ctesias; but the people against whom Cyrus marches are the Derbices, and their army is strengthened by troops and elephants furnished by Indian allies; and the death of Cyrus is speedily avenged by one of his vassals, Amorges king of the Sacians, who gains a decisive victory over the Derbices, and annexes their land to the Persian empire. This account is so far confirmed by Herodotus, that we do not hear from him of any consequences that followed the success of the Massagetæ, or that the attention of Cambyses, the son and heir of Cyrus, was called away

Death of
Cyrus.

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of Egypt.

toward the North. The first recorded measure of his reign was the invasion of Egypt.

The old Egyptian monarchy had been long ripe for destruction, ready to fall at the first blow struck by a vigorous hand, and protected only by the obstacles that nature interposed against its invaders. The only sure foundation of national independence had sunk under the oppressive and corrupting dominion of the priesthood, which had wasted and stifled the energies of the people. The caste of warriors, the privileged hereditary militia, was so feeble and helpless, that it could not defend itself, when a priest who had mounted the throne deprived it of its honours and its lands. The effect of the new intercourse opened with Greece in the seventh century B. C. by Psammétichus, appeared in the reign of his successor Necho, who conceived vast plans of commerce and navigation, in which however he seems to have been thwarted by the arts of the priesthood¹; but he displayed his respect for the Greeks by dedicating the armour in which he had gained a great victory over the Jewish king Josiah in the temple of Apollo at Branchidæ. The usurper Amasis, who was on the throne of Egypt at the death of Cyrus, had overpowered the Greek troops of his predecessor Apries by the superior numbers of his Egyptian forces; but he was not the less convinced of their value; he removed them from their old quarters near Pelusium to Memphis, that they might guard his person²; and he distinguished himself by the favour he showed to their nation. He assigned the city of Naucratis to the Greek settlers, and gave lands for the building of Grecian temples. When that of Delphi had been burnt down he contributed largely to its

¹ See Soldan in Rhein. Mus. iv. p. 135.

² Soldan, u. s. p. 137., thinks that the object of Amasis was rather to secure himself against them, by assigning to them a station where they would be more in his power; and that in general he was more parsimonious of his favours to the Greeks than his predecessors had been.

restoration, and many other Grecian sanctuaries were adorned by his munificence. He cultivated the friendship of Sparta, and honoured her with a present which was at the same time a specimen of the skill and ingenuity of his people.

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It was against this prince that Cambyses had prepared an expedition which he himself conducted in the fifth year of his reign. Amasis was conscious of his weakness, and he had endeavoured to avert the hostility of the Persian kings by every mark of obsequious respect. At the request of Cyrus he had sent an Egyptian physician to his court, and he did not even venture to refuse the demand of Cambyses, when he asked the daughter of Amasis for his harem. He is said indeed to have substituted the daughter of Apries for his own; and the anger of Cambyses, when he detected the fraud, was imagined to have occasioned the invasion of Egypt. The motive however that impelled Cambyses to this undertaking undoubtedly lies much nearer the surface. It was one which his father had meditated, but which more pressing cares had prevented him from accomplishing. The manner in which the conquest was effected is variously related. Ctesias ascribes it to the treachery of an Egyptian eunuch, who abused his master's confidence and opened the passes to Cambyses on condition of being appointed to the government of the kingdom. Herodotus, whose authority must be held greater in the affairs of Egypt, seems to know nothing of such intrigues. He only relates that Cambyses was aided by the counsels of a Greek who had deserted the service of Amasis. The chief difficulty which the invading army had to overcome was the passage of the desert that separates Palestine from Egypt. At the suggestion of the Greek, Cambyses secured the assistance of an Arabian chief, whose tribe wandered over the Syrian desert, and was enabled to cross it in

Cambyses
invades
Egypt.

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safety. But before he arrived in Egypt Amasis died; his son Psammenitus, whom Ctesias names Amyrtæus, awaited the approach of the Persians with an army, the main strength of which probably consisted in the Greek auxiliaries. They were earnest in the Egyptian cause; and an act of savage ferocity by which they took vengeance on their countryman who had betrayed it, while it proves their zeal, seems also to imply that they had lost much of their national character among the barbarians: they murdered his children, whom he had left behind him in Egypt, before his eyes, and mixed their blood in the bowl out of which they drank, while the hostile armies stood in battle-array. The Egyptians however were defeated with great slaughter, and Psammenitus threw himself into Memphis, where he was besieged and taken. He was mildly treated by the conqueror, like Cræsus and Atsyages; and Herodotus observes that such respect for fallen greatness was a maxim with the Persians: if so, it is the less probable that the clemency shown by Cambyses was, any more than that of Cyrus in the case of Cræsus, the effect of a sudden fit of capricious compassion.

Enterprises
of Cam-
byses.

The possession of Egypt opened a boundless field for wild and unprofitable adventures; it also afforded an opportunity for some useful and important conquests. The temper of Cambyses inclined him no less to the former than the latter; he aimed at all, and accomplished nothing. An army which he sent over the Libyan desert to subdue the Oasis, where the temple of Jupiter Ammon was the centre of a little independent state, was buried in the sands; another, which he led in person up the Nile, was near perishing from hunger. Some of the adjacent African tribes however acknowledged his sovereignty by gifts and tribute; and the Greeks of Barcè and Cyrenè followed their example. But Cambyses, either be-

cause he had resolved to become absolute master of these flourishing cities, or was dissatisfied with the amount of their presents, contemptuously scattered their gold among his troops. His views were drawn still further to the west by the growing fame of Carthage, and he had now a navy at his command which seemed to afford him the means of reducing it under his power. The Phœnicians had submitted to the Persian dominion without a struggle: and had sent a fleet to second the invasion of Egypt. Cyprus too, which had before been tributary to Amasis, revolted from him when his throne seemed ready to fall, and joined its forces to the invading army. Cambyses now ordered the Phœnician fleet to sail to the attack of Carthage; but the Phœnicians were too pious or too politic to lend their aid in destroying the independence of their own colony, and Cambyses was compelled to accept the plea with which they covered their refusal.

The situation of Egypt and the character of its people evidently required that it should be ruled with a firm yet gentle hand; but the conqueror felt too secure in his irresistible power to respect the feelings and opinions of his subjects. He had even trampled on the laws of Persia by an incestuous union with his sisters; and he sported with the lives of the first men in the nation. His tyranny was so wild and capricious that it seemed like the effect of madness; and he was believed to have lost his reason in habitual drunkenness, or to have been deprived of it by the gods whom his impiety had provoked. The actions ascribed to him are however not more extravagant than those recorded of other despots whose minds were only disturbed by the possession of absolute power. We hear that he ordered the body of Amasis to be taken out of the royal sepulchre, and loaded it with gross indignities; that he plundered and wantonly defaced the monuments of Egypt, disturbed the most solemn

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festivals, violated the most revered sanctuaries, and laid sacrilegious hands on the persons of the priests and even of their god, the sacred calf. Perhaps these outrages have not been greatly exaggerated, and to a Greek who, like Herodotus, regarded the Egyptian worship with reverence, they must have appeared acts of frenzy. They were certainly not meant as proofs of religious zeal; for, though the Egyptian superstition was repugnant to all the Persian modes of thinking, we have no reason to suppose that Cambyses viewed it with any other feeling than contempt. The effect however produced on the people by these insults was the same, to whatever cause they were imputed, and the frequent attempts which the Egyptians afterward made to shake off the Persian yoke, may be probably ascribed to the remembrance of these unpardonable wrongs.

During the reign of Cambyses the Greek cities of Asia Minor remained quietly subject to their Persian governors. Even without any direct and formal constraint they naturally fell under that kind of domestic rule, tyrannical or at least oligarchical, which was most congenial to the character of the monarchy under which they lived. The adjacent islands, though they had likewise made professions of obedience, and probably continued to pay tribute to Persia, were really more independent, because the satraps on the coast had no naval force at their command to enforce their will. Among them none had risen to a higher pitch of prosperity than Samos. Its political constitution had passed through a series of changes such as we have already seen pretty uniformly occurring in the Grecian commonwealths. The ancient kingly government had given way to a small number of wealthy landowners, who had become hateful to the great body of the people, and were not formidable or prudent enough to suppress their discontent.

They had sent a fleet to the aid of their colony Perinthus, which was threatened by the Megarians; the Samians gained the victory, and sailed back with six hundred Megarian prisoners. But before they entered their harbour they had reflected on the folly of fighting for a few men, who reaped all the profit and honour of their success without sharing the danger, and they resolved to set their captives at liberty, and with their aid to rid themselves of their lords. The rulers were surprised in the councilchamber, and put to death, and a democratical constitution was established.¹ But toward the end of the reign of Cyrus a bold and fortunate man, named Polycrates, supported by a few armed followers, whom Lygdamis, the tyrant of Naxos, had sent to his aid, made himself master of the city. At first he shared his power with his two brothers; but afterwards put one of them to death, and forced the other into exile. Thus become absolute master of the island, he took a thousand bowmen into his pay as his life-guards, and raised a fleet of a hundred galleys. With this he protected the Samian commerce, and enriched himself by piratical excursions, subdued many of the islands, and took several towns on the continent. He made war on Miletus, and defeated a Lesbian armament sent to its relief, in a sea-fight. These expeditions involved him in hostilities with Persia; and though the Persian power was secure enough from his attacks, still he too could safely defy it on his own element. Since the fabled maritime empire of Minos, no navy had rode on the Ægean so formidable as that of Polycrates. In the mean while he adorned his island with magnificent and useful works; among which were probably an aqueduct, and a mole, which Herodotus reckoned among the greatest wonders of Greece. He had employed the prisoners he took in

¹ Plut. Qu. Gr. 57.

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his sea-fight with the Lesbians, in digging a ditch round the walls of his capital: but his great buildings also served the purpose of furnishing employment to the poorer class of his subjects, perhaps at the expense of the rich. He himself lived in royal state and luxury; though when we hear that he imported dogs from Epirus, goats from Scyrus, sheep from Miletus, and swine from Sicily¹, we recognise the mind of a wise and active prince, bent on conferring solid benefits on his country. He cherished the arts for which Samos had been long renowned, and drew the most celebrated artists from other parts of Greece by munificent rewards. The poets whose strains were devoted to love and wine were the most welcome guests at his court, and the companions of his leisure. If Amasis gave him a lesson on the instability of his high fortune, it was probably from Ibycus and Anacreon that he sought the practical conclusion. Yet in pursuing the pleasures which were long celebrated by the verse of the bard of Teos, he did not abuse his power, or disturb the domestic peace of his subjects², nor did he forget his ambitious aims and his plans of conquest. His hopes extended even beyond the command of the islands, and he began to think it possible that he might unite all the Ionian cities under his dominion.

But his authority at home rested on a basis which was always liable to be shaken or undermined. Polycrates felt that he was feared and respected more than he was loved, and that there was a party in Samos which only waited for a favourable opportunity to revolt.³ Fortune seemed however to throw a fair occasion in his way for ridding himself of these covert

¹ Athen. xii. p. 540.

² Athen. u. s.

³ It is not easy to say what foundation there may have been for the statement of Athenæus, who observes, citing no author, (xiii. p. 602. F.) εἰσι δὲ οἱ καὶ τὰς παλαιότρας ὥσπερ ἀντιτειχίσματα ταῖς ἰδίαις ἀκροπόλεσιν ἐνεπὶμπρασάν τε καὶ κατέσκαψαν· ὡς ἐποίησε Πολυκράτης ὁ Σαμίων τύραννος.

enemies decently and safely. While Cambyses was making his preparations for the invasion of Egypt, Polycrates offered to assist him with a squadron of ships. The Persian king gladly accepted the reinforcement, and the tyrant equipped forty galleys, on which he embarked all the persons who had incurred his suspicions, at the same time by a private message requesting his royal ally to take care that they should never return to Samos. But the Samian malecontents, who probably had the entire command of the fleet, resolved to turn the force which had been placed in their hands against Polycrates himself. They sailed back, but found him on his guard, and some actions took place in which they were finally worsted; yet not before they had put the tyrant in such jeopardy, that he was forced to take the precaution of shutting up the wives and children of the other citizens in the arsenal, and threatening to set it on fire if any attempt was made in favour of the insurgents. But though defeated in their immediate design, they were not crushed, and when they could no longer make a stand in the island, they sailed away to obtain foreign succours. It was to Sparta that they addressed themselves, though she had before refused to interpose in behalf of their brethren against Cyrus. But Hippias was ruling at Athens, and from him they could not expect assistance in such an enterprise. Sparta on the other hand, though she bore no goodwill to the Samians, by whose piracies she had suffered, and though she appears to have had no ground of complaint against Polycrates, was generally hostile to a tyrannical government, and ready to take every occasion of establishing oligarchy in its room. This motive was stronger with her than the love of liberty. The envoy of the Ionians, when they were threatened with slavery, had in vain exerted all his eloquence to rouse her sympathy in their behalf; but the Samian

Spartan
expedition
to Samos.

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exiles were only rebuked for using many words, when a simple prayer would have been immediately granted. The Corinthians also lent their aid, and, thus reinforced, the Samians renewed their attempt to overthrow the tyrant; but after fighting a sharp battle, and sustaining a siege for forty days, he appeared so strong, that the Peloponnesians abandoned the undertaking in despair, and their friends were compelled to resign themselves to the loss of their native land and to seek a new home. After ranging for some time as pirates over the Ægean they took possession of Cydonia in Crete, and flourished there till they were conquered and enslaved by the Æginetans. Such was the issue of the first expedition sent out by the Spartans to the coast of Asia.

Death of
Polycrates.

The power of Polycrates seemed to be rooted more firmly than ever after the vain efforts made by his enemies to shake it, and all domestic opposition being quelled he again turned his views to the enlargement of his dominions. But when he thought himself on the point of reaching the pinnacle of his ambition he fell, as suddenly as he had risen, by a fate as cruel and ignominious as his fortune hitherto had been high and fair. Amasis had warned him against the envy of the gods, but he was not on his guard against the envy of man. One whom he was not conscious of having ever injured or provoked had secretly planned his ruin. This was Orætes the satrap of Sardis. The motive that prompted his design was certainly, as the event proved, one in which some malignant feeling had a larger share than zeal for his own honour, or his master's service. Polycrates indeed was the ally of Cambyzes, and the vague projects of ambition which he was believed to harbour scarcely afforded a pretext for attacking him. It was so much the easier to draw him into the snare. The satrap sent him a message pretending that he had himself

fallen under the displeasure of Cambyses, and saw no hopes of safety but in the protection of Polycrates : *Save me, he said, and share my treasures ; with them you may be master of Greece ; if you doubt their amount send a trusty servant, and satisfy yourself by his report.* Polycrates caught at the bait ; his messenger went, and came back from Sardis with a description of the satrap's treasury which so inflamed his master's cupidity, that, in spite of all the warnings of his friends, and the entreaties of his daughter, he resolved to make a journey to Sardis himself. He set out with a numerous train, but when he arrived at Magnesia on the Mæander he was arrested by the order of Oroetes, and hung upon a cross. The Samians who accompanied him were dismissed, and the satrap made no attempt to take advantage of his death by any expedition against Samos.

Soon after this event Cambyses died, according to Herodotus, as he was marching through Syria against a usurper who had assumed the name of a deceased son of Cyrus. The death of Cambyses left the impostor in undisputed possession of the throne, which he retained till his fraud was detected. A conspiracy was then formed against him by some noble Persians, who killed him in his palace, and chose one of their own number to reign in his stead. It is not improbable that the account which Ctesias gave of these occurrences, and which differs from the story told by Herodotus in the names of the principal actors, and in some other points of no great moment, was drawn from the Persian court-chronicles, and may therefore be entitled to greater credit than the narrative of the earlier historian. Nevertheless it is the latter who enables us to form the clearest notion of the general nature of the revolution, which, though it was only a temporary change of dynasty, was attended with consequences very important both to Persia and to Greece.

Revolutions
at the court
of Persia.

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XIII.

B.C. 521.

Darius
Hystaspis
mounts the
throne.

The usurper who is said to have reigned for a few months under the name of the brother of Cambyse, was a Magian: a member of a sacerdotal caste, which Herodotus numbers among the tribes that composed the Median nation. He was supported by all the influence of his class, and though he passed for the legitimate successor of Cyrus he undoubtedly promoted the interests of his nation, as far as he could do it without dropping his mask. We are informed that he opened his reign by a general remission of tribute and military service for three years, and that his death was regretted by all his subjects throughout Asia, except the Persians. They, it is probable, were deprived of the privileges and distinctions they had enjoyed as the conquering people, and were reduced to a level with the rest of the empire. The counter-revolution by which the Magian was dethroned was effected by Persians of the highest rank, and was accompanied by a general massacre which their countrymen made among the Magian tribe, and which continued long after to be commemorated by a yearly festival. The person whom this event placed on the throne of Cyrus, and whom the Greeks knew by the name of Darius, son of Hystaspes, belonged to the royal house of the Achæmenids, and his father had been governor of the province of Persis during the preceding reigns. In relating the deliberations of the conspirators after the death of the usurper, Herodotus introduces an episode, which, as it is evidently fictitious, seems also at first sight strangely misplaced. He represents them as discussing the relative merits of the democratical, the oligarchical, and the monarchical forms of government, with arguments not unlike those employed by the Corinthian Sosicles in the congress at Sparta, and as finally persuaded by Darius to retain the hereditary patriarchal constitution. This imaginary debate seems however to have been suggested

by a real fact¹; it is clear that, although the government preserved its monarchical form, which no one could ever have dreamed of changing, still in the reign of Darius it approached more nearly to the nature of an oligarchy than it had done before, while the whole Persian nation, or at least its leading tribes, assumed a position in respect to the rest of the empire similar to that of the sovereign people in a Greek democracy with regard to dependent towns. Whether the election of the new king was committed, as Herodotus relates, to the will of Heaven, that is, to chance or fraud, or, as is more probable, was the unanimous act of the conspirators, it is equally certain that they reserved for themselves privileges which tended at least to make them independent of the monarch, and even to keep him dependent upon them. One of their number is even said to have formally stipulated for absolute exemption from the royal authority as the condition on which he withdrew his claim to the crown; and the rest acquired the right of access to the king's person at all seasons without asking his leave, and bound him to select his wives exclusively from their families. How far the power of Darius, though nominally despotic, was really limited by these privileges of his grandees, may be seen from an occurrence which took place in the early part of his reign. Intaphernes one of the seven, appeared one day at the gate of the palace, and claimed admission to the royal presence; the king was in his harem, the only privacy into which even the partners in the conspiracy, by the terms of the original compact, were forbidden to intrude. The doorkeepers accordingly stopped Intaphernes; but disbelieving the excuse they alleged, and indignant at their pertinacity,

¹ The substance of this remark is due to Heeren, l. i. p. 415., who however places it in a somewhat different light, and attributes a higher degree of historical accuracy to the story in Herodotus, than we are able to recognise.

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he drew his cimeter and mutilated their faces. Darius indeed revenged himself for this outrage by putting Intaphernes to death, and almost entirely extirpating his family. But before he ventured to take this step he thought it necessary to sound the rest of the six, and to ascertain whether they would make common cause with the offender. He was probably glad to remove men so formidable to distant governments, and it may easily be conceived that if their power was so great at court, it was still less restrained in the provinces that were subjected to their authority.

His institu-
tions.

Nevertheless Darius was the greatest and most powerful king that ever filled the throne of Persia, and even the disasters he experienced but slightly clouded the remembrance of his wisdom and his prosperity. Cyrus and Cambyzes had conquered nations; Darius was the true founder of the Persian state. The dominions of his predecessors were a mass of countries only united by their subjection to the will of a common ruler which expressed itself by arbitrary and irregular exactions; Darius first organised them into an empire where every member felt its place and knew its functions. His realm stretched from the Ægean to the Indus, from the steppes of Scythia to the cataracts of the Nile. He divided this vast tract into twenty satrapies or provinces, and appointed the tribute which each was to pay to the royal treasury, and the proportion in which they were to supply provisions for the army and for the king's household. The proper Persis alone was exempt from the new system of taxation, and was only charged with its ancient customary gifts. The rest, beside the fixed amount of the precious metals, contributed a certain portion of their peculiar and most valuable productions; among these were herds of eunuchs, boys and virgins. A high road on which distances were regularly marked, and spacious buildings were placed at

convenient intervals to receive all who travelled in the king's name, connected the western coast with the seat of government; along this road couriers, trained to extraordinary speed, successively transmitted the king's messages. The satraps were accountable for the imposts of their several provinces, and were furnished with forces sufficient to carry the king's pleasure into effect.

Compared with the rude government of his predecessors the institutions of Darius were wise and vigorous; in themselves, unless they are considered as foundations laid for a structure that was never raised, as outlines that were never filled up, they were weak and barbarous. He had done little more than cast a bridge across the chaos over which he ruled; he had introduced no real uniformity or subordination among its elements. The distribution of the provinces indeed may have been grounded on relations which we do not perceive, and may therefore be less capricious than it seems. But it answered scarcely any higher end than that of conveying the wealth of Asia into the royal treasury, and the satraps, when they were most faithful and assiduous in their office, were really nothing more than farmers of the revenue. Their administration was only felt in the burdens they imposed; in every other respect the nations they governed retained their peculiar laws and constitution. The Persian empire included in it the dominions of several vassal kings, and the seats of fierce independent hordes, who preyed on its more peaceful subjects with impunity. In this however there was much good, and comparatively little mischief. The variety of institutions comprehended within the frame of the monarchy, though they were suffered to stand, not from any enlarged policy, but because it would have been difficult or dangerous to remove them, and there was nothing better to substitute for them, did

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not impair, but rather increased its strength ; and the independence of a few wild tribes was more a symptom than a cause of weakness. The worst evil arose from the constitution of the satrapies themselves. The provinces were taxed not only for the supply of the royal revenue, and for the maintenance of the royal army and household, but also for the support of their governors, each of whom had a standing force in his pay, and of whom some kept up a court rivalling in magnificence that of the king himself. The province of Babylon, beside its regular tribute, and the fixed revenue of its satrap, which was equal to that of a modern European prince of the first rank, defrayed the cost of a stud and a hunting equipage for his private use, such as no European prince was ever able to maintain. Four large villages were charged with the nourishment of his Indian dogs, and exempted from all other taxes. It must however be observed that when an extraordinary burden was thus laid on a particular district, the rest of the province was not relieved, but the more heavily loaded. When the king granted the revenues of whole cities to a wife or a favourite, he did not give up any portion of his own dues. And the discharge of all these stated exactions did not secure his subjects from the arbitrary demands of the satraps and their officers.

If the people suffered from the establishment of these mighty viceroys, their greatness was not less injurious to the strength of the state and the power of the sovereign. As the whole authority civil and military in each province was lodged in the hands of the satrap, he could wield it at his pleasure without any check from within ; and if he was unwilling to resign it, it was not always easy to wrest it from him. The greater his distance from the court the nearer he approached to the condition of an independent and absolute prince. He was seldom indeed tempted to

cast off his nominal allegiance, which he found more useful than burdensome, or to withhold the tribute which he had only the task of collecting; but he might often safely refuse any other services, and defy or elude the king's commands with impunity; and least of all was he subject to control in any acts of rapacity or oppression committed in his legitimate government. Xenophon indeed in his romance¹ represents the founder of the monarchy as having provided against this evil by a wise division of power. Cyrus is there said to have appointed that the commanders of the fortresses and of the regular troops in each province should be independent of the satrap, and should receive their orders immediately from court. And a modern author finds traces of this system in the narrative of Herodotus himself.² But it seems clear that if the conqueror designed to establish such a balance of power, it was neglected by his successors, and that the satraps engrossed every branch of the royal authority within their governments. Soon after the accession of Darius an occurrence took place which, as it illustrates the operation of the system just described, and is connected, though remotely, with Grecian history, deserves to be mentioned here. We have seen that Oroëtes, without having received any commission, and apparently without any view to the public service, put the king's ally to an ignominious death. For this act he was never called to account; during the usurpation of the Magian he was still more reckless; he had quarrelled with the

¹ *Cyrop.* viii. 6. In *Œcon.* iv. 6. also the civil and military authority are said to be kept separate in the Persian provinces. But it is added, § 11., that where a satrap is appointed he superintends both classes of officers. See Schneider's note on *Cyr.* viii. 6. 3.

² Heeren *Ideen*, l. i. p. 403., remarks that in Lydia Mazares commanded the army, and Tabalus the garrison of Sardis, while Pactyas had the care of the treasure. But Pactyas seems only to have been charged with a temporary commission, *Her.* i. 153., and Mazares was only sent to quell the revolt. The same remark may be made on another instance which he alleges at p. 491. from *Her.* v. 27. What can be inferred as to this point from *Arrian* ii. 2. we do not understand.

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governor of the adjacent province, and he now contrived to seize him and his son, and murdered them both. Even after this outrage he would perhaps have escaped punishment, if he had not also waylaid and murdered a courier who had brought him an unwelcome message from Darius. And the king would have been forced to send an army against him, had he not been surrounded by a guard of a thousand Persians, whose reverence for the royal name was stronger than their attachment to the person of Oroëtes. This was discovered by a trusty servant of Darius, who with their aid put the satrap to death in his palace at Sardis, and carried away his treasures to Susa.

Persian
manners.

Thus the huge frame of the Persian empire was disjointed and unwieldy; and the spirit that pervaded it was as feeble as its organisation was imperfect. The Persians, when they overthrew the Medes, adopted their laws, religion, and manners; their own, though they may have resembled them in their principal features, were certainly more simple and better fitted to a conquering people. The religion of the two nations was probably derived from a common source; but before the Persian conquest it appears to have undergone an important change in the reformation ascribed to Zoroaster. In what points his doctrines may have differed from those of the preceding period is an obscure question with which we have no concern; but it seems certain that the code of sacred laws which he introduced, founded or at least enlarged the authority and influence of the Magian caste. Its members became the keepers and expounders of the holy books, the teachers and counsellors of the king, the oracles from whom he learnt the divine will and the secrets of futurity, the mediators who obtained for him the favour of Heaven or propitiated its anger. How soon the tenets of their theology may have been introduced

into Persia is not clear; but as they were a Median tribe, it is only with the union of the two nations under Cyrus that they can have begun to occupy the station which we find them filling at the Persian court. If the religion of Zoroaster was originally pure and sublime, it speedily degenerated and allied itself to many very gross and hideous forms of superstition; and if we were to judge of its tendency by the practice of its votaries, we should be led to think of it more harshly or more lightly than it may probably have deserved. The court manners were equally marked by luxury and cruelty: by luxury refined till it had killed all natural enjoyment, and by cruelty carried to the most loathsome excesses that perverted ingenuity could suggest. It is above all the atrocious barbarity of the women that fills the Persian chronicles with their most horrid stories; and we learn from the same sources the dreadful depravity of their character, and the vast extent of their influence. Cramped by the rigid forms of a pompous and wearisome ceremonial, surrounded by the ministers of their artificial wants, and guarded from every breath of truth and freedom, the successors of Cyrus must have been more than men if they had not become the slaves of their priests, their eunuchs, and their wives.

The contagion of these vices undoubtedly spread through the nation; the Persians were most exposed to it as they were in the immediate neighbourhood of the court. Yet there is no difficulty in conceiving that long after the people had lost the original purity and simplicity of their manners, the noble youth of Persia may have been still educated in the severe discipline of their ancestors, which is represented as nearly resembling the Spartan.¹ They may have been accustomed to spare diet and hard toil, and trained to the use of horses and arms. These exer-

¹ Arrian, v. 4.

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cises do not create and are not sufficient to keep alive the warlike spirit of a nation, any more than rules and precepts to form its moral character. The Persian youth may still have been used to repeat the praises of truth and justice from their childhood, in the later period of their history, as they had when Cyrus upbraided the Greeks with their artifices and lies ; and yet in their riper years they might surpass them, as at Cunaxa, in falsehood and cunning, as much as they were below them in skill and courage. Gradually however the ancient discipline either became wholly obsolete or degenerated into empty forms ; and the nation sank into that state of utter corruption and imbecility which Xenophon, or the author of the chapter which concludes his historical romance, has painted, not as the rest from his imagination, but from the life.

CHAPTER XIV.

FROM THE ACCESSION OF DARIUS HYSTASPIS TO THE
BATTLE OF MARATHON.

Empire of Darius. — Democedes at Susa. — Syloson. — The Scythians. — Darius invades Scythia. — Darius repasses the Danube. — Histæus. — The Persians invade Pæonia. — Macedonia. — Tributary to Persia. — Histæus carried to Susa. — Invasion of Naxos. — Aristagoras excites the Ionians to revolt. — Aristagoras at Sparta. — Athens seeks Protection from Persia. — Aristagoras at Athens. — Burning of Sardis. — Insurrection of Caria and Cyprus. — Intrigues of Histæus. — The Ionians at Ladé. — Dionysius the Phœœan. — Defeat of the Ionians. — Capture of Miletus. — Flight of Miltiades. — Persian Regulations in Ionia. — Expedition of Mardonius. — Quarrel between Athens and Ægina. — Demaratus deposed. — Death of Cleomenes. — Factions of Ægina. — Expedition of Datis and Artaphernes. — Siege of Carystus and of Eretria. — Destruction of Eretria. — The Persians at Marathon. — Preparations of the Athenians. — Miltiades. — Battle of Marathon. — Miltiades attacks Paros. — His Death.

DARIUS HYSTASPIS was not a conqueror like Cyrus or Cambyses ; the ruling maxim of his government seems to have been to aim rather at consolidating and securing his empire than at enlarging it ; and though he was engaged in wars almost throughout his whole reign, they all partook of a defensive character, and were the result of prudence, or necessity, or chance, rather than of deliberate ambition. Hence it arose that his attention was chiefly turned toward the western side of his dominions, where accidental causes brought him into collision with the Greeks, and produced those memorable events which we are now about to relate. Had his genius resembled that of

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his predecessors he would probably have directed his views toward the East, where the kingdoms of India lay open to his arms. On this side the Indus appears to have been the boundary of his empire, and the Indians who composed the twentieth satrapy, and whose tribute according to Herodotus exceeded a third of that of all the remainder, were probably the inhabitants of the modern Candahar, and Cabul, and the adjacent lands west of the Indus. Of the vast and rich country beyond he knew only by report, which however had undoubtedly spread the fame of its wonderful fertility and opulence; but though he employed a Greek navigator, Scylax of Caryanda, to follow the Indus into the ocean, and to survey the coast from its mouth westward, he does not seem to have formed any settled design of conquest in this quarter.

Soon after his accession to the throne he was invited to turn his arms against Greece, and the invitation came from Greeks in whom a selfish interest had overpowered all patriotic feelings. The occasion arose out of the misfortunes of Polycrates. When he fell into the hands of the satrap of Sardis, he was accompanied not only by Samians, but by a number of attendants, natives of other countries, who in various ways had become retainers of his court. The Samians as we have seen, were dismissed, but the foreigners were kept in prison at Sardis, till the death of Oroetes when they were transported, with his confiscated treasures, to Susa. Among these captives was a physician named Democedes, a native of Croton. He had gained so high a reputation in Greece, that having been driven by domestic troubles from his native town, he was first engaged by the Æginetans in the public service at a fixed yearly salary, and next by the Athenians at one higher by two thirds; but Polycrates with his usual munificence outbade them, and attracted him to Samos. Democedes remained for

Democedes
at Susa.

time neglected at Susa ; at length an accident restored him to liberty and to his country. Darius had dislocated a foot in hunting ; his Egyptian surgeons, the only ones that practised the art in Persia, did not possess science sufficient for this case, and instead of relieving their patient aggravated his sufferings by their rude attempts to set the limb. While the king lay in torment a report reached him of the skill of Democedes. The Greek at first would have concealed his art, through fear that it might be the means of detaining him in a perpetual though honourable exile ; at length however he was induced to exert it, and soon effected a complete cure. The king loaded him with gold, and was ready to grant him every thing but what he most wished, leave to return to his country. This it was hopeless to ask.

After a time Atossa, the daughter of Cyrus, and the most honoured among the wives of Darius, also needed the aid of Democedes. In the course of his attendance he excited her curiosity by his description of his native land, and either inspired her with a wish to have Greek damsels to wait upon her, or at least persuaded her to say so to the king. Such Herodotus conceives to have been the means by which Darius was induced to send Democedes home, guarded by a small number of Persians, who were directed to survey the coasts of Greece and of Southern Italy under his guidance, and to bring him back to Persia ; and he considers this mission as a preliminary step taken with a view to the invasion of Greece. Since however one of its objects clearly was to indulge the exile with a short visit to his country, it is at least very doubtful whether Darius intended any thing more than to take advantage of the opportunity, and procure some certain information concerning a region of which he had only an indistinct notion, and which was interesting to him from its vicinity to his own dominions, as

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well as from what he had seen of its natives. Democedes, when he had landed at Croton, of course refused to go on board again, and his companions were unable to compel him; they were themselves wrecked on the southern coast of Italy, and made slaves, but were redeemed and carried back to Persia by a Tarentine named Gillus, who was then in exile, and hoped to regain his footing in his native city by Persian succour. By command of Darius the Cnicians used their influence, which was great at Tarentum, in his favour, but without success.

Syloson.

The next consequence that flowed from the calamity of Polycrates was the ruin of Samos. His younger brother Syloson, when he was driven into exile, had taken refuge in Egypt. There he met with Darius, who was serving among the guards of Cambyses, and was lucky enough to oblige the future king of Persia, by presenting him with a cloak which had chanced to catch his fancy. When he heard of the revolution which had placed a man who was indebted to him on the throne of Persia, Syloson went to court, and gained admittance to the king. Darius bad him name his reward; he asked to be put in possession of the inheritance of his deceased brother, and to be made tyrant of Samos. The island was at this time subject to Mæandrius, whom Polycrates had left governor when he set out on his last journey. On the tyrant's death his vicegerent was at first willing to resign his authority; he dedicated an altar and a plot of ground to Jupiter, under the title of the Liberator, called his fellow-citizens together, and declared his intention of restoring them to liberty; all he proposed to reserve for himself from the property of Polycrates, was a sum sufficient for a decent maintenance, and the enjoyment of the land he had consecrated, which he desired should remain in his family, together with the priesthood annexed to it. Some private enemy of Mæan-

SYLOSON.

drius, or some severe republican, imprudently objected to this modest request, while he had it still in his power to retract his offer. Finding that he could not descend safely, he resolved to keep his ground, and secured the persons of the principal citizens. During an illness from which he seemed not likely to recover, one of his brothers put them all to death. In the mean while Darius had sent Otanes, one of the Seven, with an army to restore Syloson. The Persian force was so numerous as to make resistance hopeless, and Mæandrius capitulated on condition of being allowed to quit the island. The terms were granted, and the chief Persians took their seats near the foot of the citadel to wait for their fulfilment. Mæandrius had another brother named Charilaus, a hairbrained youth, whom he had thrown into prison for some offence. Charilaus had heard what was passing without, and through the bars of his dungeon he could see the Persian nobles quietly seated in the suburb. He demanded an interview with his brother, and urged him to take advantage of the enemy's unguarded posture, or if he shrank from the enterprise himself to permit him to try his fortune. Mæandrius caring little about the event, and not sorry at least to embitter Syloson's triumph, left the young man to his discretion. While he withdrew through a covered passage to the ship that was to carry him away, Charilaus armed the garrison, threw open the gates of the citadel, and suddenly fell upon the unsuspecting Persians and cut them to pieces. But their further progress was soon checked by the main body of the Persian army, which drove them back into the fortress. This was reduced; and Otanes, indignant at the treachery, though Darius had ordered him to spare the lives of the Samians, commanded an indiscriminate slaughter without regard to age or to place, profane or sacred. Then he formed his men into a

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line stretching from sea to sea, and after the fashion of an oriental chase, drove the whole population of the island before him, cooped them up in a corner, and carried them away captive. Syloson was put in possession — of a desert; the solitude he had made passed into a proverb¹; it was at length repeopled, but the sun of Samos never rose again with its pristine lustre. Mæandrius sailed with his treasures to Sparta, hoping to prevail on king Cleomenes to espouse his cause, and to aid him in expelling his rival. He drew the Spartan to his lodging, while his slaves were scouring the vessels of gold and silver displayed on the sideboard. Cleomenes gazed and coveted, and was immediately invited to choose the fairest; but his virtue or his fear shrank from the temptation, and he desired the ephors to banish the dangerous stranger from Sparta and from Peloponnesus.

The Scy-
thians.

While these events were passing on the coast of the Ægean, Darius was meditating an expedition against the Scythians, which he made in person about the same time that the satrap of Egypt was engaged in the conquest of the Greek settlements in Africa. We have already seen that during the reign of the Median king Cyaxares a Scythian horde broke into the civilised regions of Asia, and were only exterminated or expelled after they had ranged over them as masters for eight and twenty years. They had made this irruption through the Caspian gates; as Herodotus believed, in pursuit of the Cimmerians. But since we find that the Cimmerians had gained a footing in the west of Asia before the epoch of this supposed flight, which beside would most probably have led them over the plains into Europe, rather than among the highlands of Caucasus, it is more credible that the Scythians were attracted, not by a flying enemy, but by the plunder

¹ Ἐκπῆτι Συλοσῶντος εὐρυχωρίη: which however Strabo xiv. p. 638. supposes to have arisen out of the desolating tyranny of Syloson himself.

Asia.¹ They had been themselves driven from the north-east, from the steppes at the foot of mount Altai, the Massagetæ, and were now masters of the great plain between the Danube and the Don. They were, Niebuhr has shown, a Mongolian race, equally distinct from the Getes and the Sarmatians.² The Greeks, who only contemplated them through a distance which concealed or softened their genuine features, were apt to believe that, as they were exempt from the vices peculiar to civilised society, they also possessed the virtues which the progress of civilisation, when it has reached a certain point, tends to weaken and destroy. The better they were known the more early it appeared by their example, that the manners of a savage state may be as far removed from the simplicity of a rational nature as the last stage of vicious corruption, and that man utterly uncultivated may be almost as wretched and worthless as he may become by artificial depravity. The persons of the Scythians, naturally unsightly, were rendered hideous by indolent habits, only occasionally interrupted by violent exertion; and the same cause subjected them to disgusting diseases, in which they themselves revered the finger of Heaven. The men from time to time exchanged the backs of their horses, which they hung the greater part of the day, for the cover of their waggons, in which the women and children passed all their hours, relieved by their slaves in domestic labours, in brutal uncleanness and constant torpor. In their convivial seasons an intoxicating vapour supplied the place of the juice of the vine or the barleycorn; the art by which the modern Tartars extract a spirituous liquor from the milk of their mares was unknown to them. The slaves who

See Niebuhr *Klein. Schrift.* p. 366.

In the essay *Untersuchungen über die Geschichte der Skythen Geten und Sarmaten* K7. Schr. p. 362. See however Donaldson *Varronianus*, p. 30.

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prepared their ordinary food by a mechanical process, were deprived of their sight, that their masters might be spared the trouble of watching them. The events that broke the uniform tenor of this life arose out of war or the chase: for their regular migrations could scarcely be said to vary it: the face of their wilderness, except as it shared the changes of the year, was eternally the same. They carried about with them the skins and skulls of their slain enemies, as trophies of their valour, and poured the blood of their captives as a libation, on the sword which they worshipped as the image or symbol of the god of war. One part of the nation had pre-eminence over the rest, as the royal or golden horde; its king was regarded with a kind of religious reverence: his tent contained the sacred hearth by which the most solemn oaths were sworn; and if he fell sick the danger was attributed to some secret perjury by which its sanctity had been profaned. The royal obsequies were celebrated with human victims, whose remains were stationed as guards round the tomb of the deceased, after others of his domestics had been buried with him, as if to continue after death the offices they had rendered to him during life. These rites may have been relics of a forgotten creed; there were no priests to expound their import, but there were diviners in abundance, who drew their knowledge of the future from the position of staves thrown on the ground, or from strips of bark twisted round their fingers, and possessed the privilege of pointing the vengeance of the community against criminals who had incurred the wrath of Heaven by hidden misdeeds.

Such are the outlines of the picture which the best informed among the Greek authors, Herodotus and Hippocrates, draw of the Scythian nomads. The agricultural tribe of the same name, which supplied the Greek colony of Olbia with corn for exportation, may

ve been only their subjects, and have sprung from different race, which they had found in the country when they first invaded it. This people Darius was about to seek in the midst of their deserts. His protracted expedition had been delayed by a rebellion which broke out at Babylon in the beginning of his reign. The ancient capital of Assyria had been secretly preparing for revolt during the troubles that followed the fall of the Magian, and for nearly two years it defied the power of Darius. At length the treachery of Zopyrus, a noble Persian, who sacrificed his personal honour to the interest of his master, is said to have opened its gates to him. Zopyrus gained the confidence of the Babylonians by mutilating himself; and flying to them, as one who had suffered from the king's cruelty, and was bent on revenge. He found means to betray the city to Darius, who after putting three thousand of the principal inhabitants to a cruel death, provided against new insurrections by strengthening the walls. When he was freed from this care he set out for the Scythian war. The whole history of this expedition is involved in great obscurity, so that scarcely any fact relating to it can be held absolutely certain, except that it was made by Darius in person, and that it failed. Herodotus ascribes it to his desire of avenging the calamities which the Scythians had recently inflicted upon Asia, in other words, to his ambition. But we also hear from Ctesias, that he had been provoked by a letter or a message which he received from the king of the Scythians, and that he marched to chastise his insolence. The occasion of this letter is said to have been an inroad which the king of Cappadocia had made into Scythia by command of Darius, for the purpose of carrying away captives, and in which he had protected a brother of the Scythian king in a family quarrel. It seems clear that the object Darius had in view was not to conquer

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the country, but to weaken and humble the people; and he may have looked upon this as a precaution indispensable for the security of his empire. The remembrance of ancient injuries may have been revived by recent aggressions. It is however also possible that the subjugation of Thrace was his principal aim, and that he only crossed the Danube to terrify the Scythians by the display of his gigantic power. The whole military force of the empire was put in motion, and the numbers of the army are rated at seven or eight hundred thousand men. Orders had been given for laying a bridge of boats over the Thracian Bosphorus, and the work was committed to a Samian engineer named Mandrocles, who accomplished it so successfully that Darius rewarded him with a royal present, a part of which the Samian applied to adorn the temple of Here in his native city with a picture representing the passage of the Persian host. Darius himself commemorated the event by erecting two pillars, inscribed one with Greek, the other with Assyrian characters, recording the names of the nations that composed his army. Six hundred ships waited his commands, furnished by the subject Greek cities; and most of the tyrants who ruled under the protection of Persia along the coast of Asia, and that of Europe from the Hellespont to the Bosphorus, served in the fleet. They were ordered to sail to the mouth of the Danube, and to proceed up the river to a point above the head of its delta, and there to prepare a bridge, and to wait for the arrival of the land force. Darius slowly pursued his march through Thrace, raising monuments on his road, and turning aside to subdue some Thracian tribes which refused submission; the greater part of those whose seats he crossed on the southern skirts of mount Hæmus yielded without resistance, and joined the army. On coming to the Danube he found the bridge laid, and when his

troops were safely landed on the left bank, he ordered the Greeks to break it up and to follow him into Scythia. But Coes, a Lesbian, who commanded the contingent sent by Mitylene, perceived the danger of abandoning a pass which might be needed when it could not be recovered, and advised the king to leave it in the care of the Greeks. Darius was struck with the prudence of his suggestion, and not only adopted it, but promised on his return to reward Coes for his good counsel. But as he was not sure that he should take the same road on his march back, he fixed a term of sixty days for his absence, after which the Greeks who guarded the bridge were to quit their post and sail home. The method he used to assist them in keeping an account of time, was one of surprising rudeness; he tied sixty knots in a leathern thong, and bade them unfasten one every day, till the prescribed interval had expired.¹ This done, he moved forward in search of the Scythians, whom he expected soon to find waiting his approach in battle array.

So far the proceedings of Darius are intelligible; but his adventures in Scythia elude every attempt to conceive their real nature and connection. The description Herodotus has left of them undoubtedly contains many genuine features, but can scarcely be trusted for a correct historical outline. We may easily believe that the Scythians were wise enough to retreat before the invader, that they removed their families and their most valuable possessions to a distant region, and laid the tracts over which they were pursued by the enemy utterly waste. But this renders it the more difficult to understand how the myriads of the Persian host were supplied with food and forage in their march from the Danube to the Don; and even if the fleet, which however is not said to have attended the motions of the army, could be supposed to solve this enigma, their

¹ See Kopp. *Bilder und Schriften der Vorzeit*, ii. p. 56.

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subsequent wanderings in the tract of the Scythians, when all communication with the coast must have been entirely cut off, would still be no less perplexing. We should therefore be unable to trace the movements of the hostile armies even if they belonged to our subject; but we are only concerned with the result. The pursuit in which the Persians had wasted their strength was changed into a retreat, in which they were pressed by the superior force of the Scythian cavalry, and were compelled to abandon their baggage and their sick. In the mean while the sixtieth knot had been untied, and the Scythians had sent tidings to the Greeks who were guarding the bridge of the situation of Darius, and exhorted them to sail away and leave him to his fate. The commanders deliberated; a fair opportunity seemed to present itself for recovering their independence, and inflicting a deep wound on the Persian power. They were urged to seize it by an Athenian, named Miltiades, whom chance had made master of the Thracian Chersonesus; but Histiaëus, the tyrant of Miletus, was of a different mind; and his arguments were addressed to feelings which in most of his hearers were more powerful than those to which Miltiades appealed. He reminded them that the Persian power upheld their own, and that no city which should have shaken off the sovereignty of its foreign master would continue to endure a domestic tyrant. All came over to his side, and resolved to deceive the Scythians, and to save Darius. They began to break up the bridge on the left bank, and the Scythians, persuaded that they had deprived their enemy of his only means of escaping, made no attempt to cut him off from the river. Darius had reason to fear that either in obedience to his orders, or from their knowledge of his danger, the Greeks would by this time have left their post: when he found their transports still waiting for him on the opposite side his joy and gratitude

Darius
repasses
the Danube.

were proportioned to the greatness of the evil from which he had been unexpectedly delivered.

If Darius had really traversed the regions which Herodotus describes, after they had been left bare and waste by the flying enemy, it would have been scarcely possible that he should have brought back with him more than a few emaciated followers. Yet it does not appear that he suffered severely from hunger, or that he lost any considerable part of his forces. The only difficulty he seems to experience is that of overtaking the Scythians, or of engaging them in a battle; they endeavour to protract his stay by occasionally exposing booty to his foraging parties, as though his stores were not yet spent; their kings send him a threatening present, a bird, a mouse, a frog, and five arrows; but the danger to which these symbols are believed to point, is only that of being shut up in the country, and perishing by the Scythian arms; and when at length he hastens his retreat, it is through fear of being deserted by the Greeks. The army he brought back with him was still large enough to enable him to leave eighty thousand men in Europe, under the command of Megabazus, whom he commissioned to complete the conquest of Thrace and of the Greek cities on the Hellespont. We find however that these Greeks had ventured to annoy the Persian army on its retreat¹, and that Darius was so apprehensive of invasion from the Scythians, who seem to have meditated one², and to have made an unsuccessful attempt³, that he caused the Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont (Abydus among them) to be burnt down, to prevent them from affording means of transport to the enemy.⁴ He himself rested some time at Sardis. One of his first cares on his return to Asia was to reward the services of Coes and

¹ Her. v. 27.² Ibid. vi. 40.³ Ibid. vi. 84.⁴ Strabo, xiii. p. 591.

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Histiaëus.

Histiaëus. The former at his own request was made tyrant of Mitylene; Histiaëus asked and obtained a district on the Strymon, where he founded a town called Myrcinus. The neighbouring country abounded in timber, and contained silver mines; the position chosen by Histiaëus commanded the navigation of the Strymon, and was well adapted for a great staple of commerce between the Thracian tribes of the interior and the Greek cities on the coast; Histiaëus might expect here to raise a state more flourishing than Miletus itself, which he still retained, but committed to the charge of his cousin Aristagoras. Though his loyalty was so amply requited, we do not find that any measures were taken to punish the treason of Miltiades, who remained long unmolested in his Chersonesian government, and was driven from it by an inroad of the Scythians themselves three years before he was finally compelled to abandon it by the Persians: an impunity which reflects great doubt on the story of his offence, especially as it was no less glorious at Athens, than it was dangerous to him while he was surrounded by the Persian arms.

The Persians invade
Pæonia.

Megabazus was an able and active officer; he began his operations with the reduction of Perinthus, and then proceeded to subdue all the Thracian tribes which had not yet submitted, to his master. While he was thus employed, he received an extraordinary commission which turned his arms towards another quarter. While Darius was staying at Sardis, two Pæonians, ambitious of greater power than they possessed in their own country, came over with their sister, in the hope of exciting the king's curiosity and admiration by the spectacle of their native manners exhibited by a beautiful woman, and of inducing him to annex Pæonia to his dominions, and suffer them to rule it in his name. Their scheme led to consequences which they did not expect. Darius indeed was struck

with the sight of their sister, when, clad in her best dress after the country fashion, she walked to the water's side through the streets of Sardis, with a pitcher on her head, leading a horse, and twirling a distaff.¹ He eagerly inquired to what race she belonged; but when the seats of the Pæonians were described to him, he sent an order to Megabazus, to invade their land, and transport them into Asia; so singular and industrious a people seemed worthy of living nearer his own presence. The Pæonians were widely spread over the highlands in the north of Macedonia; the tribe which Darius had been invited to subdue was seated in the upper vale of the Strymon. While the collected forces of the nation were guarding the passes nearest to the coast, Megabazus took guides, and led his army by a more circuitous road into the heart of their country. When the Pæonians heard that the Persian was master of their villages and families, they dispersed; a part of them submitted, and Megabazus transported the tribe against which his commission was principally directed, into Asia, where Darius assigned a district in Phrygia for their habitation.

The territories of Amyntas king of Macedonia bordered on the region into which Megabazus had carried his arms; and before he led his forces away from Pæonia, he sent seven Persians of high rank to the Macedonian king, in the name of Darius, to demand earth and water, the customary symbols of subjection. The kingdom of Macedonia at this epoch did not extend far to the east of the Axios, and did not include the upper part of its course. To the south it reached the foot of the Cambunian hills; westward its boundaries were lost among the territories of Illyrian

Macedonia

¹ Nicolaus Damascenus (p. 296. ed. Tauchn.) transfers the occurrence to the reign of Alyattes. The woman is a Mysian (*Μυση τὸ γένος Θράκης δ' ἔστιν αὐτὸ πολίχνιον*), and Alyattes sends an embassy to Cotys, and brings over a numerous colony of her race.

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mountain tribes, which as they were impelled by fluctuating causes acknowledged or defied the authority of its sovereigns. It had gradually grown to its present extent by successive conquests of several small states, some of which still continued distinct, though generally subject to it, and ruled by princes of the royal blood, who were vassals or dependent allies of its king. The people appears to have been a mixed race, in which Illyrian conquerors were variously united with a more ancient Pelasgian population. But the reigning dynasty was of purely Hellenic origin. Two accounts of it were known to the ancients; they agree in tracing it to the posterity of the Heracleid Temenus, but differ as to the date of its establishment in Macedonia. In one story the founder Perdiccas is the youngest of three brothers, of the house of Temenus, who fled from Argos to Illyria, and thence passed into Macedonia, where the favour of the gods raised him from a servile condition to the throne. The less romantic tradition refers the foundation of the monarchy to Caranus, a brother of the Argive prince or tyrant Pheidon; and an expedition by which a member of his family established himself in a distant country, accords so well with all we know of that powerful and ambitious man, that whether it be imagined part of a scheme of conquest which he may have formed, or, which seems more probable, the result of a family quarrel which forced Caranus into exile, it has quite the appearance of a historical fact. At the same time it is not necessary to reject the more poetical adventure as a groundless fiction, or to deny that more than one band of Heracleids or Dorians may at different times have gained a footing in the same country. At all events it was very early admitted as equally certain, that the kings were Greeks, and that the people were barbarians. This latter point was never doubted; the former was proved by a solemn

trial in the reign of the son of Amyntas, the same Alexander who will fill a conspicuous part in the history of this period. He had presented himself, perhaps for the purpose of deciding the disputed question, as a candidate for one of the prizes at the Olympic games. His competitors contested his right to enter the lists, from which barbarians were excluded by the fundamental laws of the institution; but Alexander adduced such evidence of his Argive descent, as determined the judges in his favour.

Amyntas consented to become the vassal of Darius; and before the envoys set out on their return to Megabazus, he entertained them at his table. Sobriety was not one of the Persian virtues. The guests grew heated with wine, and, elated with the success of their mission, lost all respect for the laws of hospitality and decency. They forced Amyntas to break through the usages of Greek society, and to send the women of his family into the banquet-room at a time when, if custom had permitted their presence, prudence would have led them to withdraw. The consequences were such as might have been foreseen. The old king suppressed his anger at the insolence of the strangers; but Alexander's youthful spirit boiled with uncontrollable indignation. He found a pretext for introducing some armed youths who quenched the lust of the Persians in their blood. But the resentment they had provoked did not rouse Amyntas to any further resistance; nor did Darius ever avenge their death. A body of their countrymen indeed was soon after sent into Macedonia to inquire into their fate; for none of their attendants was left alive to carry back the tale; but Alexander was able to hush all up by bribing the Persian general who came in search of them, with gold and with the hand of one of his sisters.

Tributary
to Persia.

In the course of his expedition against the Pæonians

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Histiæus
carried to
Susa.

Megabazus had observed the use that Histiæus had made of the generosity of Darius, and perceived that he was collecting at Myrcinus the elements of a formidable power, which he might in time wield to the detriment of Persia. When he carried his captives to Sardis he imparted his suspicions to his master, and awakened his jealousy; and Darius resolved to keep Histiæus harmless. He sent for him on pretence of consulting him about some important undertaking; but when he had come to Sardis, he informed him, that he could not bear to be longer deprived of his company and conversation; *Leave Miletus, he said, and your new city in Thrace, and follow me to Susa, where you shall share my table and my counsels.* With the feelings of a man whose ambitious hopes are suddenly nipped, just as they are beginning to blossom, Histiæus attended the king to the splendid prison where he saw himself doomed to spend the remainder of his days. Before he returned to Susa, Darius appointed his half-brother Artaphernes satrap of the Asiatic coast of the Ægean, and of the southern provinces of the kingdom of Cræsus, whose capital Sardis still continued to be the seat of government for this part of Asia; and he left Otanes in the room of Megabazus to reduce the maritime cities which still held out on the coasts to the north of the Ægean. Otanes, a different person from the conspirator of the same name, vigorously prosecuted the work begun by his predecessor. Among other towns in that region he took Byzantium and Chalcedon, and, with the aid of a squadron furnished by the Lesbians, he subdued the islands of Imbros and Lemnos, which were still occupied by a Pelasgian population. Lemnos did not yield without a sharp struggle, and was then consigned to a brother of the Samian tyrant Mæandrius. The success of these campaigns much more than compensated for the check that Darius had received in his

Scythian expedition. The Persian empire had never been so outwardly great, so inwardly prosperous. From the rising to the setting sun there appeared to be no power that could rival its majesty; none from which, if worth the effort, it could not enforce submission. Toward the close of the sixth century before our era (B. C. 505—501) the nations from the banks of the Indus to the borders of Thessaly rested under the shade of the monarchy, and enjoyed one of those short intervals of profound calm which in history as in nature often precede the gathering of a storm.

The repose in which the world was hushed was disturbed by a contest between two factions in the little island of Naxos. The democratical party there had gained the ascendant, and their adversaries, the most opulent of the citizens, were forced to quit their country. They were united with Histæus by political ties, such as parties in the Greek states who did not feel secure at home generally endeavoured to contract with some powerful foreigner. Aristagoras was still filling the place of his kinsman at Miletus, and to him the Naxian exiles now applied for succour. Aristagoras was not unwilling to restore them: Naxos ruled by his creatures would in effect become his own: but the undertaking surpassed his means. The island was the largest of the Cyclades, and its fertility and the industry of its inhabitants had made it rich and powerful. It maintained a considerable navy, and could bring eight thousand men into the field. It was only with the assistance of the Persians that he could attack it with any hope of success; but if he could engage Artaphernes, who was his personal friend, in the enterprise, he had the fairest prospect not only of accomplishing his immediate purpose, but of doing an important service to the interests of Persia, which would raise his credit at court. Th

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Naxians, equally confident in the support of such an ally, urged him to spare no promises to obtain it. He accordingly repaired to Sardis, and represented to Artaphernes the ease with which he might annex not only Naxos, but all the Cyclades, to the dominions of Darius, and directed his views to a still more tempting conquest, which lay only a little further off, that of the large and wealthy island of Eubœa. The cost of the expedition to Naxos he pledged himself to defray, and he promised a large sum beside for the satrap's private coffers: *A hundred ships would be sufficient to insure success.* Artaphernes was taken with the scheme, and offered, as soon as he had procured the king's consent, to place two hundred ships and a Persian force at the disposal of Aristagoras. As soon as a favourable answer arrived from Susa, he equipped the promised armament, which he intrusted to the command of Megabates, a Persian of high quality, and ordered it to sail to Miletus, and take on board the Ionian force that had been raised by Aristagoras.

Invasion of
Naxos.

It was intended to lull the enemy into security, by leading them to believe that the expedition was destined for a different and a remote quarter. Megabates therefore made toward the Hellespont, but off the coast of Chios he brought the fleet to anchor, meaning to take advantage of the first fair wind, and run across to Naxos and surprise the principal town. While he was in this station, he one day made the round of the fleet, to inspect the discipline maintained by the inferior officers. On one ship, a Myndian, he found no watch, and the commander absent. He immediately sent for him, and ordered him to be fastened to the side of his own galley with his head passing through one of the portholes, which were opened in the ancient vessels for the oars, as in ours for the ordnance. While the Myndian officer was

confined in this ignominious posture, word was brought of the occurrence to Aristagoras, who happened to be his friend. Perhaps he also thought that the severity of the Persian admiral, a stranger to the feelings of Greeks, was impolitic, and that it exceeded the bounds of his authority. When therefore on applying for the release of the prisoner he met with a refusal, he went and set him at liberty. Megabates was indignant at this act of defiance, and was still more enraged when Aristagoras openly disclaimed obedience to him, and asserted his own right to the supreme command. To wound him in the tenderest side, Megabates resolved to defeat the expedition, on the issue of which he had staked so much. He privately sent a message to the Naxians, to warn them of their danger. They forthwith began to make preparations for defence, transported their property from the country into the city, laid in stores, and strengthened their fortifications; so that when the Persian fleet at last appeared before their town, they were in a condition to sustain a long siege. At the end of four months the besiegers had made no progress, and had consumed the whole fund allotted to the war; the treasures of Aristagoras were exhausted, and, after erecting some forts in which he left the Naxian exiles to infest their countrymen, he raised the siege and returned to Miletus.

He had relied on a prosperous issue for the means of fulfilling the splendid promises he had made to Artaphernes, and the failure of the expedition put it out of his power to discharge the debt he had contracted with the Persian government. He was a ruined man. The state of his affairs called for some desperate remedy, and he saw no way of extricating himself from his embarrassment but by exciting his countrymen to insurrection. While he was revolving this expedient in his mind, he received a mess-

Aristagoras
excites the
Ionians to
revolt.

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from Histiaëus which fixed his resolution. Histiaëus likewise believed that a general commotion in Ionia, which might render his presence necessary or useful, would afford him his only chance of escaping from his irksome captivity. He shaved the head of a trusty slave, traced some letters with a hot iron on his skin, and when his hair had grown again, sent him off to Miletus. Aristagoras opened these singular credentials, and read an invitation to revolt. In all the Ionian cities there were many discontented with the form of government that had been forced upon them by the Persians, and ready at any risk to shake off the yoke. Aristagoras assembled some of the leading men to deliberate on a plan of action. Among those who met on this occasion was the historian Hecatæus of Miletus. He loved his country and prized independence as much as the most ardent and sanguine of his fellow-citizens; but he had read, travelled, and thought, more than most men of the age. He knew the vast extent, the colossal strength, of the Persian empire, and dissuaded his friends from embarking in the hopeless struggle. But when this advice was rejected, he next urged the necessity of making themselves masters of the sea, and pointed out one of the resources of which they might avail themselves for this purpose. The treasures that had been accumulated in the temple at Branchidæ by the piety of successive generations, and by the liberality of Cræsus, would supply the means of raising a navy, with which they might hope to make a stand against the Persian power. These he exhorted them to seize before they fell into the hands of the enemy. But they were rash, without being bold or firm; the treasure was sacred; they forgot that their cause was so too; they resolved on war, but neglected the fair opportunity of bracing its sinews. Another measure, less perhaps because it was politic, than because

it was agreeable to many private passions and views, was generally approved. It was determined that one of their number should sail to the camp at Myus, where the force that had returned from the siege of Naxos was still kept together, and should make himself master of the persons of the tyrants who had held commands in the Persian armament. This attempt succeeded, and it was the signal of a general insurrection. Aristagoras, who knew that his safety depended on the strength and zeal of the democratical party, conciliated it by resigning his own authority, and by delivering up the prisoners taken at Myus to the cities over which they had ruled. Most of them were suffered to go into exile; but Coes, the counsellor of Darius, was stoned to death by the people of Mitylene, and liberty was every where re-established in the revolted cities.

Aristagoras having secured the steadfastness of his countrymen by these pledges, himself sailed to Greece, to persuade some of the leading states to espouse his cause. He first bent his course to Sparta, where Cleomenes was now king in the line of Eurysthenes, and Demaratus in that of Procles. Cleomenes was the son of Anaxandridas by a second wife whom the ephors had forced him to marry, though they permitted him to retain his first wife to whom he was much attached, but who had hitherto proved childless. After the second marriage however she became the mother of three princes, Dorieus, Leonidas, and Cleombrotus. Dorieus, a high-spirited youth, hoped on his father's death that he should succeed to the throne; and when Cleomenes was preferred to him as the lawful heir, quitted Sparta, with a band of followers, and after various adventures on the coasts of Africa and Italy, fell in battle with the Phœnicians near Segesta in Sicily. The headstrong temper of Cleomenes seems to have given him some advantage over

Aristagoras
at Sparta.

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his milder colleague in carrying his measures, and he was more inclined to new and bold enterprises. To him Aristagoras addressed himself. In a private interview he drew forth a brass plate, containing a map of the world, according to the most exact notion that had been then formed by the Ionian sages of its outline and its parts. The Persian empire occupied the largest portion of it, and Aristagoras pointed out the situation of the provinces that lay between the Ægean and Susa, and extolled their wealth and fertility, and the immense treasures piled up in the capital. According to him the Spartans had only to cross over to Asia, and they would find no obstacle to prevent them from marching to Susa, and making themselves masters of it. He reminded his hearer of the continual wars in which Sparta had been engaged with her neighbours of Messenia, and Arcadia, and Argos, and of the hard struggles she had often maintained for a paltry strip of barren land, like Cynuria, and compared these laborious and unproductive conquests with the fair and opulent regions of Asia, which a slight effort would be sufficient to subdue. Cleomenes took three days to consider his answer. But when he again saw Aristagoras, he asked him how many days' journeys lay between the sea and the palace at Susa. The Ionian was thrown off his guard, and did not conceal that the distance was a three months march. On hearing this, Cleomenes, astonished and alarmed, hastily broke off the conversation, and bad the stranger quit Sparta without delay. Aristagoras however had still one engine of persuasion left. With the ensigns of a suppliant he went to the king's house, and found him with his daughter Gorgo, a child eight or nine years old, by his side. She looked on unheeded while Aristagoras tendered to Cleomenes the price of his assistance. His offers gradually rose; but when they had reached fifty

talents, the child, perceiving that her father was tempted to something which he thought to be wrong, suddenly exclaimed, *Go away, father, the stranger will do you harm.* Cleomenes accepted the omen, and left the room, and Aristagoras soon after quitted Sparta.

Athens was the second state in Greece; and here Aristagoras made his next application with better hopes of success. The Athenians had already had some transactions with Artaphernes which had raised in them no friendly feelings toward Persia, and had convinced them that they had nothing but enmity to expect from it. When they were threatened with invasion by Cleomenes after his ignominious capitulation, they had sent envoys to Sardis to propose an alliance with Persia, and to solicit aid: the first example of the fatal policy which afterward brought so many calamities upon Greece. The satrap, who had never heard of Athens, and could scarcely understand an alliance with his master which was not subjection, consented to protect the Athenians if they would present the usual signs of submission. The envoys, either thinking the danger so pressing that deliverance was cheap at any price, or not interpreting the act required in the same sense with Artaphernes, undertook to give earth and water. But on their return they were sharply censured, and their concession was not ratified. This incident probably strengthened the arguments of Hippias, who was now at Sigeum, or Sardis, gnawed by revenge and disappointed ambition, and was using all his efforts to induce Artaphernes to take up his quarrel. The Athenians hearing of his machinations sent, as unwisely as before, to deprecate the satrap's interference. The answer they received was a just rebuke: they should be safe, if they would recall their tyrant. As this was the worst evil they dreaded, they began at

Athens
seeks pro-
tection from
Persia.

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Aristagoras
at Athens.

last to give up all thoughts of appeasing the enmity of Persia, and prepared themselves to defy it.

The public mind at Athens was in this state when Aristagoras arrived. Here he had no need of secrecy or of bribes. He found willing hearers, when in the assembly of the people he unfolded the same tempting prospect which he had spread before Cleomenes: the wealth of Asia, the rudeness of the Persian mode of fighting, the certainty and the fruits of victory. To these motives he added one of piety: the religious obligation of protecting a distressed colony of Athens. His eloquence prevailed; a decree was passed to send a squadron of twenty ships to the assistance of the Ionians, under the command of Melanthius, a man of the highest reputation. Herodotus observes that the thirty thousand Athenians were more easily deluded than Cleomenes. But it does not appear that in this case they were either grossly deceived, or flagrantly rash. The twenty ships were indeed the occasion of events which they could not have dreamt of; but they might not unreasonably consider the measure as one of prudent precaution, by which an avowed enemy was occupied at home, and diverted from an attack with which he had already threatened them.

Aristagoras sailed back to Asia before the Athenian squadron, and on his arrival took a step for which no motive can be assigned but the desire of provoking Darius. He sent a message to the transplanted Pæonians, and offered, if they would make their way to the coast, to furnish them with the means of returning to their native land. They forthwith set out in a body with all their households, outstripped the pursuit of the Persian cavalry, and reached the sea-side, where they found Ionian vessels which transported them to the coast of Thrace. In the meanwhile the twenty Athenian ships came to Miletus, accompanied by five galleys from Eretria. The Eretrians were

still more imprudent than the Athenians ; for they had never been threatened by the Persians ; but without calculating the danger, they joined in the expedition, to discharge a debt of gratitude for succour which they had once received from the Milesians in a war with their neighbours of Chalcis.¹ The united forces proceeded to Ephesus under the command of two Milesians, one a brother of Aristagoras ; for he himself staid at Miletus. At Coressus in the Ephesian territory the troops landed, and reinforced by a strong body of Ionians, set off with guides from Ephesus up the vale of the Caystrus. Then ascending mount Tmolus, they crossed over to its northern side, and poured down like a torrent on the unguarded capital of Lydia. Artaphernes was there ; he threw himself into the citadel, which was capable of standing a long siege ; but the city fell into the hands of the invaders, who immediately began to plunder it. The houses of Sardis were chiefly of wicker-work, and those which were built of brick were thatched with reeds : a precaution against the effects of the earthquakes to which this region is peculiarly subject. A soldier in the heat of pillage set fire to a house ; the flames soon spread through the town. The inhabitants, driven out of their houses, rushed in a body to their market-place on the Pactolus, their last retreat, and with the courage of despair defended themselves against the enemy. The Athenians and their allies, kept at bay in the midst of a burning city, began to think their own situation dangerous. They might soon be attacked in the rear by an army which would probably be sent to the relief of Artaphernes, and they could not hope to effect the reduction of the citadel. They therefore resolved to make a timely retreat, and hastily retraced their march over the ridge of Tmolus, and down the vale of the

A. D. 449.
Burning of
Sardis.

¹ See Vol. I. p. 495.

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Caystrus. They had not long left Sardis before the whole force of the province, which had been promptly levied on the news of the invasion, came up to protect the capital. It overtook them in the Ephesian territory, where a battle took place in which they were defeated; the Ionian troops dispersed among their cities, and their allies sailed home to Eretria and Athens.

The indignation of Darius, when he heard of the destruction of Sardis, was bent not so much against the Ionians, as against the obscure strangers who had dared to defy his power, and to side with his rebellious subjects. His first question was, who the Athenians were, his first prayer that he might live to punish them; and one of his attendants was charged, every day before the king began his meal, to recall the name of the Athenians to his thoughts. The conflagration at Sardis had consumed not only the private dwellings, but the temple of Cybebe, a goddess revered by the Persians as well as the Lydians. And this accident, which was probably interpreted as a sacrilegious outrage, inflamed the resentment of the king and the whole nation. His first care however was to quell the Ionian insurrection, which was beginning to spread into other parts. He called Histiaëus into his presence, upbraided him with the revolt of his kinsman, and expressed strong suspicions of his own fidelity. But the artful Greek not only persuaded Darius of his innocence, but even obtained leave to go to Ionia, where he undertook to suppress the rebellion, which he observed could never have broken out but in his absence. Gross as this dissimulation was, it certainly succeeded; but however great the simplicity of Darius may have been, it sounds incredible that he should have been caught by a promise, which Histiaëus is said to have held out, of subjecting the island of Sardinia to his empire; unless

Indeed he was totally ignorant of its situation, or rumour had prodigiously exaggerated its wealth and importance.

In the meanwhile Aristagoras had in vain solicited fresh succours from the Athenians, who were disheartened by the issue of the expedition. But the Ionian fleet, though abandoned by their squadron, was not inactive. It first sailed to the north; its presence induced Byzantium and the other cities of the coasts between the Ægean and the Euxine to rise against the Persians, and enabled them to assert their independence. Caria had been wavering; but the tidings of the capture of Sardis, probably because it proved that the Ionians were in earnest, decided almost the whole country to embrace their cause. At the same time Cyprus shook off the Persian yoke. Yet all these fair prospects were soon overclouded. The generals of Darius, who had driven the Athenians from their ships, and had routed the Ionian army at Ephesus, proceeded to reduce the maritime cities to obedience. Daurises took several towns on the Hellespont and the Propontis, at the first assault, and was pushing his conquests in this quarter, when he received tidings of the rebellion in Caria, and immediately marched to suppress it. The Carians rejected the counsel of one of their countrymen, who advised them to place the Mæander in their rear, before they gave the Persians battle, that necessity might goad them into preternatural valour. They preferred seeing the enemy in a position where his retreat would be cut off; but they lost the day and ten thousand men. After this defeat they deliberated on leaving their country; but succours came from Miletus, which encouraged them to venture another battle, in which they were worsted with still greater slaughter. These disasters appear to have broken their strength, so that though they still maintained the

Insurrec-
tion of
Caria and
Cyprus.

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unequal conflict, and even drew Daurises into an ambush in which he was slain, this advantage could only retard their subjugation, till another general found leisure to reduce them. The Cyprian revolt did not last more than a year; it had been fomented by a brother of the king of Salamis, who wished to usurp the diadem. All the cities of the island supported him, except Amathus, which he besieged. Hearing that a Persian general was about to cross over from Cilicia in a Phœnician fleet, he sent for succours from Ionia. They came, and the hostile forces met both by sea and land. The Ionians gained a victory over the Phœnician fleet; but the Cyprians were betrayed by one of their native princes, and defeated; and their allies, seeing their affairs totally ruined, sailed away.

After this Artaphernes and Otanes began vigorously to press the cities of Ionia and Æolis. When Clazomenæ and Cuma had fallen, Aristagoras, easily dejected as he was sanguine in his hopes, grew desponding, and turned his thoughts to flight. He assembled his friends, and advised them to fix on some place of refuge, where they might find shelter if the progress of the Persian arms should force them to abandon Miletus. He proposed that for this purpose they should immediately send out a colony, and suggested the island of Sardinia, or his kinsman's town of Myrcinus. Hecataeus was present at this deliberation also, and was adverse to both plans. He advised his fellow-citizens, should they be driven to the last extremity, to fortify themselves in the island of Leros, and there wait for an opportunity of recovering Miletus. But Aristagoras himself was bent on taking possession of Myrcinus, and he induced the majority to adopt his views. He left Miletus, where he had surrendered the name but not the substance of power, in the hands of a respectable citizen, and himself

sailed to the banks of the Strymon. Here he was soon after cut off with his army, as he lay before a Thracian city, by a sally of the besieged.¹

These events had happened before Histiaeus arrived at Sardis. Artaphernes was more clear-sighted than Darius, or had better information, and perceived the connection between the Ionian rebellion and the designs of Histiaeus. *Aristagoras*, he one day said to him, *drew the sandal on, but it was of your stitching*. This speech drove him into the measure on which he had long resolved before it was quite ripe. He made his escape from Sardis by night, and crossed over to Chios. The Chians at first arrested him as an enemy, but he soon removed their suspicions, without however gaining their confidence. Many were angry with him, as having wantonly provoked a war which threatened the ruin of Ionia. To appease them he forged a story that Darius had meditated transplanting the Ionians to Phœnicia, and bestowing their land on the Phœnicians. His first step was to renew an intrigue which had been interrupted by his flight from Sardis. He had there sounded some of the Persians, and had found them not averse to his plans. He now wrote to them on the subject of their past conversations; but the bearer of his letters showed them to Artaphernes, who having procured evidence of the guilt of the conspirators from their own answers, put them all to death. Histiaeus wished to take the lead in the war which he had kindled; but he found himself a homeless adventurer. Miletus, glad to be rid of Aristagoras, would not admit her old tyrant, and he was repulsed and wounded in an attempt which he made, with the aid of the Chians, to force an entrance by night. The Chians, though they had assisted him in this en-

¹ Herodotus, v. 126., and Thucydides, iv. 102., supply one another, and perhaps only appear to differ a little about the details.

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terprise, would neither submit to his command, nor furnish him with ships. But he found the people of Lesbos more compliant. There he collected a little squadron of eight triremes, with which he sailed to Byzantium, and, as if he had been legitimate sovereign of Ionia, seized the merchant-vessels of all the cities which would not acknowledge his authority.

While he remained here, doing all the mischief he could to his country, the Ionian insurrection was drawing to a crisis. The Persian generals had resolved to strike it on the head, by capturing Miletus, the fall of which would crush the hopes of all the other revolted cities, which looked up to her as their chief. It was therefore determined to besiege Miletus by sea and land. The scattered divisions of the army were collected to bear upon this point, and a great fleet was equipped in the harbours of Phœnicia, Egypt, Cilicia, and Cyprus, to blockade it from the sea. While these armaments were expected, the Ionians who adhered to the cause¹ held a congress at the Panionium, to concert their plan of defence. It was agreed not to encounter the Persian army in the field, and to leave the Milesians to sustain the siege on the land side as they could; but that the whole strength of the confederacy should be exerted to drive the enemy from the Ægean; and the fleet was appointed to assemble at Ladé. Ladé was then a small island; by the depositions of the Mæander it has now become part of the plain which separates the site of Miletus from the sea. Here the naval force of the confederates met; Chios sent the largest squadron, a hundred galleys; the Lesbians, though their privateers were still at Byzantium with Histiaëus, seventy; the Samians could still raise as many as sixty; but Phocæa, though she had not lost her old spirit, could

The Ionians
at Ladé.

¹ Ephesus, Colophon, and Lebedus are not mentioned, and seem to have kept aloof. Her. vi. 8.

equip no more than three. The united navy amounted to 353 triremes. The hostile fleet which was on its way from the East numbered 600. Notwithstanding this vast superiority in numbers, the Persian generals, when they considered that of the Ionians in nautical skill, felt that they were by no means sure of victory, and would fain have avoided the approaching conflict. They therefore convened the tyrants, who, after being expelled from their cities at the beginning of the insurrection, had betaken themselves to their foreign protectors, and were then serving in the Persian army, and commissioned them to endeavour each to detach his fellow-citizens from the confederacy, by offers of pardon for their past offences on their return to obedience, and by threats of the most rigorous treatment if their obstinacy should at length be subdued by force. The overtures were made secretly and separately, and probably from this very cause were in each instance rejected: each state believing that it would incur the shame and the hazard of the defection alone, instead of being led to fear that it might be left to sustain a deserted cause.

During the interval in which the hostile fleets were watching each other, neither willing to begin the decisive conflict, Dionysius, the commander of the Phocæans, observed that the naval camp at Ladé was far from displaying the order and good discipline which so critical a juncture demanded. In a general assembly he pointed out to his countrymen the danger of insubordination and supineness, and prevailed on them to commit themselves to his guidance. When he was invested with the chief command, he did not suffer a day to pass without devoting several hours to martial exercises. He drew out the fleet in order of battle, practised the rowers in the evolutions of a seafight, and kept the marines at the same time under arms in the places where their

Dionysius
the Pho-
cæan.

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services would be required. After seven days of this laborious training, the troops began to murmur at what they easily persuaded themselves was a profitless hardship, and to rail at Dionysius as an ambitious meddler. It seemed intolerable that a man who had only brought three ships to join the fleet should domineer over all the rest: the Persians themselves could not lord it more tyrannically over their slaves: and they resolved to shake off the authority of Dionysius, and to assert the rights of freemen. Instead of going abroad to execute his commands, they henceforth dispersed themselves in parties over the island, and reposed during the heat of the day under tents which they pitched on the most agreeable spots. The Samian commanders were disgusted with this folly, or some of them, who were before inclined to accept the terms offered by the Persians, made use of it as an argument to draw the others over to their views. The end was that they sent to their banished tyrant, *Æaces*, the son of *Syloson*, and declared their readiness to close with his late proposals. It was agreed that they should desert in the battle.

Defeat of
the Ionians.

The Persian fleet now sailed confidently to the attack; the Ionians met them without suspicion of treachery. But in the beginning of the action the Samians quitted their post, and bore away to Samos. Only eleven captains refused to obey their superior officers, and kept their places; they were afterwards rewarded by a monument in the market-place of Samos. The example of the rest however was followed by the Lesbians, and, as the alarm spread, by the greater part of the fleet. The Chians almost alone remained firm amid the general consternation; but their skill and valour were at length overpowered by superior numbers, and they were compelled to fly. Those whose galleys were disabled from escaping the

pursuit of the enemy, ran them aground at cape Mycalé, and left them. They bent their way northward; but passing through the Ephesian territory in the night, while the women were celebrating a festival, they were taken for robbers who had come with sacrilegious intentions, and were all cut to pieces by the Ephesians. Dionysius of Phocæa had fought till the struggle became desperate, and had taken three of the enemy's ships; when forced to fly he sailed to Phœnicia, sank several merchantmen, and laden with spoil steered for Sicily, and thence carried on an unremitting war against the old enemies of his countrymen, the Tyrsenians¹, and Carthaginians.

The defeat off Ladé was soon followed by the fall of Miletus. Six years after the revolt of Aristagoras (B. C. 494) the capital of Ionia was stormed by the Persians. The conquerors carried into effect the threats with which they accompanied their pacific offers before the battle. Those of the citizens who escaped the sword were carried into captivity with their families. By the order of Darius they were transplanted to the head of the Persian gulf, and settled in a town called Ampe, in the marshes near the mouth of the Tigris. The shrine of Branchidæ was plundered of its sacred treasures. Miletus became a Persian colony; a part of its territory was annexed to that of Pedasa. Its destruction was felt at Athens as a national calamity; and the poet Phrynichus, who ventured to wound the feelings of his audience by exhibiting it as a tragedy, was punished by a heavy fine. The next year the other cities on the coast of Ionia experienced a similar fate. They were not indeed utterly desolated; but their fairest children were carried away to fill or to guard the royal harem. The islands of Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos, were swept of their inhabitants by a process

B. C. 494.
Capture of
Miletus.

¹ See Niebuhr, *Hist.* l. p. 125. ed. 3.

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like that which Otanes employed in Samos. The subjugation of Ionia was complete.

Histiæus did not long survive the ruin he had caused. After the fall of Miletus, thinking himself unsafe in the Bosphorus, he sailed with his Lesbian squadron to Chios, and easily made himself master of the island, which had spent all its forces at the battle of Ladé. After this, with a larger force collected from the remnant of the war, he invaded the island of Thasos. But he was interrupted in the siege of the town by news of the approach of the Persian fleet, and sailed to Lesbos. Finding himself in want of provisions for his troops, he crossed over to the continent for the purpose of reaping the harvest in the vale of the Caicus, which he expected to find unprotected. But Harpagus, a Persian general, happened to be at hand with a considerable force; the marauders were surprised and routed, and Histiæus himself, being overtaken by a Persian horseman, believing that the clemency of Darius might yet spare his life, cried out in the Persian language for quarter, and made himself known. He was led to Artaphernes, who immediately ordered him to be crucified, and sent his head to Susa. The only person in the world perhaps who felt pity or regret for his fate was Darius himself, who gave his remains a more honourable interment than they deserved, and blamed the hasty vengeance of the viceroy.

The Persian fleet continued its victorious career toward the Hellespont. The cities north of the Ægean were successively overpowered, and sank in the flames. The men of Byzantium and Chalcedon did not wait for the enemy's attack, but left their towns to found a new one called Mesembria on the western coast of the Euxine. Miltiades too thought himself no longer safe. The principality which he had long governed in the Chersonesus, had been founded by his uncle

Miltiades, son of Cypselus, during the reign of Pisistratus, at Athens. The Doloncians, a Thracian tribe, wanted a chief to protect them from the inroads of their neighbours, the savage Apsinthians. Under the direction of the Delphic oracle, by an accidental or preconcerted combination of circumstances, they found one in the son of Cypselus, who was glad to withdraw from the jealous eye of Pisistratus. He secured their peninsula by carrying a wall across the isthmus, waged a war with Lampsacus, in which he was made prisoner, but released through the intercession of Cræsus, and dying childless, left his dominions to his nephew Stesagoras, son of Cimon, who was soon after assassinated. At this time his brother, the younger Miltiades, was at Athens; and Stesagoras having left no child, the sons of Pisistratus, who according to Herodotus had before procured the assassination of his father¹, sent him to take possession of the vacant inheritance. On his arrival he found it necessary to establish his authority by violence. He entrapped the principal men of the Chersonesus, and threw them into prison; took five hundred foreigners into his pay, and strengthened himself by marrying a Thracian prince.² He was, in the full Greek sense of the word, a tyrant. We have seen that he attended Darius on the Scythian expedition, and that the part he is said to have acted on that occasion was apparently either unknown or forgotten. After the Scythian inroad, of which we know nothing but that it drove him out of his territories, had passed by, he returned and remained in peace, till he saw himself threatened with invasion by the triumphant arms of Persia. While the Persian fleet was lying off Tenedos, he filled five galleys with his treasure, and set sail for Athens. He narrowly

¹ VI. 39. 103.

² A daughter of Olorus, from whom the father of Thucydides, the historian, who belonged to the family of Miltiades, derived his name.

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escaped the enemy with four of his ships; the fifth was taken, and in it his son Metiochus, whom the captors sent, it is said, as a peculiarly welcome prize to Darius. If the father had indeed incurred the king's anger, the son was generously treated; for instead of death or a prison he received a fair estate and a Persian wife. The expelled tyrant became again an Athenian citizen.

Persian
regulations
in Ionia.

After the first transports of hostile fury had subsided, and the insult offered by the rebellion to the majesty of the empire had been sufficiently avenged, Artaphernes set about the regulation of the subdued country, and, in Roman language, reduced it to the form of a province. He extinguished all remains of independence in the Ionian cities, forbade them any longer to decide their quarrels by the sword, and compelled their deputies, whom he had summoned to Sardis for this purpose¹, to bind themselves, by treaties, which ought to have been the work of their own free will, to submit all their differences to arbitration. He then caused a survey to be taken of their territories, and apportioned their tribute according to the extent of the districts. Its whole amount was not increased. Thus tranquillity was restored, and order established, though at the expense of liberty; the cities revived, and no doubt recovered many of their former inhabitants, who had fled from them to avoid the first violence of the victorious enemy. From such a remnant, as well as from the influx of fresh settlers, we may suppose the new Greek population of Miletus to have arisen. In the next year after the close of the war, the Persian government adopted an expedient still better fitted to allay the discontent of its Ionian subjects, and to

¹ Among these deputies, according to Diodorus (Mal, ii. p. 38.), was Hecataeus, and the Ionians are said to have been indebted to him for the mild terms they obtained from Artaphernes. Diodorus says of Artaphernes, ἀπέδωκε τοὺς νόμους ταῖς πόλεσιν, which would be more applicable to Mardonius.

keep them in willing subjection. The king's son-in-law, Mardonius, was sent down to take the place of Artaphernes, and one of his first proceedings after his arrival in Ionia, was to depose the tyrants who had been placed in the cities by his predecessor, and to set up a democratical constitution. This change appeared so repugnant to Persian maxims, that Herodotus thought it sufficient to silence the objections of those who doubted that democracy could have found an advocate among the Seven Conspirators. It does indeed indicate more knowledge of mankind, larger views, and sounder principles of policy, than could have been expected from a barbarous and despotic court, and reflects honour on the understanding of Mardonius or of Darius. Yet the last insurrection had shown, that while the dominion of the tyrants irritated the people, and afforded a constant motive to rebellion, their own fidelity was by no means secure. A popular form of government gave a vent to the restless spirits which might otherwise have endangered the public quiet; and in the enjoyment of civil liberty and equality the sovereignty of the foreign king was almost forgotten.

Mardonius had come with a mighty armament which was designed to wreak the vengeance of Darius upon Athens and Eretria, and at the same time to spread the terror of his name, and to strengthen his power in Europe. A large fleet was to sweep the Egean, and to exact obedience from the islands, while Mardonius himself led the landforce into Greece, and on his way subdued the Thracian and Macedonian tribes which had not yet submitted. The fleet first directed its course to the island of Thasus, which still drew a large revenue from the goldmines first opened there by the Phœnicians, as well as from others on the opposite continent. The wealth of the Thasians had tempted Histiaëus, and his attack

B. C. 492.
Expedition
of Mardonius.

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had induced them to increase their navy and to strengthen their fortifications. They now yielded to the Persians without a struggle ; and the next year, when Darius, suspecting that their preparations were aimed against himself, commanded them to throw down their walls, and to surrender their ships, they acquiesced with equal readiness. But the Persian armament was soon after checked in its progress by a violent storm which overtook it off mount Athos, and was thought to have destroyed not less than three hundred vessels and twenty thousand lives. Mardonius himself was not much more fortunate : in his march through Macedonia his camp was surprised in the night by the Brygians, an independent tribe of Thracian blood ; he lost many of his troops, and was himself wounded. He punished this aggression indeed, and did not leave the country till he had tamed the Brygians ; but his forces were so weakened by these disasters that he thought it prudent to end the campaign with this conquest, and returned to Asia.

The resolution of Darius was not shaken by these accidents, and the next year he renewed his preparations for the invasion of Greece. While they were proceeding he sent heralds round to the Greek cities, among the rest to those which had incurred his anger, to try their spirit by a demand of submission. The arrival of these envoys gave occasion to some changes in the state of Greece, which must now be related, and briefly traced to their origin.

Quarrel
between
Athens and
Ægina.

We have seen that the Athenians had been delivered from the danger with which they were threatened from the revenge of Cleomenes, by the friendship of the Corinthians and the dissension between the two Spartan kings, that they had afterwards inflicted a severe and profitable vengeance on Thebes and Chalcis, and that the Thebans, too weak to revenge their dis-

comfiture, called in the aid of Ægina, with which they claimed a mythical affinity. The Æginetans however did not need this motive for espousing the cause of Thebes. They had others much stronger in their oligarchical government, and in the ancient quarrel which had produced implacable enmity between them and the Athenians. Athens had interposed in behalf of her ally Epidaurus, when she was insulted by her revolted colony Ægina. The Athenians invaded the island, but were repulsed with great loss by the united forces of the natives and the Argives. Bitter hatred sprang from this source between the neighbours; and there was a tradition, that it had induced the Athenians to lay aside the ancient dress of their women, which was that common to the Dorian race, and to adopt the Ionian fashion, while Attic wares were rigidly excluded from sacred, and perhaps from profane uses in Ægina. The Æginetans, remembering this old grudge, and confident in the superiority of their naval power, when the Thebans besought their assistance, actively espoused their cause by the invasion of Attica already mentioned. The Athenians either were unable to revenge this insult, or their attention was diverted to another quarter by the threatened restoration of Hippias, and by their unfortunate expedition to Ionia; and their quarrel with Ægina slumbered till the arrival of the Persian envoys, who came to demand earth and water for Darius. Both at Athens and at Sparta the heralds of Darius were put to death with cruel mockery. This breach of the law of nations was probably not the effect of passion, but of policy, which, though inhuman, may not have been ill-judged. At Athens Miltiades is said to have been the author of the measure.¹

¹ Paus. iii. 12. 7. Perhaps however, if any one was anxious to clear Miltiades of the imputation, he might observe, that Herodotus, when he was at a loss to discover in what way the Athenians had been visited by divine vengeance for the

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Many cities on the continent complied with this demand, and none of the islanders rejected it: Ægina consented with the rest. The Athenians interpreted this act of their rivals, as if it had been dictated by the malice they bore against Athens, and by their eagerness to assist the barbarians in accomplishing her ruin; and they immediately sent ambassadors to Sparta, and accused Ægina of having betrayed the cause of Greece. Cleomenes, without waiting for a formal commission, immediately repaired to Ægina, and was proceeding to arrest some of the principal citizens. But Demaratus had privately encouraged the Æginetans to resist this attempt of his colleague, as a step not sanctioned by any legitimate authority; and Cleomenes was compelled to retire from the island baffled and dishonoured.

Demaratus
deposed.

He knew that the author of his disgrace was the same who had before thwarted him in his designs against Athens, and he laid a scheme for revenging himself, and at the same time getting rid of a troublesome adversary. The title of Demaratus to the royal dignity was not beyond dispute. His mother, by a contract which the Spartan manners permitted, had been transferred by her first husband to his father Ariston; his birth was premature, and Ariston had expressed disbelief of his legitimacy, which he afterwards suppressed; but it had been uttered with the vehemence of a sudden surprise in the presence of the ephors, and his mother's reputation was not deemed spotless. Cleomenes now instigated Leoty-chides, a private enemy of Demaratus, and the next in succession of the same house, to avail himself of these grounds, and urge his claim to the throne. The cause was tried; it was one of the highest importance in the eyes of the Spartans, who conceived the safety

murder (vii. 133.), could hardly have failed to notice the fate of Miltiades, if he had been known as the adviser of the act.

of the state concerned in the purity of the royal blood. Leotychides insisted on the words of Ariston; but the Spartans would not decide so grave a question on such evidence, and to obtain the utmost certainty they referred it, on the suggestion of Cleomenes, to the Delphic oracle. Cleomenes had a friend named Cobon, who possessed great influence at Delphi; this man gained over the priestess, and an answer came declaring that Demaratus was not the son of Ariston. Leotychides triumphed; and not satisfied with his success he embittered the degradation of his deposed rival by a wanton insult: at a public festival he sent a message to ask him how he relished a subordinate station after royalty. Demaratus replied that Sparta would perhaps pay dearly for the question; soon after he left the city, resolved never to return but as king. He was pursued, but reached Asia in safety, and was graciously received by Darius, who gave him lands and the revenues of cities.

Cleomenes immediately proceeded to use his creature Leotychides, in obtaining satisfaction for the affront he had suffered at Ægina. They went over together, and the Æginetans, afraid of resisting their joint demand, surrendered ten of their principal citizens into their hands. These hostages they deposited with the Athenians. Soon after the sacrilegious fraud was detected; the priestess lost her office, and her suborner was banished; and Cleomenes fearing punishment fled to Thessaly. But shortly he returned to Peloponnesus and took up his residence in Arcadia, where he began to draw the Arcadians into a confederacy against his country; and his machinations alarmed the Spartans so much, that they invited him back by promises of impunity. He had not been long reinstated before the violent humour which had hitherto only betrayed itself in occasional sallies of passion, broke out into madness; and having by

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Cleomenes.

threats extorted a weapon from the helot who guarded him, he died miserably by his own hand. Leotychides too did not carry his ill-gotten dignity with him to the grave: many years after he was convicted of having taken bribes from the enemy in an expedition which he made into Thessaly, his house was razed to the ground, and he died in exile at Tegea.

Factions of
Ægina.

On the death of Cleomenes the Æginetans sent to Sparta, to complain of the unjust seizure of their citizens. Leotychides, no longer supported by his colleague, was condemned to be given up to them in the room of their hostages. But they thought it prudent not to enforce this sentence, and only took him with them to Athens to demand the restitution of his deposit. The Athenians however refused to release their prisoners, and the Æginetans retaliated by the capture of their sacred vessel, in which several men of the first rank were embarked to attend the festival of Apollo at Delos. After this fresh provocation the Athenians lent a willing ear to the proposals of a discontented Æginetan named Nicodromus, who had formed a plan for overthrowing the oligarchical government of the island with their assistance. On the appointed day he accordingly rose and seized the citadel; but the Athenian succours did not arrive in time, and he fell into the hands of his adversaries with seven hundred of his adherents. They all suffered the fate which perhaps they only wanted power to inflict; and in this as in most instances even religion had not influence sufficient to restrain the rage of party. One of the unhappy men who was led to death extricated himself from his fetters, and laid hold of the door of a temple, to which he clung by the thong which fastened it till his hands were cut off. This was the only part of the deed of blood which weighed upon the conscience of the perpetrators, and was believed to be beyond the

each of their expiations. The Athenians had been prevented from fulfilling their engagement by the want of a fleet able to cope with that of Ægina, and they had sent to borrow ships from the Corinthians. Their request was granted, though too late for its main purpose; but they defeated their enemy in a seafight, and were still carrying on the war with varying fortune while the Persians were preparing to invade them.

In the third year after the last disastrous campaign (B. C. 490) a new force was collected in Cilicia, and placed under the command of two new generals, Datis a Mede, and Artaphernes, son of the satrap of Lydia, and hence as the king's nephew superior in rank, but probably inferior both in age and military experience to his colleague, who seems to have been the real leader of the expedition. On the Cilician coast they found a fleet of six hundred triremes, together with horse transports; the whole army was taken on board, and sailed first to Samos, and thence, instead of making the round of the Ægean, which Herodotus thinks would have been preferred as the safer course but for the dread of mount Athos, crossed directly to the Cyclades. Naxos, which had baffled the attempts of Aristagoras when seconded by the power of Persia, was the first and principal object of attack. The Naxians lost their courage at the appearance of the huge armament, abandoned their walls, and took refuge in the mountains. The Persians carried off all who had not time to escape, and committed the city and its temples to the flames. The centre of the Cyclades, the sacred island of Delos, had especial reason to tremble at the approach of an enemy who made war against the gods of Greece. The peaceful people, whose life passed in a round of sacrifices and festivals, fled to Tenos, leaving their rich temple with its treasures to the protection of its

Expedition
of Datis and
Arta-
phernes.

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tutelary gods. They screened it by the fame of their sanctuary. The Persians had heard that Delos was the birthplace of two deities, who corresponded to those which held the foremost rank in their own religious system, the sun and moon. This comparison was probably suggested to them by some Greek who wished to save the temple. It seemed to be confirmed by the intimate union which the Delian legend established between the divine twins, whose simultaneous birth was not a universal tenet of the Greek theology. Hence, though separately neither of them inspired the barbarians with reverence, their common shrine was not only spared, but, if we may believe the tradition which was current in the days of Herodotus, received the highest honours from Datis: he would not suffer his ships to touch the sacred shore, but kept them at the island of Rhenea, which is parted from it by a narrow channel: he sent a herald to the fugitives, to remonstrate with them on their groundless alarm, and to assure them that he held their persons no less sacred than their island; and finally he burnt a great pile of precious incense on the altar. The main fact, that the temple escaped, though surprising, cannot be denied. But the rest of the story is not more certain than the earthquake, by which, as the Delians reported, their island was shaken after the departure of the Persians, to announce the calamities that impended over Greece.

Siege of
Carystus
and of
Eretria.

The fleet held on its course through the islands, receiving their submission, and taking from each a reinforcement and hostages, and then sailed to Eubœa to accomplish one of the two great objects of the expedition. The first town before which it appeared was Carystus; it rejected the demands of the Persians, and would not serve them against its neighbours and brethren. While it defended itself, Eretria sent to Athens for succour against the attack which she had

shortly to expect. The Athenians charged their four thousand citizens, among whom as we have seen they had distributed the estates of the rich Chalcidians, with the duty of protecting Eretria. But the city itself was wavering and divided: one party was honest but timid, and proposed to follow the example of the Naxians, and retire to the mountains; but there were others who were eager to purchase the favour of the Persians by betraying their country. On the arrival of the Athenians, one of the leading Eretrians disclosed to them the state of affairs, and the danger they ran of being deserted or sacrificed by their allies. They took his advice, and crossed over to Attica; the event proved the prudence of their retreat. After the fall of Carystus the Persians laid siege to Eretria; the men who wished to sell themselves to the enemy prevailed on their fellow citizens to abandon the design of flight, and as they could not venture to meet the invading army in the field, to sustain a siege. For six days they made a brave defence; but on the seventh the gates were treacherously thrown open. The infamy of this deed fell on two men whom Herodotus describes as among the most eminent citizens; and perhaps its baseness was mitigated by political motives, which may have led them to regard Athens as an enemy more formidable and hateful than the Persians. The conquerors exactly fulfilled the commands of the king; the more rigorously that the fate of Eretria might strike terror into the Athenians. The city with its temples was plundered, burnt, and razed to the ground; according to one tradition, which however rests on the half-poetical testimony of Plato, the Persian host swept the whole territory of Eretria, as it had done in Samos and other islands; the captives, however collected, were lodged in a safe place, till they could

Destruction
of Eretria.

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The Per-
sians at
Marathon.

be carried up to the king. Then the whole armament steered its course to the coast of Attica.

It was the aged tyrant Hippias who, as he had most earnestly urged the expedition, now guided the barbarian against his country. By his advice the fleet came to anchor in the bay of Marathon, where it was sheltered from the northern gales by a promontory which runs out from the foot of Parnes; the army landed in the plain, where a level tract, five miles in length and two in breadth, affords one of the few situations to be found in the rugged land of Attica, favourable to the movements of cavalry. On the landside the plain is bounded by steep slopes descending from the higher ridges of Pentelicus and Parnes, and by their gradual approach it is contracted towards the north into a narrow glen, the bed of a little stream, which in its course to the sea divides it into two unequal parts. Near the shore the low grounds at the foot of the hills on either side are swamps, or are covered with small stagnant pools. In this position the Persian generals encamped, expecting an opportunity of fighting a decisive battle on this advantageous ground. Had the Athenians shrunk from a conflict, a march of a day or two would have brought them through the heart of Attica to the city, which they had reason to believe would not have held out longer than Eretria. The Athenians however, as soon as they heard of the landing at Marathon, marched without delay to face the enemy. At the same time they neglected no provision that prudence suggested for strengthening themselves to meet the contest with fair hopes of success. They armed not only all their serviceable citizens, but such of their slaves as were willing to earn their liberty with their blood. They sent off a messenger, named Phidippides, a man noted for the extraordinary speed with which he could perform long journeys, to request instant

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succour from Sparta; and it is probable that they likewise summoned the Plataeans, on whom they could call not merely as allies, but as brothers. Plataea had been very early engaged in hostility with Thebes, occasioned by disputed boundaries. In the reign of Cleomenes, being hard pressed by her more powerful neighbour, she sought protection from Sparta, and offered to withdraw from the Bœotian confederacy, and to place herself under Spartan sovereignty. The Spartans saw no benefit likely to result from this connection either to themselves or the Plataeans, and, probably not without being conscious that they were sowing the seeds of perpetual feuds between Attica and Bœotia, advised them to address themselves to Athens. Athens received, and protected them. The Thebans disputed the right of the Plataeans to dissolve the ties which connected them with Bœotia, and were preparing to contest it in arms; but the Corinthians interposed, and, the question being referred to their arbitration, decided in favour of Plataea, and settled its boundaries. The Thebans were so dissatisfied with this sentence, that they fell upon the Athenian army which had come to the assistance of the Plataeans as it was returning to Attica; but they were defeated, and compelled to relinquish a part of the territory assigned to them by the Corinthians. The landmarks of Plataea, and consequently in fact those of Attica, were carried forward to the Asopus; the Plataeans became, as they were afterwards called, Athenian Bœotians, united with Athens by the most intimate bonds, that were consistent on the one hand with their own political independence, and on the other with the distinct privileges of the Athenian citizens.¹ The Plataeans now raised their whole force,

¹ It was probably the relation of *isopolity*, which was afterwards described by the Theban orator in Thuc. iii. 63. as an absolute admission to the Attic franchise. See Wachsmuth, l. 2. p. 149. Niebuhr, ii. p. 50.

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which on a subsequent and equally pressing occasion, when they fought on their own ground, amounted to six hundred heavy armed men¹; and marching to Marathon found the Athenian army already in the presence of the enemy.

The Athenian courier, travelling with breathless haste, reached Sparta the next day after he had left Athens. He related the fall of Eretria, the imminent danger of Athens. The Spartans did not refuse assistance; perhaps they hoped that a short delay might not render it useless; but if their intentions were honourable they did not feel the urgency of the juncture. The moon wanted some days of the full; to set out on an expedition in this interval, at least in the month then passing, which was probably that of the great Carnean festival, was contrary to one of the fundamental maxims of their superstition²; and they dismissed the messenger with promises of distant succour. To console his fellowcitizens, he announced to them assurances of aid from an invisible hand. As he crossed the top of the mountains that separate Argolis from Arcadia, the god Pan, he said, had called him by his name, and had bidden him cheer the Athenians with a gracious reproach, for having neglected the worship of a deity who had often befriended them in times past, and would prove his goodwill toward them yet again. This seasonable encouragement the grateful city afterward repaid by dedicating a natural grotto in the Cecropian rock to the woodland god, and by honouring him with a yearly sacrifice and a torchrace. The protection of Artemis was invoked against the arrows of the barbarians by an extraordinary vow. For every slain enemy a she-goat was to be led in solemn procession every year to

¹ Herodotus does not mention their number at Marathon. Justin and Nepos make it amount to a thousand.

² See Appendix III.

her altar, at Agræ, on the banks of the Ilissus, where according to the legend of the temple the goddess had first drawn her bow, when she came over from her native island.¹ With this strength, and with these hopes, the Athenian army crossed the ridge which divides the plain of Marathon from the midland of Attica, and posted itself on the eastern skirts of the hills at the head of the valley.

It was commanded, according to the constitution of Cleisthenes, by ten generals; at their head was the polemarch Callimachus, whose authority and influence was the only security for the unity of their counsels. He was entitled by law to the command of the right wing, and to the casting vote in every question on which the voices of the Ten should be equally split. Among them was Miltiades, the late ruler of the Chersonesus. He had not obtained this mark of public confidence without opposition. On his return to Athens he found rivals and enemies, who endeavoured to inflame the popular jealousy against him, and made the station he had held in his foreign principality the ground of a capital charge: they could urge with great force before the tribunal which tried the cause, that a countryman of Harmodius and Aristogeiton who became a tyrant was worthy of death; and as he had probably exercised his authority over Athenian citizens, though not in Attica, he had perhaps made himself according to the letter of the law liable to the penalty of tyranny. Miltiades however escaped, not so much perhaps on the merits of his case, as because he had fortunately used the power which it was deemed a crime to possess, in the service of Athens. A bitter grudge had subsisted for many ages between the Athenians and that remnant of the Pelasgian race which, as we have seen, after being driven out of Attica, had settled in the islands of

¹ Paus. i. 19. 6.

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Lemnos and Imbros. They had rendered themselves formidable in the Ægean by piratical excursions; and in one of these had landed on the coast of Attica, and carried off Attic women whom they found celebrating a religious festival. The resentment kindled by this injury in the breasts of the Athenians was inflamed by a tragic tale, which soon after reached them, that the Pelasgians, suspecting their captives of hostile designs, had murdered them with the children they had borne to their new lords. This atrocious deed, after which *Lemnian horrors* became proverbial, was believed to have been followed by the usual signs of divine anger, barrenness and scarcity, and a tradition prevailed at Athens, that by command of an oracle the offending people had offered to repair their wrong, but when called upon to deliver up their islands had eluded the demand, by promising to surrender them whenever they should be summoned by a fleet that should sail to them from Attica in one day with a northwind. It was reserved for Miltiades to fulfil this seemingly impossible condition, and at the same time to satiate the vengeance of his countrymen. The Thracian Chersonesus, when he became its master, might be called Attic ground; it was within a few hours' sail of the Pelasgian islands with a northwind; and, this not being sufficient to satisfy the Pelasgians of his right, Miltiades had the power of silencing their objections by the sword. He conquered and expelled them, and nominally at least subjected the islands to the dominion of Attica. It seems not improbable that this achievement, which was an encroachment on the Persian dominion, may have been the cause which drew the resentment of the Persians on him, and occasioned his precipitate flight. To it also he may have been indebted for the favourable issue of this as well as of a subsequent trial; perhaps too the part he had taken in the delibe-

rations of the Ionians on the Danube was now first brought to light, and contributed to turn the popular feeling on his side. After this escape he rose to the eminence which his birth and his character claimed, and when Attica was threatened with invasion he was elected one of the ten generals.

The opinions of the Ten were equally divided on the momentous question: whether they should give battle to the Persians. Those who dissuaded from immediately engaging in a conflict which was to decide the fate of Athens, might speciously alledge the prudence of at least waiting till the reinforcement expected from Lacedæmon should somewhat reduce the fearful disproportion of their little army to the Persian host; the advantage of accustoming the troops to the sight of an enemy whose name struck terror at a distance; finally the prospect of a thousand fortunate accidents from which the invaders had nothing to hope, and every thing to fear. All these arguments were outweighed by a danger, which Miltiades knew was more to be dreaded than the numbers of the Persians: that of treachery within the walls or the camp of the Athenians. The party of Hippias was probably not extinct in Athens, and, while he was in the neighbourhood of the city, with the power and gold of Persia at his command, it was likely every day to gain fresh strength. Motives like those which had led some of the leading Eretrians to betray their country, might find entrance into many Athenian breasts. Cold or selfish calculations might soon take the place of the generous ardour with which the people now glowed for the common cause. Miltiades also knew, better than any of his colleagues, how little depended on the inequality of numbers, how superior his Athenians were to the barbarians in all that formed the real strength of an army. His reasons could not prevail with his opponents; the

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decision rested with the polemarch. Callimachus was brave and honest; he saw and felt the force of the arguments with which Miltiades appealed to his judgment and his patriotism, and gave his voice for battle. The ten generals successively took the command of the whole army, each for a day; those who had seconded the advice of Miltiades were willing to resign their turns to him; but he would not expose himself to the risk of being thwarted by his adversaries in the exercise of a borrowed authority, and waited till he could assume the command in his own right. Then he drew up his little army in order of battle.

Battle of
Marathon.

The enemy's line stretched across the broadest part of the plain. Of the nations that fought in the barbarian host, the two on which the generals placed their chief reliance, the Persians themselves and the no less warlike Sacians, were posted in the centre; here therefore their chief strength lay. That the front of the Athenians might not be so unequal in length as to endanger their flanks, it was necessary that their ranks should be uniformly or partially weakened. Miltiades undoubtedly foresaw the consequences of his arrangement, when he strengthened his wings at the expense of the centre, which was opposed to the strongest, perhaps the only formidable part of the enemy's force. It is remarkable that though Herodotus represents the Persians as induced to land at Marathon with a view to the operations of their cavalry, he does not say a word either of its movements in the battle, or of any cause that prevented them. It seems not to have come into action; but perhaps he could not learn by what means it was kept motionless. Yet there was a tradition on the subject, probably of some antiquity, which appears to have assumed various forms, one of which was adopted by Nepos, who relates that Miltiades protected his

flanks from the enemy's cavalry by an abattis: a fact which it may be thought Herodotus could scarcely have passed over in silence, if it had been known to him, but which might have been the foundation of a very obscure account of the matter, which is given by another author.¹ The two armies were separated by an interval of nearly a mile; the Athenians stood on somewhat higher ground. At the signal of attack they rushed down on the enemy, who awaited them, with wonder and scorn, at the madness of a handful of men whom they saw, as it seemed, pressing blindly forward to certain destruction. Before they had be-thought themselves sufficiently to use their missiles with effect, they found themselves engaged in close combat, in which the Grecian weapons and armour gave the soldier a decided advantage. The Persians however and the Sacians sustained the shock, which was lightest in their part of the field; and after a short struggle they broke the opposite centre, put the whole to flight, and pursued the fugitives towards the hills. But in each wing the impetuous onset of the Athenians, supported by deeper ranks, overpowered the fainter resistance of the motley bands that crowded the plain, and at length drove them toward the shore and the adjoining morasses. While they were here struggling with the difficulties of the ground, Miltiades drew off his men, and, closing the two wings, led them to meet the enemy, who was now returning from the pursuit of the Athenian centre. The defeat of this body decided the battle. The only effort of the routed army now was to reach their ships; many perished in the marshes, many on the shore, and as they were thronging to get on board.

¹ In the explanation of the proverb, *χαρὶς ἰππεῖς* (Suidas, Cent. xiv. 73. Schott.) we read that, when Datis invaded Attica, the Ionians got upon the trees (?) and made signals to the Athenians, that the cavalry had gone away (*ὡς εἶπεν χαρὶς οἱ ἰππεῖς*), and that Miltiades, on learning its retreat, joined battle, and gained the victory; which was the origin of the proverb, *ἐπὶ τῶν τὴν τάξιν διαλύοντων*.

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According to some authors Hippias himself was among the slain. But a story told by Herodotus¹ seems to imply that his body at least was not left on his native land, and there was a tradition that he died at Lemnos. The victors took seven ships, and Cynægirus, a brother of the poet Æschylus, gained immortal glory, by clinging to one till his hand was cut off with a hatchet. Callimachus and one of the generals, Stesilaus, were also left on the field. The fleet at length put off with the remains of the army. But the Athenians were still threatened with another attack. Instead of shaping their course eastward, the invaders steered toward Sunium, with the evident intention of proceeding to the southern coast of Attica. It was afterward universally believed that they had been induced to make this attempt by previous concert with some Athenian citizens; and the house of the Alcmaeonids was charged with having hoisted a shield, as a signal to invite them. Whatever may have been their expectations, they were foiled by the promptness of the victorious army, which no sooner perceived their purpose, than having left one of the tribes on the field of battle to guard the prisoners and the booty², it set out on its march to Athens, and had arrived there before the Persians appeared off the coast. They seemed to perceive that their movement had failed of its object, for without any fresh act of hostility they shortly after set sail for Asia. So ended the day of Marathon.

Scarcely any achievement in the history of mankind ever supplied a theme for so many tuneful or eloquent lips. It would be impossible, and not very useful, to determine the precise abatement that must be made from the poetic and rhetorical penegyrics that have celebrated its fame, before they can be reconciled with

¹ vi. 107.² According to Plutarch, under the command of Aristides.

the sober language of historical truth. The circumstances of the event, as they were handed down for the admiration of successive ages, were discoloured and exaggerated, and they cannot now be exactly ascertained. We are able indeed to correct the vague and extravagant descriptions, which covered the field with myriads of slain, by the testimony of Herodotus, who fixes the number of the Persian dead at 6400, the Athenians at 192; among whom the Platæans are not reckoned. It is more difficult to make an approximation to the real numbers of the two armies, and particularly to estimate the larger force, which was swelled from 300,000 to 600,000 men, by later writers, who did not perceive that, by encumbering the Persians with these useless and unmanageable crowds, they were not heightening, but diminishing, the glory of the conquerors. The Athenians numbered six and forty different nations in the barbarian host; and the Ethiopian arrows, remains of which are still found at Marathon, seem to attest the fact that Darius drew troops from the remotest provinces of his empire. Yet our calculations must be kept down by the remark, that the whole invading army was transported over the sea, according to Herodotus, in 600 ships; this, on the footing which he fixes elsewhere, of 200 men to each trireme, would give 120,000; and we ought probably to consider this as the utmost limit to which the numbers of the invaders can be reasonably carried. Those of the Athenians are uniformly rated at about 10,000; it is possible that the numbers of the tribes had some share in grounding this tradition; it probably falls short of the truth, and certainly does not take the slaves into account, who served most likely as light-armed troops. When all these allowances are made, the numerical inequality will be reduced to a proportion of five to one.

This however is not the standard by which the

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glory of this memorable victory must be measured. The Persians were strong, not only in numbers, but in the terror of their name, in the renown of their conquests, in the recollection of the flight from Sardis, in the recent destruction of Eretria. If Miltiades deserves praise for having perceived the hollowness of these advantages, and if he balanced them by the superiority of his military skill, the Athenians also earned their fame by the boldness with which they faced a danger which they could not despise. When they began their onset, the first, Herodotus says, in which a Grecian army advanced to a charge running, they had all their experience of the enemy's weakness still to gain. Notwithstanding the arguments of Aristagoras, the very sight of the Median garb, as we learn from the same authority, was still terrible to the European Greeks. That these fears were strong, though their ground was imaginary, and that they required a heroic resolution to master them, is clear from the marvellous light in which the victory was viewed by the people, as a deliverance which could not have been effected by their own arm, without the friendly interposition of a higher power. Hence the block of marble, which Datis was said to have brought for a trophy, was gratefully wrought into a statue of Nemesis.¹ Hence it appeared no less credible that the courier Phidippides should have heard the cheering voice of Pan in the mountains, than that when he had told the glad tidings to the magistrates at Athens, he should have dropped down dead from joy. Hence the wonderful legends of the battle: the valiant Epizelus is blinded in the heat of the fight by the apparition of a warrior, whose shield is covered by his flowing beard; the local heroes are active in the combat, and in the picture that represented it on the walls of the Painted

¹ It appears from the observation of intelligent judges (*Unedited Antiquities of Attica*, p. 43.) that this celebrated statue was not of Parian but of Pentelic marble.

Porch, Theseus appeared rising out of the ground with Marathon and Hercules, and the hero Echelus armed with a ploughshare was seen dealing death among the flying barbarians; hence to this day the field of Marathon is believed to be haunted, as in the time of Pausanias, with spectral warriors, and the shepherds are alarmed in the night by their shouts and by the neighing of their steeds.

And therefore the Athenians were only just to their own merits in the extraordinary honours they paid to the true heroes of Marathon, and in the monuments by which they endeavoured to perpetuate their triumph. The slain enemies were committed to an obscure grave; but on the field which they had made holy ground, the Athenians who had fallen for their country were gathered together under a stately sepulchre, adorned with ten pillars, on which their names were inscribed according to their tribes. Another barrow was consecrated to the Platæans and the slaves; and when Miltiades had been removed beyond the reach of hatred and envy, his singular deserts were acknowledged by a separate tomb on the same ground. He and the polemarch Callimachus were alone distinguished from the other combatants in the Painted Porch, and stood apart with the tutelary gods and heroes.

The monuments, the trophies, the votive offerings, the processions, the pictures and sculptures, the songs and the panegyric harangues, that celebrated the victory, not only proved, but in part made its importance. They kept alive the remembrance of a deed, which had first taught the Athenian people to know its own strength, by measuring it with the power which had subdued the greater part of the known world. The consciousness thus awakened fixed its character, its station, and its destiny: it was the spring of its later great actions, and ambitious enter

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prises. With respect to these remote consequences the absence of the Spartans was a momentous event. They came to Athens while the field was still strewn with the dead; they had marched with the speed of men who wished to repair a delay which neither law nor prejudice could wholly justify even in their own eyes; yet their force amounted to no more than 2000 men: a number so small, that it lends some colour to a tradition, which rests only on the authority of Plato, the slightest of all on such points, that they had been occupied in suppressing some insurrection in Messenia.¹ Though too late to share the glory of the day, they desired to see the field, and the renowned barbarians, who for the first time had been vanquished there; they went to Marathon, beheld, praised the Athenians for their courage, and returned home.

Miltiades
attacks
Paros.

The new spirit which the victory infused into the conquerors appeared almost immediately in an occurrence which closed the career of Miltiades. The fear of the Persians was no sooner removed than he began to rouse his countrymen to plans of aggression and conquest. He easily obtained from them a fleet of seventy ships, which they placed at his command, without even knowing toward what object he would direct the expedition, but satisfied with his assurance that it would enrich them. He secretly designed to attack the island of Paros, where he had a private enemy, who had once injured his credit with the Persians; it had afforded a pretext for his revenge, by sending a trireme with the armament under Datis; probably most of the other adjacent islands had been guilty of the same offence; but he contented himself with ravaging their fields, while he laid regular siege to the town of Paros. It was at this time one of the most flourishing among the Cyclades; Miltiades de-

¹ De Leg. iii. p. 698.

manded a heavy penalty; the Parians, instead of complying, kept strengthening their walls, and baffled all his attacks, till despairing of success, he is said to have descended to superstitious arts, and to have received a dangerous hurt in his knee or hip, as he attempted to penetrate into a sacred inclosure. This compelled him to return without fulfilling the promises by which he had induced the people to fit out the fleet. His enemies took advantage of the irritation produced in the public mind by this disappointment, and Xanthippus son of Aripbron, the chief of the rival house of the Alcmaeonids, brought a capital charge against him, for having deceived the people. A gangrene had begun in his injured limb; and, unable to defend his own cause, he was brought on a couch into the court, where his brother Tisagoras pleaded for him before the people, which sat at once as judge and as sovereign. As judge it condemned him; as sovereign, on the ground of his services at Marathon and Lemnos, it commuted the capital penalty for a fine of fifty talents. As he could not immediately raise this sum, he was cast into prison, where he soon after died of his sore.

His death.

Such a sentence, passed under such circumstances, and so harshly exacted, by an absolute monarch, from a victorious general to whom he had owed the safety or the honour of his crown, would commonly be deemed sufficient to brand him with the reproach of ingratitude; and those who are disposed to view the proceedings of popular governments in the worst light, have not failed to apply this name to the conduct of the Athenian people toward Miltiades. Others, who have judged of it more mildly, have considered it only as an ordinary example of popular levity, which changes its favourites as hastily as it adopts them, and is easily persuaded to consign the same man to a dungeon, whom but the day before it

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had exalted to the skies. And certainly as in general it cannot be denied, that men are not more exempt from human passions and frailties, when they act in great bodies, than when alone, so when we reflect on the rash cupidity and blind credulity that mark the beginning of the transaction just described, it is impossible to look for calm wisdom or severe justice in its progress and its termination. So far as Miltiades fell a victim to the arts of an adverse faction which misled his judges, we may pity him without finding them guilty even of inconstancy or caprice; and we may think that they made amends for the involuntary wrong they had done him, by the honours with which they afterwards showed their sense of his merit. But how far they are liable to the charge of ingratitude, must depend on their view of the obligation they had incurred. Darius might well think that the benefit he had received from Histiaëus, was so great, that it could scarcely be effaced by any subsequent offence. But Miltiades was not in such a sense the benefactor of the Athenians: if they conceived that nothing he had done for them ought to raise him above the laws, if they even thought that his services had been sufficiently rewarded by the station which enabled him to perform them, and by the glory he reaped from them, they were not ungrateful or unjust¹; and if Miltiades thought otherwise, he had not learnt to live in a free state.

¹ Οὐκ ἔρα τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθόν τι ποιῶσιν χάριν εἶχον; σφόδρα γε, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀπεδίδουσάν γε καὶ αὐτῶν κἀκείνων ἀξίαν ὄντες γὰρ πολλοῦ πάντες ἄξιοι προὔκρινον ἐκείνους αὐτῶν ἡγεῖσθαι. ἔστι δὲ σάφροσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν βουλομένοις σκοπεῖν πολὺ μείζων τιμὴ τῆς χαλκῆς εἰκόνης τὸ καλῶς κἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν κεκρίσθαι πρότους. καὶ γὰρ τοι τῶν ἔργων τῶν τότε οὐδενὸς ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπεστέρησαν ἑαυτοὺς, οὐδ' ἔστιν οὐδεὶς ὅστις ἔν εἰποι τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν Θεμιστοκλέους, ἀλλ' Ἀθηναίων, οὐδὲ τὴν Μαραθῶνι μάχην Μιλτιάδου, ἀλλὰ τῆς πόλεως. Demosthenes c. Aristocr. p. 686.

CHAPTER XV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS.

Preparations of Darius.—Accession of Xerxes.—Onomacritus.—Artabanus.—Athos and the Hellespont.—March of Xerxes.—Review of the Persian Army.—Nations which composed it.—Persian Fleet.—March of Xerxes through Thrace.—Preparations of the Greeks.—The Thessalians.—The Phocians.—Bœotia and Argos.—Themistocles.—Aristides.—Athenian Marine.—Crete and Corcyra.—Gelo.—His Offers rejected.—Arthmius of Zelea.—The Greeks at Tempe.—At Artemisium.—Movements of the Persian Fleet.—Storm at Sepias.—Terror of the Greeks.—Battles at Artemisium.—Wreck of the Persian Squadron at Cœla.—Leonidas at Thermopylæ.—Combat at Thermopylæ.—The Anopœa.—The Spartans overpowered.—Eurytus and Aristodemus.—Advance of Xerxes.—Persians at Delphi.—Delphic Oracles.—Hesitation of the Athenians.—The Athenians quit their City.—Indecision of the Greeks.—Capture of Athens.—Mnesiphilus and Themistocles.—Advance of the Persian Fleet.—Stratagem of Themistocles.—Aristides at Salamis.—Battle of Salamis.—Artemisia.—Retreat of Xerxes.—Device of Themistocles.—Losses of the Persians.—Siege of Potidæa.—Honours paid to Themistocles.—Battle of Himera.

THE failure of the expedition led by Datis and Artaphernes, in the invasion of Attica, was poorly compensated by their success against Eretria; the insult it had offered to the majesty of the Persian empire was sufficiently avenged by its ruin, and when the captive Eretrians were brought to Darius, he was satisfied with planting them in a part of his own domain, in the Cissian village of Ardericca. But his anger was doubly inflamed against Athens by the event of Marathon, which did not suggest to him any whole-

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some warning ; the conclusion he drew from it was, that his power had been defied with impunity, merely because it had not been fully exerted. Now therefore he resolved that the insolent people, which had invaded his territories, violated the persons of his messengers, and driven his generals to a shameful flight, should feel the whole weight of his arm. A year had been spent in the preparations for the last campaign ; those he now set on foot were on a vast scale, and demanded a longer time. Every nation that owned his sway was called on to contribute to the new armament much more largely than before, and to send the flower of its warriors, such as were fit to meet the Greeks in the field, as well as an extraordinary supply, according to its means, of ships or horses, provisions and stores. For three years all Asia was kept in a continual stir¹ ; in the fourth Darius was distracted by other cares : by a quarrel in his family, and by an insurrection in Egypt. Two of his sons, Artabazanes, the eldest born to him in his private station, and Xerxes, his first by Atossa the daughter of Cyrus, whom he had married after he came to the throne, disputed the succession : the eldest grounded his claim on the common law of inheritance, the younger on his descent from the founder of the monarchy. Demaratus the exiled king of Sparta aided Xerxes with his counsels, and suggested to him another argument drawn from the Spartan rule of succession, by which a son born after the accession of a king was preferred to his elder brother. Darius decided in his favour, and declared him his heir ; swayed perhaps much more by the influence of Atossa, which was always great with him, than by reason or usage. In the following year, before he had ended his preparations against Egypt and Attica, he died, and Xerxes mounted the throne (B.C. 485).

¹ Ἐδονέτο, Her. vii. 1.

Thus the Persian sceptre passed from the hands of a prince who had acquired it by his boldness and prudence, to one born in the palace, the favourite son of the favourite queen, who had been accustomed from his infancy to regard the kingdom as his inheritance, perhaps to think that the blood of Cyrus which flowed in his veins raised him above his father. Bred up in the pompous luxury of the Persian court, among slaves and women, a mark for their flattery and intrigues, he had none of the experience which Darius had gained in that period of his life when Syloson's cloak was a welcome present. He was probably inferior to his father in ability; but the difference between them in fortune and education, seems to have left more traces in their history, than any disparity of nature. Ambition was not the prominent feature in the character of Xerxes; and had he followed his unbiassed inclination, he would perhaps have been content to turn the preparations of Darius against the revolted Egyptians, and have abandoned the expedition against Greece, to which he was not spurred by any personal motives. But he was surrounded by men who were led by various passions and interests to desire that he should prosecute his father's plans of conquest and revenge.¹ Mardonius was eager to renew an enterprise in which he had been foiled through unvoidable mischance, not through his own incapacity. He had reputation to retrieve, and might look forward to the possession of a great European satrapy, at such a distance from the court, as would make him almost an absolute sovereign. He was warmly seconded by the Greeks who had been drawn to Susa by the report of the

¹ Deinon (ap. Athen. xiv. 67.) related that it was a maxim with Xerxes not to taste of anything which grew out of his own dominions. One day some dried figs were served up as part of the royal desert. When he learnt that they were the growth of Attica, he ordered that they should be imported, until he was able to eat of them as the fruit of his own land. But it is said—the historian added—that it was done on purpose to remind him of the expedition against Athens.

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XV.Onomacri-
tus.

approaching invasion of their country, and who wanted foreign aid to accomplish their designs. The Thessalian house of the Aleuads, either because they thought their power insecure, or expected to increase it by becoming vassals of the Persian king, sent their emissaries to invite him to the conquest of Greece.¹ The exiled Pisistratids had no other chance for the recovery of Athens. They had brought a man named Onomacritus with them to court, who was one of the first among the Greeks to practise an art, afterward very common, that of forging prophecies and oracles. While their family ruled at Athens he had been detected in fabricating verses, which he had interpolated in a work ascribed to the ancient seer Musæus, and Hipparchus, before his patron, had banished him from the city. But the exiles saw the use they might make of his talents, and had taken him into their service. They now recommended him to Xerxes, as a man who possessed a treasure of prophetic knowledge, and the young king listened with unsuspecting confidence to the encouraging predictions which Onomacritus drew from his inexhaustible stores. These various engines at length prevailed. The imagination of Xerxes was inflamed with the prospect of rivalling or surpassing the achievements of his glorious predecessors, and of extending his dominion to the ends of the earth.² He resolved on the invasion of Greece. First however, in the second year of his reign, he led an army against Egypt, and brought it again under the Persian yoke, which was purposely made more burdensome and galling than before. He intrusted it to the care of his brother Achæmenes, and then

¹ Athenæus, (xiv. 83.) supposes that the Thessalian nobles were captivated by the Persian luxury and splendour, which were peculiarly congenial to their habits. Ὁμολογοῦνται οἱ Θετταλοὶ πολυτελέστατοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων γεγενῆσθαι περὶ τε τὰς ἐσθῆτας καὶ τὴν διαίταν ὅπερ αὐτοῖς αἴτιον ἐγένετο καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐπαγαγεῖν τοὺς Πέρσας, ἐξηλωκόσι τὴν τούτων τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν.

² Γῆν τὴν Περσίδα ἀποδέχομεν τῷ Διὶ αἰθέρι δμουρέουσιν. Her. vii. 8.

returned to Persia, and bent all his thoughts towards the West.

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Artabanus.

Only one of his counsellors, his uncle Artabanus, is said to have been wise and honest enough to endeavour to divert him from the enterprise, and especially to dissuade him from risking his own person in it. If any reliance could be placed on the story told by Herodotus, about the deliberations held on this question in the Persian cabinet, we might suspect that the influence and arts of the Magian priesthood, which we find in this reign rising in credit, had been set at work by the adversaries of Artabanus, to counteract his influence over the mind of his nephew, and to confirm Xerxes in his martial mood. The vast preparations were continued with redoubled activity, to raise an armament worthy of the presence of the king. His aim was not merely to collect a force sufficient to ensure the success of his undertaking and to scare away all opposition, but also, and perhaps principally, to set his whole enormous power in magnificent array, that he might enjoy the sight of it himself, and display it to the admiration of the world. For four years longer Asia was still kept in restless turmoil; no less time was needed to provide the means of subsistence for the countless host that was about to be poured out upon Europe. Beside the stores that were to be carried in the fleet which was to accompany the army, it was necessary that magazines should be formed along the whole line of march as far as the confines of Greece. But in addition to these prudent precautions two works were begun, which scarcely served any other purpose than that of showing the power and majesty of Xerxes, and proving that he would suffer no obstacles to bar his progress. It would have been easy to transport his troops in ships over the Hellespont; but it was better suited to the dignity of the monarch, who was

Athos and
the Helles-
pont.

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about to unite both continents under his dominion, to join them by a bridge laid upon the subject channel, and to march across as along a royal road. The storm that had destroyed the fleet which accompanied Mardonius in his unfortunate expedition, had made the coast of Athos terrible to the Persians. The simplest mode of avoiding this formidable cape, would have been to draw their ships over the narrow low neck that connects the mountain with the main land. But Xerxes preferred to leave a monument of his greatness and of his enterprise, in a canal cut through the isthmus, a distance of about a mile and a half. This work employed a multitude of men for three years.¹ The construction of the two bridges which were thrown across the Hellespont, was intrusted to the skill of the Phœnicians and Egyptians. When these preparations were drawing to a close, Xerxes set forth for Sardis, where he designed to spend the following winter, and to receive the reinforcements which he had appointed there to join the main army (B. C. 481).

During his stay at Sardis the Phœnician and Egyptian engineers completed their bridges on the Hellespont; but the work was not strong enough to resist a violent storm, which broke it to pieces soon after it was finished. How far this disaster was owing to defects in its construction, which might have been avoided by ordinary skill and foresight, does not appear. But Xerxes is said to have been so much angered by the accident, that he put the architects to death. Such a burst of passion would be

¹ Leake, *Northern Greece*, iii. p. 145., observes that *Xerxes was perfectly justified in cutting this canal, as well from the security which it afforded to his fleet, as from the facility of the work and the advantage of the ground, which seems made expressly to tempt such an undertaking.* But he adds: *If there be any difficulty arising from the narrative of Herodotus, it is in comprehending how the operation should have required so long a time as three years, when the king of Persia had such multitudes at his disposal, and among them Egyptians and Babylonians, who were accustomed to the making of canals.* See also Mr. Long, in the *Classical Museum*, i. p. 84.

credible enough in itself, and is only rendered doubtful by the extravagant fables that gained credit on the subject among the Greeks, who in the bridging of the *sacred Hellespont* saw the beginning of a long career of audacious impiety, and gradually transformed the fastenings with which the passage was finally secured, into fetters and scourges, with which the barbarian in his madness had thought to chastise the aggression of the rebellious stream.¹ The construction of new bridges was committed to other engineers, perhaps to Greeks; but their names have not passed down like that of Mandrocles. By their art two firm and broad causeways were made to stretch from the neighbourhood of Abydos to a projecting point in the opposite shore of the Chersonesus, resting each on a row of ships which were staid against the strong current that bore upon them from the north, by anchors, and by cables fastened to both sides of the channel; the length was not far short of a mile.

When all was in readiness, the mighty armament was set in motion. Early in the spring (B. C. 480) Xerxes began his march from Sardis, in all the pomp of a royal progress. The baggage led the way; it was followed by the first division of the armed crowd that had been brought together from the tributary nations: a motley throng, including many strange varieties of complexion, dress, and language, commanded by Persian generals, but each tribe retaining its national armour and mode of fighting. An interval was then left, after which came a thousand picked Persian cavalry, followed by an equal number of spearmen, whose lances, which they carried with the points turned downward, ended in knobs

B. C. 480.
March of
Xerxes.

¹ The origin of the story is sufficiently explained, as the commentators on Æschylus and Herodotus have remarked, by the lines of the poet Pers. 371. *ὅστις Ἑλλήσποντον ἱερὸν δοῦλον ὡς δεσμώμασιν ἤλπισε σχῆσειν ῥέοντα Βόσπορον ῥέον θεοῦ*. See Arrian, vii. 14.

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XV.

of gold. Next were led ten sacred horses of the Nisæan breed in gorgeous caparisons, preceding the chariot of the Persian Zeus, drawn by eight white horses, the driver following on foot. Then came the royal chariot, also drawn by Nisæan horses, in which Xerxes sat in state; but from time to time he exchanged it for an easier carriage, which sheltered him from the sun and the changes of the weather. He was followed by two bands of horse and foot, like those which went immediately before him, and by a body of 10,000 Persian infantry, the flower of the whole army, who were called the Immortals, because their number was kept constantly full. A thousand of them who occupied the outer ranks bore lances knobbed with gold; those of the rest were similarly ornamented with silver. They were followed by an equal number of Persian cavalry. The remainder of the host brought up the rear.

Review of
the Persian
army.

In this order the army reached Abydos, and Xerxes from a lofty throne surveyed the crowded shores and bosom of the Hellespont, and the image of a sea-fight: a spectacle which Herodotus might well think sufficient to have moved him with a touch of human sympathy. The passage did not begin before the king had prayed to the rising sun, and had tried to propitiate the Hellespont itself by libations, and by casting into it golden vessels and a sword. After the bridges had been strewed with myrtle, and purified with incense, the Ten Thousand Immortals, crowned with chaplets, led the way. The army crossed by one bridge, the baggage by the other; yet the living tide flowed without intermission for seven days and seven nights, before the last man, as Herodotus heard, the king himself, the tallest and most majestic person in the host, had arrived on the European shore. In the great plain of Doriscus, on the banks of the Hebrus, an attempt was made to number the landforce. A

space was inclosed, large enough to contain 10,000 men; into this the myriads were successively poured and discharged, till the whole mass had been rudely counted. They were then drawn up according to their natural divisions, and Xerxes rode in his chariot along the ranks, while the royal scribes recorded the names, and most likely the equipments of the different races. It is an ingenious and probable conjecture of Heeren¹, that this authentic document was the original source from which Herodotus drew his minute description of their dress and weapons.

We may observe that the Persian fashion, which the Persians themselves had borrowed from their old masters the Medes, prevailed with a few variations among all the nations between the Tigris and the Indus. The bow was the principal weapon. To it was commonly added a spear and a short sword or dagger; the Sacians were singular in the use of the hatchet. In the defensive armour there was greater diversity among these tribes. Most of them were without shields. The tunic, scaly breastplate and loose trowsers, of the Persians, who used a peculiar wicker buckler², were contrasted with the cotton vest of the Indians, with the shaggy skins worn by some mountain hordes, with the Arabian plaid³, and the bright dyes of the Sarangian garb. A cap or turban, low or pointed, seems generally to have supplied the place of a helmet. The Assyrians or Chaldeans were conspicuous for their brass helmets of strange shape, their linen corslets, and the wooden clubs tipped with steel, which they added to the shield, spear, and dagger. With the exception of the club, their weapons were similar to those of most of the bar-

Nations
which com-
posed it.

¹ *Ideen*, l. 1. p. 137.

² The *γέφυρον*: it was perhaps covered with leather, and we should suspect, from the descriptions given of its use, furnished with a spike for fixing it upright in the ground. A shield furnished with such a spike was to be seen in the Armoury of the Tower of London.

³ The *ζείρα*. Those of some Thracian tribes were variegated.

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barians of Western Asia, among whom the Lydians came nearest to the Greek fashion, and the Lycians of the interior (the Milyans) alone used the bow. No Egyptian troops are mentioned; perhaps the late rebellion might seem to render it unsafe to arm them. But the Ethiopians above Egypt, the negroes of Nubia — with their bodies painted half white, half vermilion, and partly covered with skins of lions or leopards, their bows four cubits long, and small arrows, in which a sharp stone supplied the place of steel, their spears pointed with the horn of the antelope, and their knotty clubs — were among the most prominent figures in the motley host. They met in the camp of Xerxes with another race, whom Herodotus calls Eastern Ethiopians, a dark but straight-haired people, neighbours of the Indians, and resembling them in their armour, except that for a helmet they wore the skin of a horse's head, with the ears erect, and the mane flowing down their backs. All these nations, Herodotus observes, were able to furnish cavalry; but for manifest reasons a part of them only was called upon to do so. Among these he describes a nomad people of the Persian race, the Sagartians, who were no less expert than the South Americans in the use of the instrument which is now familiar to our ears under the name of the *lasso*; this and a dagger were the only weapons they brought into the field. But the mass of the cavalry was swelled by the dromedaries of the Arabians, and by chariots from the interior of Africa and from the borders of India, in which the Indians yoked not only horses but wild asses. All the great divisions both of horse and foot were commanded by Persian officers.

Persian
fleet.

After this review the king went on board a Sidonian vessel, where a golden tent had been prepared for him, to inspect the fleet, and caused its divisions and numbers to be registered. According to the result of this

inspection or calculation, the armed part of the multitude that followed Xerxes over the Hellespont, amounted to one million and seven hundred thousand foot, and eighty thousand horse. The fleet consisted of one thousand two hundred and seven ships of war, and besides the native crews, each was manned with thirty marines, Persians, or Medes, or Sacians. But as they proceeded southward both the army and the fleet received an addition from the inland tribes, and from the seaports of Thrace and Macedonia and the neighbouring islands, which Herodotus computes at three hundred thousand infantry, and one hundred and twenty triremes. There seems to be no sufficient ground for supposing that these estimates are greatly exaggerated. Yet the imagination is fatigued in attempting to conceive the train that must have followed such a host, to minister to its wants and its luxuries; and Herodotus himself, after having taken the pains to reckon the prodigious quantity of corn that would be required for each day's consumption by the men, despairs of approaching the additional sum to be allowed for the women, the eunuchs, the cattle, and the dogs.

The real military strength of the armament was almost lost among the undisciplined herds which could only impede its movements as well as consume its stores. The Persians were the core both of the land and sea force: none of the other troops are said to have equalled them in discipline or in courage: and the four and twenty thousand men who guarded the royal person were the flower of the whole nation. Yet these, as we see from their glittering armour, as well as from their performances, were much better fitted for show than for action, and of the rest we hear that they were distinguished from the mass of the army, not only by their superior order and valour, but also by the abundance of gold they displayed, by

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the train of carriages, women, and servants, that followed them, and by the provisions set apart for their use. Though Xerxes himself was elated with the spectacle he viewed on the plains and the shores of Doriscus, it must have filled the clear-sighted Greeks who accompanied him with misgivings as to the issue of the enterprise. The language of Demaratus, in the conversation which Herodotus supposes him to have had with Xerxes after the review, though it was probably never uttered, expressed thoughts which could scarcely fail to occur to the Spartan. Poverty, he is made to observe, was the endowment which Greece had received from nature; but law and reason had armed her with instruments, with which she had cultivated her barren inheritance, and might still hope to repel the invasion even of Xerxes and his host.

March of
Xerxes
through
Thrace.

From Doriscus the army pursued its march along the coast, accompanied by the fleet, through a region which had been already subdued in the expeditions of Megabazus and Mardonius. As it advanced it still swelled its numbers with reinforcements from the Thracian hordes, through which it passed. It experienced no scarcity of provisions: the country, the fleet, and the magazines formed in the towns on the coast, together furnished abundant supplies. The principal cities in the line of its march had long before been ordered to prepare for the reception of the king, and each celebrated his arrival with a splendid banquet. The division of the army which came with him indeed was only provided with its daily fare. But for himself and his train a tent was pitched, a table spread with vessels of gold and silver, and loaded with luxuries for which earth, air, and water had been ransacked. On the morning after the feast, when the royal guest moved onward, his followers carefully cleared away the relics of the

entertainment, the tent, the vessels, and the furniture. A single meal of Xerxes cost the Thasians four hundred talents: nearly as much as the sum yearly contributed by the allies of Athens to maintain the navy which destroyed his maritime power. It was with good reason that a citizen of Abdera advised his townsmen to offer a solemn thanksgiving to the gods, through whose mercy it happened that Xerxes was used to make only one meal in the day. The principal inconvenience that the armament felt, arose from an occasional scarcity of water. Herodotus mentions several rivers which did not yield a sufficient supply.

Among the preparations that had been made for the campaign was a bridge thrown over the Strymon. When Xerxes arrived on the banks of this river, his Magian priests made a sacrifice of white horses, and exerted their charms to propitiate the stream. But on the site of Amphipolis, then called the Nine Ways, they celebrated a more horrid rite, suggested by the name. For some cause, which perhaps they alone understood, they thought fit to bury alive a boy and a maid, natives of the place, for each of the Nine Ways. Herodotus remarks that a queen of Xerxes afterwards offered fourteen victims, children of noble Persians, in the same manner to an infernal deity. At Acanthus Xerxes stopped to survey the wonderful canal by which the fleet was saved from the danger of doubling mount Athos. He found the Acanthians zealous in his cause, and honoured them with peculiar marks of his favour. They had probably reaped no little gain from the work which had so long employed a vast multitude in the neighbourhood of their city, and looked forward to permanent advantages from the canal itself. And hence perhaps it arose that a Persian of high birth, who had superintended the undertaking, and who happened to die while Xerxes

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was staying with them, was ever after honoured by them with sacrifices as a hero. At Acanthus the army for the first time parted with the fleet, and left the coast to strike across the Chalcidian peninsula to Therme, a small town from which the gulf, afterwards called from Thessalonica, then took its name. Here, after the naval armament had coasted the intervening bays, and had strengthened itself with ships and men drawn from the Chalcidian ports, the two forces again met. During the stay of the armament at Therme, Xerxes indulged his curiosity by sailing to the mouth of the Peneus, and viewing the remarkable defile through which it issues from the Thessalian plains. He heard the legends of the place, and learnt the nature of the land, and, it is said, commended the prudence of the Thessalians, in averting the deluge, with which he could have overwhelmed their fields, by timely submission.

Prepara-
tions of the
Greeks.

While Asia was agitated with the stir of the Persian preparations, Greece could not be perfectly tranquil; and those states more especially which had most to fear from a successful invasion, must have been early disquieted by the rumour of the great armament which Darius had begun to raise immediately after the battle of Marathon. Yet the confidence produced by the recent triumph, the uncertainty of the enemy's designs, and afterward the revolt of Egypt, retarded the counsels of the Greeks, and prevented them from making active use of the time which they might have employed in preparation for their defence. At length when the Egyptian insurrection was suppressed, and the intention with which the new king was prosecuting the preparations begun by his father was placed beyond doubt, the leading states, and those which breathed the same spirit, felt the necessity of providing against the impending danger. After Xerxes had come down to Sardis, they sent spies to

ascertain the truth of the rumours they heard about the vast armament collected there. The spies were detected at Sardis, but were dismissed by the king's orders, after they had been invited to inspect the whole strength of his mighty host, less perhaps through either mercy or pride, than in the hope that the report which they would carry back might crush the spirit of those who sent them. The strength of Greece lay in the union of her sons. Without this the natural barriers which the land opposed to an invader would become useless, and no effectual resistance could be made by arms. The most pressing therefore of all concerns was to combine the whole nation, by one heart and one mind, against the common enemy; when this was done it only remained to defend, with firmness and caution, the bulwarks which nature had reared for its protection. But as the need was urgent, the difficulty was great. The views and feelings of the Grecian states varied in respect to the threatened invasion almost as much as their natural situations. Not that there was anywhere wanting in the body of the people a warm love of independence, and a strong aversion to foreign dominion, however mildly it might be exercised. But this unanimity in many cases was suppressed either by other passions and interests, which, though they could not extinguish the national feeling, counteracted it, or by political relations, which tended to thwart the public cause.

The Thessalian house of the Aleuads, as we have seen, had urged Xerxes to the expedition against Greece; and they had led him to believe that they expressed the wishes of the whole Thessalian people. But in reality they had only consulted their own private ambition, and their countrymen perhaps did not know, and certainly did not approve of their proceeding. Three brothers, sons of a younger Aleuas.

The Thes-
sallians.

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XV.

The Phocians.

were at this time the chiefs of the house. They were desirous of strengthening their power by the help of the Persians, and, to become undisputed masters of their country, were willing to be vassals of a foreign king. But the Thessalians were so far from consenting to their treachery, that when Xerxes was about to cross over into Europe, they had sent to the congress of the Greek states assembled at the Isthmus, to call upon them for assistance in defending their passes against invasion. At the same time however they declared their own inability to protect themselves against the threatened attack, and that if they were abandoned by their allies, they should be compelled to make the best terms they could with the enemy. Xerxes, while he wintered at Sardis, had sent envoys to Greece to demand earth and water from every state except Athens and Sparta; and the Thessalians had complied, perhaps while they were still uncertain about the succour they might expect, and without thinking themselves bound by this act of homage, if they should be able to retract it with safety. Their example was followed by all the tribes seated between them and the chain of Cæta, and even by the Locrians, who nevertheless did not desert the cause of Greece. The Phocians, whose land lay next in the line of the enemy's march, did not fear the Persians so much as they hated the Thessalians. From old times enmity had prevailed between the two neighbours, and had been inflamed to the most violent rancour by events which had occurred but a few years before the expedition of Xerxes. The Thessalians had invaded Phocis with an overpowering force; but the Phocians had surprised and defeated them with great slaughter. The vanquished people never forgave this blow, and yielded to the Persians with the less reluctance from their eagerness to revenge it; while the Phocians, if the side they took was not, as Herodotus believed, entirely determined by the op-

STATE OF GREECE.

posite choice of the Thessalians, were at least confirmed by it in their zeal for the good cause. The mountaineers of Doris did not share this feeling: they were too weak to think of resistance, and not ardent enough to conceive the resolution of abandoning their towns. In Bœotia Thebes was predominant; in Thebes itself the government was in the hands of a few families. They hated and feared Athens not only as an old rival of Thebes, but as the enemy of their own political power. On the other hand Thespiae and Platæa were united with Attica by their hatred and dread of Thebes. Thus in the states north of the Isthmus selfish aims and angry passions in many cases overcame all concern for the public safety, and the common weal; and even where the better cause prevailed, it seldom owed its triumph to pure and generous motives.

Within the peninsula likewise causes were at work to prevent it from exerting its whole strength. The greater part of the Peloponnesian states indeed were either allies of Sparta, or subject to her influence. But two were led to keep aloof chiefly by the jealousy and aversion they felt toward her. Her old rival Argos was at this time only beginning to recover from a blow with which Sparta had almost crushed her some years before. The epoch of this event is not precisely marked; Pausanias¹ says that it took place immediately after the accession of Cleomenes, but all circumstances agree in assigning it to a much later period in his reign. Cleomenes had been encouraged by an answer from Delphi to make an attempt upon Argos. Deterred by the presages of the border sacrifice, from invading the Argive territory on the side of Arcadia, he transported his army across the gulf to Nauplia, with the assistance of some Sicyonian

¹ III. 3. 10. See Mr. Clinton, F. H. II. p. 425.

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XV.

and Æginetan vessels, which he drew or forced into his service. In the plain below Tiryns he was met by the whole force of Argos, and during some days the two armies watched each other's movements, and the Argives, for greater security, regulated their meals by the example of the Spartans. This, it is said, suggested a stratagem to Cleomenes, by which he threw them off their guard, and made a great slaughter of them. The main body of those who escaped from the carnage, took refuge in a neighbouring inclosure sacred to the hero Argus. Cleomenes, fearful of violating the hallowed precincts, first attempted to draw them into his power by an artifice; but when this was discovered he ordered his helots to heap wood round the grove of the sanctuary, and set it on fire. The flames spread through the whole consecrated ground, and all within perished. Cleomenes appears to have made use of his victory as might have been expected, and to have led his army against Argos, thus bereft of its defenders. But the remnant of the citizens, the young, the old, and especially the women, animated, it is said, by the strains of the poetess Telesilla, made so brave a stand, that he was unable to storm the town, and, moved perhaps by superstitious fears, marched back to Sparta. The Argives afterward honoured the genius and the courage of Telesilla by a statue, which represented her holding a helmet in her hand, while her books lay at her feet; and an oracle recorded by Herodotus, though he does not mention the event, ascribes the deliverance of the city to female prowess.¹ But Argos had lost six thousand men, the flower and core of its population: most of the hands that had wielded the power of the state,

¹ Mueller Dor. 1. 8. 6. note 1. rejects the story of Telesilla, and seems to think that it arose out of the statue, which he conceives to have been meant for an Aphrodite arming herself. But this explanation is omitted in the English translation.

as well as guarded it, were gone: and its subjects, who had hitherto been excluded from all share in the government, now met with no opposition when they claimed the rights of citizens. This forced admission of the inhabitants of the surrounding district, as it is described by Aristotle, assumes a more romantic form in the narrative of Herodotus, who relates that the slaves of the Argives rose at the death of their masters, and seized the reins of government, which they kept in their hands till the next generation had grown up and claimed the inheritance of their fathers, when the intruders were forced to quit the city, and withdrew to Tiryns. We see in this account clear traces of a revolution, by which the posterity of the old citizens, when they became strong enough, deprived the new freemen of their privileges. While the Persian invasion was impending, Argos had sent to the Delphic oracle for advice as to the part she ought to take, after the recent stroke by which Cleomenes had deprived her of six thousand of her citizens. The answer was such as she desired, and probably had dictated: it enjoined her to shield herself from the danger and remain quiet. While the remembrance of the injury she had suffered was still fresh, it was difficult for her to distinguish the cause of Sparta from that of Greece; and if, as Herodotus heard it commonly reported, Xerxes sent emissaries to Argos, they were sure to find the Argives well disposed to receive the genealogical fiction, which was probably invented for this occasion, that their hero Perseus was the founder of the Persian race. At all events the Persians would not treat them less like brothers than the Spartans. And therefore when the confederate Greeks called on them for aid, they eluded the application by a demand which they knew would not be granted. *They might fairly claim the supreme direction of the war,*

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for Sparta ought to acknowledge the pre-eminent dignity of Argos; but they would be content with an equal share in the command; yet, that Sparta might not take advantage of their weakness to renew her unjust aggression, they required that she should conclude a truce with them for thirty years. The last point the Spartans would have conceded, but they would not condescend to a claim of a humbled rival, which they would not have admitted even if her power had been undiminished; and, to meet the dissimulation of Argos as decency required, they offered to give the Argive king an equal voice with each of their own. This proposal was rejected, negotiation was broken off, and Argos remained a passive spectator of the war. She could not however force the other towns of Argolis to follow her example, and even Mycenæ shamed her by the zeal she displayed. A motive of a similar kind, but which does not afford so good ground for excuse, seems to have kept Achæa likewise inactive. After so many ages the Achæans had not yet forgotten or forgiven the invasion by which they had been expelled from their original seats, now occupied by the Spartans, and had not learnt to look upon the Dorians as their brethren, even when threatened by a barbarian enemy. The conduct of the Achæans on this occasion is the only great stain that sullies the fair history of that noble people. Every lover of freedom must wish to have read their name among the conquerors of Salamis and Plataea.

The discovery of so much lukewarmness and so many unworthy feelings at such a season, was disheartening to those who were ready to stake every thing for liberty. The two leading states however, the principal parties in the war, themselves prepared for the last extremity, calmly availed themselves of all the means at their command. Each had many

excellent citizens ; and in Sparta the wild Cleomenes had been succeeded by his brother Leonidas. Athens possessed several great men, equal to the great occasion ; but one was now the soul of her counsels. The chance which deprived her of Miltiades had perhaps been fortunate, since it made room for a man still better suited to the emergency : for Themistocles. His father Neocles was a man of high birth after the Athenian standard, as connected with the priestly house of the Lycomedæ, but his mother was not a citizen, and, according to most accounts, not even a Greek. His patrimony seems to have been ample for a man of less aspiring temper. The anecdotes related of his youthful wilfulness and waywardness, of his earnest application to the pursuit of useful knowledge, of his neglect of the elegant arts which already formed part of an Athenian education, of his profusion and his avarice, of the sleepless nights in which he meditated on the trophies of Miltiades, all point, with more or less of particular truth, the same way : to a soul early bent on great objects, and formed to pursue them with steady resolution, incapable of being diverted by trifles, embarrassed by scruples, or deterred by difficulties. The end he aimed at was not merely the good of his country ; but still less any petty mark of selfish cupidity. The purpose of his life was to make Athens great and powerful, that he himself might move and command in a large sphere. The genius with which nature had endowed him, warranted this noble ambition, and it was marvelously suited to the critical circumstances in which he was placed by fortune. The peculiar faculty of his mind, which Thucydides contemplated with admiration, was the quickness with which it seized every object that came in its way, perceived the course of action required by new situations, and sudden junctures, and penetrated into remote consequences. Such

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Aristides.

were the abilities which at this period were most needed for the service of Athens.

At the time when Themistocles was beginning to rise into credit with his fellow citizens, another man of very different character already possessed their respect and confidence. This was Aristides, son of Lysimachus. He was sprung from an ancient and noble family, one branch of which was distinguished for its great wealth: Callias, the richest man in Athens, and the hereditary Torch-bearer in the Eleusinian mysteries¹, was his cousin: his own fortune either was from the first, or became, through neglect or the disasters of the times, so small, that it is said to have been made a ground of accusation against Callias, that he suffered his kinsman to be reduced to indigence. It is at least certain that Aristides left his family dependent on the public bounty at his death, though the offices he had filled were those which of all others afforded the amplest opportunities of enriching himself with perfect safety. The degree in which this fact marks his character can only be duly estimated, when it is considered that such integrity was one of the rarest virtues, both in this and in all subsequent periods, at Athens. Though not in itself admirable or heroic, it was yet the index of a quality which unfortunately has never been common in any age or country. Aristides appears throughout the whole course of his history as one of the few men who have not merely abstained from wrong, but have loved right, truth, and equity, and hated and resisted all things opposed to them, with the steadiness of instinct. He too, like Themistocles, had the welfare of Athens at heart, but simply and singly, not as an instrument, but as an end. On this he kept his eye, without looking to any mark beyond it, or stooping to any private advantage that

¹ Δαδούχος.

lay on his road. It is not surprising that a man of such a mould should have come into frequent conflict with a statesman like Themistocles, though their immediate object was the same, and though there was no great discordance between their general views of the public interest. Aristides knew no cause, but that of justice, and the common weal; no party, but its friends. Themistocles had formed or entered into a union with men who were pledged to mutual protection and assistance; and he did not always shrink from sacrificing the service of the people to his friends and adherents; he connived at their offences, seconded them in their undertakings, and used their aid to further his views. In all such cases a neutral and independent man, who kept aloof from all factions, and exposed and resisted corrupt practices, wherever he perceived them, might easily become a troublesome adversary. Characters like that of Aristides, even when there is nothing rugged and forbidding in their exterior, are seldom loved; and so probably there were many at Athens, who were not only displeased that one man should be distinguished by the epithet of the *just*¹, but were offended by the vigilance and severity with which he detected abuses, and guarded the public welfare. Without having incurred accusation or reproach, without being suspected of any ambitious designs, he was sent by the

¹ Wachsmuth l. 2. p. 56. thinks that it would be more proper to call Aristides the Disinterested. But we cannot help thinking that this negative epithet falls short of his real merit, as it does of what his contemporaries meant to express by the epithet *Δίκαιος*. There are only two things related of him which may seem to render his claim to the title doubtful: one, that he resisted measures proposed by Themistocles, though they tended to promote the public good, that they might not increase the influence of their author; the other that he sometimes sacrificed justice to the advantage of the state (Plut. Arist. 3. 25.). But the first of these points is perhaps no more than an uncertain inference from the saying attributed to him about his contests with Themistocles, which, however conscientious the part he took in them, might still be injurious to the public interest. That his justice was limited by his patriotism, as Theophrastus asserted, is probable enough, though there is no clear example recorded; but this would rather be an error in principle, than a failure in practice.

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ostracism into honourable banishment, as the wise Hermotimus by the Ephesians, because he had no equal in the highest virtue. There is a pleasing story, that he assisted an illiterate countryman in writing his own name on one of the sherds that condemned him (B. C. 483).

Athenian
Marine.

His removal left Themistocles in almost undivided possession of the popular favour. His thoughts had long been turned toward the struggle that was now approaching. He had seen that Athens could not remain stationary: that she must either cease to exist as an independent state, or else must take up a new position, and rise to a new rank in Greece: and this it was evident she could only do by cultivating the capacity she had received from nature, of becoming a great maritime power. Early in the interval between the first and the second Persian invasion, he had dexterously prevailed on the people to take one step toward this end, by making a sacrifice of individual emolument for the sake of a great general good. The silvermines of Laurion were at this time one of the most productive sources of the public revenue: they were farmed in small parcels to hereditary tenants, who, beside a sum paid for the right of working them, rendered a fixed portion of the produce to the state. This rent the people had hitherto enjoyed like the profits of a private partnership, by sharing it equally among them; it was one year unusually large, and would have yielded to each citizen of the poorer class a sum which would have been felt as an important addition to his ordinary income.¹ Themistocles persuaded them to forego this advantage, and to apply the fund to the enlargement of their navy. Yet it was not by holding out the danger of a new Persian invasion that he gained

¹ Ten drachmas: according to Boeckh's calculation (*Staats. i. c. 20.*) an Athenian at this time might have lived on 100 drachmas a year.

their consent, but by appealing to their hatred and jealousy of Ægina, which was still at war with them and was mistress of the sea. To be able to cope with this formidable rival, they built a hundred new galleys, and thus increased their naval force to two hundred ships¹, and it was probably at the same time that they were persuaded to pass a decree, which directed twenty triremes to be built every year.² The conqueror of Marathon is said to have opposed this augmentation of the marine.³ But it is not probable that the jealousy to which his opposition is attributed, and which we shall find very active in the sequel, was awakened so soon.

While Xerxes was wintering at Sardis, the Greek states which adhered to the cause of liberty sent envoys to hold a congress at the Isthmus.⁴ Their first consultations were directed to cementing the union of Greece, and to strengthening it with all the succours they could obtain from without. They began by mediating between Athens and Ægina, and induced them to bury, or at least to suspend, their old enmity. They sent envoys, as we have seen, to Argos, and, with no better success, to Crete. The Cretans raked up a legend out of their mythical antiquity, about the disastrous expedition of Minos to Sicily, and that of his subjects who sailed in search of him, and under cover of a convenient oracle, with a

Crete and
Corcyra.

¹ In this way perhaps the statement of Herodotus vii. 144. may be reconciled with those of Plutarch, Them. 4., Polyænus l. 30. 5., and Nepos Th. 2., who seem to have confounded the Æginetans with the Corcyreans.

² Diodorus xi. 43. assigns this decree to a later period. But see Boeckh *Staats.* ii. c. 19.

³ Plut. Them. 4.

⁴ Mueller, *Proleg. z. e. w. M.* p. 407. fol., has shown that the assembly described Herod. vii. 145. was held on the Isthmus, where it received the envoys of the Thessalians (vii. 172.), and to which the army returned as to its head-quarters (c. 173.); and that it met in the autumn before the invasion; since the Thessalians must then have heard that it was impending, and they sent to the Isthmus as soon as they received the news (c. 172.). It appears indeed from vii. 145. that the congress was assembled, and had mediated between Athens and Ægina, and been engaged in other proceedings of a like nature, before it received intelligence of the king's arrival at Sardis, which must have reached it early.

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decent profession of regret, refused their aid.¹ The Corcyraeans, whose naval force was among the most powerful in Greece, received the ambassadors of the congress with assurances of their goodwill, and promised to prove it by sending a fleet to take part in the conflict. They accordingly manned sixty ships; but, as the event seemed to show, without any other intention than that of providing themselves with a plea which they might use with the successful party, whatever might be the issue of the war. Their squadron was detained, they afterwards alleged, by contrary winds, which prevented it from doubling Malea, and from arriving before the hour of need was past; they did not attempt to carry it over the Isthmus. Perhaps hostility to Corinth enforced the suggestions of their narrow prudence.

Gelo.

Other envoys, among whom was one from Sparta and one from Athens, were also charged with a mission to Sicily, where Gelo was now master of Syracuse. Gelo belonged to that class of bold, crafty, and fortunate usurpers, of which we have already seen so many examples; but his elevation to the tyranny at Syracuse was distinguished by some peculiar circumstances. His family, which sprang from the isle of Telos, had been settled in Gela ever since that city was founded by the Rhodians, and one of his ancestors had acquired the dignity of hereditary hierophant in a mystic worship, by the address with which he had applied the influence of religion to compose the strife of parties at Gela. Gelo had early attached himself to the fortunes of Hippocrates, who on the death of his brother Cleander had succeeded him as tyrant of Gela, and afterwards added several Greek towns in the east of the island, as well as many of the barbarian tribes, to his dominions. He had

¹ Yet Ctesias c. 26. speaks of Cretan bowmen at Salamis.

gained a victory over the Syracusans, which reduced them to such distress, that they were forced to solicit the good offices of the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans, who were only able to make their peace on condition of their ceding the town of Camarina, which had been always subject to them, to Hippocrates. In these wars Gelo had served his master with so much zeal and ability that he had been promoted to the command of all his cavalry; and when Hippocrates had fallen in an expedition against the Sicels of Hybla, and the people of Gela attempted to extricate themselves from the yoke of their tyrant's sons, Gelo suppressed the revolt; but instead of restoring the sovereignty to the heirs of his benefactor, he kept it in his own hands (B. c. 491). A few years after he had thus made himself master of Gela, chance threw a still more important conquest in his way. The commonalty of Syracuse had united with the serfs¹, to overthrow the dominion of their lords, the descendants of the original colonists, who occupied the best part of the land and engrossed all political power, but were weakened by a feud which arose out of the vices and passions of two members of their own body.² The oligarchs were expelled, and took refuge in Casmenæ. It seems probable that both parties addressed themselves to Gelo, and accepted him as arbitrator of their differences. At least we find that the commonalty opened the gates to him, though he came to bring back their adversaries. He now acted over again the same part which he had played so successfully at Gela, and made himself absolute lord of Syracuse and of both the parties (B. c. 485). Henceforth, committing Gela to the care of his brother Hiero, he bent all his thoughts on increasing the strength of his new capital. He razed

¹ The Κιλλύριοι or Κιλλικύριοι (see Welcker on Theognis, p. xix.)

² Aristot. Pol. v. 3. 1. Plut. Relp. præc. 32.

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Camarina to the ground, and transplanted its entire population, and one half of that of Gela, to Syracuse. On the other hand, by a very refined stroke of policy, he introduced a counterpoise to the democratic ascendancy which these measures tended to create. He seems hitherto to have been considered as a friend of the commonalty, and the oligarchs of Megara made war upon him, apparently from no other motive. He laid siege to Megara and forced them to surrender at discretion. But when they expected the most rigorous fate, as the sole authors of a war to which the Megarian commonalty was known to be averse, he disappointed both, by admitting the nobles to the privileges of Syracusan citizens, while he consigned their unoffending subjects to slavery, and transportation. He afterwards treated the two contending parties of the Sicilian Eubœa in like manner. The implacable animosity of the two classes which he thus brought together, and between which he probably observed a strict neutrality, was no doubt the firmest groundwork of his dominion. But he seems to have wielded the power which he had usurped by means of this long tissue of fraud and violence with equity and mildness. No Grecian state had the means of raising a force equal to that which he had at his command. The fame of his greatness and power had spread far and wide; the value of his alliance seems to have been well understood, and it is probable that no slight cause would have induced the Greeks to forego it. When the envoys laid their request before him, he at first expostulated with them on the neglect with which their countrymen had treated proposals which he himself had formerly made to them for an alliance. *He had in vain called upon them for assistance against the Carthaginians and the Tuscan pirates, who infested their commerce as well as that of the Sicilians, and the*

Egestæans, on whom they had to avenge the death of Dorieus. Yet he would not now turn away from their distress, but was ready to succour them with an armament of two hundred triremes, twenty thousand heavy armed foot, two thousand heavy, and as many light horse, as many bowmen, and as many slingers, and to furnish provisions throughout the war for the whole Grecian army. The only condition he tacked to his offer, was that he should be allowed the command of the allied forces. On hearing this proposal the Spartan Syagrus is said to have taken fire, and to have expressed his indignation at the presumption of a Sicilian Greek, who aspired to a pre-eminence which exclusively belonged to Sparta: the shade of Agamemnon would groan at such disgrace. His Athenian colleague likewise declared that his city would resign the command of the naval force to no other power but the Spartans. Gelo then calmly observed, that they seemed likely to be better supplied with generals than with troops, and bad them tell the Greeks, that they had lost the spring out of their year: such he deemed his own succour to their cause.

His offers
rejected.

If the spirit of this conference has been faithfully preserved by Herodotus, the offers of Gelo were generous, and they were rejected on grounds which seem to savour of blind confidence and overweening arrogance. The envoys indeed speak hastily; yet not rashly. Had their resolution been the result of the maturest deliberation, it could not have been wiser, more becoming, or more truly politic. The only feature in the conversation which might raise a doubt, is the part attributed to the Athenian: that he should have taken such a tone, when the naval power of Athens had been so lately raised to a bare equality with Ægina, though not incredible, is a little surprising. But that Athens and Sparta should have permitted a Sicilian tyrant to assume the supreme com-

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mand of their fleet and army, that they should have confessed themselves dependent on him for their existence, even without looking to the remoter consequences of such a protectorship, would have been no less perilous than degrading. Had they been capable of yielding to such a demand, had they not felt the pride which spurned at it, they could scarcely have placed themselves in the condition that called for the rejected succour, or have shown how well they could do without it.

The Sicilian Greeks wished it to be believed that, even after his terms had been refused, Gelo would still have come to the assistance of the Greeks in the moment of danger, if he had not been detained by the Carthaginian invasion, which he repulsed about the same time that Xerxes was driven out of Greece. But this favourable supposition is scarcely consistent with the conduct which he really adopted. Herodotus relates that he entrusted Cadmus, a native of Cos, who had freely resigned the tyranny in his own city, and had retired to Sicily, with a shipload of treasure, a speech of fair words, and an offer of earth and water, to be laid at the feet of Xerxes, if he proved victorious. Cadmus sailed to Delphi, and there watched the issue of the struggle, and when it ended in favour of the Greeks, returned with his trust to Gelo.

In the meanwhile Themistocles was busied in allaying animosity and silencing disputes among the Grecian cities. He was seconded in this noble task by a man of whom we should wish to have known more than we do, an Arcadian of Tegea named Cheileos. At the same time he used every expedient for cherishing the ardour, and bracing the energy, of his fellow-citizens: for it must have been during this period that he procured a decree to be passed condemning Arthmius of Zelea and all his posterity to

outlawry. Arthmius had been employed, probably with the envoys whom Xerxes sent from Sardis, to scatter Persian gold and promises in Peloponnesus. In the time of Demosthenes a brazen pillar recorded the offence, and the sentence, of this emissary, who was shut out from the protection of the laws, and might be killed with impunity by any Athenian who lighted on him. Another proceeding of Themistocles, which can perhaps only be justified by the extraordinary circumstances of the case, was evidently dictated by the same motive. He caused an interpreter who accompanied the Persian envoys to be put to death for daring to use the Greek tongue to utter the commands of the barbarian king. In the same spirit the assembled deputies bound themselves in the name of the Greeks by an oath, to consecrate to the god at Delphi a tenth of the substance of every Grecian people which, without being compelled by necessity, had surrendered itself to the Persians.

The next care of the congress at the Isthmus, after their endeavours to unite the nation in the common cause, was to decide on their place of defence. Their first step was determined by the call of the Thes-
salians, who, as we have seen, notwithstanding the treachery of the Aleuads, were willing, if supported by the allied forces, to resist the invader on their border. They invited the deputies to send a strong body of troops to guard the pass of Tempe. It seems not have occurred to any one, that this position would be useless, and that an expedition to Thessaly would answer no purpose, unless it was made with the intention of giving the enemy battle in the Thessalian plain, a field much more favourable to the invading army, than to the weaker force. A body of 10,000 men was sent, while Xerxes was preparing for his passage at Abydus, under the command of Euænetus, a Spartan, and of Themistocles, to take posses-

The Greeks
at Tempe.

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sion of Tempe. While they were encamped there, they received a message from Alexander, now king of Macedon, exhorting them to withdraw, and not to wait till they were trampled under foot by the invading host. At the same time they discovered that Thessaly lay open to the passes over the Cambunian range, and that the enemy would be able to hem them in on every side. They therefore took the advice of the Macedonian, and marched back to the Isthmus.

The next defensible position appeared to be the pass of Thermopylæ; and here it was resolved to make a stand, and at the same time to guard the northern entrance of the Eubœan channel. Accordingly when news came that the Persians were in Pieria, on the borders of Thessaly, more than two thirds of the whole naval force set sail for the north coast of Eubœa, and a small body of Peloponnesians began its march for Thermopylæ.

At Artemi-
sium.

The northern side of Eubœa afforded a commodious and advantageous station: it was a long beach called, from a temple at its eastern extremity, Artemisium, capable of receiving the galleys, if it should be necessary to draw them upon the shore, and commanding a view of the open sea and the coast of Magnesia, and consequently an opportunity of watching the enemy's movements as he advanced towards the south; while on the other hand its short distance from Thermopylæ enabled the fleet to keep up a quick and easy communication with the landforce. Here therefore 271 triremes were stationed under the Spartan admiral Eurybiades. A Spartan had been appointed to the command, though the Lacedæmonians sent only ten ships, by the desire of the allies, who refused to obey an Athenian. Yet Athens manned 127 ships, and also supplied the Chalcidians with twenty others. It may have been principally the

jealousy of Ægina that led to the determination not to submit to Athenian command. The force she sent on this occasion, eighteen triremes, bore no proportion to her power, and to the end of the war she husbanded her navy under the plea of protecting her own shores. Corinth contributed forty sail, Megara twenty, and the rest were chiefly drawn from the Dorian cities of Peloponnesus, which, though not hostile to Athens, could not acknowledge an Ionian leader without a considerable sacrifice of national prejudices.

While the Persian army was waiting in Pieria, till a road had been opened for it through the thick forest that clothed the sides of the Cambunian hills, or soon after it had crossed over into Thessaly, a squadron of ten fast-sailing ships was detached from the fleet of Therme, to obtain intelligence about the movements of the Greeks. Off the island of Sciathus they fell in with three Greek ships, which were there stationed on the look-out, one an Athenian, the others of Trœzen and Ægina. They took to flight at the sight of the Persians, who pursued and captured the Trœzenian, and, after a brave struggle, the Æginetan. The victors selected the comeliest man they found among their Trœzenian prisoners, and sacrificed him at the prow of his ship for an omen of victory; this fearful superstition however did not prevent them from paying a generous respect to the valour of Pytheas the Æginetan, who, after his ship was taken, fought till he was almost cut to pieces. The Athenians ran their vessel aground in the mouth of the Peneus, and made their way home through Thessaly. This first appearance of the enemy was speedily announced by fire-signals from Sciathus to the Greeks at Artemisium. The alarm it excited was so great, that the admiral resolved on quitting this station, and retiring to Chalcis, where a few ships might

Movements
of the Per-
sian fleet.

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defend the Euripus; before he sailed away, he set watches on the heights of Eubœa, to secure the earliest intelligence of the hostile armament. The Persian squadron, after setting up a stone pillar to mark a dangerous rock in the channel between Sciathus and Magnesia, returned to Therme, with the report that the coast was clear. On this information the whole fleet got under way, eleven days after Xerxes began his march from Therme, and the same evening came to anchor on the southern coast of Magnesia. From the mouth of the Peneus to the gulf of Pagasæ the whole coast is rugged, and destitute of harbours, and even of good roadsteads, but more especially at the foot of Ossa and of Pelion. Night overtook the Persians before they could reach the Pagasæan gulf; but under the brow of Pelion they found a beach, stretching from the town of Canasthæa to the cape of Sepias; and here they resolved to wait for the morning. As the low shore was of little extent in proportion to their numbers, only a small part of the ships could be drawn up on the beach; the rest rode at anchor, their sterns turned toward the sea, line within line. The night (it was the middle of summer) was fair and calm: but when the dawn was beginning to break, a ripple and a swell of the sea gave notice of an approaching change. As the wind rose from the north-east those who paid heed to the signs of the weather, and could find a place of shelter, secured themselves from the coming storm; but on the rest it burst with irresistible fury. The ships were torn from their anchorage, driven against each other, and dashed upon the cliffs. The tempest raged with unabated violence for three days and nights. The commanders began to fear lest the Thessalians should be encouraged by the general confusion to fall upon them, and complete the ruin; and they hastily formed a high fence out of the

Storm at
Sepias

wrecks round the fleet that was drawn up on the beach. In the meanwhile the Magians were not idle: they kept repeating their incantations, and offering sacrifices to the wind, and to Thetis and the Nereids, when they heard from the Ionians that the fatal coast was sacred to these powers. At length the storm subsided; but for many miles the shores were strewn with wrecks and with corpses. The ships of war destroyed were reckoned, on the lowest calculation, at 400; the lives, the transports, the stores, the treasure lost, were past counting. When the sea grew calm, the remains of the fleet doubled the southern headland of Magnesia and put into the gulf of Pagasæ, where they moored in the harbour of Aphetæ close at its mouth.

The joy with which the Greeks observed the rising and the continued raging of the tempest, was proportioned to the fears which the first approach of the barbarian armament had excited in them. It was afterward believed that the event had been signified by oracles, which bade the Delphians sacrifice to the wind, and the Athenians to Boreas, their kindred god, who had carried off Orithyia, the daughter of Erechtheus, from the banks of the Ilissus. They now gratefully acknowledged his friendly succour, and not only sacrificed with earnest invocations to him and to their native heroine, while the storm lasted, but afterward raised a temple to him on the Ilissus. The day after the gale got up, while it was at its height, the scouts who had been left to look out for the enemy came to Chalcis with such a description of its effects, that every one believed the whole armada to be almost utterly ruined, and after a thanksgiving and a libation to Poseidon, the fleet returned to its former station at Artemisium, to complete the victory which the gods had begun. It arrived in time to capture fifteen Persian ships, which had been detained at

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Sepias after the departure of the main body, and as they followed in search of it, seeing the Greeks off Artemisium, took them for their friends, and only discovered their error when they had gone too far to retreat.

Terror of
the Greeks.

The loss the Persians had suffered, though it amounted to a number exceeding that of the whole Grecian fleet, was scarcely felt in their huge armament. When from their station at Aphetæ they perceived the slender force of their adversary, their only concern was to prevent him from escaping: they could not imagine that he would venture on a contest. They therefore without delay detached a squadron of 200 sail, with orders to make for the north, that their object might not be suspected, but when they had got out to sea beyond Sciathus, to bear away to the south, round the southern extremity of Eubœa, and then sail up the channel, and cut off the retreat of the Greeks. The Greeks on their part, who had persuaded themselves that they should scarcely find an enemy to combat, were at first thrown into consternation by the sight of the force opposed to them, and it is said that Themistocles had great difficulty in restraining them from again turning their backs, and seeking shelter in the Euripus. Herodotus even relates, that having received the enormous sum of thirty talents from the Eubœans (the particular cities are not mentioned), as the price of his endeavours to detain the fleet at Artemisium, he employed a part of the sum in bribing the admiral Eurybiades and the Corinthian commander Adeimantus, and thus induced them to change their resolution. We would willingly agree with Plutarch in rejecting this story, as one of the numberless, scandalous and groundless anecdotes which Herodotus must have found in circulation, such as commonly spring up in abundance, after a period big with great

events, in minds that love to trace them to secret and little causes. But whatever foundation it may have had, the Greeks not only staid, but soon recovered from their first astonishment, and did not shrink from looking the enemy in the face. They had received early information of his plans from a man named Scyllias, who deserted to them from Aphetæ, and was so famous as a diver, that he was commonly believed to have traversed the whole intervening space, about ten miles, under water. The news reached them in the morning; and it was determined to wait till midnight, and then sail to meet the squadron which had been sent round Eubœa. In the meanwhile the Persians did not move from their station at Aphetæ; for they feared lest they should scare their puny enemy to flight: they deemed their own ships superior, not only in numbers, but as sailors. The Greeks were surprised at their inaction, and having waited till noon expecting an attack, they then resolved to venture out, and try their strength. The Persians were astonished at their fool-hardiness, and hastened to meet and enclose them. They formed a circle round them; the Greeks first drew their line into a smaller circle, with their prows facing the surrounding enemy, and then at the signal darted forward, like rays, to pierce and break the wall of ships that encompassed them. The Persians were thrown into disorder by the attack, and lost thirty ships, but the combat was still undecided, when the approach of night put an end to it. Each party returned to his station, with altered feelings, the Persians perplexed and disheartened, the Greeks with new hopes. They had gained, not indeed a clear victory, but a pledge of one: confidence in their own strength, and insight into the enemy's weakness. It was with good reason Pindar afterward celebrated Artemisium as the place

Battles at
Artemi-
sium.

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XV.Wreck of
the Persian
squadron at
Cœla.

where the sons of Athens laid the shining groundwork of freedom.

In the following night another violent summer storm, accompanied with torrents of rain, thunder, and lightning, terrified more than it hurt the Persians at Aphetæ, where the road was choked with the wrecks and the bodies that were drifted in from the scene of the action. But the same storm overtook the squadron that was sailing round Eubœa, with perhaps greater fury, and off a part of the coast, infamous in ancient times, under the name of Cœla (the Hollows). This terrible place probably lay on the eastern side of the island, which, throughout the whole line of its ironbound coast, contains only one inlet where a ship can find shelter in distress. On these rocks the Persian squadron perished. The joyful tidings reached the Greeks at Artemisium, at the same time that they received a reinforcement from Athens of fifty-three ships, which, if Cœla lay as has been commonly supposed, passed by the scene of the wreck, and must have brought the news. Thus strengthened and cheered they again sailed out, ready for another trial. The Persians yet trembling under the terrors of the past night kept still; but a squadron of Cilicians, either freshly arrived, or detached for some unknown purpose from the main body, fell in with them and was destroyed.

The next day the Persian commanders, indignant at the resistance they had encountered from so contemptible a force, and fearing their master's anger, sailed up to Artemisium to begin the attack. As they came near they bent their line into a crescent; the Greeks as before assailed, pierced and broke it; the unwieldy armament was thrown into confusion and shattered by its own weight. Yet the several ships maintained an obstinate conflict and gained partial triumphs. The Egyptian division distinguished itself



above the rest, and captured five Greek ships with all their men. On the side of the Greeks none equalled the Athenians, and among them the foremost was Clinias the son of Alcibiades, who commanded a ship which he had equipped and manned at his own charge. On the whole, nearly as much damage was done and suffered on the one side as on the other. When the combatants were parted by night or weariness, though the Greeks remained masters of the wrecks and the dead, and might therefore claim the victory, they had bought it dearly: the Athenians found one half of their ships disabled. It became evident that they could not survive such another victory, and that it was necessary to retreat. Their resolution was confirmed the next day by the arrival of an Athenian who had been stationed at Thermopylæ with a light galley, and now came with the news, that the Spartan king Leonidas was slain, and all his men killed or taken, and that the Persians were masters of the pass, which was the key to Phocis, Bœotia, and Attica.

At the time when the congress at the Isthmus resolved on defending the pass of Thermopylæ, the Olympic festival was near at hand, and also one little less respected among many of the Dorian states, especially at Sparta, that of the Carnean Apollo, which lasted nine days. The danger of Greece did not seem so pressing, as to require that these sacred games, so intimately connected with so many purposes of pleasure, business, and religion, should be suspended, and it was thought sufficient to send forward a small force, to bar the progress of the enemy, until they should leave the Grecian world at leisure for action. That the northern Greeks might be assured that notwithstanding this delay Sparta did not mean to abandon them, the little band which was to precede the whole force of the confederates was

Leonidas at
Thermo-
pylæ.

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placed under the command of her king Leonidas. It was composed of only 300 Spartans, attended by a body of helots whose numbers are not recorded, 500 from Tegea, and as many from Mantinea, 120 from the Arcadian Orchomenus, and 1000 from the rest of Arcadia. Corinth armed 400, Phlius 200, and Mycenæ 80. Messengers were sent to summon Phocis and the Locrians, whose territory lay nearest to the post which was to be maintained, to raise their whole force. *They were reminded that the invader was not a god, but a mortal, liable, as all human greatness, to a fall; and they were bidden to take courage, for the sea was guarded by Athens and Ægina, and the other maritime states, and the troops now sent were only the forerunners of the Peloponnesian army which would speedily follow.* Hearing this the Phocians marched to Thermopylæ with 1000 men, and the Locrians of Opus with all they could muster. On his arrival in Bœotia Leonidas was joined by 700 Thespians, who were zealous in the cause; but the disposition of Thebes was strongly suspected: her leading men were known to be friendly to the Persians; and Leonidas probably believed that he should be counteracting their intrigues, if he engaged the Thebans to take a part in the contest. He therefore called upon them for assistance, and they sent 400 men with him; but in the opinion of Herodotus this was a forced compliance, which, if they had dared, they would willingly have refused. With this army Leonidas marched to defend Thermopylæ against two millions of men.

It was a prevailing belief in later ages, one perhaps that became current immediately after his death, that when he set out on his expedition he distinctly foresaw its fatal issue. And Herodotus gives some colour to the opinion, by recording that he selected his Spartan followers among those who had sons to

leave behind them. But Plutarch imagined that before his departure from Sparta he and his little band solemnised their own obsequies by funeral games in the presence of their parents; and that it was on this occasion he spoke of them as a small number to fight, but enough to die. One fact destroys this fiction. Before his arrival at Thermopylæ he did not know of the path over the mountain by which he might be attacked in the rear; the only danger he had before his eyes was one which could not have shaken the courage of any brave warrior, that of making a stand for a few days against incessant attacks, but from small bodies, in a narrow space, where he would be favoured by the ground. The whole pass shut in between the eastern promontory of Œta called Callidromus, which towers above it in rugged precipices, and the shore of the Malian gulf, is four or five miles in length; it is narrowest at either end, where the mountain is said once to have left room only for a single carriage. But between these points the pass first widens, and then is again contracted, though not into quite so narrow a space, by the cliffs of Callidromus. At the foot of these rocks a hot sulphureous spring gushes up in a copious stream and other slenderer veins trickle across the road. This is the pass properly called Thermopylæ. On the side of the sea it was once guarded no less securely than by the cliffs; for it runs along the edge of a deep morass, which the mud, brought down by the rivers from the vale of the Spercheius, is now continually carrying forward into the gulf, while the part next the road gradually hardens into firm ground, and widens the pass. In very early times the Phocians were in possession of Thermopylæ, and to protect themselves from the inroads of the Thessalians, had built a wall across the northern entrance, and had discharged the water of

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the springs to hollow out a natural trench in the road. They were in safety behind this bulwark till the Thessalians discovered a path, which beginning in a chasm through which a torrent called the Asopus descends on the north side of the mountain, winds up by a laborious ascent to the summit of Callidromus, and then by a shorter and steeper track comes down near the southern end of the pass, where the village of Alpeni once stood. After this discovery the fortification became comparatively useless, and was suffered to go to ruin. It seems wonderful, and would be scarcely credible if it was not positively asserted by Herodotus, that when the congress at the Isthmus determined to defend Thermopylæ, there was not a man among them who knew of the existence of this circuitous track. They ordered the old wall to be repaired; but when Leonidas arrived, he was informed of the danger that threatened him from the Anopæa, so the mountain path was named, if it should come to the knowledge of the barbarians; and on the arrival of the enemy he posted the Phocians by their own desire on the summit of the ridge to guard against a surprise.

The first sight of the Persian host covering the Trachinian plains is said to have struck some of the followers of Leonidas with no less terror than their brethren at Artemisium felt at the first approach of the hostile armada: the Peloponnesians would have retreated, and have reserved their strength for the defence of their own Isthmus. But the Phocians and Locrians, who were most interested in checking the progress of the invader, were indignant at this proposal, and Leonidas prevailed on the other allies to stay, and soothed them by despatching messengers to the confederate cities to call for speedy reinforcement. Xerxes had heard that a handful of men under the command of a Spartan king were stationed at this part of his road; but he

imagined, it is said, that his presence would have scared them away. He was surprised by the report of a horseman whom he had sent forward to observe their motions, and who on riding up perceived the Spartans before the wall, some quietly seated, combing their flowing hair, others at exercise. He could not believe Demaratus, who assured him that the Spartans at least were come to dispute the pass with him, and that it was their custom to trim their hair on the eve of a combat.¹ Four days passed before he could be convinced that his army must do more than show itself to clear a way for him. On the fifth day he ordered a body of Median and Cissian troops to fall upon the rash and insolent enemy, and to lead them captive into his presence. He was seated on a lofty throne from which he could survey the narrow entrance of the pass, which in obedience to his commands his warriors endeavoured to force. But they fought on ground where their numbers were of no avail, but to increase their confusion, when their attack was repulsed: their short spears could not reach their foe, the foremost fell, the hinder advanced over their bodies to the charge: their repeated onsets broke upon the Greeks idly, as waves upon a rock. At length as the day wore on, the Medians and Cissians, spent with their efforts, and greatly thinned in their ranks, were recalled from the contest, which the king now thought worthy of the superior prowess of his own guards, the ten thousand Immortals. They were led up as to a certain and easy victory; the Greeks stood their ground as before; or, if ever they gave way and turned their backs, it was only to face suddenly about, and deal tenfold destruction on their pursuers. Thrice during these fruitless assaults the king was seen to start up from his throne in a transport of fear or

Combat at
Thermo-
pylæ.

¹ Plut. Lyc. 22. Strabo, x. p. 467. καὶ τοὺς περὶ Λεωνίδα κτενιζομένους, δὲ δέξασαν εἰς τὴν μάχην, καταφρονηθῆναι λέγουσι ὑπὸ τῶν Περσῶν, ἐν δὲ τῇ μάχῃ θανασθῆναι.

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rage. The combat lasted the whole day ; the slaughter of the barbarians was great ; on the side of the Greeks a few Spartan lives were lost ; as to the rest nothing is said. The next day the attack was renewed with no better success ; the bands of the several cities that made up the Grecian army, except the Phocians, who were employed as we have seen, relieved each other at the post of honour ; all stood equally firm, and repelled the charge not less vigorously than before. The confidence of Xerxes was changed into despondence and perplexity.

The Anopæa.

The secret of the Anopæa could not long remain concealed after it had become valuable. Many tongues perhaps would have revealed it ; two Greeks, a Carystian, and Corydallus of Anticyra, shared the reproach of this foul treachery ; but by the general opinion, confirmed by the solemn sentence of the Amphictyonic council, which set a price upon his head, Ephialtes, a Malian, was branded with the infamy of having guided the barbarians round the fatal path. Xerxes, overjoyed at the discovery, ordered Hydarnes, the commander of the Ten Thousand, with his troops to follow the traitor. They set out at nightfall ; as day was beginning to dawn they gained the brow of Callidromus, where the Phocians were posted ; the night was still, and the universal silence was first broken by the trampling of the invaders, on the leaves with which the face of the woody mountain was thickly strewed. The Phocians started from their couches, and ran to their arms. The Persians, who had not expected to find an enemy on their way, were equally surprised at the sight of an armed band, and feared lest they might be Spartans ; but when Ephialtes had informed them of the truth, they prepared to force a passage. They showered their arrows on the Phocians, who, believing themselves the sole object of attack, retreated to the highest peak of the ridge, to sell their lives as dearly as

hey could. The Persians, without turning aside to pursue them, kept on their way, and descended toward Alpenus.

Meanwhile deserters had brought intelligence of the enemy's motions to the Grecian camp during the night, and their report was confirmed at daybreak, by the sentinels who had been stationed on the heights, and now came down with the news, that the barbarians were crossing the ridge. Little time was left for deliberation; opinions were divided as to the course that prudence prescribed, or honour permitted. Leonidas did not restrain, perhaps encouraged, those of his allies who wished to save themselves from the impending fate; but for himself and his Spartans he declared his resolution of maintaining the post which Sparta had assigned to them, to the last. All withdrew, except the Thespians and the Thebans. The Thespians remained from choice, bent on sharing his glory and his death. We should willingly believe the same of the Thebans, if the event did not seem to prove, that their stay was the effect of compulsion. Herodotus says, that Leonidas, though he dismissed the rest because their spirit shrank from the danger, detained the Thebans as hostages, because he knew them to be disaffected to the cause of liberty; yet, as he was himself certain of perishing, it is equally difficult to understand why, and how, he put this violence on them; and Plutarch, who observes the inconsistency of the reason assigned by Herodotus, would have triumphantly vindicated the credit of the Thebans. if he could have denied that they alone survived the day. Unless we suppose that their first choice was on the side of honour. their last, when death stared them in the face, on the side of prudence, we must give up their conduct, and that of Leonidas, as an inscrutable mystery. Megistias, an Acarnanian soothsayer, who traced his descent to the ancient seer Melampus, is said to have read the ap-

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proaching fate of his companions in the entrails of the victims, before any tidings had arrived of the danger. When the presage was confirmed, Leonidas pressed him to retire: a proof, Herodotus thinks, that the Spartan king did not wish to keep any who desired to go. Megistias, imitating the example of the heroic prophet Theoclus, who, after predicting the fall of Eira to Aristomenes, refused to survive the ruin of his country, would not quit the side of Leonidas; but he sent away his son, an only one, who had accompanied him, that the line of Melampus might not end with him. Leonidas would also, it is said, have saved two of his kinsmen, by sending them with letters and messages to Sparta; but the one said he had come to bear arms, not to carry letters, and the other, that his deeds would tell all that Sparta wished to know.

Before Hydarnes began his march, Ephialtes had reckoned the time he would take to reach the southern foot of the mountain, and Xerxes had accordingly fixed the hour when he would attack the Greeks in front. It was early in the forenoon when the Ten Thousand had nearly finished their round, and the preconcerted onset began. Leonidas, now less careful to husband the lives of his men than to make havock among the barbarians, no longer confined himself as before within the pass, but leaving a guard at the wall sallied forth, and charged the advancing enemy. His little band, reckless of every thing but honour and vengeance, made deep and bloody breaches in the ranks of the Persians, who, according to an oriental custom, were driven on to the conflict by the lash of their commanders. Many perished in the sea, many were trampled under foot by the throng that pressed on them from behind; yet the Spartans too were thinned, and Leonidas himself died early. The fight was hottest over his body, which was rescued after a hard struggle, and the Greeks four times turned the enemy. At length when most of their spears were broken, and their swords blunted with slaughter, word

came that the band of Hydarnes was about to enter the pass. Then they retreated to the wall, and passed on to a knoll on the other side, where they took up their last stand. The Thebans however did not return with them, but threw down their arms, and begged for quarter. This it is said the greater part obtained; Herodotus heard a story, about which Plutarch is with good reason incredulous, that they were afterwards all branded like runaway slaves; but it is not denied that they placed themselves at the mercy of the barbarians. The Persians rushed forward unresisted, broke down the wall, and surrounded the hillock, where the little remnant of the Greeks, armed only with a few swords, stood a butt for the arrows, the javelins, and the stones of the enemy, which at length overwhelmed them. Where they fell, they were afterwards buried; their tomb, as Simonides sang, was an altar: a sanctuary, in which Greece revered the memory of her second founders.¹

The Spar-
tans over-
powered.

The inscription of the monument raised over the slain, who died from first to last in defence of the pass, recorded that 4000 men from Peloponnesus had fought at Thermopylæ with 300 myriads. We ought not to expect accuracy in these numbers: the list in Herodotus, if the Locrian force is only supposed equal to the Phocian, exceeds 6000 men: the Phocians, it must be remembered, were not engaged. But it is not easy to reconcile either account with the historian's statement, that the Grecian dead amounted to 4000, unless we suppose that the helots, though not numbered, formed a large part of the army of Leonidas. The lustre of his achievement is not diminished by their presence. He himself and his Spartans no doubt considered their persevering stand in the post entrusted to them, not as an act of high and heroic devotion, but of simple and indispensable duty. Their

¹ 'Ο δὲ σηκὸς οἰκετᾶν (οἰκιστᾶν?) εὐδοξίαν Ἑλλάδος εἶλετο. Diodor. xi. 11.

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XV.Eurytus
and Aristodemus.

spirit spoke in the lines inscribed upon their monument, which bad the passenger tell their countrymen, that they had fallen in obedience to their laws. How their action was viewed at Sparta, may be collected from a story which cannot be separated from the recollection of this memorable day. When the band of Leonidas was nearly inclosed, two Spartans, Eurytus and Aristodemus, were staying at Alpeni, who had been forced to quit their post by a disorder which nearly deprived them of sight. When they heard the tidings, the one called for his arms, and made his helot guide him to the place of combat, where he was left, and fell. But the other's heart failed him, and he saved his life. When he returned to Sparta, he was shunned like a pestilence: no man would share the fire of his hearth with him, or speak to him: he was branded with the name of the recreant Aristodemus. A separate inscription recorded the generous loyalty of Megistias. The Persians are said to have lost 20,000 men; among them were several of royal blood. To console himself for this loss, and to reap the utmost advantage from his victory, Xerxes sent over to the fleet, which, having heard of the departure of the Greeks, was now stationed on the north coast of Eubœa, and by public notice invited all who were curious, to see the chastisement he had inflicted on the men who had dared to defy his power. That he had previously buried the greater part of his own dead, seems natural enough, and such an artifice, so slightly differing from the universal practice of both ancient and modern belligerents, scarcely deserved the name of a stratagem.¹ He is said also to have mutilated the body of Leonidas; and as this was one of the foremost he found on a field which had cost him so dear, we are not at liberty to reject the tradition, because such ferocity was not con-

¹ With which it figures in Polyænus, vii. 15. 4.

with the respect usually paid by the Persians to
 nt enemy.¹ At Thermopylæ Xerxes learnt a
 which he had refused to receive from the warn-
 of Demaratus; and he inquired, with altered
 whether he had to expect many such obstacles
 conquest of Greece. The Spartan told him that
 were eight thousand of his countrymen, who
 all be ready to do what Leonidas had done, and
 the Isthmus he would meet with a resistance
 powerful and obstinate than at Thermopylæ.
 instead of attacking Peloponnesus on this side,
 he would find its whole force collected to with-
 him, he sent a detachment of his fleet to seize
 and of Cythera, and to infest the coast of Laco-
 ie confederacy would be distracted, and its
 rs, deprived of their head, and perhaps dis-
 would successively yield to his arms. The
 hether Demaratus or Herodotus was the author,
 no supporters in the Persian council.

had now the key of Northern Greece in his
 and it only remained to determine toward which
 should first turn his arms. The Thessalians,
 er since his arrival in their country had been
 in his service, now resolved to make use of
 fluence, and to direct the course of the storm to
 wn advantage. These Thessalians, who are men-
 on this occasion by Herodotus without any more
 description, were probably the same nobles who,
 the wishes of their nation, had invited and
 led the invasion. They had now an opportunity
 ifying either their cupidity or their revenge;
 ey sent to the Phocians to demand a bribe of
 lents, as the price at which they would consent
 t the destruction which was impending over

Advance of
 Xerxes

The Phocians however either did not trust

off the head and right arm of slain rebels was a Persian usage. Compare
 i. 13., and Strabo, xvi. p. 733.

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their faith, or would not buy their safety of a hated rival. The Thessalians then persuaded Xerxes to cross that part of the Cætæan chain, which separates the vale of the Sperchius from the little valley of Doris. The Dorians were spared as friends. Those of the Phocians who had the means of escaping took refuge on the high plains that lie under the topmost peaks of Parnassus, or at Amphissa. But on all that remained in their homes, on the fields, the cities, the temples of the devoted land, the fury of the invader, directed and stimulated by the malice of the Thessalians, poured undistinguishing ruin. Fire and sword, the cruelty and the lust of irritated spoilers, ravaged the vale of the Cephissus down to the borders of Bœotia. The rich sanctuary of Apollo at Abæ was sacked and burnt, and fourteen towns shared its fate. At Panopeus Xerxes divided his forces, or rather detached a small body round the foot of Parnassus to Delphi, with orders to strip the temple of its treasures, and lay them at his feet. He had learnt their value from the best authority at Sardis. The great army turned off toward the lower vale of the Cephissus to pursue its march through Bœotia to Athens.

The Delphians had been warned of their danger, and had taken precautions for their own safety: they had shipped their families across the sea to Achaia, and they themselves retired either to Amphissa, or to the summits of Parnassus, where they housed in the Corycian cave. But they had first consulted the oracle about securing the sacred treasures, and asked whether they should bury or remove them. The god bad them not to touch his treasures: *he was able to guard his own*. Relying on this assurance sixty Delphians remained in the sacred inclosure, with the prophet, to await the invaders. The Persians advanced, still burning and wasting all they found on their way, along the road, called the Sacred, from the periodical processions

by which it was hallowed, which follows the course of the Pleistus through the glen that separates Parnassus from Mount Cirphis, and then turns off northward toward the steep of Delphi.

What consultations had been really held by the natural guardians of the oracle, what preparations may have inspired them with confidence in the midst of their seeming helplessness, what arts or engines they possessed or devised to meet this extraordinary danger; what misgivings and forebodings might spring up in the breasts of the barbarians, when, at the opening of the defile, they saw the city rising like a theatre before them, crowned with the house of the god, the common sanctuary of the western world, and at its back the precipices of Parnassus, crag above crag, which had witnessed the destruction of so many contemners of the majesty of Apollo; how the stillness of the deserted streets, as they approached the mark of their sacrilegious enterprise, may have shaken their hearts, and put their minds on the stretch of dreadful expectations; what forms, conjured up at the critical moment, may have met their eye, what sounds, like the voice of angry deities, may have pierced their ear, what instruments of death, wielded by invisible hands, may have struck the boldest, and have justified the more timid in yielding to their fears; and whether any timely uproar of the elements lent new force to the panic:—these are questions which history cannot answer. It must be left to the reader's imagination to determine how the tradition which became current after the event may be best reconciled with truth or probability. While the Persians were advancing, the prophet Aceratus, it is said, saw the sacred arms which were kept within the sanctuary, and which no human hand might touch, lying without; he announced the prodigy to the Delphians, who had remained with him. The barbarians had reached a temple dedicated to Athene of the Vesti-

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Persians at
Delphi.

bule¹, when in the midst of thunder and lightning two huge rocks, broken off from the crags that overhung the road, fell among them and crushed many. At the same time a war-cry was heard from within the temple of Athene. They were struck with terror, and the Delphians, seeing them turn their backs, rushed down upon them and pursued them with unresisted slaughter: they fled without stopping till they had passed the borders of Bœotia. The survivors related that, among other dreadful sights, they had seen two gigantic warriors foremost in the pursuit, dealing death among the hindmost. These the Delphians knew to be two of their native heroes, Phylacus and Autonous, and they consecrated to each of them a portion of ground near the place where they first appeared. The fallen rocks were seen by Herodotus within the precincts of the temple of Athene. Thus Delphi was delivered, and the power of Apollo gloriously proved.

Delphic
oracles.

When the Grecian fleet finally quitted its station at Artemisium, the Athenians expected that on reaching the Euripus they should hear of a Peloponnesian army encamped in Bœotia for the protection of Attica. Finding however that no friendly force had arrived to guard their frontier, and learning that the Peloponnesians had no intention of venturing beyond the Isthmus, but meant to fortify it with a wall, and to reserve all their efforts for the defence of the peninsula, they begged their allies to sail on with them to Salamis, that they might provide for the safety of their wives and children, and decide on the course to be adopted with regard to the approaching invasion. While the storm was yet hanging over Greece, Athens had sent to Delphi for advice. Her messengers, on being admitted into the sanctuary, heard the prophetess in no obscure strains announce the ruin that was impending

¹ Τῆς Προνητῆς Ἀθηναίης, Herod. viii. 37. According to another reading (which is confirmed by Harpocration Πρόνοια, and Paus. x. 8. 6.), τῆς Προνοῆς Ἀ.

over their city. *Fly*, she said, *to the uttermost ends of the earth; for, from the crown to the sole, no part of Athens can escape the fire and sword of the barbarian. It will perish, and not alone: elsewhere too the temples of the gods are already bathed in sweat and blood, signs of foreseen destruction. Begone, and expect your doom.* While the messengers, overwhelmed with grief and dismay, were revolving this dreadful answer in their minds, they were cheered by one of the leading men of Delphi, named Timon, who encouraged them once more to approach the god with the ensigns of suppliants, if perchance they might move his compassion to a milder decree. They returned and spread their olivebranches before the shrine, declaring that they would not quit the sanctuary till they had obtained a more favourable answer. It was given, but in darker and more ambiguous words: *Pallas had earnestly struggled, but could not propitiate her sire to spare her beloved city. It and the whole land were irrevocably doomed to ruin. Yet had Zeus granted to the prayer of his daughter, that, when all beside was lost, a wooden wall should still shelter her citizens. Let them not wait to be trampled down by the horse and foot of the invader, but turn their backs; they might again look him in the face. In seedtime or in harvest thou, divine Salamis, shalt make women childless.*

The verses in which these mysterious threats and promises were delivered, were carefully recorded, and carried to Athens. Their import gave occasion to various conjectures. The *wooden wall*, which was to afford the only refuge in the hour of danger, seemed best explained by the fleet, which, since it had been increased according to the advice of Themistocles, might well be deemed the surest bulwark of Athens. The young men, who had begun to look to the sea as their proper field of action and enterprise, embraced

Hesitation
of the
Athenians.

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this interpretation ; but the elder citizens thought it incredible, that the goddess should abandon her ancient citadel, and resign her charge to the rival deity with whom she had anciently contended for the possession of Attica. To them it seemed clear that the oracle must have spoken of the hedge of thorns, which once fenced in the rock of Pallas, and that this, if repaired and strengthened with the same materials, would be made an impregnable barrier against all assaults. Even those who held the ships to be the wooden wall were divided in opinion as to the use which was to be made of them. Some thought that they were to be the instruments of deliverance only by transporting the people to some remote land, such as the first answer had bidden them to seek ; and that the oracle, while it appeared to predict the disaster which Salamis was to witness, had in truth only warned them against making its shores the scene of a fatal conflict with an irresistible enemy. The existence of Athens hung on the issue of these deliberations. The people in their uncertainty looked to Themistocles for advice.

It cannot be reasonably doubted that he had himself prepared the crisis which he now stepped forward to decide. The story of the embassy to Delphi is so transparent, that it is scarcely possible to mistake the real springs of the transaction. Themistocles could not have found greater difficulty in gaining the co-operation of Timon, in a pious fraud, than Cleomenes in procuring that of Cobon for his base and malignant ends. His keen eye had probably caught a prophetic glimpse of the events that were to hallow the shores of Salamis ; and he now reminded his hearers, that a Grecian oracle would not have called the island the *divine*, if it was to be afflicted with the triumph of the barbarians, and was not rather to be the scene of their destruction. He therefore ex-

horted them, if all other safeguards should fail them, to commit their safety and their hopes of victory to their newly-strengthened navy. This counsel had prevailed.

The time had now come when this resolution was to be carried into effect. The Persian army was in full march for Athens: after the desolation of Phocis it had passed peaceably through Bœotia, where all the cities, except Thespiæ and Plataea, had testified their submissive spirit, by receiving Macedonian garrisons. Thespiæ and Plataea were reduced to ashes. Athens might expect soon to share their fate. Yet it was not without a hard struggle that the people consented to the decree which Themistocles moved, directing that the city should be abandoned to the charge of its tutelary goddess, and that the men, after placing their wives and children and the aged and infirm in security, should betake themselves to their ships. According to Aristotle¹ the council of the Areopagus found it necessary, in order to man the fleet, to advance eight drachmas, a sum equivalent to the ordinary pay for twenty-four days, to every man who served. The Plataeans, who had fought on board the Athenian ships at Artemisium, had landed in Bœotia on their passage through the Euripus to provide for the safety of their families, and were prevented from rejoining the fleet. There was a story that, when all were ready to embark, the head of the Gorgon which ornamented the breastplate of Pallas disappeared from her statue, and that Themistocles in searching for it had discovered a sacred treasure, which enabled the Areopagus to exercise its prudent liberality. It must be supposed that nothing was left for the Persians which could be concealed or carried away. Some sign was still wanting to convince the wavering that the moment had indeed

The Athenians quit their city.

¹ Plut. Them. 10.

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arrived, when the city could no longer hope to be defended by any arm human or divine. And now the priestess of Athene announced, that the sacred snake, which was regarded as the invisible guardian of the Rock, and was propitiated by a honeycake laid out for it every month in the temple, had quitted its abode in the sanctuary: the monthly offering lay untasted. This portent removed all doubts, except in the minds of a few of the poorest citizens, who, partly because they wanted the means of shifting their habitation, and partly because they still clung to the hope of some wonderful deliverance, which the oracle seemed to countenance, resolved to remain in the citadel with the keepers of the temple. The rest transported their families and their movable property, some to Salamis, some to Ægina, some to Trœzen, where the exiles were received with all the kindness that it became the birthplace of Theseus to show to his people in their distress. A decree was passed, ordering that they should be maintained, and the children instructed, at the public expense; and even the vineyards and orchards of the Trœzenians were thrown open to their unrestrained enjoyment. The fleet assembled at Salamis was reinforced by a squadron, composed partly of additional ships furnished by the same states which had contributed their succours at Artemisium, and partly of a small number sent from other quarters. Among these were four from Naxos, which had been intended by the Naxians for the service of the barbarians; but Democritus, who commanded one of them, and was a man of great influence in his island, persuaded his countrymen to neglect the orders they had received at home, and to join the Greeks. The most remote cities of the Greek continent, that took a part in the national cause, were the Corinthian colonies of Leucas and Ambracia. To the west of the Adriatic Croton alone showed itself

touched by the danger of Greece. It sent one ship; though perhaps this merit belonged to the commander Phäyllus, who had obtained three victories at the Pythian games, and probably equipped his ship at his own expense. The whole armament thus strengthened, with the addition of two deserters, amounted to 380 ships.¹

Eurybiades still held the chief command. He had called a council of war, to deliberate on the position in which it would be most advisable to await the enemy's approach. Almost all voices concurred in the opinion, that they ought to leave Salamis, and take up a station nearer the Isthmus. *Peloponnesus alone remained to be defended. If they lost the battle they would be blocked up in Salamis, unable to escape or to protect their cities; if they fought near the Isthmus, should the worst happen, they might join the army on shore, and renew the contest in defence of their homes.* The interest of the Athenians indeed was evidently opposed to this course: they could not reckon on such an alternative; for they had ventured their all upon the sea, and defeat would to them be irreparable ruin. But though their naval force was nearly equal to that of all their allies, they had only one vote in the debate. It was still undecided, when news came that the Persians had overrun Attica, and that the citadel was either already in their hands, or must speedily fall. And before long the flames rising from the Rock published far and wide that the oracle was completely fulfilled, and that every foot of Attic ground was in the power of the barbarians. Xerxes had pursued his march without resistance, spreading desolation as he advanced over the plains of Attica, till he arrived at the foot of the Cecropian hill. He found it guarded by the little remnant who had been kept there almost

Indecision
of the
Greeks.

¹ See Appendix IV.

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as much by helplessness and despair as by their forlorn and treacherous hope. They had raised a wooden wall round the brow of the rock, filling up, with a palisade of doors and planks, the breaches that had been made by the lapse of ages in the old Pelasgian fortification. Still their courage was not cast down, even when they saw the mighty host that surrounded them, and cut off all possibility of relief. They would not listen to the proposals of the Pisistratids, who urged them to save their lives by a timely surrender. The assailants who attempted to mount by the gentler declivities of the rock were crushed by heavy stones rolled down upon them from above. The hill of the Areopagus is separated from the western end of the Rock by a narrow hollow. From this height the besiegers discharged their arrows tipped with lighted tow against the opposite paling. The wooden wall was often in flames; no friendly deity held an ægis before it. Still the spirit of the little garrison did not sink, though toil and watching and wounds and hunger had brought them to the verge of death. Xerxes and all his host were baffled and perplexed.

Capture of
Athens.

At length, after all attempts had failed on the side which seemed most open to attack, the fortress was surprised, as so often happens, on that which had been deemed impregnable. Toward the north the Cecropian hill terminates in the precipices anciently called the Long Rocks: where the daughters of Cecrops were said to have thrown themselves down in the madness which followed the indulgence of their profane curiosity. The Persian army contained numbers of mountaineers, who could climb wherever it was possible for man to set his foot. While the besieged were busied in repelling the attacks of the enemy at the western wall, a few of the barbarians scaled the northern rocks, made their way into the

citadel, and immediately proceeded to open the gates. Some of the garrison, seeing that all was lost, threw themselves over the precipice; others took refuge in the sanctuary of the goddess. But the Persians pursued them to their last retreat and put every one to the sword. Then they plundered the temples, and gave the whole citadel to the flames. Xerxes immediately despatched a messenger to Susa to carry the tidings of this success, one of the principal objects of his expedition, to Artabanus, whom he had sent back from Abydus, to be regent during his absence. The next day, after his exultation or his anger had subsided, and some scruples perhaps began to disquiet his mind, he called together the Athenian exiles who were in his train, and bad them go up to the Rock, and sacrifice after their rites. They brought back the report of a happy omen for Athens. The sacred olive, — the earliest gift of Pallas, by which in her contest with Poseidon she had proved her claim to the land, and which grew in the temple of her foster-child Erechtheus, by the side of the salt pool that had gushed up under the trident of her rival, — had been consumed with the sacred building. Those who came to worship in the wasted sanctuary related that a shoot had already sprung to the height of a cubit, from the burnt stump.¹

When intelligence of these events was brought to the Greeks at Salamis, the greater number were struck with such consternation, that some of the commanders are said to have left the council and to have made preparations for immediate retreat; those who remained came to the resolution of retiring from Salamis, and giving battle near the shore of the Isthmus. It was night before the council broke up. Themistocles, on his return to his ship, related the

Mnesiphilus
and Themis-
tocles.

¹ Herod. viii. 55. Pausanias (l. 27. 2.) makes it shoot up two cubits on the same day.

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result of the conference to his friend Mnesiphilus, a man of congenial character, a little more advanced in years, who was commonly believed to have had a great share in forming the mind of Themistocles. Mnesiphilus is described as a sample of the elder school of Athenian statesmen, such as flourished from the time of Solon to that of Pericles: a man of vigorous practical understanding, which he applied wholly to public business, taking no interest in the philosophical speculations which were beginning to engage the attention of many active minds, and disdaining or ignorant of any rhetorical arts beyond what sufficed for expressing plain sense in clear words. When he heard of the determination which had been adopted, he pointed out the fatal consequences that would inevitably result from it: the certainty, that, when the Peloponnesians found themselves on their own shore, it would be impossible to keep them together, and that the public cause would be sacrificed to the timid prudence of the several cities, or of individuals intent on their particular safety. He exhorted Themistocles to make a strenuous effort, while there was yet time, to avert this calamity. Plutarch is angry with Herodotus for giving the credit of this counsel to Mnesiphilus. If indeed it was through his suggestion that Themistocles first perceived the danger, he instead of Themistocles would have deserved the praise of having saved Greece by his foresight. But assuredly the two friends did nothing more than interchange their thoughts and mutually strengthen their former conviction. Themistocles hastened to Eurybiades, explained to him the real ground there was for apprehension, and earnestly entreated him to go on shore again, and call another council. In this, before the subject of deliberation had been formally proposed, he endeavoured to bring the assembly over to his

ws. His principal adversary was the Corinthian
niral, Adeimantus, who probably thought he had
strongest reason to fear for the safety of his own
r, if the fleet continued at Salamis. He is said to
re rebuked the premature importunity of Themis-
les, by reminding him that, in the public games,
se who started before the signal was given were
rected with the scourge. *But those who lag behind,*
s the Athenian's answer, *do not win the crown.* In
debate that ensued, Themistocles could not insist
the grounds he had urged in his interview with
rybiades, without offending those whom he wished
persuade. He dissembled his suspicions of their
istancy, and confined himself to pointing out the
antages of the position they then occupied: *In*
straits of Salamis you will be fighting as at the
Isthmus in defence of Peloponnesus, but fighting in
situation the most favourable to yourselves, and
with a reasonable prospect of victory; fighting also
with Salamis, and Ægina, and Megara, behind you,
and untouched; while if you withdraw to the Isthmus,
you both abandon them to the barbarians, and fling
away your best chance of success. Adeimantus still
mentally opposed his proposition, and is said even
have thrown out an ungenerous taunt against
Themistocles and Athens: *a man who had no*
country was not entitled to a vote. Themistocles
only repelled the insult, and then turning to Eury-
biades, declared that the Athenians were resolved, if
their allies persisted in their design, not to fall a
helpless sacrifice, but to take their families and for-
tunes on board, and sail away to the rich land of
Syracuse in the south of Italy, where a colony of Ionians
had already founded a flourishing city. This threat
permanently convinced Eurybiades, or, if he had been before
unconvinced, furnished him with a decent plea for
adopting his plan. His authority or influence decided
the resolution of the council.

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XV.Advance of
the Persian
fleet.

Six days after the Greeks had left Artemisium the Persian fleet arrived in the Attic bay of Phalerum. In passing through the channel of Eubœa it is said that the Persian admiral seeing himself locked in by the land, which seemed to close the Euripus, suspected that his pilot, a Bœotian named Salganeus, had purposely drawn him into a snare, and hastily put him to death, and that the town of Salganeus took its name from the tomb with which the Persian, when he had discovered his error, endeavoured to repair it.¹ But the anecdote implies an ignorance which can scarcely be reconciled with the plan of circumnavigating Eubœa. Xerxes went on board one of the ships with Mardonius, and summoned the chief commanders of the fleet into his presence, to deliberate on the expediency of seeking an immediate engagement. Among a number of vassal princes who conducted their squadrons in person, was a woman, Artemisia, queen of Caria. She alone, according to Herodotus, perceived the rashness of hastening a contest, by which every thing might be lost, and nothing would be gained, but what might reasonably be looked for without one, if time were allowed for the disunion and dispersion of the Greeks, which would inevitably take place when the want of provisions should have driven them from Salamis to the Isthmus. Artemisia, if these were her views, thought like Mnesiphilus; but there was no Themistocles in the Persian council. The king resolved on attacking the enemy without delay. He attributed the checks his fleet had met with at Artemisium to the remissness of servants acting at a distance from the eye of their master. In the approaching conflict his presence would stimulate the brave, and overawe the timid. That same day he ordered the fleet to sail up toward Salamis, and to form in line of battle. But the hour was so late,

¹ Strabo, ix. p. 403. and i. p. 10. Compare Mela, ii. 7.

that there was only time to perform the evolution without advancing into the straits. It was resolved however that the battle should take place on the morrow.

The sight of the Persian armada, drawn up in order and ready for action, revived all the alarm which Themistocles had just been labouring to counteract. The danger of being defeated and blocked up in Salamis again rushed upon the minds of the Peloponnesians, and overpowered all other thoughts. It seemed to them madness in Eurybiades to remain in a position where nothing but an almost miraculous victory could enable them to act in concert with the army at the Isthmus. For now the whole force of the Peloponnesian confederates was assembled there under the command of Cleombrotus, brother of Leonidas. They too hoped little from the fleet, and believed that it rested with them alone to bar the progress of the invader. They had come together in haste after the tidings from Thermopylæ, and had made such preparations for defence as the shortness of the time permitted. The road along the seaside over the Scironian rocks had been broken up, and they had raised a rude wall across the Isthmus, of materials indiscriminately collected and hastily put together: stone and brick, and wood, and sand, with which the whole army had laboured night and day till the work was completed. The murmurs of the Peloponnesians in the fleet grew louder every moment; a meeting was called in which the voices of the Athenians, the Æginetans, and the Megarians, were drowned by the rest, who exclaimed against the folly of staying before a country which was already in the enemy's power. Themistocles, seeing that arguments and remonstrances were thrown away upon men who were blinded by their fears, turned his thoughts to a different method of gaining his

Stratagem
of Themis-
tocles.

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point. He resolved to save Athens in spite of her allies, and her allies in spite of themselves. The resolution was formed, the means contrived, the plan carried into effect, with the rapidity which the juncture demanded, and of which he alone was capable. While the commanders were still bandying passionate words, he withdrew from the council unobserved, called to him a slave named Sicinnus, who had the charge of his children, had been brought from the East, and spoke the Persian language. This man he instantly sent with a message to the Persian admiral. *Themistocles, the general of the Athenians, so the message ran, wishes well to the King, and desires to see his cause prevail. Therefore he has sent, without the knowledge of the Greeks, to say that they are panic-struck, and bent on flight. If you prevent their escape, you ensure a complete and easy victory. Already divided among themselves, they will no sooner see themselves pent in by your ships, than they will begin to turn their arms against one another.* Tidings so probable, and so accordant with their wishes, found easy credence with the Persian commanders, and they hastened to follow the friendly advice. About midnight they silently moved from Phalerum to block up the entrance of each of the narrow channels by which Salamis is separated, on the east from Attica, on the west from the territory of Megara. One line stretched from Cynosura, the eastern promontory of the island, to the Attic port of Munychium; another from Ceos, probably the western cape of Salamis, round the mouth of the other strait. A body of Persians was also posted in a little island named Psyttaleia, situate between Cynosura and the Attic coast, to protect their friends who might suffer in the battle, and to do all the mischief they could to the enemies who might be driven on the shore.

These movements were so promptly executed that the island was completely inclosed, while the debate was still continuing in the council of the Greeks. Themistocles had returned, and probably had done all he could to prolong the discussion. At length he was called out of the room to speak with a stranger at the door. It was Aristides. This was the third year of his exile, and the sentence which banished him appears to have been still in force. Plutarch indeed relates that it had been repealed by a formal decree, proposed by Themistocles himself, when Xerxes was on his march. But this statement is not confirmed by Herodotus, and can scarcely be reconciled with his narrative.¹ If Aristides had been legally restored to his country, he would have been present on this occasion at Salamis. We can more readily believe Plutarch, when he says that the exile had been actively employed in arming the Greeks for the national cause. He now came over from Ægina, perhaps to offer his services to his countrymen in the approaching conflict. With difficulty he made his way under cover of the night through the Persian fleet. *Themistocles*, he said, *let us still be rivals; but let our strife be, which can best serve our country. I come to say, that you are wasting words in debating whether you shall sail away from Salamis. We are encircled, and can only escape by cutting a passage through the enemy's fleet.* Themistocles made no secret of his artifice, and introduced Aristides into the council-room to report its success. While the assembly was engaged in a fresh dispute on this unwelcome intel-

¹ I must now entertain some doubt about the correctness of this opinion, since I find Welcker, in an essay on the *Persæ* of Æschylus (*Rhein. Mus.* v. p. 209. n. 13.), observing—*How Clinton* (OL 74. 2.), referring to *Herodotus* (viii. 79.), and taking no notice of the *Persæ* of Æschylus, can conjecture that Aristides had not yet been recalled at the time of the battle of Salamis, is hard to comprehend. Yet I must own that I can find nothing in the *Persæ* that appears to me decisive on this point.


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ligence, which the greater part refused to believe, it was confirmed by a Tenian ship, which came over from the enemy, and placed the truth beyond doubt. Nothing now remained but to brace every nerve for the battle, which the return of day would inevitably bring on.

When morning came, the Persian fleet was seen covering the sea between Psyttaleia and the mouth of the channel, and the army lining the shores of the Gulf of Eleusis. On one of the heights of mount Ægaleos, the last limb of the long range of hills that branching out from Cithæron stretches to the coast fronting the eastern side of Salamis, a lofty throne was raised for Xerxes, from which he could view the fight, quicken the tardy, and goad on the backward by the terror of his presence, and dispense instant punishments or rewards, as justice might demand. By his side were his scribes, to register the names of those who caught the king's attention by any signal exploit. The Greeks had different motives to animate them, and a different presence to cheer them. Before they embarked, Themistocles addressed them in a speech, the substance of which, as Herodotus reports it, was simply to set before them on the one side all that was best, on the other all that was worst, in the nature and the condition of man, and to exhort them to choose and hold fast the good. He might truly say that on the issue of that struggle depended all that was noble in the Greek character, all that was beautiful in Grecian life: that no advantage which distinguished the Greek from the barbarian, neither virtue and honour, nor prosperity and happiness, could long survive their independence. As they were about to take their stations a vessel arrived from Ægina, which had been sent the day before, when the resolution of defending Salamis was adopted, to implore the assistance of Æacus and his line, the

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tutelary heroes of Ægina.¹ They were solemnly evoked from their sanctuary, to come and take part in the battle; similar rites had already been performed to secure the presence and the aid of those Æacids, who had once reigned and were especially worshipped in Salamis itself. The tradition of Ægina was that the ship sent on the sacred embassy was the same which began the combat; and it was believed that the heroes were seen during the day, in the form of armed warriors, lifting up their hands to shield the Grecian galleys.

The Greeks awaited the advance of the Persians in the straits, which in the narrowest part are no more than a quarter of a mile wide. As the Persians approached, the Greeks backed their galleys, probably till they saw the enemy closely pent in the brief space which permitted only a small part of his force, more than triple their own numbers, to be brought into action together. Then the ship of the Æacids, or, as was more generally believed, an Athenian, commanded by Ameinias, darted forward, and struck one of the Persians. This was the signal for a general engagement. The Persians exerted their utmost efforts, and did not yield to the Greeks in courage and per-

Battle of
Salamis.

¹ Herod. viii. 64. ἔδοξε δέ σφι ἐξῆσθαι τοῖσι θεοῖσι καὶ ἐπικαλέσασθαι τοὺς Αἰακίδας συμμάχους. A question may here occur to the thoughtful reader — in what way the succour of these heroes was conceived to be obtained. The case is illustrated by another related by Diodorus (Mal 11. p. 13.) where the Epizephyrian Locrians apply to Sparta for aid against Croton, and receive the answer, that the Spartans give the Tyndarids (Castor and Pollux) as allies. The envoys accept the offer; and, after a propitious sacrifice, spread a couch for the Dioscuri on board, and depart. Müller (Dor. 1. 6. 12.) supposes that they carried away the statues of the heroes. But this seems extremely improbable in itself, and is not intimated by any expression in Diodorus — ἀπεκρίθησαν αὐτοῖς συμμάχους δίδόναι τοὺς Τυνδαρίδας· οἱ δὲ πρέσβεις, εἴ τε προνοία θεοῦ εἴ τε τὸ ῥῆθεν οἰωνισάμενοι, προσεδέξαντο τὴν βοήθειαν παρ' αὐτῶν, καὶ καλλιερήσαντες ἔστρωσαν τοῖς Διοσκούροις κλίνην ἐπὶ τῆς νηὸς, καὶ ἀπέπλευσαν ἐπὶ τὴν πατρίδα. Nor does Justin appear so to have understood his narrative (xx. 2.): Illi longinqua militiæ gravati auxilium a Castore et Polluce petere eos jubent. Neque legati responsum sociæ urbis spreverunt, profectique in proximum templum, facto sacrificio, auxilium deorum implorant. Litatis hostilis, obtentoque ut rebantur quod petebant, haud secus latè, quam si deos ipsos secum avecturi essent, pulvinaria illis in nave componunt; faustisque profecti omnibus, solatia suis pro auxiliis deportant. It is still less probable that the images of the Æacids were carried into a sea-fight.

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severance ; every man fought as if the eyes of the king were upon him. But the valour of the Greeks, if not directed by superior skill, was cooler and more deliberate ; for it had not to struggle with any of the impediments which threw their antagonists into confusion, and took away their presence of mind. Several causes contributed to this effect. The Persian vessels, those especially in the foremost line, were taller and larger than those of the Greeks, and were so much the more exposed to the action of a strong breeze which regularly blew up the channel at a certain time of the day. Themistocles is said to have foreseen the advantage that might be derived from it, and to have delayed the battle to the hour when it was expected to get up. The Persian ships were turned by the wind and the waves, their evolutions were thwarted, and their sides exposed to the attacks of the enemy's prows. While those in front were thus embarrassed, the commanders of the hindmost, impatient to signalise themselves in the presence of the king, pressed forward to the scene of action, and often fell foul of their friends whom they met retreating. Some of the Phœnicians, whose galleys had been disabled by the shock of some Ionian triremes, which had been accidentally driven against them, went on shore, and complained to the king of what they called the treachery of the Ionians. The loyalty of the Ionians was not unsuspecting, and Xerxes listened to the charge, till an extraordinary exploit of one of their galleys convinced him of their fidelity, and excited his indignation against their accusers. The Ionian had struck and sunk an Attic ship, when she was herself attacked, and borne down by an Æginetan ; her deck however remained above water, so as to allow her crew still to stay on board. From this situation her men cleared the deck of the Æginetans with their javelins, and boarded and captured

the ship which had sunk their own. When the king saw this he commanded that the Phœnicians, who had calumniated the bravest and stanchest of his servants, should lose their heads.

Though the complaint of the Phœnicians was probably groundless, it cannot be doubted that the confusion which soon began to prevail in the Persian fleet was greatly aggravated and rendered more mischievous by the variety of forces that composed it. The Ægyptians, the Phœnicians, the Cilicians, the Cyprians, the Ionians, and the other nations that fought in it were united by no bond but their compulsory service of the same master; and as they could feel no interest in the cause they were forced to support, so they could be little concerned about any damage they might inflict on their brother slaves which did not endanger their own safety, and must have been always ready to sacrifice every other object to this. An adventure, which Herodotus describes, was probably not the only instance of this spirit which the battle afforded. The Carian heroine, Artemisia, was chased by Ameinias, who did not suspect the value of the prize he had in view; for the Athenians, indignant it is said at being invaded by a woman, had set a price of 10,000 drachmas on her head. She was flying with many others; for it was when disorder had become general among the Persians; and, hard pressed by her pursuer, saw before her the galley of the Calyndian Damasithymus. Without scruple she struck and sunk it: not a man of the whole crew was saved. Ameinias, believing that he had been chasing a friend, turned away from her; while Xerxes, who saw the occurrence, but only learnt the name of Artemisia, loudly expressed his admiration of her courage and skill.

Artemisia

The event of the battle was really decided at the

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first onset, which threw the unwieldy armament into a confusion from which it could never recover, and which so many causes co-operated to increase. Yet it appears to have been long before the resistance of the mass, whether active or inert, was finally overcome; and night had begun to draw in ere the remains of the Persian fleet took refuge in Phalerum, to which the Greeks attempted not to pursue it. When the vanquished enemy began to seek safety in flight, a squadron of Æginetan ships, which had stationed itself near the mouth of the channel, met the fugitives, completed their defeat, and cut off many who had escaped from the conflict unhurt. It was in this encounter that a Sidonian vessel, the same which had captured the Æginetan off Sciathus, and which had the lion-hearted Pytheas still on board, was struck at the same time by the galley of Themistocles and by that of Polycritus, an Æginetan, whose father, Crius, had some years before been the forwardest in resisting Cleomenes when he landed in Ægina, and attempted to arrest the principal men of the island who were suspected of favouring the Persians. Polycritus, when he saw the banner of the Athenian admiral, called out to him, and asked whether the Æginetans were traitors to the cause of Greece. The brave Pytheas was restored to his country.

Aristides, who had been one of the ten generals at Marathon, did not command a ship at Salamis. But he was on the shore, intent on the course of events, and watching for an opportunity of ministering to the victory from which his successful rival was to reap praise and power. When the tide of battle had begun to turn, he embarked a body of heavy-armed Athenians, with some archers and slingers, in light craft, and landed them at Psyttaleia. The Persians there were driven into a corner, and, according to Herodotus and Æschylus, were cut in pieces to a

man. Plutarch, on the authority of a writer whom he praises for his historical learning¹, has connected this occurrence with a horrible tragedy, on which the elder authors are silent. According to this story, Aristides took three prisoners at Psyttaleia, nephews of Xerxes, whom he sent to Themistocles. They found him sacrificing on board his ship, with the soothsayer Euphrantides by his side, who persuaded him to immolate them to Bacchus. It is perhaps unnecessary to suppose that there was any ground for this tradition, since at all events the captives from Psyttaleia could not have been brought to Themistocles while he was sacrificing for success in the battle; yet it seems not incredible that he might endeavour to still popular fears, which may have been excited by the incantations of the magians, by similar mysterious rites; or that he imitated the example of the Persians, without sharing their superstition, in order to take vengeance for the Træzenian whom they had sacrificed near Sciathus. The Persian invasion appears to have interrupted the annual procession, in which the statue of the mystic Iacchus was carried in solemn pomp along the Sacred Road from Athens to Eleusis. One of the Athenian exiles, as he looked over the Thriasian plain toward the sanctuary, fancied that he saw the cloud of dust usually raised by the festive throng which at this season formed the train of the god, and that he heard the shouts with which they were accustomed to invoke him. As the cloud rolled toward the sea, and dropped upon the fleet, he inferred that the insulted deity was issuing from Eleusis to succour the Greeks, and avenge his neglected rites upon the Persians. If any apparition of this kind, as Plutarch relates, had excited the imagination of the Athenians either before

¹ Themist. 13. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀνὴρ φιλόσοφος καὶ γραμμάτων οὐκ ἄπειρος ἱστορικῶν Φανίας ὁ Λέσβιος εἶρηκε. Compare Aristid. 9.

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or during the combat, the soothsayer might have conceived that the blood of barbarian captives would be a grateful offering to the angry god; and though Themistocles was probably little prone to superstition himself, he would not have been reluctant to use it as an instrument.¹

The loss sustained on each side in this battle is not recorded by Herodotus; but since Ctesias raises that of the Persians to five hundred ships, Diodorus probably drew his numbers, two hundred for the Persians and forty for the Greeks, from good authority. The barbarians lost more lives in proportion than the Greeks; for few of their mariners who came from the inland regions of Asia could save themselves by swimming when their ships were sunk, while almost every Greek, accustomed to the water from his childhood, could easily reach the shore. Among the slain was Ariabignes, a brother of Xerxes, and commander of the fleet, and many other Persians of the highest rank; and from the language of Æschylus we should be inclined to suppose that the troops posted in Psytaleia were taken from among the Immortals. Xerxes however had still the means of renewing the contest with a greatly superior force, and the aspect he assumed led the Greeks to believe that he would not be deterred by his defeat from prosecuting his enterprise with even greater vigour. He began to make preparations for throwing a bridge or causeway over the narrowest part of the strait by fastening some Phœnician merchantmen together.² But this threatening attitude was only a feint to conceal his real feelings and intentions. He began to be conscious that his situation was one of no little danger. His fleet had suffered some severe blows; another defeat

¹ Compare Polyænus, iii. 11. 2.

² Ctesias (26.) and Strabo, ix. p. 395., represent Xerxes as having originally designed to carry his troops across to Salamis over a causeway, and as having been prevented from executing his plan by the battle.

might utterly ruin it, and give the Greeks the undisputed command of the seas. He might find himself cut off from Asia, and shut up in a hostile country, where his army might melt away by famine and the sword. The remembrance of the past threw no cheering light on his future prospects. His progress through Greece had hitherto been a series of disasters; for even his successes had been purchased with ignominy, and tended to weaken the terror of his name, and to encourage the enemy to unflinching resistance. The day of Salamis was probably not over, before he had secretly resolved on retreat.

Mardonius, the main author of the unfortunate expedition, could easily perceive what thoughts were passing in his master's mind. He knew how treacherous the hopes had proved with which he had allured him, how little the temper of Xerxes was formed to brook such disappointments, how many enemies he himself had at court who would turn it to his ruin. He therefore prudently resolved to forestall the king's wishes, and to give him the advice which coincided with his designs, while he reserved for himself a field for his ambition, and a prospect of achieving a conquest which would completely re-establish him in the royal favour. *He bad the King not to let his spirits be cast down by the loss of a few ships, nor because the Greeks had shown themselves better men on the sea than Phœnicians, and Ægyptians, Cyprians, and Cilicians. Their disgrace could not tarnish the honour of the Persians, who were used to rely not on frail planks, but on men and horses, for victory. The Persian arms were still irresistible as ever on their proper element. Let the King but make the trial, by advancing into Peloponnesus, and he would see that these sailors, however proud they were of their triumph, would none of them dare to land and meet him. If however he was satisfied with the display he*

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had made of his power, and thought it time to return to Persia, Mardonius himself, if he were permitted to select 300,000 troops from the army, would undertake to complete the subjugation of Greece. Xerxes was pleased; for what he heard was his own mind. Artemisia, whom he affected to consult, though, as Herodotus believes, neither man nor woman could have prevailed on him to stay, seconded the proposal of Mardonius, and observed, that, if it was adopted, the risk would be all on the side of the Greeks, for when the King was safe, it mattered little what became of one of his slaves; if Mardonius fulfilled his promise, the glory would belong to his master. Xerxes commended her prudence, and honoured her by entrusting his children to her charge, with whom she immediately set sail for Ephesus. The same night the fleet received orders to make for the Hellespont with all speed, to guard the bridges till the King's arrival. As they sailed in the dark by Cape Zoster, they were deceived by the appearance of some rocky islets which are scattered near the coast, and taking them for Grecian ships fled panic-struck in different directions. The error was detected in time to prevent a dispersion, and they pursued their course to the Hellespont without further interruption.

Retreat of
Xerxes.

It was not till about the middle of the following day that the Greeks received information of the departure of the Persian fleet. They instantly gave it chase; but having proceeded as far as Andros without gaining sight of it, they there stopped to hold a council of war. The Athenians were desirous of continuing the pursuit, and sailing to the Hellespont, to destroy the bridges, and intercept the return of Xerxes; and Themistocles proposed this movement. But Eurybiades represented the danger of driving a powerful enemy to despair, and was of opinion that no impediment ought to be thrown in his way. Plu-

arch ascribes this counsel to Aristides, supposing it to have been given at Salamis ; but there is no reason for thinking that he was with the fleet at Andros. The Peloponnesian commanders all approved of the admiral's caution ; and Themistocles, probably himself convinced, laboured to soothe the disappointment of his countrymen, who at first were for separating from their allies, and undertaking without their assistance to block the Persians up in Europe. He reminded them *that men driven to extremities often pluck up a courage to which they would else have been strangers ; that they might think themselves happy enough to have freed themselves and Greece from the cloud that had hung over them, without trying to detain it now that it was rolling away. Even what had been done was not their own deed, but the work of the gods and heroes whom the invader had provoked by his impious pride and sacrilegious violence.* The Athenians were persuaded, and the fleet made some stay among the Cyclades to chastise those of the islanders who had sent succour to the barbarians.

. It may be easily conceived that a man like Themistocles loved the arts in which he excelled for their own sake, and might exercise the faculties with which he was pre-eminently gifted upon very slight occasions. In devising a plan, conducting an intrigue, surmounting a difficulty, in leading men to his ends without their knowledge and against their will, he might find a delight which might often be in itself a sufficient motive of action. We should be apt to suppose that this was the inducement which led him to send another secret message to Xerxes, if, as Herodotus represents, its import was only to inform the king of the resolution which the Greeks had just adopted, and to let him know that he might return to Asia without any fear of hinderance. For that in the

Device of
Themisto-
cles.

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very moment of victory, when he had just risen to the highest degree of reputation and influence among his countrymen, he should have foreseen the changes which fortune had in store for him, and have conceived the thought of providing a place of refuge among the barbarians to which he might fly if he should be driven out of Greece, is a conjecture that might very naturally be formed after the event, but would scarcely have been thought probable before it. That he sent the second message need not be doubted, notwithstanding the ease with which such anecdotes are multiplied; according to Herodotus, the bearer, the same Sicinnus, was accompanied by several other trusty servants or friends; Plutarch found a more probable tradition, that the agent employed was a prisoner, named Arnaces, one of the king's eunuchs. In Herodotus, Themistocles claims the merit of having diverted the Greeks from pursuing the Persian fleet, and destroying the bridges, and bids Xerxes dismiss all fear about his return. Plutarch's authors, on the contrary, related that he had terrified Xerxes with the danger of being intercepted, and urged him to fly with the utmost speed. And this seems more consistent with the narrative of Herodotus himself, who, though he did not believe the report he heard at Abdera, that Xerxes never loosened his girdle before he reached Abdera on his way back, describes him as making forced marches to the Hellespont.

Mardonius accompanied Xerxes as far as Thessaly, where he himself meant to take up his winter quarters. He selected the flower of the whole army, including the Immortals, and one of the troops of the king's horse-guard. A body of 60,000 men, part of those whom he retained, under the command of Artabazus, escorted Xerxes to the Hellespont. Widely different from the appearance of the glittering host which a few months before had advanced over the

plains of Macedonia and Thrace to the conquest of Greece, was the aspect of the crowd which was now hurrying back along the same road. The splendour, the pomp, the luxury, the waste, were exchanged for disorder and distress, want and disease. The magazines had been emptied by the careless profusion or the peculation of those who had the charge of them; the granaries of the countries traversed by the retreating multitude were unable to supply its demands; ordinary food was often not to be found, and it was compelled to draw a scanty and unwholesome nourishment from the herbage of the plains, the bark and leaves of the trees. Sickness soon began to spread its ravages among them, and Xerxes was compelled to consign numbers to the care of the cities that lay on his road, already impoverished by the cost of his first visit, in the hope that they would tend their guests, and would not sell them into slavery if they recovered. The passage of the Strymon is said to have been peculiarly disastrous. The river had been frozen in the night hard enough to bear those who arrived first. But the ice suddenly gave way under the heat of the morning sun, and numbers perished in the waters.¹ In forty-five days after he had left Mardonius in Thessaly, he reached the Hellespont; the bridges had been broken up by foul weather, but the fleet was there to carry the army over to Abydos. Here it rested from its fatigues, and found plentiful quarters; but intemperate indulgence rendered the sudden change from scarcity to abundance almost as pernicious as the previous famine.

Losses of
the Per-
sians.

¹ It is a little surprising that Herodotus, when he is describing the miseries of the retreat, does not notice this disaster, which is so prominent in the narrative of the Persian messenger in *Æschylus*. There can however be no doubt as to the fact; and perhaps it may furnish a useful warning, not to lay too much stress on the silence of Herodotus, as a ground for rejecting even important and interesting facts which are only mentioned by later writers, though such as he must have heard of, and might have been expected to relate. It seems possible that the story he mentions of Xerxes embarking at Eion (viii. 118.) may have arisen out of the tragical passage of the Strymon.

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The remnant that Xerxes brought back to Sardis was a wreck, a fragment, rather than a part of his huge host.

Many of the Greek cities on the coast of the Chalcidian peninsula, when they heard of the battle of Salamis and the flight of the Persian fleet, had cast off the yoke; Potidæa, on the isthmus of Pallene, was the foremost in asserting its independence. Olynthus, at this time inhabited by Bottiæans, a race which laid claim to some infusion of Cretan blood, and had been driven by the progressive conquests of the Macedonians from the gulf of Therme, betrayed a similar disposition. Artabazus, when he had executed his commission, seeing time to spare before Mardonius would need his presence in Thessaly, resolved to employ it in chastising this rebellion. He first laid siege to Olynthus, made himself master of it, and massacred the whole population in cold blood. He then repeopled it with colonists of the Chalcidian race: henceforth Olynthus is a purely Greek city. This cruelty was perhaps meant to strike terror into Potidæa; if so, it failed of its end. Artabazus here met with a more determined resistance; he tried to gain admission by gold; his bribes prevailed, but the treachery was defeated by a timely detection. He lay three months before the walls, without shaking the firmness of the garrison; at length they seemed to be deserted by the gods: an extraordinary ebb of the sea left the shore of the isthmus bare under the walls of the city. Artabazus took advantage of the prodigy to send a division of his army round the town; but in the middle of their march the waters returned, in a tide higher than had ever been known before. The barbarians were either overwhelmed by the waves, or cut to pieces by the garrison; and Artabazus in despair raised the siege, and marched back to Thessaly.

Siege of
Potidæa.

The Grecian fleet, as we have seen, had staid

among the Cyclades, to punish the islanders who had aided the barbarians. Themistocles seized this opportunity of enriching himself at their expense. He first demanded a contribution from Andros; and when the Andrians refused it, he told them that the Athenians had brought two powerful gods to second their demand, Persuasion and Force. The Andrians replied, that they also had a pair of ill-conditioned gods, who would not leave their island, or let them comply with the will of the Athenians, Poverty and Inability. The Greeks laid siege to Andros; but it made so vigorous a defence, that they were at length compelled to abandon the attempt, and returned to Salamis. Themistocles however employed the assistance of his two gods with more success in several of the other islands, which bribed him for impunity. All Greece resounded with the fame of his wisdom; the deliverance just effected was universally ascribed, next to the favour of the gods, to his foresight and presence of mind. When the choicest of the spoil had been selected for thanksgiving offerings, of which the greater part were sent to Delphi, and converted into a colossal statue, and the rest had been divided among the allies, the commanders met in the temple of Poseidon on the Isthmus to award the palm of individual merit. Among the states which had taken a part in the battle, almost unanimous consent assigned the foremost place to Ægina: her claim to this glory seemed so unquestionable, that the Delphic god, when he was asked if he was content with the offerings he had received, said that he still missed that which Ægina owed for her precedence; and it was sent, in the shape of three golden stars fixed on a brazen mast. The other question was to be decided by the votes of the competitors themselves, which were solemnly given at the altar of Poseidon for the first and for the second degree of excellence. No one was gene-

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paid to Themistocles.

rous enough to resign the first place to another ; most were just enough to award the second to Themistocles. Still higher honours awaited him from Sparta, a severe judge of Athenian merit. He went thither, according to Plutarch, invited ; wishing, Herodotus says, to be honoured. The Spartans gave him a chaplet of olive leaves ; it was the reward they had bestowed on their own admiral, Eurybiades. They added a chariot, the best the city possessed ; and to distinguish him above all other foreigners that had ever entered Sparta, they sent the three hundred Knights¹ to escort him as far as the borders of Tegea on his return. He himself subsequently dedicated a temple to Artemis, as the goddess of good counsel.

Battle of
Himera.

While these great events were passing in Greece, Sicily was delivered from a danger not less threatening. Terillus, tyrant of Himera, had been expelled from his city by Theron, tyrant of Agrigentum. To recover his dominions the exile solicited aid from Carthage. The Carthaginians were no doubt glad of an opportunity of gaining a footing in the island ; though Diodorus, with the natural prejudices of a Sicilian, imagined that they had been stimulated to the invasion of his country by Xerxes, who probably had scarcely heard the name of Sicily. They appear however to have required some security from Terillus ; and his son-in-law, Anaxilaus, tyrant of Rhegium, sent his own children, as hostages, to the Carthaginian suffete, Hamilcar, who was himself by his mother's side of Syracusan origin, and was bound by ties of hospitality to Terillus. The Carthaginians sent an army, it is said of 300,000 men, collected from Africa and from the coasts and islands of the Tuscan Sea, under the command of Hamilcar, to Sicily. On his arrival he laid siege to Himera, now in the possession of Theron, whose daughter Demaratè

¹ See Vol. I. p. 379., where the word *knights* should have been used instead of *horsemen*.

BATTLE OF HIMERA.

was the wife of Gelo of Syracuse. Gelo marched promptly to the relief of his father-in-law with a powerful army, revived the confidence of the Himeræans, and shut up the Carthaginians in their camp. An intercepted letter, containing promises of succour from Selinus, suggested to him a stratagem, by which he introduced a body of cavalry into the Carthaginian intrenchments, who surprised and slew Hamilcar, and burnt almost the whole of his fleet, which he had drawn on shore, and inclosed within his fortifications. At the same time he marched up with his whole force; the Carthaginians came out and gave him battle, but were defeated, with the loss, it is said, of half their army. The rest took refuge in a position where the want of water compelled them to lay down their arms. To complete the disaster of the Carthaginians, twenty of their ships, which had escaped the conflagration of the fleet, and carried off a part of the crews, perished in a storm on their way home. Scarcely a boat returned to bring the news to Carthage. This great victory was gained, it is said, on the same day with that of Salamis. The allied cities were enriched with the Carthaginian spoil, and adorned by the labours of the prisoners whom they divided among them. Of these so many fell to the share of Agrigentum that private persons are said to have become owners of 500 slaves. The quarries were filled with these unfortunate captives; solid and magnificent works rose under their hands, to the honour of the gods, and for the convenience and pleasure of the citizens: temples of vast size, sewers, more celebrated, perhaps not much less massy, than the Roman, an artificial lake rivalling the splendour of eastern kings, were, as long as Agrigentum stood, and still remain in part, monuments of the day of Himera.

CHAPTER XVI.

FROM THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS TO THE END OF THE
PERSIAN INVASION.

The Greek Fleet at Delos. — Mardonius and the Greek Oracles. — Alexander of Macedon at Athens. — Heroic Conduct of the Athenians. — Mardonius at Athens. — Mysterious Conduct of the Spartans. — Probable Explanation of it. — Mardonius in Bœotia. — Banquet at Thebes. Forces of the Greeks. — Skirmish of Cavalry. — Defeat and Death of Masistius. — The Greeks advance toward Platœa. — Greek Diviners. — Skirmish at Gargaphia. — Amompharetus. — Battle of Platœa. — Destruction of the Persians. — Division of the Spoil. — Honours paid to the Dead. — Feast of Liberty. — Punishment of the Thebans. — Movements of the Greek Fleet. — Leotychides at Mycalè. — Battle of Mycalè. — Siege of Sestus. — Fortification of Athens. — Stratagem of Themistocles. — Fortification of Piræus. — Ambitious Views of Pausanias. — Origin of the Athenian Supremacy. — Assessment of Aristides. — Innovation in the Athenian Constitution. — Death of Aristides. — Death of Pausanias. — Rapacity of Themistocles. — His Opposition to Sparta. — His Exile. — Flight. — Reception at the House of Admetus. — His Journey to the Court of Persia. — His Death.

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WITHIN a few days after the battle of Salamis Attica was delivered from the presence of the barbarians, and the Athenians returned to cultivate their fields and to repair their dwellings. The necessity of attending to their domestic concerns had been one of the main arguments by which Themistocles prevailed on them to desist from the pursuit of the Persian fleet. They now applied themselves to their useful labours with the greater alacrity, as they entertained a reasonable hope that their land would not again be visited by the ravages of the same invader. Sparta had been too late for Marathon, too late to save Athens; but now there

was ample time for preparation, and full warning of the need. Though the enemy was yet formidable by land, still after the brilliant success that had hitherto attended the Greeks, after the example that had been given at Marathon, of what might be effected by a small number of brave and disciplined troops, it was not too much to expect that the allies would not again look on at a distance, while the barbarians overran the territory of a people which had done and suffered so much for the common cause. During the winter the Greeks remained tranquil, as if they had no enemy at their doors; but in the spring they awoke, like men who have slept upon an uneasy thought, and remembered that Mardonius was in Thessaly, and a Persian fleet still upon the sea.

This fleet, after having transported the army across the Hellespont, had wintered, the main part at Cuma, the rest at Samos, and when the sea was open again the whole was assembled at the latter station under the command of three new admirals. Their intention was to remain entirely on the defensive; and they did not expect to be attacked by the Greeks, who had not pursued them after their defeat; but they watched the Ionians with suspicion. Their force amounted only to 300 ships, of which the Ionian squadron formed a part. A revolt in Ionia, seconded by the victorious Greeks, would give them full employment. Their suspicions and fears were not ill grounded. When the Grecian fleet, consisting of 110 ships, met at Ægina in the spring, under the command of Leotychides, king of Sparta, the successor of Demaratus, and Xanthippus son of Ariphron, the prosecutor of Miltiades, some Ionian refugees, who had failed in an attempt against Strattis the tyrant of Chios, came over to solicit aid for the purpose of restoring Ionia to independence.¹

¹ Among them was a Herodotus, son of Basilides, whom Manso, *Sparta*, i. p. 346., confounds with the historian. Manso conjectures, we think needlessly, that the

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The Greek
fleet at De-
los.

They had already applied to Sparta, and seem to have been referred to the judgment of the allies. But the only point they could carry with the commanders of the fleet, was to prevail on them to advance eastward as far as Delos, and even this movement was made with great reluctance, and perhaps to many seemed too bold. The intercourse between Ionia and Greece had not been active enough to render the eastern coast of the *Ægean* familiar to the Greeks, particularly to those of Peloponnesus. Beyond Delos their imagination covered the sea with hostile forces, and Samos lay as far out of their self-traced field of action, as the pillars of Hercules. Thus mutual fears kept the interval between the two islands open, and the two fleets at rest, though in an attitude of defence. All eyes were turned to the land forces, which were evidently destined to decide the conflict.

Mardonius
and the
Greek ora-
cles.

During his stay in Thessaly Mardonius had been making preparations for his approaching campaign. However sanguine his temper might be, he could not now be blind to the truth, that the conquest of Greece was by no means so easy an undertaking as he had once fancied, and had led Xerxes to believe; he was now about to make the cast on which all his hopes were set, and was ready to embrace any expedient that would ensure his success, or lessen his difficulties. It was probably the anxiety with which his prospects must have inspired him, that suggested to him the thought of sending an agent round to the most celebrated Grecian oracles to which he had access, in the hope, even through the rites of a strange religion, to catch some glimpse of futurity or some light for his guidance. What revelations his emissary brought back from the shrines of Apollo and

Spartans, to cover their fear of the Persians, pretended total ignorance of the distance of Samos and the Asiatic coast. As little do we believe them to have been really ignorant of it.

Amphiaraus, or the mysterious cave of Trophonius, though they were carefully recorded, Herodotus could not learn. But he thinks it probable that their answers may have had some share in impelling Mardonius to the step he took next. This was an attempt to detach Athens from the cause of Greece, and to gain her as an ally for Persia. To conduct this negotiation, he selected Alexander the king of Macedonia, who, connected with Persia by the marriage above mentioned between his sister and a Persian of high rank, and on the other hand by ties of friendship and hospitality with Athens, appeared singularly fitted to mediate between the parties.¹ The ambassador, on his arrival at Athens, spoke in the name of Mardonius, but as the bearer of a proposal, which Xerxes had empowered and commanded his lieutenant to make. *The king was ready to forget past offences, to secure the Athenians in the unmolested possession of their territory, and to add to it any other they might covet; he offered to rebuild all the temples he had burnt in their city; he asked in return not the subjection, but the alliance of Athens, as a free and independent state. Mardonius exhorted the Athenians to embrace the king's generous offer, and not to keep up a ruinous struggle against a power which, even if they should escape for the present, must crush them in the end.* Alexander himself, whose friendly sentiments they well knew, freely added his own advice on the same side. *He would not have been the bearer of such a message, if he had seen any prospect of their being able to maintain a perpetual contest with Xerxes; but the power of the king was more than mortal, his arm*

Alexander
of Macedon
at Athens.

¹ Welcker (*Ueber die Perser des Æschylus Rhein. Mus.* v. p. 214. note 26.) observes that according to Aristides, or. sec. pro quatuorviris, p. 217. Jebb. (ii. p. 286. Dindorf), Mardonius employed Alexander, king of Macedonia, to convey his proposals: as if this was not likewise related by Herodotus, whom Welcker refers to in the same note.

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stretched beyond the reach of man ; if they did not wish their land to be for ever a theatre of war, or to be from time to time continually deprived of it by hostile invasion, let them joyfully accept the magnanimous offer of the Great King, which had been vouchsafed to them alone of all the Greeks.

The Spartans had heard of the embassy of Alexander, and were alarmed by it. A prophecy, naturally suggested by the aspect of the times, is said to have heightened their fears for the constancy of Athens. It was believed that a time should come when they and all the other Dorians should be driven out of Peloponnesus by the united forces of the Persians and the Athenians. They were also not yet quite prepared to sustain an attack. The works which they had hastily thrown up in the foregoing summer on the Isthmus, had fallen to ruin during the winter, or were so slight that a new fortification was deemed necessary. They were now employed in constructing one, and, at least till it should be completed, it was prudent not to neglect any precaution to secure the alliance of the Athenians. They accordingly sent an embassy to Athens ; and as it was there expected that they would take this step, the answer to be sent to Mardonius was deferred, until it could be delivered in the presence of the Spartan envoys. They spoke of what Athens owed to Greece, which she had herself involved in the war ; of what she owed to her own renown, as a city famed above all others for her resistance to tyranny, and her efforts in behalf of the oppressed. *The Spartans felt for the distress which the Athenians had suffered from the late invasion, and for the sacrifices which they might still have to make, and would do their utmost to mitigate them. They offered to maintain the families of the Athenians as long as the war should last, at their own expense. Let not the Athenians prefer the hollow promises of the bar-*

barians to their natural and faithful allies. A distinct and manly answer, framed it appears according to a decree proposed by Aristides¹, destroyed the hopes of Mardonius, and silenced the fears of the Spartans. So long as the sun held on his course, Alexander might tell Mardonius, Athens would never come to terms with Xerxes: enormous as his power was, she would continue to defy it, relying on the gods and the heroes, whose temples and images he had burnt and defaced. That the Spartans should have been anxious about the conduct of the Athenians on this occasion, was natural enough; but the character of the Athenians ought to have protected them from the suspicion, that they could be tempted to betray Greece to the barbarian, though he should offer them all the gold the earth contained, or the fairest and richest land under the sun. They must first forget the injuries they had suffered, and the ties of blood, language, manners, and religion that united them to Greece. They thanked the Spartans for their offer, but they would not burden them. This was not the kind of assistance they desired from their allies. But they wished them to put their forces in motion without delay to meet Mardonius in Bæotia, as, on receiving the answer they had just heard, he would probably set out on his march for Attica. The decree likewise directed that the priests should pronounce a solemn imprecation on every Greek, who should negotiate with the barbarian, or abandon the national confederacy.²

What the Athenians expected came to pass; what they desired was not done. Mardonius, as soon as he heard the message brought by Alexander, set out from Thessaly, and marched at full speed toward Athens. His Thessalian friends, with Thorax of Larissa at their head, whose interests were bound up

¹ Plut. Arist. 10.² Ibid. u. 2.

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at Athens.

in his, showed greater zeal than ever in his service; and he was no less heartily welcomed in Bœotia, where the Theban Attaginus, a man of great wealth and credit, exerted all his influence in the Persian cause. The Thebans advised him not to advance further, but to fix his quarters in Bœotia, which was well suited to the operations of his army; and they held out to him the prospect of effecting the conquest of Greece without striking a blow. The Greeks, they said, were strong while they held together, but they might be made to turn their arms against one another. Let the Persian gold be distributed among the leading men in each city, and factions would soon be raised every where, which would save him the labour and risk of sieges and battles. Perhaps the advice was not wholly neglected; but Mardonius had several motives for pursuing his march into Attica. He wished to make himself master of Athens, for the sake of his credit with Xerxes, who was still at Sardis, whither he designed to convey the news by beacons over the islands of the Ægean. He was also not without hopes of bending the obstinacy of the Athenians, when their country and city were in his possession, to accept the terms which they had rejected while his invasion was uncertain. He therefore proceeded; and he found no obstacle on his way: at Athens only the deserted walls. The inhabitants had retired to Salamis, when they saw that they had no protection to expect from the Peloponnesians. Ten months after its capture by Xerxes, Athens fell into the hands of Mardonius.

He immediately sent a Greek named Murychides over to Salamis, to renew the proposals he had before made through Alexander. The envoy was introduced into the council, and delivered his message. Only one voice among the councillors recommended compliance. The name of the wretched man was Lycidas;

Herodotus suspects with reason, that he had sold himself to the Persians: mere pusillanimity would scarcely have given him courage enough to defy public opinion. He paid dearly for his rashness: his colleagues heard him with indignation; the report of his false or base counsel soon spread among the multitude that surrounded the doors of the councilchamber, and he was stoned to death. Murychides was suffered to go unhurt. The Athenian women, when they heard of the crime and the punishment of Lycidas, were seized with a similar fury, but unhappily vented it against innocent objects. They rushed in a body to his house, and imitated the example of their husbands and brothers, by destroying his wife and children.¹

While the Athenians, a second time driven from their homes, were giving these proofs of their inflexible resolution, the Spartans, lately so concerned about their intentions, seemed to have wholly forgotten their danger. The news of the approach of Mardonius, instead of hastening the march of a Spartan army for the protection of Athens, only quickened the hands that were employed in fortifying the Isthmus. Cleombrotus, the brother of Leonidas, who exercised the kingly functions during the minority of Pleistarchus, son of Leonidas, had been sent with an army to superintend the work. It was not quite finished when Mardonius took possession of Athens. It seems to have been the design of the Ephors, that when the wall should have been completed, and the peninsula should thus have been

Mysterious
conduct of
the Spar-
tans.

¹ It is somewhat perplexing to find this incident related by Demosthenes (Cor. p. 296.) of one Cyrillus, whom, as it would appear from the comparison he draws, he conceived to have excited the anger of his countrymen, by opposing Themistocles the year before, when he proposed the evacuation of Attica. It can scarcely be doubted, that the orator alludes to the same occurrence which the historian describes. Perhaps the easiest solution of the difficulty would be to suppose that Lycidas had also been called Cyrillus, a name which might imply, that he had already made himself odious or contemptible by overbearing manners. See Welcker, Theognis, p. xxxiii.

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secured from all fear of a sudden attack, Cleombrotus should lead his forces against the Persians. But an eclipse of the sun, which happened while he was consulting the victims on the issue of his expedition, terrified him so that he returned home with his army; and he soon after died, leaving a son of mature age, named Pausanias, who succeeded to the guardianship of his cousin Pleistarchus. In the mean time the Athenians sent an embassy to Sparta¹, in which they were joined by Megara and Plataea, to remonstrate on the indifference and neglect with which their zeal and constancy had been requited, and to call for assistance to rid Attica of the barbarians. The ambassadors found the Spartans engaged, as if they had no more pressing business, in celebrating the great Amyclæan festival, the Hyacinthia. They laid their complaints before the Ephors: reminded them of the offers which the Athenians had received from the Persians, and which were not yet recalled; of the promises of succour which Sparta had given while she trembled for Peloponnesus, and had forgotten when she began to feel secure behind the newly-built wall. Athens, they said, was justly indignant at this desertion; yet the Spartans might still repair their fault, by promptly seeking the enemy in Attica, where they would find him in the Thriasian plain.

The Ephors deferred their answer till the morrow, and the sacred festival afforded them a pretext for protracting the delay. Perhaps it was also the principal motive of their conduct. They were unwilling to interrupt the holyday season by military preparations: the march of their troops would have begun under an unfavourable omen, and as Attica could no

¹ Plutarch, Arist. 10., adopts the account of Idomeneus, who represented Aristides himself as at the head of this embassy. But he observes that, in the decree of Aristides, Cimon, Xanthippus, and Myronides are named as the envoys.

longer be saved, they might think that nothing would be gained by breaking through their ordinary rules. The wall across the Isthmus too, though far advanced, was not yet, it appears, quite completed, when the Athenians arrived in Sparta. The return of Cleombrotus, though this is not expressly mentioned, seems to have happened during their stay there.¹ But whatever may have been the motives or intentions of the Ephors, they deemed it absolutely necessary to keep the Athenians in the dark, and preferred to run the risk of losing their alliance, rather than disclose their designs before it was time to carry them into effect. The patience of the envoys grew more and more weary as they were continually put off during ten days from morrow to morrow. The Arcadian Cheileus, who happened to be in Sparta, and to whom they probably expressed their resentment, is said to have been the person who convinced the Ephors of the imprudence of sporting with the feelings of so valuable an ally. Unless however we imagine that their plans had not before been fixed, it can scarcely be conceived that they were much affected by his counsels. It was probably not before every motive of delay had ceased, that they at last ordered Pausanias to put himself at the head of the army—5000 Spartans attended each by seven helots—which they meant to send into the field. For according to Herodotus they were so careless about the suspense in which they kept the envoys, that they prolonged it when no end could remain to be answered by it. Instead of hastening to announce to the impatient strangers that their troops were about to march, they sent Pausanias away in the night, and did not even

¹ Müller, *Prolegom.* p. 409., supposes Cleombrotus to have died the year before (B. C. 480), having led away his army soon after the eclipse which took place October 2. But the language of Herodotus, ix. 8—10., conveys a different impression, which seems to have been also Mr. Clinton's. *F. H. H.* p. 209., who fixes the death of Cleombrotus in the year B. C. 479.

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make known his departure till the next day, when the Athenians wrung the singular secret from them, by declaring that their patience was spent, and that they would forthwith return home. They at the same time threatened that Athens, since she had no hope of succour from Sparta, would throw herself into the arms of the Persians. Then the Ephors revealed the truth. *They were ready to swear that their army was already on its march; and they thought it must by this time be in Arcadia.* The envoys could scarcely believe what they heard, and when they were convinced that the Spartan gravity was capable of descending to so poor a jest, they set out in all haste to follow Pausanias. They were accompanied by a body of 5000 heavy-armed men, the flower of the provincial Lacedæmonians.

Probable
explanation
of it.

- Such is the account given of this transaction by Herodotus; but it represents the conduct of the Ephors as so capricious, and so childish, that when we consider how easily occurrences that took place at Sparta might be subsequently distorted and discoloured at Athens, we can scarcely avoid suspecting, that the real state of the case may have been less disgraceful to the Spartans than it appears according to this view of it.¹ If Cleombrotus brought his army back during the ten days that the envoys were detained, his illness and death, and the appointment of the new commander-in-chief might render so long a delay unavoidable, and the departure of Pausanias, instead of having been deferred to the last moment, may have taken place at the very first that admitted of it. Yet it may have been at last both sudden and secret; but not because it was the result of a newly-adopted policy, and still less for the sake of a paltry and most

¹ Il est difficile de dire ce qui choque le plus dans cette conduite, le vil égoïsme qu'on y remarque, ou le dédaigneux mépris, l'irrision amère qui le caractérise. V. Limburg Brouwer, *Hist. de la Civ.* liv. p. 71.

unseasonable jest. Herodotus relates a fact, which may have had some share in hastening it, and which at the same time proves that nothing was uncertain about it except the time. Argos, if the historian was correctly informed, had been solicited by Mardonius to make a diversion in his favour: perhaps he had adopted the advice of the Thebans, and had corrupted some of her leading men; publicly or privately he had received assurances, that the Argives would prevent the Spartans from sending an army against him. We do not hear how they purposed to effect this, and it may have been an empty boast; yet intelligence of such a design might reach Sparta, and quicken the movements of Pausanias. In the meanwhile the Athenians at Salamis were no doubt impatient of the delay, the cause of which they only learnt on the return of their envoys; and the rumours which must be supposed to have sprung up during this interval might easily continue afloat, even after the truth had been ascertained, and, as the jealousy between the two rival states increased, might more and more usurp the place of history.

Several reasons determined Mardonius not to await the approach of Pausanias, nor to fight a battle in Attica. The nature of the ground was unfavourable to the movements of his cavalry, the arm on which he principally relied. If defeated, he would be compelled to retreat through narrow and difficult passes, and would be in danger of losing his whole army; and should his stay be lengthened, he would find great difficulty in providing for its subsistence. He therefore resolved on falling back upon Bœotia, where he would be favoured by the nature of the country, and by the neighbourhood of a friendly city. Until the eve of his departure he had not given up all hopes of gaining over the Athenians, and he had therefore abstained from doing any damage to their

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territory, that they might be tempted by the prospect of saving their still unwasted fields and dwellings. But when the moment of retreat was come, and no end could be served by sparing them any longer, he gave the reins to havoc and plunder, ravaged the land, and consumed and destroyed whatever had been left standing of buildings, sacred or profane, in the former invasion. He had already set out on his march, when he received intelligence that a body of a thousand Spartans had pushed forward before the main army to Megara. Hoping to surprise and destroy them, he took the road toward that city, and scoured the Megarian plain with his horse. This was the farthest point to which the Persian arms were ever carried in this quarter; it was probably in this expedition that the temple of Eleusis was either first committed to the flames, or utterly wasted and ruined. News came to him before he had reached Megara, that Pausanias with all his forces had arrived at the Isthmus; and he now thought it advisable to commence his retreat without delay. He did not however take the direct road to Bœotia, but bent his way eastward, and, passing by Decelea, crossed Parnes, and came down into the lower vale of the Asopus. The object of this circuit was probably the better quarters to be found at Tanagra, where he halted for the night. The next day he crossed to the right bank of the Asopus, and pursued his march up the valley to the outlet of the defile, through which the high road from Athens to Thebes descends to the northern foot of Cithæron. Near this outlet at the roots of the mountain stood the towns of Hysiaë and Erythræ, between which the road appears to have passed. On the plain between Erythræ, the easternmost of the two, and the river, Mardonius pitched his camp. Here he expected that the enemy, entering Bœotia by the passes of Cithæron, would overtake and give him battle. He wished for

Mardonius
in Bœotia.

an early opportunity of fighting, but he was not so confident in his strength as to disdain taking precautions against the consequences of a defeat. He inclosed a space of upwards of a mile square with a rampart surmounted by a palisade, and flanked with wooden towers, to guard his treasure, and to afford a refuge, if it should be needed, from a superior enemy. While this work was proceeding, he accepted an invitation from Attaginus, who entertained him and fifty of his officers with a splendid banquet at Thebes. To show the fraternal harmony that subsisted between the Persians and their Greek allies, Attaginus at the same time invited fifty of his fellow-citizens, and arranged his guests so that there should be one of each nation on every couch. Herodotus himself afterward met with one of the Greeks who were present, and heard from him that the Persian who shared his couch had privately disclosed to him the gloomy forebodings with which he looked forward to the approaching conflict. If we may believe this anecdote, many of the Persian officers foresaw its fatal issue, and considered themselves as victims whom Mardonius had sacrificed to his desperate ambition.

All the Greeks north of the Isthmus, who owned the Persian away, had joined in the invasion of Attica, except the Phocians. They too had promised to send a reinforcement to the Persian army, but either through unavoidable delays, or aversion to the service into which they were pressed, their troops, a thousand men, did not arrive till after the return of Mardonius to Thebes. When he heard of their coming he sent some horsemen to order them to station themselves in the plain apart from the rest of the army. As soon as they had done so, the whole of the Persian cavalry rode up and began to encircle them. The Greeks, who looked on at a distance, expected forthwith to see them fall beneath the Persian javelins ;

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they themselves deemed their fate certain. Harmocydes their commander bad them prepare for the worst: their enemies the Thessalians, he said, had probably instigated the Persians to massacre them: he exhorted them to die not like a tame herd, but as brave men, who had arms in their hands, and could sell their lives dearly. They closed their ranks, and formed into a circle, and in a defensive attitude calmly awaited the threatened charge. The Persians rode up, and levelled their javelins; one or two actually hurled them, but the rest suddenly wheeled round, and rode away. Mardonius wished it to be thought that the scene was only meant to try the courage of the Phocians: he sent soon after, and applauded their dauntless spirit. The Phocians believed that it had really saved their lives.

Forces of
the Greeks.

The Spartan army on its arrival at the Isthmus was joined by the forces of all the Peloponnesian allies, and continued its march along the coast into Attica. At Eleusis it was met by an Athenian reinforcement under the command of Aristides. It then took the road across Cithæron, and coming down upon Erythræ discovered the Persians encamped on the plain near the banks of the Asopus. Near Erythræ Pausanias halted, and formed his line on the uneven ground at the foot of the mountain. His whole force, which consisted wholly of infantry, amounted to nearly 110,000 men: that number is said to have been completed by 1800 Thespians, who had survived the destruction of their city, and now accompanied the Greeks, but were without arms, and though they might tender some useful services in the camp, appear to have had no place in the field. Of the rest, 38,700 were men at arms; next to the Lacedæmonians the Athenians furnished the largest body, 8000 men; the Plataeans could only muster 600. After the Athenians Corinth raised the most considerable force: she herself armed 5000 men,

and she drew succours not only from her western colonies, Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia, but also from Potidæa, which proved its good will by sending a band of 300. Megara and Sicyon furnished each 3000; Tegea half that number; Orchomenus, which mustered 600, was the only Arcadian state that took a part in the expedition. Among the rest the greater part came from the towns of Argolis: Trœzen could raise 1000; but the united forces of Mycenæ and Tiryns amounted to no more than 400. The light-armed troops were 69,500 strong; for beside the 35,000 helots who attended the Spartans, each man at arms in the rest of the army was accompanied by one light armed; and some small bodies which came from the Lacedæmonian colony of Melos, from Ceos, and Tenos, Naxos, and Cythnus, were probably equipped in a similar manner, and hence have been omitted in the list of Herodotus, though they earned a place for their names in the monument at Olympia, which recorded the cities that shared the glory of this great contest.¹ The numbers of the Persian army more than tripled that of the Greeks: Xerxes, as we have seen, had left behind 300,000 of his best troops, and the Macedonian and Greek auxiliaries are estimated by Herodotus at 50,000 more. Plutarch has perhaps recorded an Athenian or a Platæan tradition, which was not generally current, when he relates that Aristides obtained an ambiguous oracle from Delphi, promising victory to the Athenians, if they sacrificed to the local gods, nymphs, and heroes, and if they joined battle in the plain of the Eleusinian goddesses *in their own land*. The legend ran, that while Aristides was perplexed by the terms which seemed to enjoin a retreat to Eleusis, the Platæan general Arimnestus was guided by a nocturnal vision to the discovery of an ancient temple, dedicated to the Eleusinian goddesses, which

¹ See Broendsted, *Reisen*, p. 105.

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stood near Hysiæ at the foot of Cithæron, on ground excellently suited to the purpose of protecting infantry from the attacks of a superior cavalry, and that the Plataeans by a decree ordered the landmarks which parted their country from Attica to be removed, that the Athenians might be able to fight on their own ground without recrossing Cithæron. It is added that when the Macedonian conqueror restored Plataea, he declared by a solemn proclamation at Olympia, that he thus rewarded the Plataeans for the magnanimity with which they had surrendered their territory for the service of Greece. It may have been this proclamation misunderstood, which gave occasion to that part of the story which relates to the absolute union of territory between Athens and Plataea: a fact quite inconsistent with their subsequent history.

Skirmish of
cavalry.

Mardonius, on perceiving the Greeks, waited for a time in expectation that they would descend and give him battle in the plain. At length, seeing that they did not move from their position on the rugged skirts of the mountain, he ordered his cavalry to go up and attack them. Masistius, the commander of the cavalry, was an officer of high rank, second only to Mardonius himself, and of great personal reputation. He rode up at the head of his troops, distinguished from the rest by his Nisæan charger, and by the gold that glittered in his armour and in the caparisons of his fiery steed. The Greeks were for the most part protected by the broken ground on which they were posted, but that which the Megarians occupied was more exposed, and they consequently had to bear the brunt of the charge. Troop after troop assailed them in succession, and allowed them no breathing-time; their ranks were rapidly thinned by the missiles of the enemy, and their strength and spirits began to fail. In this distress they sent to Pausanias, to beg that he would immediately detach a force for their relief, without which they could

no longer keep their station. It was a service of extraordinary difficulty and danger; and Pausanias scrupled to exercise his authority by selecting one division from the rest to engage in it; but he called upon those who were willing to earn honour, freely to undertake it. While the rest hesitated, an Athenian officer, named Olympiodorus, offered, with his battalion of 300 men and a body of archers, to cover the Megarians. He hastened to their assistance, and received the charge of the enemy with a well-directed shower of arrows. Masistius was still foremost; his horse was wounded in the side, reared, and threw its rider. The Athenians rushed forward and fell upon him before he could rise from the ground. His scaly armour¹ for a time resisted their weapons; at length he was pierced with a shaft of a javelin through the visor of his helmet. In the tumult of the charge his fall was not observed, and no attempt was made to rescue him; but when the assailants, having wheeled round and retired, discovered their loss, they spontaneously rushed forward to recover the body of their slain chief. The Greeks, seeing the Athenians exposed to the shock of this overwhelming force, moved on to their assistance. They came up as the little band had been compelled to resign the body; but they renewed the struggle, and wrested it from the Persians. After a sharp conflict the cavalry was repulsed with some slaughter, and having halted at the distance of a couple of furlongs thought it advisable to return with their mournful tidings to the camp. The whole army testified its grief at the event by funeral honours such as were paid only to the most illustrious dead. They shaved not only their own heads, but their horses and beasts of burden; and they set up a wailing, which, Herodotus says, resounded throughout all Bœotia. The Greeks, though their loss probably exceeded that of the Persians, were consoled and ani-

Defeat and
death of
Masistius.

¹ In which according to Plutarch he was cased from head to foot. Arist. 14.

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The Greeks
advance to-
ward Pla-
tæa.

mated by their final triumph, and especially by the death of an enemy whom his countrymen so deeply deplored. His body was placed in a cart, which was drawn along the lines, and the men ran out from their ranks to gaze upon the gigantic barbarian.

This success encouraged Pausanias to leave his position at the outlet of the pass, for one where his army, though more exposed to the attacks of the enemy's cavalry, would among other advantages be better supplied with water than in the neighbourhood of Erythræ. With this view he descended into the territory of Plataea. The town itself, which had not yet risen from its ruins, lay about two miles off to the west, near the foot of the mountain. The plain before it is watered by a number of small streams from the side of Cithæron; some of them feed the Asopus, which, after it has collected these and other tributaries, takes an easterly direction toward the Eubœan channel; others go to form the Oeroe, which, rising in the same elevated plain, flows through a narrow glen at the western foot of Cithæron into the gulf of Creusis (*Livadostro*). Pausanias now posted himself on the bank of a stream which Herodotus calls the Asopus, but which must be considered as only one of its tributaries running northward to join the main channel. The right wing of the army, which, as the post of honour, was occupied by the Lacedæmonians, was near a spring, called Gargaphia, from which it drew a plentiful supply of water.

Before the troops could be arrayed in the order which they were to preserve in the day of battle, the Lacedæmonians were called upon to decide a dispute between the Tegeans and the Athenians, who each claimed the left wing, the place second in honour. The Tegeans grounded their pretensions on the exploit of their ancient hero Echemus, who, they asserted, had been rewarded by the Peloponnesians for his vic-

tory over Hyllus by the privilege granted for ever to his people, of occupying one wing in all common expeditions made by the cities of the peninsula. To the Lacedæmonians they were willing to yield; but they insisted that as well ancient usage, as the valour they had shown in so many contests with the Spartans themselves, entitled them to precedence over all the other allies. The Athenians also in urging their claim did not forget their mythical glories: their defence of the Heracleids against the power of Eurystheus, the succours with which they had successfully taken up the cause of the defeated Argives against the Cadmeans, and their victory over the Amazons. They needed not however, as they truly said, to allege the exploits of their ancestors: the field of Marathon had been witness to one, equal to any in the days of yore; on this they were content to let their right rest. Yet, they added, as the juncture was one that forbad all contention, they would submit to the decision of the Spartans, and would endeavour to do honour to any post that should be assigned to them.

The spirit of Aristides seems to speak in this language; the modesty of the Athenians pleaded in their favour perhaps as much as their merit; and the Lacedæmonian army exclaimed, as one man, that they were the most worthy. Mardonius, as soon as he was apprised of the movement of the Greeks, advanced with all his forces, which he drew up on the opposite bank of the Asopus. He stationed the Persians, as his best troops, in the left wing, to face the Lacedæmonians; to the Athenians he opposed his Greek auxiliaries, whom he probably considered as the second hope of his army. The Thebans had suggested this arrangement, to which they were guided by reflecting that the Persians were new antagonists to the Spartans, while the Athenians had learnt by experience to despise them. Before these movements

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viners.

were completed, the day was too far advanced for beginning an engagement. But the next day the soothsayers in both armies sought to discover the will of the gods from the entrails of the victims. The Spartans had brought with them Tisamenus, the most celebrated diviner in Greece, sprung from a branch of the Iamids of Elis. His fame was so great, that the Spartans, when they were looking anxiously forward to the Persian war, and could not prevail on him to dedicate himself to their service on any other terms, had granted the freedom of their city both to him and to his brother Hegias. In the time of Herodotus this was the only instance in which they had ever adopted a foreigner. But the Persians too had Greek soothsayers in their camp, and endeavoured to explore the secrets of futurity by Grecian rites. One of these, Hegesistratus, was also an Elean, and of the line of the Telliads, which was likewise believed to be endowed with a hereditary prophetic virtue. He had been engaged in the service of the Persians by a high salary; but hatred, still more than avarice, impelled him to exert all his arts against the Spartans, who had once thrown him into a dungeon with the intention of putting him to death.¹ The soothsayers on both sides read similar answers in the sacrifices. Tisamenus declared that the signs were favourable to the Greeks, if they meant to remain on the defensive; but that disaster threatened them if they should cross the Asopus, and offer battle. Hegesistratus and his brother diviner, a Leucadian named Hippomachus, likewise announced, that the entrails forbade the Persians to begin the attack. The experiment was repeated day after day with the same result: the two armies remained inactive; except that the Persian

¹ He had effected his escape in a singular manner. He extricated himself from the stocks by cutting off the fore part of his foot, and in spite of the wound broke through his prison wall and made his way to Tegea, travelling by night, and spending the day in the woods. Her. ix. 37.

avalry harassed the Greeks, confined them to their encampment, and interrupted their watering parties. In other respects they were well supplied with provisions, which were brought to them from Peloponnesus over Cithæron, and they were every day receiving fresh reinforcements. Mardonius on the contrary, having taken no precautions to ensure regular supplies, was daily becoming more and more straitened in his means of subsistence. He was heartily impatient of the delay, and eager to exert his apparently superior strength.

It is undoubtedly a singular spectacle to see a Persian general, against both his inclination and his judgment, kept motionless by Greek soothsayers, the nature of whose pretensions to foreknowledge he can scarcely have understood. Yet there was nothing in the difference between the religion of Greece and of Persia to prevent him from admitting their prophetic art or faculty, and the mission he sent to the Bœotian oracles shows a great proneness to adopt Greek superstitions. Hegesistratus only filled the place of the Magians, who appear to have accompanied the court, and to have left the army with Xerxes. But it cannot easily be imagined that the coincidence between the declarations of the soothsayers was the effect of chance. Tisamenus probably expressed the judgment and the wishes of most of the commanders in the Greek army, when he enjoined it to remain on the defensive. And it is not very likely that his rival trusted entirely to the rules of his art for the satisfaction of the revenge with which he burned against Sparta. Mardonius himself perhaps had not learnt how to wield these religious instruments; but the Thebans were more conversant with them, and since the warning of the soothsayers exactly coincided with their advice, we may with some confidence attribute it to their direction. They

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had from the first been averse to running the risk of a battle, and probably hoped that by delaying it they might prevent it altogether. Plutarch relates an occurrence which, though Herodotus does not mention it, seems credible enough, especially when it is coupled with the policy which the Thebans had recommended to Mardonius. He says that some Athenians of high birth, whose fortunes had been ruined by the war, had formed a conspiracy to subvert the constitution: that they held secret meetings in a house at Plataea, and had drawn many into their scheme, when Aristides discovered it, and quietly suppressed it, by compelling two of the leaders to quit the camp, and intimating to the rest, that the suspicions they had incurred might still be effaced by their services in the field. It was by such engines that the Thebans hoped to undermine the Greek cause.

The two armies had been eight days facing each other on the banks of the Asopus, during which the Greeks were continually strengthened by the influx of fresh troops, before it came into the mind of Mardonius or his counsellors to watch the passes, and to intercept the reinforcements and supplies that had hitherto been pouring through them into the enemy's camp. It was Timagenidas, a Theban, who suggested this thought, and the event immediately proved the prudence of his advice. The cavalry sent to guard the outlet of the defile under cover of night surprised a convoy of provisions with 500 beasts of burden. They fell upon their prey with such fury as even to slaughter many of the cattle: the rest were brought into the Persian camp. This little success however did not soothe the impatience of Mardonius; he perceived that the enemy was daily gaining strength, and when at the end of ten days the signs of the victims continued still unpropitious, he re-

olved to be no longer governed by them. He secretly disclosed his intentions to Artabazus; but Artabazus, unless he only afterward claimed the credit of superior foresight when no one could contradict him, had adopted the views of the Thebans, and strenuously advised Mardonius to avoid a battle, to fall back upon Thebes, where magazines had been formed for the army, and to scatter his gold with an unparing hand among the leading men in the Greek cities. Mardonius however was too confident in his prospect of victory, and of too impetuous a temper, to embrace this tardy course, and adhered to his purpose. Wishing nevertheless to counteract the impression that might be produced in the minds of his Greek allies, and perhaps of the Persians, by his neglect of prognostics which were universally deemed infallible, he summoned a council of the principal officers of both nations, and endeavoured to convince them that fate was on his side. Among the numerous prophecies that were current at this period, was one which spoke of the destruction of a foreign army that should invade Greece, and plunder the temple of Delphi. Herodotus believed that the prediction referred to the irruption of an Illyrian horde, the Encheleans, who, as we learn from this accidental mention of them, had in very early times carried their ravages so far. But as this tradition was almost forgotten, the prophecy was generally applied to the Persians. Mardonius, with some dexterity, though not without violence, strained it into an assurance, that the Persians would be invincible so long as they abstained from spoiling the sanctuary at Delphi; and since they neither had perpetrated nor any longer meditated the sacrilege, he bad his hearers dismiss all religious scruples, and cheerfully prepare for the battle which he had determined to give the next day.

In the dead of the following night a horseman pre-

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sented himself at the outposts of the Athenians, and desired to speak with the generals. When called to him by the sentinels, they found Alexander of Macedon. He said that he was come at the risk of his life, to give them a friendly warning, and begged that they would reveal it to none but Pausanias. He then informed them that Mardonius, notwithstanding the threatening aspect of the victims, designed to attack them on the morrow. Should however the engagement be delayed, he exhorted them to keep their ground, since the Persian army had only a few days provisions left, and would soon be compelled to retire. Then after praying them to remember his good will, if the cause of Greece triumphed, he rode away.

On receiving this intelligence Pausanias put into execution a purpose, which he had probably conceived some time before. He requested the Athenian commanders to exchange their position for that of the Spartans, where they would be opposed to the Persians, whose mode of fighting was familiar to them. The Athenians, or perhaps more properly Aristides, expressed the greatest readiness to comply with his wishes. The necessary movements were performed in the night; and when the morning came, Mardonius was apprised of the change. He immediately altered his own dispositions to meet it, and transferred the Persians to his right wing, where they again faced the Spartans. Pausanias, finding his design thwarted, brought the Spartans back to the right, and both armies resumed their original order. Mardonius was elated with what he considered a confession of fear in the Spartans, and he sent a herald to taunt them with their faintheartedness. *He had expected, the messenger said, from their reputation among the Greeks, that instead of shrinking from measuring their strength with the Persians, they would have challenged them to decide the contest by a separate com-*

bat; and the Persians on their part were willing to rest their cause on the issue of a battle with the Spartans alone. The Spartan gravity was not to be ruffled by this empty insult. But Mardonius, taking their calmness for cowardice, ordered his cavalry to charge them. The attack was so vigorously made that the assailants got possession of the Gargaphian spring, which they choked up, and rendered useless. This was an irreparable loss to the Greeks; for as they were prevented by the enemy's horse from fetching water from the Asopus, they depended on the fountain for their whole supply. It became evident that they could not remain a day longer in the same position; and beside the want of water they were in danger of suffering from scarcity of provisions; for the pass of Cithæron was closely watched by a detachment of the Persian cavalry, and a supply which was on its way from Peloponnesus was unable to reach them. As the enemy made no signs of beginning a general engagement, the principal commanders assembled to deliberate on their future movements. It was resolved, if battle should not be joined in the course of the day, to retire during the following night to a part of the plain nearer Plataea, which being almost surrounded by two branches of the Oeroe, was known by the name of the Island, and that on their arrival at this post a strong detachment should be sent to clear the pass, and convoy the supply that was detained on the mountain into the camp.

Skirmish at
Gargaphia.

Mardonius did not follow up the attack of his cavalry, which continued throughout the day to gall the Greeks with their missiles. When night came the greater part of the allied generals, according to the resolution that had been adopted in the council of the morning, began to move off. But instead of taking up the position that had been agreed on, they

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retus.

marched to Plataea, and posted themselves near a temple of Heré, which was close to the town. Their object in thus deviating from the preconcerted plan was perhaps to take advantage of such shelter as the remains of the city might afford for their wounded men. In the mean while Pausanias was detained by an unexpected impediment. One of his officers, named Amompharetus, conceived that the movement ordered by Pausanias was a disgraceful flight, by which the honour of Sparta was sullied: he had not been present at the previous deliberation, and now thinking the obedience due to his commander subordinate to the higher duty he owed to the laws of his country, which forbade him to fly from an enemy, he refused to set his division in motion. What was the amount of the force under his command we do not know: we are the less able to judge of it from the account of Herodotus, because he describes it by a term which Thucydides condemns as inaccurate: but it may most probably be considered as one of the bodies, six of which composed an ordinary Spartan army. It was too considerable to allow Pausanias to leave it exposed to the danger of being overwhelmed by the Persian host; and no arguments could bend the stubbornness of Amompharetus: Pausanias and his colleague both urged him in vain. In the mean time the Athenians, distrusting, Herodotus says, the intentions of the Spartans, sent a horseman to inquire whether they had given up the design of retreating, and how they themselves were to act. The messenger found the Spartan generals in the heat of their dispute; and Amompharetus, probably a man of few words, taking up a large stone with both hands, flung it down at the feet of Pausanias: *There*, he cried, *is my vote against flying before the strangers*. Pausanias called him a madman, and sent orders to the Athenian commanders, to bring up their forces, and follow the

movements of the Spartans. Day began to break, and still the intractable man would not yield. Pausanias, thinking that his obstinacy might give way when he saw himself abandoned to inevitable destruction, now moved forward with the rest of his Lacedæmonian forces and the Tegeans along the skirts of Cithæron. At about the distance of a mile however he halted again, to give Amompharetus time for better thoughts, and to have it still in his power to succour him, if his rashness should, as seemed likely, involve him in urgent danger. Amompharetus however did at last think better when he saw himself left alone with the men whom he was about to sacrifice to his point of honour, and reluctantly led them at a slow pace after the main body. They had scarcely overtaken it before the Persian cavalry, having discovered the retreat of the Greek army, came up, and began to infest them as on the day before.

Mardonius, when he heard that the Greeks had decamped during the night, asked his Thessalian friends, what they now thought of the boasted valour of the Spartans, and declared that Xerxes should hear from him of the cowardly counsel of Artabazus, who had advised retreating before such men. Without further delay he crossed the Asopus, and pursued the track of his cavalry, to fall upon the Lacedæmonians, whose force, together with the Tegeans and forty thousand light troops, amounted to upwards of fifty thousand men. The Athenians were out of sight, separated from them by some low ridges, the last spur which the mountain throws out into the plain. Pausanias, when he found himself pressed by the Persian cavalry, despatched a horseman to desire them to come to his assistance, or, if they were unable, to send their bowmen. But the approach of the enemy's Greek auxiliaries prevented them from obeying his call. While Pausanias was preparing to sustain the

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attack of the Persians, the soothsayer was busy in examining the victims. Their signs were still adverse, and the Spartan general ordered his men to seat themselves on the ground, holding their long shields before them, and in that posture to wait till the gods should vouchsafe to give the signal for battle. It was long delayed. The Persians advanced within bowshot, and then closing their wicker shields, and fixing them in the ground, so as to form a kind of breastwork before them, began to ply the Spartans with their arrows. Not a man stirred; many were wounded, and among the rest Callicrates, distinguished as the most beautiful person in the Grecian army, died, lamenting only that he had not been able to raise his arm in the service of his country.

Battle of
Plataea.

In this distress Pausanias, turning toward the quarter where the Plataean temple of Heré stood, implored aloud the aid of the goddess. The prayer had no sooner been uttered, than the soothsayer announced that the last sacrifice showed favourable tokens. The next instant the Spartans sprang up and advanced upon the Persians. Their slight fence did not long resist the shock of the Dorian phalanx, and they soon found themselves engaged in close combat with unequal weapons and armour. Their short spears and daggers were as ill fitted to make an impression on the Spartan panoply, as their light corslets to repel the Spartan lance. Yet they fought bravely, though without method and order: they rushed forward, singly or in irregular groups, and endeavoured to seize and break the enemy's lances. Mardonius himself, with the thousand horse whom he had selected from the royal guards, was foremost in the fight. He was conspicuous by his white charger, as well as by the splendour of his arms; but while the issue of the conflict was still doubtful, he received a mortal wound from a Spartan, named Aeimnestus,

and his fall decided the fate of the day. The Persians immediately began to give way, and their example was followed by all the other barbarians. The rout soon became general, and the fugitives made for the camp as their nearest and surest refuge. Artabazus alone took a different course. Discontented with Mardonius, or foreboding the event, he had lingered behind with his division of forty thousand men. As he came up to the field of battle, he met the flying multitude, and finding that all was lost, took the road to Phocis, with the design of making his way by forced marches to the Hellespont. The Greek auxiliaries of the Persians, as soon as they perceived their defeat, dispersed for the most part willingly and without a blow; only the Bœotians, urged by the Theban traitors, maintained for some time a sharp conflict with the Athenians. They were at length put to flight, leaving three hundred of their number on the field, and sought shelter behind the walls of Thebes. With these exceptions the whole barbarian army threw itself into the fortified camp, barred the gates, manned the towers, and the walls, and prepared as well as they could to sustain the attack of the conquerors.

The combat had lasted so short a time that the Greeks posted at Plataea, though they were at less than half an hour's distance from the scene of action, and on hearing of the battle hastened to the assistance of their countrymen, only arrived in time to join in the pursuit of the Persians. But the Megarians and Phliasians, who, instead of returning along the skirts of the mountain, marched across the plain, were perceived by the Theban cavalry, which suddenly fell upon them, cut to pieces six hundred, and drove them into the hills. It now only remained to complete the victory by storming the camp, and thus to deliver Greece at one blow from the presence of the barbarians.

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of the Per-
sians.

The Lacedæmonians had followed close upon the heels of the Persians, and attempted to scale the rampart, but, unaccustomed to sieges, they were baffled by the rude fortifications, and by the desperate resistance they encountered. At length the face of the contest was changed by the arrival of the Athenians, who hastened up as soon as they had put the Thebans to flight. Though their experience in the attack of fortified places was perhaps not greater than that of the Spartans, they could more readily adapt themselves to a new situation. They were the first to mount the wall, and forcing away the wooden defences opened a breach by which their allies poured in. After this the barbarians lost all hope, courage, and self-possession, and, like sheep crowded in a narrow fold, submitted without a struggle to the slaughter. The rage of the Greeks, inflamed by their recent danger, and by the remembrance of their heroes who had been overwhelmed by the numbers which it now only cost them labour to destroy, could not sate itself with blood. Out of the whole multitude only three thousand are said to have escaped the carnage: not therefore through either the mercy or the weariness of the victors. The treasure found in the camp was immense: the furniture of the tents glittered with gold and silver, and vessels of the same metals were seen scattered about for ordinary use, and piled up in waggons. Xerxes, when he set out on his hasty retreat, had left, it was said, all the superfluous ornaments of his equipage in the possession of Mardonius. Even the manger of his horses was of brass, and curiously wrought. It fell into the hands of the Tegeans, who were the first to enter through the breach made by the Athenians, and were permitted to carry away this prize to adorn their temple of Athené Alea. The splendid armour of the slain, the collars and bracelets, with which the Persians in

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particular adorned their persons, were countless and inestimable. Pausanias ordered the helots to collect the whole of the spoil, that gods and men might receive their due. Much, as might be expected, was concealed by the serfs intrusted with this task, and the great wealth of several families in Ægina was commonly attributed to the gains they had made, in purchasing the embezzled treasures, from men who were ignorant of their value, so as even to sell gold for brass, and were glad to get rid of them at any price. According to a tradition which conveys in another form the same lesson that Xerxes was said to have received from Demaratus, Pausanias, when he entered the tent of Mardonius, and saw the rich hangings, the soft carpets, the couches and tables shining with gold and silver, ordered the Persian slaves to prepare a banquet such as they were used to set out for their master. When it was spread, he bad his helots set by its side the simple fare of his own ordinary meal, and then invited the Greek officers to mark the folly of the barbarian, who, with such instruments of luxury at his command, had come to rob the Greeks of their scanty store. Demaratus perhaps would have desired them to observe the precarious tenure by which riches are held, when they are not guarded by wisdom and valour.

A portion of the spoil, nominally a tenth, was set apart for the Delphic god: it was formed into a golden tripod, supported by a three-headed brazen serpent: an offering which outlasted not only the temple in which it was placed, and the worship of the god to whom it was dedicated, but the liberty of Greece, and the power which crushed it. Another portion adorned the national sanctuary at Olympia with a colossal statue of Jupiter, on the base of which were inscribed the names of the cities which had shared the glory of the contest; a third was con-

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secrated in a similar form to Poseidon on the Isthmus. A sum of eighty talents was reserved to be employed by the Plataeans in building a temple of Athené, which was adorned with pictures, of which Plutarch speaks as retaining all their freshness in his day after a lapse of six hundred years. This was undoubtedly an act of piety, and not, as Plutarch represents it, a contrivance for settling a dispute which he says arose between the Spartans and the Athenians about the palm of merit. The next care, after paying the debt of gratitude to the gods, was to reward or honour the valour of those who had fought and bled in the cause. The foremost place was assigned by general consent to the Lacedæmonians; and it was perhaps more as a national than a personal distinction, that a magnificent present was selected for Pausanias, consisting of ten samples of every thing that was most valuable in the booty. The man who was most conspicuous among the Spartans for his dauntless and reckless bravery, was the Aristodemus who since the day of Thermopylæ had dragged on a dishonoured existence, in the hope of ending it in some glorious field; he found what he wished at Plataea. Yet the Spartans justly refused to award the palm to him, and looked rather at the cause from which he sought death, than at the courage with which he met it; no honours were paid to his memory, as to those of their other heroes. They raised three barrows over their dead: one for the officers¹, among whom we read the name of Amompharetus: the rest of the Spartans were buried under another, and the helots under the

Honours
paid to the
dead.

¹ This seems to be the meaning of Her. ix. 85., if we adopt the reading *εἰρέες* for *ἰπέες*, which manifestly cannot stand. But in this case the term *ἰρήν* or *εἰρήν* is here employed in a very different sense from that described by Plut. Lyc. 17., where it must be observed that the words *οὗτος δ' εἰρήν ἄρχει τῶν ὑποταγμένων ἐν ταῖς μάχαις*, refer not, as Manso (*Sparta*, i. p. 344.) understood them, to real battles, but to the exercises of the youths. If *ἰρέες* is the true reading, it must be supposed that *εἰρήν* was the name given not to all the youths past twenty, but only to those who commanded the rest. This might be a regular step to rank in the army. But all this is very uncertain, and there seems to be less difficulty in the conjecture *ἰνέες*.

third: similar barrows marked the common graves in which the other cities collected their slain. It was not however every city, of those which earned a place for their names on the pedestal at Olympia, that could lay claim to a monument of this kind at Plataea. Many had lost no lives, or only in the skirmishes that preceded the decisive conflict. Yet, as the absence of their troops from the battle was involuntary, as all had borne a part in the danger, in the toil, in the purpose, which it fell to the lot of a few to effect, they cannot be justly charged with vanity, or falsehood, if, as Herodotus asserts, they raised some cenotaphs by the side of the sepulchres of their more fortunate allies. How dearly such honours were prized, we see from the example of Elis and Mantinea. They had sent each a body of troops to Plataea, but the reinforcements did not arrive till the battle had been fought. The Mantineans bitterly lamented their misfortune, and with great justice reproached themselves for their delay. To make what amends they could for it, they instantly set off in pursuit of Artabazus, and followed his traces as far as Thessaly, but without effect. Artabazus reached Asia in safety, though a part of his army perished by hunger, and by the attacks of the Thracian tribes on the road. It seems that Alexander of Macedon also fell upon his allies in their retreat, and that he was rewarded either for this or his former services by the Athenian franchise.¹ Artabazus would probably have had still greater dangers to encounter, if he had not prudently suppressed the news of the defeat, and spread the belief that Mardonius was on his march to the north. Both the Mantineans and the Eleans on their return home banished the general they had sent on the expedition, to whose tardiness they imputed their disappointment. At a short distance from the road at

¹ Demosth. Aristocr. p. 687., probably by a lapse of memory, names Perdiccas.

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the outlet of the defile near Erythræ, stood a monument, which, in later times, was commonly believed to cover the remains of Mardonius.¹ It was certain that on the day after the battle some friendly hands had removed his corpse, and many claimed the merit of the service from his son. An officious Æginetan had urged Pausanias to revenge the mutilation of Leonidas, by impaling the dead body of Mardonius. But Pausanias rejected the barbarous counsel with the abhorrence it deserved: victims enough, he said, had fallen, to appease the shades of Leonidas and the heroes of Thermopylæ.

Thus was Greece completely and finally delivered from her Persian invader, within a few hours after she had been brought nearer to the verge of destruction than ever before since she became a nation. In the two great conflicts that preceded this, though ordinary minds might feel doubt and even despondency as to the issue, there were signs that enabled the great men who were at the head of affairs, to foresee almost with certainty the triumphs they were to gain. And hence the victories of Marathon and Salamis are intimately associated with the names of Miltiades and Themistocles. At Platæa the result depended on a variety of causes, the operation of which it was impossible to calculate, and it is difficult to determine the degree of praise that belongs to any of the men who filled the leading stations, and contributed to decide the event of the struggle. Whether Pausanias committed any considerable faults as a general, is a question still more open to controversy than similar cases in modern warfare. But at least it seems clear, that he followed, and did not direct or control, events, and that he was for a time on the brink of ruin, from which he was delivered more by the rashness of the enemy, than by his own prudence. Had Mardonius abstained from a

¹ Paus. ix. 2. 1.

general engagement, and confined himself to harassing and starving the Greeks, as his cavalry enabled him to do, the war would perhaps have been brought to an opposite, certainly not to a similar termination. In the critical moment however Pausanias displayed the firmness, and if, as appears manifest, the sooth-sayer was his instrument, the ability of a commander equal to the juncture. It is even more doubtful what share in the military events may have belonged to Aristides, whose name is as rarely mentioned by Herodotus, as it is prominent in the description his biographer gives of the same occurrences. Yet we can scarcely be mistaken in referring the extraordinary moderation, good temper, and chastened ardour, which render the conduct of the Athenians so admirable in the scenes before the battle, to the authority and influence of Aristides. But perhaps his magnanimity and the Spartan commander's presence of mind, were not more necessary for the final success, than the sanguine temperament of Mardonius and the perverse pride of Amompharetus.

Before the army broke up from the field of victory, the commanders, among whom we may believe with Plutarch that Aristides was foremost, took advantage of the prevailing temper, to make some provision for the preservation of union among the allies, and for directing their forces against the common enemy. With the sanction of the Delphic oracle they erected an altar to the father of the gods under the title of the Deliverer¹; but before they offered the first sacrifice on it, they were directed to extinguish all the fires in the country, as polluted by the presence of the barbarians, and to light them anew from the national hearth at Delphi. A Plataean named Euchidas ran from the camp to Delphi, a distance of more than sixty miles, and returned the same day with the sacred fire, but had scarcely deli-

¹ Ζεὺς Ἐλευθέριος.

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Feast of Liberty.

vered it before he dropped down dead. He was buried within the sacred precincts of Artemis Euclea, and an inscription recorded his feat.¹ After this an assembly was held in which, on the motion of Aristides, it was decreed that deputies should be sent from all the states of Greece every year to Platæa, for the purpose of political consultations, as well as to celebrate the anniversary of the battle with sacred rites²; and that every fifth year, a festival, to be called the feast of Liberty³, should be solemnised at Platæa. The allies were to keep up an army of 10,000 men at arms, and 1000 cavalry, and a fleet of 100 galleys, to prosecute the war against the barbarians. The Platæans were declared sacred and inviolable, so long as they offered the sacrifices which were now instituted on behalf of Greece. They in return undertook to honour the defenders of Greece who were buried in their land with yearly ceremonies, which were still observed in the time of Plutarch, who has left a minute description of them. A martial procession marched at break of day to the sound of the trumpet through the midst of the city, followed by waggons full of myrtle boughs and chaplets, by the victim, a black bull, and by free youths — no slave was permitted to minister on this occasion — bearing the vessels which contained the libations for the dead. Last of all the archon, who was not allowed at any other time during his year of office to touch a weapon, or to wear any but white apparel, now, in a purple tunic and with a sword in his hand, bore an urn kept for this solemnity in the public archives. When the procession reached the burial ground, he first washed and anointed the tombstones, and then sacrificed the victim⁴, and poured a

¹ Εὐχίδας Πυθῶδε θρῆξας ἦλθε τῷδ' αὐθήμερον. Plut. Arist. 20.² Πρόβουλοι καὶ δεσποί.³ Ἐλευθέρια.⁴ It is a little strange that Plutarch, who gives so detailed a description of this ceremony, should have omitted one of the very few features which Thucydides (iii. 58.) expressly notices — the dresses which once formed a part of the offerings. If,

libation, and, after having prayed to the gods of the lower world, solemnly invited the brave men who had fallen in defence of their country to share the banquet which her gratitude had provided for them. So little could the Greeks be in the midst of their greatness.

No enemy now remained in the field to call for the further stay of the allies in Bœotia; but the honour of Greece required that they should not withdraw before they had punished the Thebans, who had not merely submitted to the barbarian, but had zealously lent their aid to enslave their country. According to the strict construction of the oath which had been taken the year before at the Isthmus, the offending city should have been compelled to dedicate a tenth of all it possessed to the Delphic god. It was known however that it had been forced into the part it acted by the power of a small faction, seconded by the arms of the Persians, and that it was a reluctant instrument in their hands. Justice and prudence therefore prescribed, that the vengeance should fall on the guilty few. Ten days after the battle the allied army appeared before the walls of Thebes, and demanded the surrender of the traitors, and especially of Timagenidas and Attaginus. Their influence however was still great enough to prevail on their fellow-citizens to resist the demand, and to sustain a siege, though the confederates had declared their purpose never to retire till they had extorted compliance. For twenty days they blockaded the town, and ravaged its territory. Then the party which had brought this evil upon Thebes, either perceiving that they could no longer hold out, or hoping to elude punishment, consented to be delivered up. Attaginus however made his escape; his children and his adherents were put into the hands of the besiegers. Pausanias spared and dis-

Punishment
of the The-
bans.

according to Dr. Arnold's very probable conjecture, they were consumed, we may suppose that they used to be heaped on the pile mentioned by Plutarch, at which the victim was sacrificed. Perhaps in Plutarch's time poverty had induced the Platæans to drop this part of the ceremony.

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missed the family of the offender, which had not shared his guilt. His accomplices had expected to be brought to a regular trial before the commanders of the allied army, and had relied on the power of gold to secure a majority among their judges. But Pausanias, foreseeing this danger, frustrated their hopes by an arbitrary step, the first indication that appears of his imperious character: he dismissed the forces of his allies, and carried his prisoners to Corinth, where he put them to death, it seems, without any form of trial.

Movements
of the
Greek fleet.

On the same day that the victory at Plataea put an end to the undertakings of the Persians for the conquest of Greece, they suffered the first signal blow that the Greeks struck at their power on their own continent. The fleet under Leotychides was still stationed at Delos, watching from a distance the movements of the Persian fleet, but much more anxious about the proceedings of the two armies, which were known to be on the eve of a momentous struggle. During this interval of suspense three envoys arrived to lay before Leotychides the wishes of a strong party in Samos, who were desirous of shaking off the yoke of Persia, and at the same time that of their tyrant Theomestor, who had been rewarded for the zeal and courage he had shown in the service of the invaders in the battle of Salamis, with the supreme power in his native country. The chief spokesman among the Samians was Hegesistratus, a man of ready eloquence, who endeavoured to convince the Spartan king that he had only to show himself on the coast of Ionia, to excite the Ionians to a general insurrection; that the Persians either would not wait for his approach, or would fall a rich and easy prey to his arms; finally he said that himself and his colleagues were willing to abide the event of the enterprise, as hostages, on board the allied fleet.

It was only some weeks before, that Leotychides, as we have seen, had received and rejected a similar proposal from Chios, which like this was made by a few individuals who professed to represent the wishes of the whole nation, but who might be suspected of being induced by their private passions and interests. Yet now the Spartan king was strongly inclined to listen to the call. His former doubts and fears had probably in great degree subsided during his stay at Delos. He may in that interval have gained more information as to the spirit prevailing in Ionia, and the strength of the Persians ; a new summons from another quarter was in itself an argument that both were grounded on reasonable prospect of success ; he had besides been long enough in the same station to grow tired of inaction. Whatever was his motive, he did not long resist the suit of the Samians, and in his present mood the name of Hegesistratus (*leader of armies*) struck him as so happy an omen, that he affected to ground his compliance upon it, and when the other envoys turned home he kept Hegesistratus with him. The sacrifices too, conducted by a soothsayer who claimed hereditary gift of divination, seconded the inclination of the commander. Thus encouraged he set sail for Samos.

On arriving there he found one part of the prediction of the envoys fulfilled. The Persian admirals did not venture to meet him on the sea, and at his approach went away the Phœnician squadron, and with the remainder of the fleet sailed across to the main land, to seek the protection of the land force, which was stationed, under the command of Tigranes, on the coast, at the foot of the mountains that end in the promontory of Mycalè, opposite the southern extremity of Samos. His army was sixty thousand strong ; it had been left by Xerxes, when he began his expedition, for the security of Ionia ; he himself was still at Sardis. The

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at Mycalè.

ships were drawn up on the beach at the foot of the mountain, and inclosed within a wall hastily constructed of stones and timber. The army was posted on the shore in front of it. The Greeks were at first confounded by the retreat of the enemy, and by the new position he had taken, and debated for a time whether they should return to Delos or make for the Hellespont. At length however they resolved not to give way to the unexpected obstacle, but to cross over to Mycalè, and offer battle. When they came near the shore, Leotychides repeated the stratagem which Themistocles had used on the retreat from Artemisium for a similar purpose. When his galley was within hearing of the Persian troops, he addressed a proclamation by the voice of a herald to the Ionians, in which he exhorted them in the approaching battle to remember first the liberty of their country, and next the watchword which he gave them. All who heard him he desired to convey the same summons to the absent. This contrivance succeeded in the principal object: the Persians believed that a plan of desertion and revolt had been already formed among the Ionians, to be carried into execution at the first favourable opportunity, and that they had just received the signal. When therefore Leotychides, finding that the enemy had no intention of coming to an engagement at sea, landed his men to attack them on the shore, they disarmed the Samians, who were most strongly suspected of disaffection, and removed the Milesians from the camp, under the pretext of posting them on the top of Mycalè to guard the passes. The Persians were drawn up at the foot of the mountain behind the breastwork, which, according to their usual practice, they formed with their serried shields.

As the Greeks approached, a herald's staff was found lying on the beach. Whether it had been purposely placed there, whether it suggested or only appeared to

confirm a rumour for which all minds were ripe, must be left to conjecture. But at this critical moment a report flew through the Grecian ranks, that their countrymen had gained a victory over Mardonius in Bœotia. Nothing could be more natural than such a rumour, whether it be considered as the effect of accident or design; that it should afterward have been found to coincide with the truth, is one of those marvels which would be intolerable in a fictitious narrative, and yet now and then occur in the real course of events. Being believed however without any reason, it was much more efficacious in raising the confidence and courage of the Greeks, than if it had been transmitted through any ordinary channel on the strongest evidence. For now the favour of the gods seemed visible not only in the substance but in the manner of the tidings. Cheered with the assurance that Greece was already delivered, they advanced to combat, not any longer for safety and a home, but for the mastery of the islands and the Hellespont.

The Athenians who occupied one wing, with the troops of Corinth, Sicyon, and Trœzen, which were drawn up next to them, composing about half of the army, having only even ground between them and the enemy, came up first, and immediately began the attack, certain of victory, and only eager that it should be entirely their own. The Spartans in the other wing, and the rest of the forces, were parted from the scene of action by the bed of a torrent, and by a spur of the mountain, which compelled them to make a longer circuit and retarded their march. Before they had arrived, the Athenian wing had forced the slight barrier on which the Persians chiefly relied for protection, and at length drove their antagonists, and probably a still greater number who were never engaged, to take refuge in the inclosure that contained their ships. They themselves entered with the fugi-

Battle of
Mycalè.

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tives, and the greater part of the barbarians, without any attempt at further resistance, betook themselves to the passes of the mountains which were guarded by the Milesians. The Persians however, on reaching the camp, made a stand against their pursuers, as they came in small bodies, and maintained the contest even after the loss of their general Tigranes and of one of the admirals. The arrival of the Spartans decided the conflict, and put them to a total rout. In the mean while the disarmed Samians, as soon as they saw the battle begin to turn, had lent all the assistance they could to the Greeks, and the other Ionians soon followed their example, and fell upon the Persians. Even of those who escaped from the carnage into the mountain a part were betrayed by the Milesians, who, instead of guiding them to the summit, led them into tracks which brought them upon the enemy, and themselves joined in destroying them. Only a small remnant gained the heights in safety, where they remained till the Greeks had retired, and then made for Sardis. The Greeks, after having collected the booty, and burnt the ships and the palisade, returned to Samos.

Here they held a council on the plan to be adopted for the protection of the Ionians, if they should be induced to engage in a general revolt. As long as a Greek fleet commanded the Ægean, the islanders were safe; but the Ionian cities on the continent could not be permanently secured against the power of Persia, without the constant presence of a Greek force. The Peloponnesian commanders therefore proposed, that the Ionians who prized independence above every other good, should quit their country, and that the Greeks who had taken part with the barbarian should be compelled to resign their maritime regions to them. But the Athenians vehemently opposed this project, and denied the right of the Peloponnesians to inter-

fere in the management of their colonies. Their allies readily dropped the scheme, which perhaps they had scarcely meditated in earnest, and it was agreed that the continental Ionians should be left to make the best terms they could with the Persians, but that Chios, Lesbos, Samos, and the other islands of the Ægean should be solemnly admitted into the Greek confederacy, and should bind themselves never to abandon it. When this question had been settled, the fleet steered its course to the Hellespont, where the bridges were supposed to be still standing. When it was found that they were already removed, Leoty-chides and the Peloponnesians, conceiving that every object of their expedition had been attained, proposed to sail away home; Xanthippus and the Athenians wished to remain, and make an attempt to recover the ancient dominion of Miltiades in the Chersonesus. This was a conquest in which their allies took no interest, and they left the Athenians to accomplish it as they could by themselves.

Xanthippus immediately laid siege to Sestus, the strongest place of the whole peninsula, where many Persians from the neighbouring towns, on hearing of the approach of the Grecian fleet, had sought refuge. The governor, a Persian named Artayctes, had abused his power, which extended over the whole Chersonesus, by wanton acts of tyrannical insolence. One above all provoked the indignation of the Greeks under his government. The town of Elæus on the south-east coast of the Chersonesus boasted of possessing the grave of the hero Protesilaus, who had fallen by the hand of Hector, as he leaped, the first of all the host of Agamemnon, on the Trojan shore. He was honoured at Elæus with a tract of consecrated ground, and a temple which had been gradually enriched with costly offerings. Its wealth tempted the cupidity of Artayctes, and when Xerxes passed

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Sestus.

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through Sestus on his march toward Greece, he prayed the king to grant him the house of a Greek who had invaded his dominions, and, having met with the death he deserved, was buried in the neighbourhood. Xerxes, not suspecting what he was giving away, granted the suit. Artajctes not only spoiled the temple of its treasures, but ploughed and sowed the sacred inclosure, and even studiously profaned the sanctuary, by selecting it for the scene of his grossest debauchery. He was now surprised by the arrival of the Athenian fleet, before he had made any preparations for sustaining a siege, which he had so little reason to expect. The fortifications indeed were strong enough to resist all the attacks of the besiegers; and as the autumn was advancing they began to grow impatient of their lengthened absence from home, and importuned their commanders to lead them back to Attica. But Xanthippus and his colleagues refused to abandon the undertaking without orders, and the blockade was continued throughout the winter; the stores of the besieged were the sooner exhausted, as their numbers had received an extraordinary addition; and when the spring came, famine began to make ravages among them: the scarcity became such that they were driven to boil and eat the leathern stays of their bedding. In this extremity Artajctes and another Persian of high rank named Œobazus, with the greater part of their countrymen, attempted to make their escape, and they succeeded in passing through the Athenian lines in the night-time. The next morning, as soon as their flight was discovered, the Greek inhabitants of the town opened their gates to the besiegers. The fugitives were closely pursued. Œobazus however, who had left the city soonest, found his way out of the Chersonesus; but only to fall into the hands of the wild Absinthians, who sacrificed him to one of their gods. Artajctes

was doomed to perhaps a still more cruel fate. He was overtaken with his son, and brought to Xanthippus; he had forfeited all claim to mercy; but he attempted to purchase his life. He offered a hundred talents as amends to the hero for his sacrilege, and two hundred more as ransom for himself and his son to the Athenians. But the people of Elæus would accept no atonement but the last punishment of the offender, and Xanthippus abandoned him to their vengeance. It was inflicted in a form borrowed from Persian manners: he was nailed to a cross, and his son was stoned to death before his eyes. After this conquest the Athenian fleet sailed away home, carrying with it, among other treasures, the remains of the cables that had been employed in the bridges, the chains of the now delivered Hellespont, to be dedicated in the temples of the Attic gods.

When the Athenians returned to their country they found a wasted land, and a city which, with the exception of a few houses that had been occupied by the principal Persians, was a heap of ruins. The public coffers were drained by the war, and though the spoil may have enriched some individuals, that part of it which fell to the share of the state was mostly consecrated to the gods. Thus Athens might seem to be reduced to the lowest stage of poverty and weakness. But in reality her strength had never before been so great, and time only was wanting first to call it into action, and then to clothe it with beauty and splendour. In the drama in which Æschylus, a few years after the battle of Salamis, revived the image of that glorious day, the mother of Xerxes, on hearing of her son's defeat, asks whether Athens has not been laid 'waste? We can understand, but an Athenian audience alone could feel the force of the messenger's reply: *While the men remain, it has an impregnable rampart.* The Athenians had proved how well they

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understood, that their city was made for ~~them~~, not they for the city; and having twice sacrificed it to liberty, they were now about to show what liberty could make of it.

The restoration of the private dwellings was left to their owners; they were rebuilt, as Rome after its destruction, without any uniform or regular design, and upon a scale more suitable to the indigent condition of the citizens, than to the future greatness of the state. Almost all were small and mean, and overhung and encumbered the narrow crooked streets with unsightly projections, which soon became so inconvenient that, at the instance of Themistocles and Aristides, the Areopagus exercised its authority, in removing or limiting them.¹ But the city never outgrew these defects in its original construction, and after the lapse of nearly two centuries, and all the changes effected during that period by the progress of luxury, a stranger who entered it for the first time was ready to doubt whether what he saw could be Athens.² The rebuilding of the ruined temples was reserved for another season. The thoughts of Themistocles and Aristides were engaged by a more urgent care: that of providing for the immediate security and the permanent strength of the city. Only a few fragments of the wall had been left standing. It was necessary to replace it; and the widening prospects and towering hopes of Athens demanded that the new wall should inclose a larger compass. In the mean while however the allies of Athens were viewing her situation, and watching her steps with feelings, which the recent deliverance ought to have suppressed, but which unhappily it only served to excite. They considered not what she had suffered in the common cause, but what she had done; and

Fortifica-
tion of
Athens.

¹ Heracl. Pont. 1.

² Dicaearchus Bíos 'EA.

this, instead of admiration and gratitude, awakened their jealousy and their fears. Her maritime rivals, Ægina and Corinth, were perhaps the first to take the alarm; and Sparta was easily persuaded to seize the favourable opportunity of checking the growth of a power which might soon become formidable to herself. Before therefore the new fortification was begun, Spartan envoys came to Athens with a message that sounded like the language of friendship. *Instead of raising new walls, which might hereafter, as Thebes had already done, serve to shelter the barbarians in a fresh invasion, the Athenians would do better if they joined the Spartans in throwing down all that were still standing north of the Isthmus. Peloponnesus would always afford a sufficient refuge, and a place of arms for the united forces of Greece to assemble in.* That Sparta should wish to see the peninsula become the sole fortress of Greece, was perfectly natural; for as the fortress would command the country, so Laconia would be the citadel that commanded the fortress. This however was not the state of things for which Athens had been spending her blood and treasure. She was at no loss for an answer; but it was not a time for words. It was clear that men who did not blush to spread so thin a veil over their unjust designs, would not scruple to accomplish them by open force, and since the Athenians were not yet able to resist violence, prudence required that they should elude it. The occasion was especially suited to the genius of Themistocles, and he undertook the task of defeating the Spartans with their own weapons. By his advice their envoys were dismissed, with a promise that an embassy should forthwith be sent to treat on their proposal at Sparta. He himself immediately set out on this mission; but he directed that the colleagues who should be appointed to share it with him, should delay their

Stratagem
of Themis-
tocles.

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departure, till the walls had been raised to such a height as would sustain an attack ; that for this purpose every Athenian capable of labour, without distinction of age or sex, should lend a hand to the work ; and that no building, public or private, sacred or profane, that could supply materials, should be spared. This was done : all the citizens, old and young, men and women, took their parts in the task, and pushed it forward with restless activity : houses, temples, the monuments of the dead, were the quarries from which they drew. In the mean while Themistocles arrived at Sparta ; but as he did not ask for an audience, or take any steps toward opening his commission, the ephors inquired the cause of his delay. *He was waiting, he said, for his colleagues whom he had left behind to despatch some very urgent business, but whom he expected daily, and had hoped to have seen before.* The Spartans were satisfied with this excuse, till tidings reached them from various quarters that the walls, the subject of the negotiation, had been begun, and were rapidly rising. They could scarcely doubt the report ; yet it was no more than hearsay ; and Themistocles, the man whom they had so lately covered with honours, begged them to suspend their belief, till they had ascertained the truth by the eyes of some of their own citizens. They accordingly sent some of their gravest and most trustworthy men to Athens ; and Themistocles at the same time by a secret message bad the Athenians detain them with as little show of violence as possible, till he and his colleagues returned. For he had been already joined by Aristides and another ambassador, who announced to him that the walls were high enough to stand a siege. It was now time to drop the mask, and to let the Spartans hear the voice of truth. At his next audience Themistocles, after informing them that the fortification

of Athens was advanced too far to be stopped, addressed them with a wholesome admonition: *When they and their allies sent ambassadors again to Athens, to deal with the Athenians as with reasonable men, who could discern what belonged to their own safety, and what to the general interests of Greece. They had not needed the counsels of Sparta, when they left their city, and committed themselves to their ships, and they thought they might now trust their own judgment in rebuilding their walls. Even for the common weal it was desirable that Athens should have a free voice in the councils of Greece; but with such a voice she could only speak so long as she stood on an equal footing with her allies.* The Spartans possessed the art of keeping their countenance in perfection; they dissembled their vexation, and only expressed their regret, that what had been meant merely as a friendly suggestion, should have been construed as a serious design of encroaching on the right of the Athenians to do as they would in their own territory. So the envoys on both sides returned home without any further complaints or reproaches; the city walls were quietly completed; but in their irregular structure they exhibited a lasting monument of the clashing interests and jarring passions, by which their ill-assorted parts had been brought together, at the expense of much that was dear, beautiful, and sacred.

When this necessary labour was finished, Themistocles turned his thoughts to the prosecution of a still greater work, which was to determine the character and prospects of Athens, and was the last step to the object which had been the mark of his whole political career. He had long seen, and it was now clearer than ever, that the days had past by when Athens, safe in unenvied obscurity, might content herself with cultivating and protecting her little territory. Hence-

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ræus.

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forward to be secure she must be powerful; on land nature had confined her within narrow limits; but while she was thus forced toward the sea she was amply provided with the means of becoming mistress of it. To establish this dominion was the final aim of the policy of Themistocles. He had laid the first foundation of it in the navy which raised Athens at once above all her maritime neighbours; but the enlarged navy required the protection of a spacious and fortified port. In the times when Athens made war with Megara for Salamis, and borrowed succours from Corinth against the superior force of Ægina, she was content with Phalerum, the easternmost and smallest of the three harbours which lay nearest to the city. The largest basin, which contained three distinct ports capable of being closed by separate bars, and all opening into the sea by a narrow outlet, had hitherto been neglected by the state, though Piræus, from which it took its name, was an ancient deme. The plan of Themistocles was to fortify the three ports Phalerum, Munychia, and Piræus, by a double range of walls: one on the land side inclosing space for a considerable city, the other following the windings of the rocky shore between the mouth of Phalerum and that of Piræus, so as to take in the peninsula of Munychia, by which Piræus is sheltered from the east. Already in his archonship¹ he had persuaded the people to begin this vast undertaking on a scale which should deter all hostile assaults.² The wall had been carried to half its intended height: it was of a breadth which allowed two waggons to pass each other, and this space was entirely filled with hewn stones exactly fitted together within, and consolidated on the outside by iron cramps and molten lead.

¹ On the date of the archonship of Themistocles see Appendix V.

² On a ridiculous story related by Diodorus (xi. 41—43.), about the precautions taken by Themistocles in setting about this undertaking, see Appendix V.

The invasions first of Darius and then of Xerxes had interrupted the labour, but had not destroyed the work; it was now carried on with fresh ardour: the walls rose to the height of sixty feet¹: Piræus was converted into an entirely new town, which was no longer to be considered as a deme, but as the lower part of Athens. Themistocles — if, as has been commonly believed, he filled up the space which he inclosed² — engaged Hippodamus a Milesian architect, the first among the ancients who invented designs for new cities, and a theory of the best form of government, to trace the plan. The same artist is said to have designed some streets in the city; but in general the regularity and symmetry of the port must have formed a contrast with the upper town very unfavourable to the latter. The new quarter was adorned with numerous temples, a theatre, and a marketplace, in a word, with all that Grecian life required for use and pleasure; it drew into it all whose occupations connected them with the sea, especially the foreigners who came to exercise their arts or trades at Athens. It was the great aim of Themistocles to turn the attention of the Athenians toward Piræus, as their surest stronghold, and their natural refuge in danger; and it has been supposed, though on evidence which does not seem conclusive, that he made a change in the *bema* of the Pnyx, so that the speaker might have the sea and Piræus in view.³

¹ That is, if we may infer the original height from that to which they appear to have been carried when restored by Conon. Appian. Mithrid. 30.

² Müller, *Archäologie der Kunst*, § 111. and *De Munimentis Athenarum*, p. 11., expresses his belief that Hippodamus, who, according to Strabo, drew the plan of Rhodes, was employed by Pericles in the building of Piræus, and that Themistocles did not design it for a town, but only for a place of refuge in time of war.

³ So Col. Leake, *Topography of Athens*, p. 42. But this is only a doubtful inference from a passage in which Plutarch (Them. 19.) describes the contrast between the policy of Themistocles, and that of the ancient kings of Attica. It does not follow, because the old *bema* was made *ὥστε ἀποβλέπειν πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν*, that it was so placed for that purpose. It might have been in that position before the time of Themistocles. On the other hand, perhaps it may be

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Thus Athens was armed at all points for the station to which Themistocles had taught her to aspire ; but it was still filled by a jealous rival, who could not have been expected to resign without a struggle. Now however fortune came to her aid, and finished the work which industry and prudence had begun. In the year following the fall of Sestus (B. C. 477) the allied fleet again put to sea ; its entire force is not recorded ; but the Peloponnesian states equipped twenty ships ; Athens thirty, which were commanded by Aristides and Cimon the son of Miltiades, who was now fast rising toward the place which his father had once held in the public esteem. Pausanias was at the head of the whole armament. It first sailed to Cyprus, and wrested the greater part of the island from the Persians, and then steered for the north of the Ægean, and laid siege to Byzantium, which soon surrendered. While the allies remained in this station, the Spartan regent began more fully to unfold a character and views of which he had already betrayed some indications. He had been vain and indiscreet enough to cause the tripod dedicated to Apollo from the spoil taken at Platæa to be inscribed with a couple of verses, in which his name alone was mentioned, and the victory and the offering were both attributed to him. The Spartans indeed had the arrogant inscription erased, and substituted for it a list of the cities which had shared the glorious expedition ; but such an act awakened suspicions which the conduct of Pausanias soon confirmed. After the capture of Byzantium he laid aside the manners of his country, to adopt those of the barbarians, and carried himself toward the allies under his command as if he regarded them as his subjects. The secret

urged that unless there had been a tradition of some previous alteration of the site, the Thirty could scarcely have thought of meddling with it. But at least this does not seem to have occurred to Plutarch.

rings that moved him, and the designs he had conceived, were not brought to light till many years after; but it was clear enough that his views were no longer confined to Sparta, and that he had ceased to feel himself proud of being a Spartan citizen; and there was therefore reason to doubt his fidelity to the use of Greece.

Even now it is not quite certain what motives were predominant in the breast of Pausanias; and whatever they may have been, his behaviour appears so strange that it is difficult to explain it, without supposing that his sudden elevation to his high rank, the wonderful success which crowned his first military undertaking, and the dazzling prospects that it opened to him, had made him giddy, and had not only inspired him with extravagant ambition, but had blinded him to the dangers he was encountering, and to the conditions necessary for effecting his designs. It is however beyond a doubt that, before he set out on this second expedition, he had formed a project of exchanging his limited and temporary office for a station which appeared to him higher and happier: that of a vassal of a king of Persia, enriched with the rewards of valour to his country and to Greece. That he could have conceived such a wish, that he should have been unable to endure the thought of descending a few years to a private station, and have been irritated by the restraints laid upon his authority by the jealousy of the ephors, is not surprising: it only proves that his character was weak, and that he was incapable of understanding the nature of real greatness and dignity. But our wonder is excited by the inflation of his self-confidence, by his inability to measure his means with his ends, and by his reckless neglect of the most obvious precautions. He began by opening a negotiation with Xerxes, for which he found a favourable occasion in the capture of Byzantium.

Ambitious
views of
Pausanias.

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Among the prisoners he took there, were some Persians of high rank, connected with the royal family. He did not venture openly to release them, but he secretly furnished them with the means of escaping, and then sent a trusty messenger to Xerxes, to claim the merit of this service, and to offer one still more important. He wrote, as a man who had the fate of Greece in his hand, that if Xerxes would give him his daughter in marriage, he would lay Sparta and the rest of Greece at his feet; and requested that the king would send some one on whom he relied, to concert a plan with him for this end. Xerxes might naturally imagine that the victorious general who had lately defeated the power of Persia, was able to restore it. He eagerly caught at the new hope held out to him, and sent Artabazus to take the government of the satrapy which included the provinces on the north-west coast of Asia, and was called the Dascylian from the Bithynian town Dascylium, where the satrap held his court, that he might keep up an active correspondence with the Spartan in Byzantium, and supply him with money and every other aid. When Pausanias learnt that his treachery was welcome to Xerxes, he began to act as if no further obstacle lay in his way, and as if it was scarcely necessary any longer to dissemble his intentions. Happily the extreme of rashness is nowhere more commonly found, than in cases where the consciousness of evil thoughts might have been expected to suggest the most watchful caution and the closest reserve. He assumed the state of a Persian satrap; imitated the luxury and the fashions of the barbarians in his table and in his dress; and as if with the intention that the bent of his views might be the more clearly understood, he journeyed through Thrace escorted by a guard of Persians and Ægyptians. His folly, had it been confined to this, might not have been attended with consequences deeply affecting any

it himself; by carrying it one step further he became the occasion of a very important revolution. In his vision of greatness he forgot the ties by which he was ill bound, and gave vent to his ambitious hopes in arrogance and harshness toward the freemen over whom he held a responsible command. He chastised slight faults with severe and degrading punishments; made himself difficult of access, and terrified or incensed those who obtained an interview with him by his silence and peevishness. The Ionians, who had just asserted their independence, were provoked by treatment worse than they had commonly experienced from their barbarian governors. On the other hand, the Athenian generals displayed qualities which were the more winning from their contrast with the character and deportment of the Spartan commander; and their new allies could not help reflecting how much happier would have been their condition, if they had been subject to the mild and equitable Aristides, the generous and gentle Cimon. This too seemed to be what nature and reason prescribed; for Athens, not Sparta, was the parent to whom most owed their origin. So the wish gradually ripened into a resolution; and the unanimous voice of all the confederates, except the Deloponnesian states and Ægina, called upon the Athenians to accept the supremacy of rank and authority in the common affairs of the alliance, which had hitherto been enjoyed by Sparta.

It was Aristides who had the glory of establishing his country in this honourable and well-earned pre-eminence, as his personal character had been most instrumental towards inspiring the confidence on which it was founded. After ascertaining that the proposal of the Ionians was the result, not of hasty passion but of a settled purpose, he undertook the task which was entrusted to him by general consent, regulating the laws of the union, and of its sub-

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ordination to Athens. The object of the confederacy was to protect the Greeks in the islands and the coasts of the *Ægean* from the aggression of the Persians, and to weaken and humble the barbarians. All who shared the benefit were to contribute according to the measure of their ability to the common end; Athens was to collect their forces, to wield and direct them, not however with absolute and arbitrary power, but as the organ of the public will, possessing only the influence and authority due to the greater sacrifices she made to the common cause. Least of all was she to interfere in the constitution and internal administration of any of the allied cities. All were to be independent of her and of each other, except so far as they were bound together by the same danger and the same interest. Aristides executed the difficult and delicate task of fixing the assessments of the numerous members of the confederacy, so as to satisfy all, without incurring even a suspicion of having turned one among so many opportunities of gain to his own advantage. Perhaps other Greeks might also have resisted the temptation; he seems to have been the only one that was acknowledged to be above calumny. Some of the allies were to furnish money; the more powerful were to equip ships. The whole amount of the yearly contribution was settled at 460 talents, about 115,000 pounds; Delos, the ancient centre of Ionian commerce and religion, was chosen for the treasury of the confederates, and its temple as the place where their deputies were to hold their congress.

In the mean while complaints had reached Sparta of the conduct of Pausanias, and rumours of his meditated treason. The ephors immediately recalled him, and sent out other commanders, among whom Dorcis is named, with a small force. But this step had been taken too late: the islanders and the Asiatic Greeks were irretrievably lost to Sparta, and Dorcis and his



colleagues found on their arrival that they must be content with a subordinate rank. This was repugnant alike to the pride and the policy of Sparta; and as she could not undo what had happened, or recover her station, she retired from the field where her rival was now triumphant, with the less reluctance as it was not that on which she could hope to reap honour or advantage. Her forces were withdrawn; and henceforth, in the room of the single general confederacy of the Greeks, of which she had been the head, two separate associations divided between them the whole strength of the nation.¹ For as that over which Athens presided was foreign to Sparta, so her sway was exclusively acknowledged by her Peloponnesian allies, whom the rising power of Athens and the Ionian confederacy united more closely than ever round their ancient leader. Thus Sparta had fallen back into her original sphere, while Athens had risen into a new one, which nature had evidently destined her to fill. It might have seemed that no turn of events could have been more favourable to the tranquillity of Greece, than one which placed each of these states in the situation most congenial to its habits and character, and assigned to each the functions which it was best qualified to discharge: enabling the one without interruption to pursue its hereditary round, and watch over the stability of the national institutions: and furnishing the active spirit of the other with constant employment in repelling or attacking the common

¹ Müller, *Dor.* i. 9. 7. and *Prolegom.* p. 412., takes an entirely different view of this transaction. He conceives Sparta not to have considered herself as having parted with her ancient ascendancy, but only as having transferred the prosecution of the war in Asia, and the management of the concerns relating to it, as a commission, to the Athenians, whom she regarded as still subject to her supremacy. That this was for a time the tone at Sparta, and even the way in which the matter was viewed there, is probable enough. But the question still is, how it really stood, and in what light it appeared at Athens. In the passage of his work on the Dorians, i. 9. 7., Müller's brevity would deceive a reader who did not consult Thucydides. For omitting all mention of the expedition under Dorcis, he represents Sparta as voluntarily abandoning the Asiatic war, as soon as she found it necessary to recall Pausanias.

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enemy. Perhaps even a statesman would not have deserved the reproach of shortsightedness, who had cherished the pleasing hope, that this happy distribution, so peaceably effected, might have prevented them from coming into hostile conflict, or at least might have averted the danger of their strength being wasted in a long struggle with each other. And if political affairs had ever been regulated by the pure light of reason, such hopes might have been fulfilled. By what passions this fair prospect was overclouded, and how the equipoise between the two powers became the cause through which they at length ground each other to dust, will be the subject of the ensuing part of this history. An entirely new period begins from the epoch at which we have now arrived, and new actors come forward on the scene. And though the public life of the men who principally contributed to bring about the new order of things is not precisely terminated by this point of time, yet what remains of their career belongs so much more to biography than to history, that the clearness of our narrative seems likely to gain, if we anticipate a little the course of events, and immediately subjoin the later occurrences of their lives to the transactions which made their names memorable, and which give their private fortunes a claim to our attention.

Innovation
in the
Athenian
constitu-
tion.

The regulation of the Ionian confederacy was the greatest work of Aristides, and as it was that which displayed the noblest features of his character in the clearest light, so it is the last we hear of. It is possible however that it may have preceded, and have had some share in producing a change in the Athenian constitution, of which he is said to have been the chief mover, and which according to Plutarch he introduced immediately after the battle of Platæa. He threw down the barrier of privilege which separated the highest of Solon's classes from the lower,

opening the archonship, and consequently the council of Areopagus, to the poorest of the citizens. At least is the description Plutarch gives of the reformation; and though in other cases there may be ground to suspect, that some of the steps which separated successive stages in the developement of the democracy at Athens have been overlooked, and that changes which occupied a whole period have been crowded together without any interval in the same process, it seems certain that this measure of Aristides really the extent that is commonly ascribed to it, that the fourth class, the Thetes, were now let into the highest dignity of the state. This change had in some degree been prepared by the gradual alterations that had taken place since the time of Solon in the value of property, which rendered the archonship accessible to a much more numerous body than the lawgiver ventured to admit into it. Aristides himself was archon, though his fortune was below mediocrity. But the admission of the lowest class evidently rested on a different ground: on the supposition that every Athenian citizen was entitled by his birth alone to aspire to every office in the state, which could not from its nature render the possession of a certain share of wealth necessary for the security of the public, as those which concerned the custody or disbursement of public money. And certainly if there was ever a time in the history of Athens, when a statesman like Aristides might have thought that justice required the acknowledgment of this principle, it was after the heroic exertions that all classes had made in the Persian wars; and there may have been many instances, of families reduced from affluence to poverty by the misfortunes of the times, and even by their own patriotic sacrifices, which, by calling aloud for particular exceptions to the law, where it manifestly tended to exclude the most deserving, may have

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seemed to show the wisdom and equity of abolishing the distinction altogether. If however we adopt the other view which Plutarch suggests, and suppose Aristides to have been moved, not only or chiefly by the merit of the people, but by his conviction of the necessity of the measure, we may easily conceive that such a necessity may have become apparent, not perhaps immediately after the return from Plataea, but after Themistocles had formed a new population in Piræus, depending entirely on maritime pursuits, and consequently on the labour of the Thetes who manned the fleet, and disposed to scorn as antiquated prejudices the opinions that may still have prevailed in the upper city in favour of artificial distinctions. At all events the change could not have been long delayed, after the Athenian people had assumed the rank it acquired as chief of the Ionian confederacy; for then all minute shades of dignity were lost in the new lustre of the Athenian name; and how hard must it have seemed to exclude from the honours of the republic the class on which its maritime supremacy was mainly founded!

Death of
Aristides.

Aristides lived to see the order he had established in the confederacy, for the benefit both of the members and their head, broken, as will be hereafter mentioned, in a material point, by a violation of the original compact, which he condemned, but could not prevent. The close of his life is so obscure that it is not certain whether he died in or out of Athens; but it seems clear that he preserved to the last the unabated respect of his countrymen. He died poor; his fortune, small at first, was probably diminished, since it was not augmented, by his public employments. It was perhaps only a rhetorical exaggeration to say that he did not leave behind him wherewith to defray his funeral; though his monument was built at the public charge; but it is beyond a doubt that his pos-

terity for several generations were pensioned by the state: a fact which though it may not prove their utter indigence, any more than similar rewards in modern times, may in Athens be admitted as a sufficient proof that their ancestor was believed to have deserved well of his country.

Very different was the end of the two men with whom Aristides had shared some of his most glorious days. Pausanias, recalled to Sparta, was subjected to a severe inquiry, and to various charges for injuries inflicted on individuals under his command. On some of these he was convicted and condemned to slight penalties; but for the gravest accusation, that of correspondence with the barbarians, no evidence was brought to light that could ground more than a very strong suspicion. It was dropped. But Pausanias found himself transported from a high and splendid station to an obscure and narrow sphere, where he was fettered by many irksome restraints, and surrounded by watchful and jealous observers. Unable to endure the change, and having no prospect of obtaining a release from his domestic thralldom by another foreign command, he cast aside the authority of the ephors, and without their leave quitted Sparta, and embarked in a vessel of Hermione for Byzantium. That city was still in the hands of his creature Gongylus, an Eretrian, whom he had employed in his negotiation with Xerxes, and had left in his place when he obeyed the call of the ephors. On his arrival he renewed his treasonable practices, and the Athenians, who saw through them, compelled him to leave Byzantium. He then retired to Colonæ in Troas, where he took so little pains to disguise his criminal intrigues, that a report of them was soon brought to Sparta, and he was once more interrupted in his dreams of greatness by a short message from

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the ephors, bidding him follow the bearer under pain of being proclaimed a public enemy. As his plans were far from ripe, and as he could scarcely hope to mature them in the condition of an exile and an outlaw, he obeyed the command, and returned to Sparta. On his arrival he was thrown into prison; as a punishment, it would appear, for having gone abroad without leave; but he soon obtained his liberty, and demanded a trial. Still however the ephors had not procured evidence of his treason, such as would warrant them in proceeding to the last extremity against a man of his rank; again they let the affair drop; and if Pausanias could have remained at rest, he might still have lived secure, and have died without infamy. But he had gone too far in a maze of guilt and folly to stop or to recede. He conceived the design of exciting an insurrection among the helots, of putting himself at its head, and of maintaining his usurped station by the aid of Persia. The thought of enlarging the narrow system of Lycurgus, of raising the oppressed and degraded serfs into a free commonalty, of admitting the free population of Laconia to a share in the political rights of the Spartans, and for this purpose of breaking the power of the ephors, and restoring the ancient authority of the heroic kings, would have been one worthy of a greater man than Pausanias in his best days. But no one will suppose that justice and humanity prompted his enterprise, any more than Napoleon's decree for the abolition of the slavetrade. His plan, if it had succeeded, would probably have bathed Sparta in blood, and have established a tyranny, no less odious than the government which it overthrew, and more dangerous to the liberties of Greece; its end would perhaps have been a counter-revolution, which would have plunged the eman-

cipated slaves into aggravated wretchedness. But it seems to have been as improvidently concerted as it was recklessly adopted. It was betrayed to the ephors by some of the helots themselves, probably because they saw that it was hopeless and ruinous. But even on this information the ephors forbore to act, exercising, Thucydides observes, their usual caution in requiring unquestionable proofs before they proceeded to extremities with a Spartan, and perhaps reluctant to divulge so dangerous a charge. They therefore dissembled their suspicions till chance should convert them into certainty, or supply them with evidence which they could safely produce. Pausanias continued his correspondence with Persia; but he used the precaution of desiring the Persian satrap to put to death the bearers of his letters. He at length selected a Spartan, named Argilius, whom he had already employed more than once in his treasonable negotiations, to execute one of these fatal commissions. The suspicions of Argilius were awakened; he counterfeited the seal of Pausanias, opened the letter entrusted to him, and found his apprehensions confirmed by the contents. As he had enjoyed a peculiar degree of intimacy with Pausanias, his resentment was roused by the indifference with which he proposed to sacrifice his life to his selfish fears, and he revealed the secret to the ephors. They now hesitated no longer, and devised a plan for the conviction and punishment of the traitor, which was executed in the following manner.

On the peninsula of Tænarus, at the southern verge of Laconia, was a celebrated temple of Poseidon, a revered asylum. Here Argilius took refuge, and within the sacred precincts raised a temporary hovel divided into two apartments by a thin partition, behind which he concealed some of the ephors, in expectation that Pausanias would soon come to

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Pausanias.

inquire the motive of his conduct. Pausanias came. Argilius reminded him of his past services, of the fidelity and discretion with which he had carried his messages to the Persians, and reproached him with his ingratitude. Pausanias acknowledged the justice of his complaints, and endeavoured to soothe his anger by the most solemn assurances that he should be exposed to no danger in discharging his commission. When the ephors had heard the confession of his guilt from his own mouth, they took measures for arresting him on his return to Sparta in the open street. But as they advanced in a body to apprehend him, his conscience took the alarm at a warning gesture of a friendly member of the college, and he fled to the sanctuary of Athené Chalciæcus¹, and took shelter in one of the detached buildings inclosed within the hallowed precincts. To reconcile the claims of justice as far as possible with the respect due to the sacred asylum, the building was unroofed, while the entrance was blocked up, and its approaches carefully guarded. The aged mother of the criminal is said to have been among the foremost to lay a stone at the doorway for the purpose of immuring her son.² When he was on the point of expiring, and too weak to offer any resistance which would have rendered the act sacrilegious, he was taken out of the consecrated ground just in time to avoid the pollution which his death would have occasioned in it: he breathed his last as soon as he had crossed its bounds. It was not without some opposition that his friends obtained permission to pay the last honours to his remains: the sterner patriots were for throwing his body, as that of a vile malefactor, into the Ceadas. But as this proposal was immediately overruled, so in time the recollection of his services seems to have softened the indignation inspired by his guilt, and to have rendered

¹ So called from the brass plates with which her temple was lined.² Schol. Thuc. l. 134. with Poppe's note.

his fate a subject first of compassion and regret, and of length of religious compunction. The Delphic oracle ordered an atonement to be made to him and to the goddess whose protection he had vainly sought. By its direction his bones were removed to the spot near the precincts of the temple where he expired¹; and as two persons were to be surrendered to the goddess in the room of the suppliant she had lost, two brazen statues of Pausanias were dedicated in her sanctuary. Yet as the profanation was thus divinely atoned, while the mode of expiation was only suggested by human ingenuity, room was still left, if not for religious scruples, at least for the reproach of an enemy, that the land had never been freed from the curse of sacrilege; and a time came when the hypocrisy of Sparta rendered such an accusation a just retort.

The fate of Pausanias involved that of Themistocles. No Greek had yet rendered services such as those of Themistocles to the common country; no Athenian, except Solon, had conferred equal benefits on Athens. He had first delivered her from the most imminent danger, and then raised her to the preeminence on which she now stood. He might claim her greatness, and even her being, as his work. Themistocles was not unconscious of this merit, nor careful to suppress his sense of it. He was thought to indicate it too plainly when he dedicated a temple to Artemis under the title of Aristobule (*the goddess of good counsel*): and the offence was aggravated if he himself placed his statue there, where it was still seen in the days of Plutarch, who pronounces the form no less heroic

¹ Ἐν τῷ προτεμενίσματι. This could not have been within the sanctuary (τὸ ἅγιον), since Thucydides says just before that he was taken out of it. But Dr. Arnold's remark, *that a dead body would not have been buried within the sacred ground*, requires limitation; as appears from the case of Euchidas above mentioned, Plut. Arist. 20., and from a number of others alleged by Theodoret (Græc. Eccl. Cur. viii. ; tom. iv. p. 908.) from Antiochus and other authors.

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XVI.Rapacity of
Themistocles.

than the soul of the man. In the same spirit are several stories related by Plutarch, of the indiscretion with which he sometimes alluded to the magnitude of the debt which his countrymen owed him. If on one occasion he asked them: where they would have been without him? and on another compared himself to a spreading plane, under which they had taken shelter in the storm, but which they began to lop and rend when the sky grew clear, he would seem not to have discovered, till it was too late, that there are obligations which neither princes nor nations can endure, and which are forfeited if they are not disclaimed.

After the battle of Salamis, and while the terror of the invasion was still fresh, his influence at Athens was predominant, and his power consequently great wherever the ascendancy of Athens was acknowledged; and he did not always scruple to convert the glory with which he ought to have been satisfied into a source of petty profit. Immediately after the retreat of Xerxes he exacted contributions from the islanders who had sided with the barbarians, as the price of diverting the resentment of the Greeks from them. Another opportunity of enriching himself he found in the factions by which many of the maritime states were divided. Almost everywhere there was a party or individuals who needed the aid of his authority, and were willing to purchase his mediation. That he sold it, and without nicely distinguishing the merits of the cases, we learn from the invectives indeed of an enemy, but of one whose enmity seems to have been provoked by the action which is the ground of his complaint. A Rhodian poet, Timocreon of Ialysus, celebrated among his contemporaries for the powers of his appetite, the strength of his body, and the bitterness of his verse, which were commemorated in his epitaph by Simonides, had been united by ties of friendship and hospitality to The-

mistocles, and had expected, as he gave out, upon the faith of a promise, to be restored to his country, when his friend became all-powerful in Greece. But the bribes, as he alleged, of his adversaries prevailed with Themistocles against him, and he continued to pine in exile. He avenged his wrongs by a poetical complaint, in which he contrasted the virtues of Aristides with the perfidy, avarice, and cruelty of Themistocles, who for sordid gain had betrayed his friend, and for three talents had consented to do the will of those who bought him, and to banish or recall, to kill or spare, at their pleasure. It is the more credible that there was real ground for this charge, since Aristides could reproach his rival with not knowing how to command his hands, while he had the disposal of the public money, and he unquestionably accumulated extraordinary wealth on a less than moderate fortune.¹

But if he made some enemies by his selfishness, he provoked others, whose resentment proved more formidable, by his firm and enlightened patriotism. He was zealous and vigilant in protecting the interests of Athens against the encroachments of Sparta, and the success of these exertions contributed more to his downfall than any of his misdeeds. Sparta never forgave him the shame he brought upon her by thwarting her insidious attempt to suppress the independence of her rival, and he further exasperated her animosity by detecting and baffling another stroke of her artful policy. The Spartans proposed to punish the states which had aided the barbarians, or had abandoned the cause of Greece, by depriving them of the right of being represented in the Amphictyonic congress. By this measure Argos, Thebes, and the northern

His opposi-
tion to
Sparta.

¹ *A great part of his property was secretly conveyed into Asia by his friends, but that part which was discovered and confiscated is estimated by Theopompus at a hundred talents, by Theophrastus at eighty; though before he engaged in public affairs all he possessed did not amount to so much as three talents.*—Plut. Them. 25.

states, which had hitherto composed the majority in that assembly, would have been excluded from it, and the effect would probably have been that Spartan influence would have preponderated there. Themistocles frustrated this attempt by throwing the weight of Athens into the opposite scale, and by pointing out the danger of reducing the council to an instrument in the hands of two or three of its most powerful members. The enmity which he thus drew upon himself would have been less honourable to him, if there had been any ground for a story, which apparently was never heard of till it became current among some late collectors of anecdotes, from whom Plutarch received it; it has been popular, because it seemed to illustrate the contrast between the characters of Themistocles and Aristides, and to display the magnanimity of the Athenians. Themistocles is made to tell the Athenians that he has something to propose which will be highly beneficial to the commonwealth, but which must not be divulged. The people depute Aristides to hear the secret, and to judge of the merit of the proposal. Themistocles discloses a plan for firing the allied fleet at Pagasæ, or according to another form of the story adopted by Cicero ¹, the Lacedæmonian fleet at Gythium. Upon this Aristides reports to the assembled people, that nothing could be more advantageous to Athens than the counsel of Themistocles, but nothing more dishonourable and unjust. The generous people rejects the proffered advantage, without even being tempted to inquire in what it consists.

Themistocles was gradually supplanted in the public favour by men worthy indeed to be his rivals, but who owed their victory less to their own merit than to the towering preeminence of his deserts. He himself, as we have observed, seconded them by his indiscretion

¹ De Off. iii. 11.

their endeavours to persuade the people that he had risen too high above the common level to remain a harmless citizen in a free state: that his was a case which called for the extraordinary remedy prescribed by the laws, against the power and greatness of an individual which threatened to overlay the young democracy. He was condemned to temporary exile by

B.C. 471.
His exile.

the same process of ostracism which he had himself before directed against Aristides. He took up his abode at Argos, which he had served in his prosperity, and which welcomed, if not the saviour of Greece, at least the enemy of Sparta. Here he was still residing, though he occasionally visited other cities of Peloponnesus, when Pausanias was convicted of his treason.

In searching for further traces of his plot the ephors found some parts of a correspondence between him and Themistocles, which appeared to afford sufficient ground for charging the Athenian with having shared his friend's crime. They immediately sent ambassadors to Athens, to accuse him, and to insist that he should be punished in like manner with the partner of his guilt. It does not appear that the documents which the charge was founded, or any evidence of the fact beyond the assertion of the envoys, was transmitted to Athens. Thucydides does not express any opinion as to the truth or falsehood of the accusation; but at the utmost we have no reason to believe that there was any more solid foundation for it than what Plutarch relates: that Pausanias, when he saw Themistocles banished, believing that he would embrace any opportunity of avenging himself on his grateful country, opened his project to him in a secret manner. Themistocles thought it the scheme of a madman, but one which he was not bound and had no reluctance to reveal. He may have written, though prudence renders it improbable, something that betrayed his knowledge of the secret. But his cause

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was never submitted to an impartial tribunal: his enemies were in possession of the public mind at Athens, and officers were sent with the Spartans, who tendered their assistance, to arrest him and bring him to Athens, where in the prevailing disposition of the people almost inevitable death awaited him. This he foresaw, and determined to avoid. In Peloponnesus he could no longer hope to find a safe refuge; he sought it first in Corcyra, which was indebted to him for his friendly mediation in a dispute with Corinth about the Leucadian peninsula, and had by his means obtained the object it contended for. The Corcyræans, however willing, were unable to shelter him from the united power of Athens and Sparta, and he crossed over to the opposite coast of Epirus. He had little time to deliberate, and perhaps he had no better choice. A year sooner the court of Hiero, Gelo's successor, might have seemed to present a pleasant and secure asylum; though if it is true that Themistocles had instigated the multitude at Olympia to tear down the pavilion erected there in Hiero's name during the games, and to exclude his horses from the contest, he would have debarred himself from seeking the protection of the man on whom he had drawn this insult.¹ But Hiero died the year before (B. c. 467), and about the time of the flight of Themistocles Syracuse was in the midst of the convulsion by which she shook off the yoke of Hiero's worthless successor Thrasybulus. The Molossians, the most powerful people of Epirus, were now ruled by a king named Admetus, whose descendants claimed the son of Achilles as their ancestor and the founder of their dynasty. The royal family had at least a tinge of Greek manners and arts, which distinguished

¹ The story, though mentioned by Plutarch on the authority of Theophrastus, seems doubtful; because it is nearly the same that is told of the orator Lysias and the elder Dionysius.

them from their barbarian subjects. But Themistocles in the day of his power had thwarted the Molossian prince in a suit which he had occasion to make to the Athenians, and had added insult to his disappointment. It might therefore seem a desperate resolution to seek his court as a suppliant; yet if Themistocles had already formed the design of crossing over to Asia, and his road lay through the dominions of Admetus, there may have been less of boldness than of prudence in the step. The king was fortunately absent from home when the stranger arrived at his gate, and his queen Phthia, in whom no vindictive feelings stifled her womanly compassion, received him with kindness, and instructed him in the most effectual method of disarming her husband's resentment, and securing his protection. When Admetus returned he found Themistocles seated at his hearth, holding the young prince whom Phthia had placed in his hands. This among the Molossians was the most solemn form of supplication, more powerful than the olive branch among the Greeks. With this advantage Themistocles addressed himself to the generosity of Admetus, disclosed the urgency of the danger that threatened his life, and argued the meanness of exacting an extreme revenge for a slight wrong from a fallen adversary. The king was touched or roused; he raised the suppliant with an assurance of protection, which he fulfilled, when the Athenian and Lacedæmonian commissioners dogged their prey to his house, by refusing to surrender his guest.

Reception
at the
house of
Admetus.

Plutarch, apparently following a writer of slight authority, says that Themistocles was here joined by his wife and children. The temper of the Athenians is indicated by the fact, that the person to whom he was indebted for the assistance by which his family was restored to him, was put to death for this friendly

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office at the prosecution of Cimon. If his family was already with him, he had the less inducement to quit the territories of Admetus. But it would seem that he never intended to fix his abode among the Molossians, and he had probably very early conceived the design of seeking his fortune at the court of Persia. He is said to have consulted the oracle of Dodona, perhaps less for a direction than for a pretext; the answer seemed to point to the Great King, and Admetus, practising the hospitality of the heroic ages, supplied his guest with the means of crossing over to the coast of the Ægean. At the Macedonian port of Pydna he found a merchantship bound for Ionia, and embarked in it. A storm carried the vessel to the coast of Naxos, which happened at this juncture to be besieged by an Athenian fleet and army. To avoid the danger of an accidental discovery, Themistocles made himself known to the master of the ship, and worked upon his hopes by large promises, and upon his fears by threatening to denounce him as having knowingly sheltered an outlaw. The man consented to keep his secret, and, as he desired while detained by the weather on the coast of Naxos, prevented all the crew from going ashore. At length he arrived safely at Ephesus, where not long afterwards he received that part of his property which his friends were able to withdraw from the grasp of the state at Athens, and that which he had left at Argos; perhaps it was here also that his family met him.

When Themistocles arrived in Asia, Xerxes was still on the throne, but not many months after he was assassinated by two of the great officers of his court, Artabanus, and the cunuch Spamtres. The conspirators charged Darius his eldest son with the murder, and persuaded Artaxerxes, the younger, instantly to avenge the imputed parricide by the exe-

cution of his brother.¹ After this Artabanus, who was the father of seven sons in the prime of life, waited only till matters should be ripe for removing the young king, and establishing a new dynasty. He was afterward betrayed by a Persian nobleman to whom he revealed his design, and perished in the attempt to murder Artaxerxes. It appears to have been in the interval between the death of Xerxes and this event, while the traitor was at the height of his power, that Themistocles arrived at the Persian court. We do not venture to relate the adventures of his journey from the coast to the capital, with which later writers filled up the simple narrative of Thucydides. He found a Persian friend, who accompanied him, and whose presence was undoubtedly sufficient to protect him without the contrivance, by which he is said to have eluded the dangers of the road, of screening himself from view in a covered litter, and giving out that it contained a lady designed for the royal harem. This was probably a fiction of the same authors who related that a price of two hundred talents had been set upon his head by the Persian king, and that it was with difficulty he escaped the attempts aimed at his life for the reward. As little may we paint his first audience at court, which Plutarch has worked up into a romantic and theatrical scene, though the silence of Thucydides does not prove that Artaxerxes did not immediately gratify his curiosity or his pride with the sight of the extraordinary man, who had sought refuge from the people he had saved in the land of the enemy whom he had so deeply humbled. It was however by a letter, presented perhaps by Artabanus through the mediation

His journey
to the court
of Persia.

¹ Ctesias and Justin, iii. 1. know only of two sons of Xerxes. Diodorus (xi. 69.) mentions a third, Hystaspes, who was satrap of Bactria, and absent at the time of his father's murder. Ctesias speaks of an Artabanus who was satrap of Bactria at the time when the conspiracy against Artaxerxes was defeated. Did the assassin Artabanus procure the murder of Hystaspes?

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of his Persian friend, that Themistocles first made himself known to Artaxerxes ; in it he acknowledged the evils he had inflicted on the royal house in the defence of his country, but claimed the merit of having sent the timely warning by which Xerxes was enabled to effect his retreat from Salamis in safety, and of having diverted the Greeks from the design of intercepting it. He ventured to add, that his persecution and exile were owing to his zeal for the interest of the king of Persia, and that he had the power of proving his attachment by still greater services ; but he desired that a year might be allowed him to acquire the means of disclosing his plans in person. His request was granted, and he assiduously applied himself to study the language and manners of the country, with which he became sufficiently familiar to conciliate the favour of Artaxerxes by his conversation and address, no less than by the promises which he held out, and the prudence of which he gave proofs. If we may believe Plutarch, he even excited the jealousy of the Persian courtiers, by the superior success with which he cultivated their arts : he was continually by the king's side at the chase and in the palace, and was admitted to the presence of the king's mother, who honoured him with especial marks of condescension ; it seems that he thought it prudent to soothe the religious prejudices of the people by listening to the doctrines of the priests. He was at length sent down to the maritime provinces, perhaps to wait for an opportunity of striking the blow by which he was to raise the power of Persia upon the ruin of his country. In the mean while a pension was conferred on him in the Oriental form : three flourishing towns were assigned for his maintenance, of which Magnesia was to provide him with bread, Myus with viands, and Lampsacus, with the growth of her celebrated vineyards. He fixed his residence

at Magnesia in the vale of the Mæander, where the royal grant invested him with a kind of princely rank. There death overtook him, hastened, as it was commonly supposed, by his consciousness of being unable to perform the promises he had made to the king. Thucydides however evidently did not believe the story that he put an end to his own life by poison. That fear of disappointing the Persian king should have urged him to such an act is indeed scarcely credible. Yet we can easily conceive that the man who had been kept awake by the trophies of Miltiades, must have felt some bitter pangs when he heard of the rising glory of Cimon. Though his character was not so strong as his mind, it was great enough to be above the wretched satisfaction implied in one of Plutarch's anecdotes: that amidst the splendour of his luxurious table he one day exclaimed: *How much we should have lost, my children, if we had not been ruined.* It must have been with a different feeling¹ that he desired his bones to be privately conveyed to Attica, though the uncertainty which hangs over so many actions of his life extends to the fate of his remains. A splendid monument was raised to him in the public place at Magnesia; but a tomb was also pointed out by the seaside within the port of Piræus, which was generally believed to contain his bones. His descendants continued to enjoy some peculiar privileges at Magnesia in the time of Plutarch; but neither they nor his posterity at Athens ever revived the lustre of his name.

¹ One which seems to be indicated by the fact related by Possis in Athenæus, xii. 45. Πόσσις ἐν τρίτῃ Μαγνητικῶν τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα φησὶν ἐν Μαγνησίᾳ τὴν στεφανηφόρον ἀρχὴν ἀναλαβόντα θῦσαι Ἀθηνᾶ καὶ τὴν ἑορτὴν Παναθήναια ὀνομάσαι, καὶ Διονύσῳ Χοροπότην θυσιάσαντα καὶ τὴν Χοῶν ἑορτὴν αὐτόθι καταδείξαι.

CHAPTER XVII.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ATHENIAN MARITIME ASCENDANCY TO THE THIRTY YEARS TRUCE BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA.

Beginning of Cimon's public Life. — Conquest of Eion — of Scyros. — Revolt of Naxos. — Battles of the Eury-medon. — Earthquake at Sparta. — Beginning of the third Messenian War. — Education of Pericles — his first public Appearance — his political Views. — Cimon's Munificence. — Popular Measures of Pericles. — Ephialtes. — Impeachment of Cimon. — Attempt to depress the Areopagus. — The Athenians at Ithome. — Alliance between Athens and Argos. — The Eumenides of Æschylus. — Change in the Jurisdiction of the Areopagus. — Athenian Expedition to Egypt. — Great Efforts of the Athenians. — Myronides. — Spartan Expedition to Doris. — Battle of Tanagra. — Battle of Ænophyta. — Expedition of Tolmides. — End of the third Messenian War. — Disasters of the Athenians in Egypt. — Cimon's Recall. — Assassination of Ephialtes. — Death of Cimon. — Project of a Congress at Athens. — Spartan Expedition to Delphi. — Battle of Coronea. — Invasion of Attica. — Thirty Years' Truce.

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THOUGH the issue of the Persian invasion had not broken nor even dangerously shaken the power of Persia, it had relieved the European Greeks, and the islanders of the Ægean, from all apprehension of another attack on their freedom from the same quarter. Most of the states now united with Athens would have been satisfied with this security, and had no wish to act on the offensive against the vanquished enemy. But Athens saw a vast field open to her ambition in the East; the situation of the Asiatic Greeks afforded a fair pretext for the continuance of hostilities, and many of her leading statesmen were desirous of

g this direction to the restless spirit of their trymen.

remost among these was Cimon, son of Miltiades. In his youth he gave little promise of the abilities or the character which he afterwards displayed, and seemed to have inherited the limited capacity of his grandfather, who had incurred a nickname expressive of extreme simplicity¹, rather than his father's genius. His propensity to pleasure was so strong as to divert his attention from business, and drew on him the satire of the comic poets; and in his early youth he is said to have neglected the ordinary accomplishments of an Athenian gentleman. If however this was the case, it could seem, from an anecdote reported by Plutarch on the authority of a contemporary, to have supplied this deficiency at a later period.² But he was not supplied with the promptness and volubility which commonly distinguished his countrymen, and never shone as an orator. It was probably his consciousness of this defect that determined him to devote himself to commerce, which kept him mostly away from Athens, and to abandon the popular assembly to his rivals. At his father's death he seems to have succeeded to only a scanty fortune³; and he would perhaps have found it difficult to raise the penalty of fifty talents to the treasury, if Callias, one of the wealthiest of Athens, struck by the charms of his sister Iphigeneia, a woman more remarkable for her beauty than for the propriety of her conduct, had not undertaken to discharge the penalty as the

Κοδλέμος.

¹ Plut. Cim. 9.

² According to Diodorus (Mai ii. p. 39.) it was Themistocles who was the author of Cimon's fortune, by recommending him as a son-in-law to a rich Athenian, who consulted him on the choice of a husband for his daughter, and whom he advised to look out not for wealth which wanted a man, but for a man who wanted

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price of her hand.¹ Cimon however had attracted notice, and gained reputation, by the spirit which he displayed on the occasion of leaving the city on the approach of the barbarians, when he was the foremost to hang up a bridle in the Acropolis, as a sign that he placed all his hopes in the fleet, and by the valour with which he fought at Salamis; and many friendly voices encouraged him to tread in his father's footsteps. Aristides, in particular, saw in him a capacity and disposition, that fitted him for a coadjutor to himself, and an antagonist to Themistocles, and exerted his influence in his favour; and the readiness with which the allied Greeks, when disgusted by the arrogance of Pausanias, united themselves with Athens, was owing in a great measure to Cimon's mild temper, and to his frank and gentle manners. Yet we should be inclined to question the genuineness of his generosity and good nature, if we believed what was related by an author cited by Plutarch: that after the flight of Themistocles, Cimon procured a capital sentence against Epicrates, for having aided the wife and children of the exile in escaping from Athens, and joining him in the dominions of Admetus.

The popularity of Themistocles was already declining, while Cimon, by a series of successful enterprises, was rapidly rising in public favour and esteem.

¹ Tzetzes (Chil. I. Hist. 22.) has produced an extraordinary jumble of facts and names. With him, Callias is Cimon's son by Isodicé (as to whom see Plut. Cim. 4.), and was fined fifty talents on account of his father's illicit connection with Elpinicé: Καλλίας δὲ πεντήκοντα ταλάντων ζημιούται Ὅπως δὲ Κίμων ὁ πατὴρ μηδὲν δεινόν τι πάθῃ Ἐνεκα γάμων τῶν αἰσχρῶν, τῆς ἀδελφομιξίας. Some of Plutarch's authors represented Cimon as having openly wedded Elpinicé (Cim. 4.). This scandalous history is of very little importance in itself; but when some modern writers (as Passow, in F. Jacob's *Vermischte Schriften*, v. p. 573.) speak of the *corrupt morals* of Themistocles as characteristic of the party to which Aristides and Cimon were opposed, it may be worth observing, that the anecdote of a prodigious outrage against public decency imputed to Themistocles (Athen. xiii. p. 578. c.) does not seem to be so well attested as Cimon's flagitious incontinence, and that even the character of Aristides in this respect did not escape obloquy. See Plut. Them. 3.

VICTORIES OF CIMON.

The first of these triumphs, achieved in the third year after the battle of Plataea (B. C. 476), was the conquest of Eion on the Strymon, which was held by a Persian garrison, among whom were some men of high rank, and even related to the king. They were on friendly terms with the neighbouring Thracians, and, probably with their aid, gave great annoyance to the adjacent Greek towns. Cimon, after defeating and shutting them up, pressed the place so closely, that Boges, the Persian governor, unable to hold out, and disdaining to surrender, set fire to the town, and perished in the flames, which consumed his friends, family, and treasures.¹ This victory was on many accounts peculiarly agreeable to the Athenians, who by it were relieved from a troublesome enemy, and gained a very important position, which not only provided immediately for the wants of many, but was the first step to the establishment of one of their most valuable colonies. They conferred the freedom of their city on Meno the Pharsalian², who on this occasion gave them twelve talents, and himself came to their aid with 300 of his Penests mounted at his own charge. The reward they bestowed on the conqueror was considered at the time as an extraordinary mark of favour, and was celebrated in after-ages, when much slighter services were far more richly recompensed, as a proof of the cheapness of the ancient heroism. It consisted in three stone busts of Hermes, each inscribed with two or three distichs in honour of the exploit, but containing neither the name of the general, nor any allusion to his particular merit. In the course of the same year

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¹ Herod. vii. 107. Pausanias viii. 8, 9. speaks of a stratagem employed by Cimon, similar to that by which Agesipolis afterwards took Mantinea (see below, Ch. xxxvii.). But it does not seem as if Herodotus had heard of it.

² Demosth. Aristocr. p. 687. The author of the oration *Περὶ Συντάξεως* contradicts this statement. *Μένωνι* — *οὐκ ἐψηφίσαντο πολιτείαν, ἀλλ' ἀτέλειαν ἔδωκαν μόνον.*

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Of Scyros.

Cimon effected another conquest, which had a value in the eyes of the people independent of the substantial advantage it afforded them. The inhabitants of the isle of Scyros, a mixt race of Pelasgians and Dolopians, had become infamous for piracy, and had incurred the ban of the Amphictyons, by a breach of hospitality in plundering some Thessalian merchants. Cimon seized this specious pretext for exterminating the people, and dividing the land among Attic colonists. He was afterwards fortunate or skilful enough to discover the relics of Theseus, who, according to an ancient tradition, had been buried in Scyros.¹ An oracle was procured which directed the Athenians to recover the hero's remains, and to treat them with due honour. Perhaps Cimon and his party may have thought it seasonable, on political grounds, to reanimate the popular veneration for the founder of the ancient order of things. The bones were dug up, and carried with great pomp to Athens, where a temple, which became a perpetual asylum for the oppressed, was erected in honour of the hero, who had so often exerted his prowess in protecting innocence, and redressing wrong.

The next enterprises to which the Athenian arms were directed, were important as the first steps toward the establishment of a new system in the relation between Athens and her allies. The town of Carystus in Eubœa, from what causes we are not informed, provoked the hostility of the Athenians, and, though not supported by any other states in the island, made a long resistance before it was reduced to submission. Its revolt was perhaps considered of too little im-

¹ According to Paus. i. 17. 6. the professed object of the first expedition was to avenge the murder of Theseus, though Lycomedes had been instigated by jealousy of the honours which his subjects paid to the hero. But the bones were not brought to Athens till six or seven years after the conquest of the island, in the archonship of Aphepsion, or Apsephion, B.C. 468. See Mr. Clinton, F. H. ii. p. 34.

portance to deserve more strenuous efforts for its suppression. But that of the rich and powerful island of Naxos, which followed, was of greater moment. It was an indication that the Athenian alliance began to be felt irksome, and that Athens would only be able to preserve the advantages which she derived from her station in the confederacy, by taking a new ground, and exacting by force what was no longer cheerfully given. Naxos was conquered after a hard siege, and, instead of an ally, became a subject of Athens: the first member of the confederacy which experienced from its protectors the worst evil which it had to fear from the Persians. But its example did not induce those who were exposed to the same danger either to unite in defence of their liberty, or to abstain from provoking a like attack. One after another they unseasonably refused compliance with the requisitions of the leading state, and were punished with the loss of their independence. Many were imprudent enough to seek ease from their burdens by sacrificing their strength. They offered to commute their personal services in the endless expeditions to which they were summoned, for stated payments of money. Cimon perceived the advantage which Athens would reap from this arrangement, and accepted it whenever it was proposed. Its effect was, that the states which adopted it, exempt from the necessity of keeping up a naval force of their own, were ever after exposed, without any means of defence, to the growing demands of Athenian rapacity, and when the wants of their sovereign were multiplied, found themselves in addition subjected to the very services from which they had so dearly purchased a temporary relief.

In the year of the conquest of Naxos (B. C. 466), the same in which Themistocles took refuge in Asia, Cimon obtained his most memorable triumph over

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the Persians. A great sea and land force had been collected at the mouth of the Eurymedon in Pamphylia; the fleet, according to Ephorus, who is most moderate in his numbers, amounted to 350, and the Persian commanders expected to be joined by 80 Phœnician galleys from Cyprus. Cimon, having strengthened his fleet by successive reinforcements, as he slowly moved along the south coast of Asia Minor, till it amounted to 250 galleys, provoked the enemy to an engagement before the arrival of the Phœnicians, and having defeated them and sunk or taken 200 ships, sailed up the river to their camp, and landing his men flushed with victory, completely routed the Persian army, and carried away the rich booty which they left in their tents. According to the author whom Plutarch follows, he still found time for another victory the same day, and having sailed to meet the Phœnician squadron, which had not heard of the defeat of their allies, fell in with it and destroyed the whole.

Cimon's next enterprise was one in which he had a personal and hereditary interest. The Persians still kept possession of the Thracian Chersonesus, and were supported by some of the Thracian tribes of the main land. Cimon sailed with a small force, and dislodged them not only from the territory of the republic, but from perhaps the most valuable part of his own patrimony. It appears to have been soon after the power of the Athenians had been thus strengthened in this quarter — in the year following the battles of the Eurymedon — that they were again engaged in a contest with one of their allies, who was able and disposed to make a vigorous resistance. The Thasians were compelled to defend their gold mines on the continent from the cupidity of Athens, which perhaps claimed them as a conquest won from the Persians. The islanders were first defeated at

sea by Cimon, and then closely besieged. While the siege was in progress, the Athenians suffered a disastrous defeat in one of their most important possessions. They had sent a colony of ten thousand settlers, partly citizens and partly allies, to establish themselves in a site on the Strymon, then called, from the various lines of communication which branched from it, the Nine Ways¹, and occupied by the Edonian Thracians. These the colonists dislodged; but in an expedition which they made into the interior against the Edonian town of Drabescus they were attacked by the united forces of the Thracians, who viewed their settlement as a hostile invasion, and were cut off to a man.

The Thasians, alarmed at the turn which the war had taken, began to look out for foreign assistance. The jealousy of Sparta toward Athens had been betrayed, as we have seen, immediately after their joint victory over the common enemy; and the events of the subsequent period were not fitted to allay it. The Thasians therefore sent an embassy to engage the Spartans to make a diversion in their favour by invading Attica. Their envoys were favourably received, and dismissed with a secret promise that their wishes should be fulfilled; and the Spartans were preparing to keep their word, but had not yet taken any step which could disclose their intention to the Athenians, when a calamity befell them by which they were forced to renounce this design, and to struggle hard for their own preservation. The whole of Laconia was shaken by an earthquake, which opened great chasms in the ground, and rolled down huge masses from the highest peaks of Taygetus; Sparta itself became a heap of ruins, in which not more than five houses are said to have been left

B.C. 464.
Earthquake
at Sparta.

¹ See *antè*, p. 287.

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Beginning
of the third
Messenian
war.

standing.¹ More than twenty thousand persons were believed to have been destroyed by the shock², and the flower of the Spartan youth was overwhelmed by the fall of the building in which they were exercising themselves at the time. It was chiefly the presence of mind displayed on this occasion by king Archidamus, that preserved the state from a still more terrible disaster. Many of the Helots assembled, and hastened to the city, to take advantage of the defenceless condition in which they hoped to surprise their masters. But Archidamus foreseeing the danger, as soon as the first consternation had subsided, while the survivors were busied among the ruins, ordered an alarm to be sounded, as of an enemy's approach, and gathered all his people round him in arms. The Helots, finding an armed band ready to receive them, retreated and dispersed. But though this danger was thus averted, the safety of Sparta was not yet secured. The Messenians seized the opportunity of rising against their hated lords, and fortified themselves in the ancient stronghold of their liberty, Ithome. Their insurrection was the more formidable, as they were joined not only by many of the Helots, but by the free inhabitants of some of the Laconian towns. The Spartans, though reduced to extreme weakness, were still masters of the open country, and laid siege to Ithome, but made very slow advances toward the reduction of the place. In the meanwhile the Thasians, left to themselves, were compelled to capitulate in the third year of the war, and after dismantling their fortifications, surrendering their ships, ceding their continental territory and mines, paying a sum of money immediately, and stipulating to pay a certain tribute in future, were permitted to remain subjects of Athens.

¹ Plut. Cim. 16.² Diod. xi. 63.

As the siege of Ithome lingered, the Spartans called on their allies for aid; and among the rest they did not blush to implore it from the Athenians. This application gave rise to a very warm debate in the Athenian assembly, and was treated by the leaders of the opposite parties as an occasion of trying their strength. The feelings with which it was received can scarcely be clearly understood, without taking a view of these parties and of their relative position; and a short digression on this subject will be necessary to place many events of the following history in their proper light.

Cimon was beyond dispute the ablest and most successful general of his day; and his victories had shed a lustre on the arms of Athens, which almost dimmed the glories of Marathon and Salamis. But while he was gaining renown abroad, he had rivals at home, who were endeavouring to supplant him in the affections of the people, and to establish a system of domestic and foreign policy directly counter to his views, and were preparing contests for him in which his military talents would be of little avail. While Themistocles and Aristides were occupying the political stage, an extraordinary genius had been ripening in obscurity, and was only waiting for a favourable juncture to issue from the shade into the broad day of public life. Xanthippus, the conqueror of Mycale, had married Agariste, a descendant of the famous Cleisthenes, and had left two sons, Aripbron and Pericles. Of Aripbron little is known beside his name; but Pericles, to an observing eye, gave early indications of a mind formed for great things, and a will earnestly bent on them. In his youth he had not rested satisfied with the ordinary Greek education, but had applied himself, with an ardour which was not even abated by the lapse of years, nor stifled by his public avocations, to intellectual pursuits, which

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were then new at Athens, and confined to a very narrow circle of inquisitive spirits. His birth and fortune afforded him the means of familiar intercourse with all the men most eminent in every kind of knowledge and art, who were already beginning to resort to Athens as a common seat of learning. Thus, though Pythoclides taught him to touch the cithara, he sought the elements of a higher kind of music in the lessons of Damon, who was believed to have contributed mainly to train him for his political career: himself no ordinary person; for he was held up by the comic poets to public jealousy, as a secret favourer of tyranny, and was driven from Athens by the process of ostracism.¹ But Pericles also entered with avidity into the abstrusest philosophical speculations, and even took pleasure in the arid subtleties of the Eleatic school, or at least in the ingenuity and the dialectic art with which they were unfolded to

¹ Plut. Per. 4. Aristid. 1. Schlosser (*Universalhist. Uebersicht*, l. 2. p. 39.) has a note on this subject, in which he brings a charge against Plutarch, which in this instance, at least, does not appear to be well founded. He considers the passage in the Life of Pericles, compared with one in Plato on the same subject, as a notable illustration of *the manner in which Plutarch treats his authors*: conceiving that he introduced the name of Damon merely on account of its celebrity, though Damon was, as is well known, Plato's master; and Plutarch himself observes, that Aristotle describes Pericles as receiving his early lessons in music from Pythoclides. Schlosser then gives a long extract from the first Alcibiades, the only material part of which is the passage from which it appears that Pericles was on terms of familiar intimacy with Damon toward the end of his life: *νῦν τηλικούτος ὢν Δάμωνα ζύουσιν*. And if, as Schlosser asserts, it was well ascertained that Damon was Plato's teacher, it would certainly be difficult to believe that he also instructed Pericles — who died in the same year in which Plato was born — at a very early period of his life. But I do not know on what grounds this assertion rests, and certainly the fact is not generally admitted. Ast, for instance (*Platon's Leben und Schriften*, p. 18.), observes, that Plato is said to have received instruction in music from Draco, a scholar of Damon's; and he refers to Olympiodorus's Vit. Plat., where this fact is mentioned, and to Plutarch De Musica, p. 1136 E. In this last passage the common reading is: *πάνυ γὰρ πρόσεσχε τῇ Μουσικῇ ἐπιστήμῃ Πλάτων, ἀκούστης γενόμενος Δράκοντος τοῦ Αθηναίου*. Wytttenbach indeed remarks on the word *Δράκοντος*, *Non est dubium quin auctor scripserit, certe scribere debuerit, Δάμωνος*. *Itaque verte*. But as he assigns no reason for this correction, one is led to suspect that Damon's more celebrated name occurring to his memory, caused him to forget the passage in Olympiodorus. Damon may have been younger than Pythoclides, as the Scholiast on the passage in the Alcibiades represents them as separated from each other by two generations; for, according to him, Pythoclides taught Agathocles, he Lamprocles, he Damon. But as this is clearly a mistake, we, in fact, know nothing as to the relation in which they stood to each other.

n by Zeno. But his principal guide in such searches, and the man who appears to have exercised the most powerful and durable influence on his mind and character, was the philosopher Anaxagoras, with whom he was long united in intimate friendship. Not only his public and private deportment, and his habits of thought, but the tone and style of his eloquence were believed to have been formed by his intercourse with Anaxagoras. It was commonly supposed that this effect was produced by the philosopher's physical speculations, which, elevating his disciple above the ignorant superstition of the vulgar, had imparted to him the serene composure and dignified language of a superior being. It is not so much that we should be loth to believe that it was the possession of such physical secrets as Anaxagoras was able to communicate, that inspired Pericles with his lofty conceptions, or that he was intoxicated with the little taste of science which had weaned him from his former popular prejudices. We should rather ascribe to him a deep impression to the distinguishing tenet of the Anaxagorean system, by which the philosopher himself was supposed to have acquired the title of *mind* from his contemporaries. The doctrine of an ordering intelligence, distinct from the material universe, and ruling it with absolute sway, was striking from its novelty, and peculiarly congenial to the character of Pericles. Such was the supremacy which Athens exercised over the multitude of her dependent states, and such the ascendancy which he felt himself destined to obtain over the multitude at Athens.

It was undoubtedly not for the mere amusement of his leisure that Pericles had enriched his mind with many rare acquirements. All of them were probably considered by him as instruments for the use of the statesman; and even those which seemed most

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remote from all practical purposes, may have contributed to the cultivation of that natural eloquence, to which he owed so much of his influence. He left no specimens of his oratory behind him, and we can only estimate it, like many other fruits of Greek genius, by the effect it produced. The few minute fragments preserved by Plutarch, which were recorded by earlier authors because they had sunk deep in the mind of his hearers, seem to indicate that he loved to concentrate his thoughts in a bold and vivid image: as when he called Ægina the eyesore of Piræus, and said that he descried war lowering from Peloponnesus. But though signally gifted and accomplished for political action, it was not without much hesitation and apprehension that he entered on a field, where he saw ample room indeed for the display of his powers, but also many enemies and great dangers. The very superiority of which he could not but be conscious, suggested a motive for alarm, as it might easily excite suspicion in the people of views adverse to their freedom; and these fears were heightened by some circumstances, trifling in themselves, but capable of awakening or confirming a popular prejudice. His personal appearance was graceful and majestic, notwithstanding a remarkable disproportion in the length of his head, which became a subject of inexhaustible pleasantry for the comic poets of his day¹; but the old men who remembered Pisistratus, were struck by the resemblance which they discovered between the tyrant and the young heir of the Alcmaeonids, and not only in their features², but

¹ Plut. Per. 3. 14.

² The contemporaries of Pisistratus seem to have discovered a striking likeness between his head and that of a statue of the god Dionysus, which was therefore supposed by some to have been sacrilegiously designed by the artist as a portrait of the mortal, and was looked upon as a specimen of the tyrant's arrogance. (Athen. xii. p. 533.) Hence, probably not without a malicious allusion to the scandal about Aspasia, Hermippus, in one of his comedies, entitled Pericles King of the Satyrs. Plut. Per. 33.

His first
public ap-
pearance.His political
views.

in the sweetness of voice, and the volubility of utterance, with which both expressed themselves. Still, after the ostracism of Themistocles, and the death of Aristides, while Cimon was engaged in continual expeditions, Pericles began to present himself more and more to the public eye, and was soon the acknowledged chief of a powerful party, which openly aimed at counteracting Cimon's influence, and introducing opposite maxims into the public counsels.

To some of the ancients indeed it appeared that the course of policy adopted by Pericles was entirely determined by the spirit of emulation, which induced him to take a different ground from that which he found already occupied by Cimon; and that, as Cimon was at the head of the aristocratical party which had been represented by Aristides, he therefore placed himself in the front of that which had been led by Themistocles. The difference between these parties, after the revolution by which the ancestor of Pericles had undermined the power of the old aristocracy, was for some time very faintly marked, and we have seen that Aristides himself was the author of a very democratical measure, which threw the first offices of the state open to all classes of the citizens. The aristocracy had no hope of recovering what it had lost; but, as the commonalty grew more enterprising, it became also more intent on keeping all that it had retained, and on stopping all further innovation at home. Abroad too, though it was no longer a question, whether Athens should continue to be a great maritime power, or should reduce her navy to the footing of the old *naucraries*, and though Cimon himself had actively pursued the policy of Themistocles, there was room for great difference of opinion as to the course which was to be followed in her foreign relations. The aristocratical party wished, for their own sake at least as much as for that of

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peace and justice, to preserve the balance of power as steady as possible in Greece, and directed the Athenian arms against the Persian empire with the greater energy, in the hope of diverting them from intestine warfare. The democratical party had other interests, and concurred only with that part of these views which tended towards enriching and aggrandizing the state.

It is difficult wholly to clear Pericles from the charge of having been swayed by personal motives in the choice of his political system, as it would be to establish it. But even if it were certain that his decision was not the result of conviction, it might as fairly be attributed to a hereditary prepossession in favour of the principles for which his ancestors had contended, and which had probably been transmitted in his family, as to his competition with Cimon, or to his fear of incurring the suspicion that he aimed at a tyranny, or unconstitutional power: a suspicion to which he was much more exposed in the station which he actually filled. But if his personal character might seem better adapted to an aristocratical than to a democratical party, it must also render us unwilling to believe, that he devoted himself to the cause of the commonalty merely that he might make it the instrument of his own ambition. There seems to be much better ground for supposing that he deliberately preferred the system which he adopted, as the most consistent, if not alone reconcilable, with the prosperity and safety of Athens; though his own agency in directing and controlling it might be a prominent object in all his views. But he might well think that the people had gone too far to remain stationary, even if there was any reason why it should not seize the good which lay within its reach. Its greatness had risen with the growth of the commonalty, and, it might appear to him, could only be maintained and

extended by the same means: at home by a decided ascendancy of the popular interest over that of the old aristocracy, and every other class in the state; abroad by an equally decided supremacy over the rest of Greece.

The contest between the parties seems for some time to have been carried on, without much violence or animosity, and rather with a noble emulation in the service of the public, than with assaults on one another. Cimon had enriched his country with the spoil and ransom of the Persians; and he had also greatly increased his private fortune.¹ His disposition was naturally inclined to liberality, and he made a munificent use of his wealth. Several great works were wanting for the security of the city, and little had yet been done for its embellishment. The south wall of the citadel was built with the treasure which Cimon brought home from Asia, and the plans of Themistocles were brought nearer to their accomplishment, by preparations which were now made for joining the city to its harbours, by walls carried down on the one side to Phalerus, on the other to Piræus. The laying of the foundations of these walls was itself an arduous and expensive work, on account of the marshy ground which they crossed; and Cimon himself executed the most difficult part with magnificent solidity at his own charge. He also set the example of adorning the public places of the city with trees, and by introducing a supply of water converted the Academy, a spot about two miles north of the city, from an arid waste, into a delightful grove, containing open lawns and courses for the exercises of the young, shady walks for the thoughtful, a scene of wholesome recreation for all.

Cimon's
munifi-
cence.

¹ Plut. (Cim. 10.) attributes his wealth entirely to this source; but it may have been in great part derived from the recovery of the Chersonesus, as Wachsmuth observes, l. 2. p. 57.

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This kind of expenditure was wise and noble ; but it was coupled with another, mischievous in its tendency, and seemingly degrading both to the benefited and to the benefactor. Cimon, it is said, not only like Pisistratus invited all who would to partake of the fruits of his fields and orchards, but threw down the fences, that none might scruple to enter. He not only gave the usual entertainments expected from the rich, to the members of his deme, but kept a table constantly open to them. When he went out into the streets he was commonly attended by a number of persons in good apparel, who, when they met with any elderly citizen, scantily clothed, would insist on exchanging their warm mantles for his threadbare covering. It was the office of the same agents respectfully to approach any of the poorer citizens of good character, whom they might see standing in the market-place, and silently to put some small pieces of money into their hands. There were some, Plutarch innocently observes, who decried this liberality as flattery of the mob, and the trick of a demagogue¹; but such slander is, he thinks, amply refuted by the fact, that Cimon was the leader of the aristocratical and Laconian party, and one of the few Athenians whose incorruptible integrity raised them above all suspicion of venality, or of ever acting from selfish motives. And he adds a story of the magnanimity with which Cimon had rejected a present offered to him by a foreigner who needed his protection. It might perhaps be alleged with more colour of truth, that the ordinary relation subsisting at this period between the rich and the poor at Athens, rendered such good offices so common, that they could not fairly be attributed even to ambition, much less to

¹ Cim. 10. In his Life of Pericles, 9. he seems himself to adopt the same view. With regard to the removal of the fences, Plutarch's statement is not confirmed by Theopompus (Athen. xii. p. 533.), and may therefore be suspected of exaggeration.

any meaner motive. It is true that the state of things had undergone a great change at Athens in favour of the poorer class, since Solon had been obliged to interpose, to protect them from the rigour of creditors, who first impoverished, and then enslaved them. Since this time the aristocracy had found it expedient to court the commonalty which it could no longer oppress, and to part with a portion of its wealth for the sake of retaining its power. There were of course then, as at all times, benevolent individuals, who only consulted the dictates of a generous nature; but the contrast between the practice which prevailed before and after the age of Solon, seems clearly to mark the spurious origin of the ordinary beneficence. Yet Isocrates, when he extols the bounty of the good old times, which prevented the pressure of poverty from being ever felt, speaks of land granted at low rents, sums of money advanced at low interest¹, and asserts that none of the citizens were then in such indigence, as to depend on casual relief.² Cimon's munificence therefore must have been remarkable, not only in its degree, but in its kind; and was not the less that of a demagogue, because he sought popularity, not merely for his own sake, but for that of his order and his party.

Such was the light in which it was viewed by Pericles; and some of the measures which most strongly marked his administration were adopted to counteract its effects. He was not able to rival Cimon's profusion, and he even husbanded his private fortune with rigid economy, that he might keep his probity in the management of public affairs free both from temptation and suspicion. His friend Demonides is said first to have suggested the thought of throwing Cimon's liberality into the shade, and rendering it superfluous,

Popular
measures of
Pericles.

¹ Areop. c. 12.

² Ibid. c. 38.

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by proposing a similar application of the public revenue.¹ Pericles perhaps deemed it safer and more becoming, that the people should supply the poorer citizens with the means of enjoyment out of its own funds, than that they should depend on the bounty of opulent individuals. He might think that the generation which had raised their country to such a pitch of greatness, was entitled to reap the fruits of the sacrifice which their fathers had made, when they resigned the produce of the mines of Laurium to the use of the state. Very early therefore he signalised his appearance in the assembly by becoming the author of a series of measures, all tending to provide for the subsistence and gratification of the poorer class at the public expense. We do not stop to describe these measures, because they will find a more appropriate place in a general view of the administration of Pericles. But we must here observe, that, while he was courting the favour of the multitude by these arts, he was no less studious to command its respect. From his first entrance into public life, he devoted himself with unremitting application to business: he was never to be seen out of doors, but on the way between his house and the seat of council: and, as if by way of contrast to Cimon's convivial tastes, declined all invitations to the entertainments of his acquaintance — once only during the whole period he broke through this rule, to honour the wedding of his relative Euryptolemus with his presence — and confined himself to the society of a very select circle of intimate friends. He bestowed the most assiduous attention on the preparation of his speeches, and so little disguised it, that he used to say he never mounted the *bema*, without praying that no inappropriate word might drop from his lips. The impression thus pro-

¹ Plut. Per. 9., on the authority of Aristotle.

duced was heightened by the calm majesty of his air and carriage, and by the philosophical composure which he maintained under all provocations.¹ And he was so careful to avoid the effect which familiarity might have on the people, that he was sparing even in his attendance at the assembly, and, reserving his own appearance for great occasions, carried many of his measures through the agency of his friends and partisans. Among them the person whose name is most frequently associated with that of Pericles was Ephialtes, son of Sophonides, a person not much less conspicuous for his rigid integrity than Aristides himself, and who seems to have entered into the views of Pericles with disinterested earnestness, and fearlessly to have borne the brunt of the conflict with the opposite party.

Ephialtes.

Immediately after the conquest of Thasos an occasion occurred for the two parties to measure their strength. It would appear that Cimon had received instructions, before he brought home his victorious armament, to attempt some further conquest on the mainland between the newly conquered district and Macedonia. Plutarch says, that he was expected to have invaded Macedonia, and to have added a large tract of it to the dominions of Athens. Yet it does not clearly appear how the conquest of Thasos afforded an opportunity of effecting this with greater ease: nor is any motive suggested for such an attack on the territories of Alexander. We might hence be inclined to suspect, that the expedition which Cimon had neglected to undertake, though called for by the people's wishes, if not by their express orders, was to have been directed, not against Macedonia, but against

Impeach
ment of
Cimon.

¹ Plutarch tells a story — characteristic if not true — of a rude fellow, who after railing at Pericles all day, as he was transacting business in public, followed him after dusk with abusive language to his door, when Pericles ordered one of his servants to take a light, and conduct the man home.

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the Thracian tribes on its frontier, who had so lately cut off their colonists on the Strymon: a blow which the Athenians were naturally impatient to avenge, but which the king of Macedonia might well be supposed to have witnessed without regret, even if he did not instigate those who inflicted it. However this may be, Cimon's forbearance disappointed and irritated the people, and his adversaries inflamed the popular indignation by ascribing his conduct to the influence of Macedonian gold. This part of the charge at least was undoubtedly groundless; and Pericles, though appointed by the people one of Cimon's accusers, when he was brought to trial for treason, seems to have entered into the prosecution with reluctance. The danger however was great, and Elpinice came to the house of Pericles to plead with him for her brother. Pericles, playfully, though it would seem not quite so delicately as our manners would require, reminded her that she was past the age at which female intercession is most powerful; but in effect he granted her request; for he kept back the thunder of his eloquence, and only rose once, for form's sake, to second the accusation. Plutarch says, that Cimon was acquitted: and there seems to be no reason for doubting the fact, except a suspicion, that this was the trial to which Demosthenes alludes, when he says that Cimon narrowly escaped with his life, and was condemned to a penalty of fifty talents: a singular repetition of his father's destiny.¹

¹ Aristocr. p. 688. In this case he does not mention the charge, but, as Wachsmuth observes, the motive of the prosecution. On the other hand, the language of Demosthenes, *ὅτι τὴν πατριὸν μετεκίνησε πολιτείαν*, would suit very well what Plutarch says of Cimon's attempt to revive the old aristocracy, Cim. 15.; but then we hear of no formal prosecution before the ostracism. Bekker's reading, *Πατρίων* for *πατριὸν*, would put an end to this question, but would imply that the orator had confounded Cimon's history with his father's. We have already noticed one instance of a similar confusion in the case of Alexander of Macedon, whose pursuit of the Persians after the battle of Platæa the orator (Aristocr. p. 687.) ascribes to Perdiccas. Others are cited by Funkhanel in Zimmermann's *Zeitschrift f. d. A.* 1836, n. 130. (*Ueber die Redner als geschichtliche Quelle*).

This however was only a prelude to a more momentous struggle, which involved the principles of the parties, and excited much stronger feelings of mutual resentment. It appears to have been about this time that Pericles resolved on attacking the aristocracy in its ancient and revered stronghold, the Areopagus. We have seen that this body, at once a council and a court of justice, was composed, according to Solon's regulation, of the ex-archons. Its character was little altered after the archonship was filled by lot, so long as it was open to none but citizens of the wealthiest class. But, by the innovation introduced by Aristides, the poorest Athenian might gain admission to the Areopagus. Still the change which this measure produced in its composition was probably for a long time scarcely perceptible, and attended with no effect on its maxims and proceedings. When Pericles made his attack on it, it was perhaps as much as ever an aristocratical assembly. The greater part of the members had come in under the old system, and most of those who followed them probably belonged to the same class; for though in the eye of the law the archonship had become open to all, it is not likely that many of a lower station would immediately present themselves to take their chance. But even if any such were successful, they could exert but little influence on the general character of the council, which would act much more powerfully on them. The poor man who took his seat among a number of persons of superior rank, fortune, and education, would generally be eager to adopt the tone, and conform to the wishes of his colleagues; and hence the prevailing spirit might continue for many generations unaltered. This may be the main point which Isocrates had in view, when he observed, that the worst men, as soon as they entered the Areopagus,

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seemed to change their nature.¹ Pericles therefore had reason to consider it as a formidable obstacle to his plans.² He did not however attempt, or perhaps desire, to abolish an institution so hallowed by tradition; but he aimed at narrowing the range of its functions, so as to leave it little more than an august name. Ephialtes was his principal coadjutor in this undertaking, and by the prominent part which he took in it exposed himself to the implacable enmity of the opposite party, which appears to have set all its engines in motion to ward off the blow.

B. C. 461.
The Athenians at Ithome.

It is not certain whether this struggle had begun or was only impending, at the time of the embassy which came from Sparta to request the aid of the Athenians against Ithome. But the two parties were no less at variance on this subject than on the other. The aristocratical party considered Sparta as its natural ally, and did not wish to see Athens without a rival in Greece. Cimon was personally attached to Sparta³, possessed the confidence of the Spartans, and took every opportunity of expressing the warmest admiration for their character and institutions; and, to mark his respect for them, gave one of his sons the name of Lacedæmonius. He himself was in some degree indebted to their patronage for his political elevation, and had requited their favour by joining with them in the persecution of Themistocles. When therefore Ephialtes dissuaded the people from granting the request of the Spartans, and exclaimed against the folly of raising a fallen antagonist, Cimon urged them *not to permit Greece to be lamed, and Athens to lose her yoke-fellow*.⁴ This advice prevailed, and Cimon

¹ Areop. 15.

² On this subject see some excellent remarks in Droysen's German translation of Æschylus, i. p. 176.

³ φιλολάκων. Plut. Cim. 16.

⁴ μήτε τὴν Ἑλλάδα χωλὴν, μήτε τὴν πόλιν ἑτερόζυγα περιδεῖν γεγεννημένην — the language of Cimon reported by his contemporary the poet Ion of Chios. Plut. Cim. 16.

was sent with a large force to assist the Spartans at the siege of Ithome.

The Spartans had hoped that the Athenians, who were eminently skilful in this kind of warfare, would have enabled them speedily to reduce the place. But when they found that a long time passed without any impression having been made on it, they began to suspect that the fault lay in the will, rather than in the ability of their auxiliaries, and conceived apprehensions, suggested perhaps by the consciousness of their own bad faith, that the Athenians might be induced to betray them to the besieged. Their distrust soon became so strong that, while they retained all their other allies, they dismissed the Athenian troops, without assigning any other reason, than that they had no further need of their services. The Athenians, who clearly perceived their real motive, were probably more exasperated by this want of confidence, than they would have been by a perfidious attack. The first effect produced by the affront at Athens was a resolution to break off all connection with Sparta, and, to make the rupture more glaring, they entered into an alliance with Sparta's old rival, Argos. Argos had been induced by her jealousy of Sparta to keep aloof from the Persian war, and had probably been much offended at seeing Mycenæ, over which she claimed a disputed supremacy, take an honourable part in that glorious struggle. After that event Mycenæ seems to have shown a disposition to put forth new pretensions, grounded on the title of her ancient kings. She asserted a right to the presidency of the Nemean games, which had been long enjoyed by Argos, and to the superintendence of a temple of Heré, which was common to the two cities, and lay between them, though nearer to Mycenæ. It had no doubt been the prospect of support from Sparta, that encouraged Mycenæ in this rivalry with her more

Alliance
between
Athens and
Argos.

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powerful neighbour. But when the earthquake and the Messenian insurrection had disabled Sparta from all efforts on behalf of others, the Argives seized the opportunity of making war on Mycenæ. They were assisted by Tegea and Cleonæ, defeated the Mycenians in battle, shut them up within their walls, and in spite of a gallant resistance took the city, razed it to the ground, and annexed the territory to their own. It was apparently very soon after this important conquest, to which we shall hereafter return, that they received proposals of alliance from Athens, which they gladly embraced; and the Thessalians—by what means does not appear—were included in the treaty.¹

This turn of events was extremely agreeable to the democratical party at Athens, not only in itself, on account of the assistance which they might hope to receive from Argos, but because it immediately afforded them a great advantage in their conflict with their domestic adversaries, and in particular furnished them with new arms against Cimon. He instantly became obnoxious, both as the avowed friend of Sparta, and as the author and leader of the expedition, which had drawn so rude an insult on his countrymen. The attack on the authority of the Areopagus was now prosecuted with greater vigour, and Cimon had little influence left to exert in its behalf. Yet his party seems not by any means to have remained passive, but to have put forth all its strength in a last effort to save its citadel; and it was supported by an auxiliary who had some very powerful engines to wield in its defence. This was the poet Æschylus, who was attached to it by his

¹ Mr. Clinton, *Fasti Hell.*, on the authority of Diodorus, places the fall of Mycenæ in the archonship of Theagenides, Ol. 78. 1. B. C. 468, four years before the earthquake at Sparta. But Diodorus seems to be much better entitled to attention in his view of the connection of the events, which is that taken in the text, than in his date. Independent of his authority, it is scarcely conceivable that Sparta would have permitted the destruction of Mycenæ, if she had been in a condition to protect her ally.

character, and his early associations. Himself a Eupatrid, perhaps connected with the priestly families of Eleusis, his deme, if not his birth-place, he gloried in the laurels which he had won at Marathon, above all the honours earned by his sword and by his pen, though he had also fought at Salamis, and had founded a new era of dramatic poetry.¹ He was an admirer of Aristides, whose character he had painted in one of his tragedies, under the name of an ancient hero, with a truth which was immediately recognised by the audience. The contest with Persia, which was the subject of one of his great works, probably appeared to him the legitimate object for the energies of Greece. Beside this general disposition to side with Cimon's party, against Pericles, the whole train of his poetical and religious feelings, nourished by a deep study of the mythical and religious traditions of Greek antiquity, engaged him in the cause of the Areopagus, to oppose what he probably considered as a sacrilegious encroachment on a venerable and hallowed institution. As such he endeavoured to represent it to the people, with all the power of his solemn poetry, and all the arts of theatrical illusion. In his tragedy, entitled the *Eumenides*, which was acted probably in the year of the rupture with Sparta, and just after the conclusion of the treaty with Argos, he exhibits the mythical origin of the court and council of Areopagus, in the form which best suited his purpose, tracing it to the cause first pleaded there between the Argive matricide Orestes, who pledges his country to eternal alliance with Athens, and the *dread Goddesses*, who sought vengeance for the blood which he had shed. The poet brings these terrible beings on the stage, as well as the tutelary goddess of the city, who herself institutes the tribunal, to

The Eumenides of
Æschylus.

¹ Paus. i. 14. 4.

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Change in
the juris-
diction of
the Areopa-
gus.

last throughout all ages, and exhorts her people to preserve it as the glory and safeguard of the city; and the spectators are led to consider the continuance of the blessings which the pacified avengers promise to the land, as depending on the permanence of the institution which had succeeded to their functions.

Nevertheless, though the composition to which this drama belongs seems to have surpassed all his former productions, the author failed in his political object; and Ephialtes carried a decree, or a law, by which the Areopagus was shorn of its authority, and only retained a few branches of its jurisdiction. Thus much is certain; but it is extremely difficult to determine the precise nature of the innovation, and whether it affected the power of the tribunal, which took cognisance of causes of murder, or that of the council, which claimed a large and indefinite superintendence over the education and conduct of the citizens, and the decision of various causes pertaining to religion and morals, and even the right of interfering with the decrees of the people, in cases where, according to its own view, the public safety might seem to require it. One of the strongest arguments for the opinion that the law of Ephialtes took causes of murder out of the jurisdiction of the Areopagus, and transferred them to the popular courts, is afforded by the poem of Æschylus, which turns entirely on the foundation of the *court*. Yet it must be owned that the praises of Athene rather apply to the *council*, and it is especially difficult to conceive what object Pericles and his party could have had in touching that part of the criminal jurisdiction, which was at once the most venerable, the most rarely exercised, and the least liable to abuse. For it does not appear that hitherto the spirit of party had become so furious at Athens, as to resort to assassination; though not long after we shall meet with a remarkable instance

of such an excess. On the other hand it may be objected, that the power of the council had long ceased to be formidable, and could not give occasion to so earnest and passionate a contest. Yet its dormant claims might be revived at a more seasonable juncture, and there were some branches of the jurisdiction pertaining to its censorial authority, which might at all times offer a convenient handle to the aristocratical party for an attack on Pericles and his friends. There was none, as the event proved, which they had more cause to fear than a charge of impiety, which now came under the cognisance of the Areopagus, but at a later period in the life of Pericles seems to be no longer subject to it. We are therefore still inclined to think, though some of the highest modern authorities are on the opposite side, that it was the council, with its incidental jurisdiction, rather than the tribunal for the prosecution of murder, which Ephialtes struck at; and this opinion seems to accord best with the manner in which Plutarch connects the attempts of Cimon to restore the authority of the Areopagus, with those which he made to revive the old aristocratical constitution.¹

¹ Cim. 15. For the literature of the controversy which has been warmly agitated in Germany on this question, the reader may consult note 4. p. 118. of Müller's edition of the Eumenides. Some readers may perhaps be surprised to find no mention made here of a prerogative, which they may have seen elsewhere attributed to the Areopagus, and which it is said to have retained even to the time of the change effected by Pericles and Ephialtes. Till that time, we have been informed by a modern historian, the Areopagus *directed all issues from the public treasury*. The assertion is one of those — very numerous in the work where it occurs — which have owed their success neither to the force of testimony nor of reasoning, but simply to the placid assurance with which they are advanced. We have seen indeed (Vol. II. p. 329.) an extraordinary case, in which the Areopagus seems to have assumed such a power. But if any one thinks this a sufficient proof of the general assertion, we could only reply by the old Greek jest, of the simpleton who carried a brick about as a sample of a house, or by the Roman story, of the youth who finding a fragment of a boat on the beach was seized with the desire of building a ship. It is one of those statements which can hardly be refuted until some attempt has been made to prove them. But we may observe that the very fact of Aristotle's mentioning the report on this subject for which Plutarch cites his authority — and after all it was no more than a report, and Clidemus (Plut. Them. 10.) gave a different account of the matter — raises the strongest presumption that, if true, it was an extraordinary case. But even if there was any reason for supposing that such a power was exerted by the Areopagus, as one of its

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This triumph of Pericles and his party over the Areopagus seems to have been immediately followed by the ostracism of Cimon, which took place about two years after the return of the Athenians from Messenia; and it is therefore not improbable that his exile may have been not so much an effect of popular resentment, as a measure of precaution, which may have appeared necessary even to the moderate men of both parties, for the establishment of public tranquillity.

The rupture between Athens and Sparta led to new movements, by which Athens gained a great immediate advantage, but lost one of her old and most useful allies. Corinth and Megara had been for some time past at war: a dispute about their frontier was probably the pretext rather than the cause of the quarrel. The party uppermost at Megara could now rely on the friendship of Athens; it renounced the alliance with Sparta, and admitted an Athenian garrison into the city, and into the port of Pegæ on the Corinthian gulf. To secure the communication between Megara and the sea, and its dependence on its new ally, the Athenians connected the city with its harbour at Nisæa by a work similar to that which had lately been begun between Athens and Piræus, and themselves garrisoned the walls which they built for the Megarians.

B. C. 460.
Athenian
expedition
to Egypt.

While a part of their force was thus employed, another was carrying on the war with Persia in a new quarter. Inarus, king of some of the Libyan tribes on the western border of Egypt, had excited an insurrection there against the Persians, and his

ordinary prerogatives, at the time of the Persian war, it would still be utterly incredible that it should have subsisted down to the time of Pericles. We are only surprised that Schlosser (I. 2. p. 83.) should have adopted the opinion, and without offering any argument in support of it, have stated it as a notorious fact. Wachsmuth more judiciously contents himself with remarking its improbability and groundlessness in a note (II. I. p. 147.).

authority was acknowledged throughout the greater part of the country. Artaxerxes sent his brother Achæmenes with a great army to quell this rebellion. An Athenian armament of 200 galleys was lying at the time off Cyprus, and Inarus sent to obtain its assistance. The Athenian commanders, whether following their own discretion, or after orders received from home, quitted Cyprus, and having joined with the insurgents, enabled them to defeat Achæmenes, who fell in the battle by the hand of Inarus. They then sailed up the Nile to Memphis, where a body of Persians, and some Egyptians, who still adhered to their cause, were in possession of one quarter of the city, called White Castle.¹ The rest was subject to Inarus, and there the Athenians stationed themselves, and besieged the Persians.

They were still engaged in this enterprise, which from the magnitude of the force employed in it might once have seemed sufficient to engross their attention, in the year B. C. 457, one of the most eventful in their annals. The occupation of Megara had roused the most vehement resentment at Corinth, and was followed by a war in which the Corinthians were joined by Ægina and the maritime towns of Argolis. The Athenians did not wait to be attacked. They landed a body of troops near Haliæ in the Argolic Acté, but were driven back to their ships with loss by the united forces of Corinth and Epidaurus. This check however was soon revenged by a victory which they gained over the Peloponnesian fleet, off the island of Cecryphalea in the Saronic gulf; and shortly afterward, under the command of Leocrates, their arms were crowned with a still more brilliant success. He defeated the allies in a great sea-fight near Ægina,

B. C. 457.
Great
efforts of
the Athe-
nians.

¹ Λευκὸν τεῖχος. Thuc. I. 104. Ctesias, c. 32. Diodor. (XI. 74.) calls Achæmenes the uncle of Artaxerxes.

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Myronides.

and took seventy of their galleys, and then landing his troops on the island, laid siege to the city. The Corinthians thought to effect a diversion in favour of the Æginetans by seizing the passes of Geranea, and invading the Megarian territory, while they sent a small force over to Ægina. They could not believe it possible that the Athenians, while they were carrying on a war in Egypt and the adjacent coasts of Phœnicia, and in Cyprus, could protect Megara without drawing their troops away from Ægina. But the spirit of Athens was even greater than her strength, and rose against dangers and difficulties¹; and she had a man within her walls perhaps not inferior to Cimon or Miltiades. Myronides collected all the citizens, young and old, who had been left at home for the defence of the city, and marched out with them to meet the Corinthians. The action which followed was not decisive; but the Athenians remained on the field, and erected a trophy, while the Corinthians returned home. But, being there reproached for yielding to so unequal a force, twelve days after they again sallied forth, and marched to the scene of action, to set up a rival trophy, or, more properly, to challenge the Athenians to another battle. The Athenians, who, perhaps expecting a fresh attack, had remained at Megara, immediately issued from the town, cut to pieces a party of the enemy who were erecting the trophy, and then, coming up to the main body, completely defeated them. In their flight a part of the Corinthians missed their road, and turned into a large pit or quarry, from which they could find no egress. The Athenians having stationed their heavy-armed in the passage by which they entered, surrounded the place with their light

¹ The Athenians were conscious of the greatness of their own efforts. In an inscription still preserved in the Louvre, the Erechthean tribe records with emphatic simplicity, that its slain fell in Cyprus, in Egypt, in Phœnicia, at Hallæ, in Ægina, in Megara, *in the same year*. See Dr. Arnold on Thuc. I. 104.

roops, who with their missiles slew every man within. Thucydides does not mention the number that fell, but says that the loss was great enough to be deeply felt at Corinth.

Some time before the Corinthians made this ineffectual attempt to relieve Ægina, the king of Persia, who saw himself in danger of losing his last hold on Egypt, had endeavoured to procure a similar diversion in his own favour, which might draw away the Athenians from Memphis. The time had now come when the gold of Persia was to be found more formidable to Greece than her arms. Artaxerxes sent a Persian, named Megabazus, to Sparta, with a sum of money, to be employed in bribing the principal Spartans to use their influence, so as to engage their countrymen in an expedition against Attica. Megabazus did not find the leading Spartans unwilling to receive his money; but they seem to have been unable to render him the service for which it was offered. Ithome still held out: and Sparta had probably not yet sufficiently either recovered her strength, or restored internal tranquillity, to venture on the proposed invasion. Some rumour of this negotiation may have reached Athens, and have quickened the energy with which Pericles now urged the completion of the long walls, for which preparations had been made, as we have seen, some years before. But among his opponents there was a faction who viewed the progress of this great work in a different light from Cimon, and saw in it, not the means of securing the independence of Athens, but a bulwark of the hated commonalty. They too would gladly have seen an invading army in Attica, which might assist them in destroying the work and its authors. And in the same year which witnessed the last-mentioned victory of Myronides, an opportunity presented itself — if it was not procured by their intrigues — which encouraged them to hop

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XVII.Spartan
expedition
to Doris.

for such a triumph. The Phocians had invaded Doris, and had taken one of its little towns. The piety of the Spartans was roused; they assembled an army of 10,000 allied troops, and 1500 of their own, marched into Doris, and compelled the Phocians to restore their conquest. But an obstacle seemed now to be placed in the way of their return. The Athenians, who had a squadron at Pegæ, could prevent them from crossing the Corinthian gulf; and, though they had been permitted to traverse the Isthmus without hinderance, they heard that the passes were now vigilantly guarded by the enemy. These were the ostensible reasons which induced Nicomedes, who commanded in the stead of the young king Pleistoanax, to turn aside on his march through Bœotia, as if to deliberate on the safest course, and to encamp at Tanagra, near the borders of Attica. But he had received secret advice from the oligarchical faction at Athens, which led him to hope for their co-operation in striking a great blow. These intrigues were not so carefully concealed as to avoid all suspicion; but the apprehensions they excited only animated the sounder part of the Athenians to seek the enemy, instead of waiting for an attack in which force might be seconded by treachery. They mustered their whole strength, which, with 1000 Argives and some other allied troops, chiefly from Ionia, amounted to 14,000 infantry; and a body of cavalry came to their aid from Thessaly. With this army they marched to Tanagra. While the two armies were here in presence of each other, and an engagement was daily expected, Cimon, who was in the neighbourhood, came to the Athenian camp, and requested leave to take his post among the men of his tribe. The Athenian generals either felt or affected a suspicion of his intentions; which, though groundless, was not perhaps unreasonable. All was not secure, as we have just seen,

Battle of
Tanagra.

at Athens; and there were friends and partizans of Cimon in the army, who formed a body of 100 men. Instead of breaking up this band, and distributing it over the army, the generals, according to Plutarch, referred Cimon's request to the council of Five Hundred, which ordered them to reject it.¹ Elsewhere Plutarch ascribes the refusal to the friends of Pericles, who was himself present, and probably in command.² Thus repulsed, Cimon is said to have left his armour with his friends, exhorting them by their deeds to refute the calumnies of those who charged them with preferring Sparta to their country. A hard-fought battle took place, in which Pericles signalised himself by extraordinary feats of valour, as if in emulation of Cimon's friends, who had placed his panoply in their ranks, and fought round it with inflexible spirit, till they fell, every one at his post: the most painful loss which the Athenians suffered on this disastrous day. The treachery of the Thessalians, who went over to the enemy in the midst of the action, contributed to decide it in favour of the Peloponnesians; though the slaughter was great on both sides, and the author followed by Diodorus³ represented the victory as doubtful, and that the battle was followed by a truce for four months. But Thucydides is clear as to the issue of the engagement, and seems to know nothing of the truce. The Peloponnesians, as he relates, ravaged the Megarian territory, and finding the passes of Geranea now open, returned home over the isthmus.

If Plutarch's information was accurate, the Athenians were not only worsted at Tanagra, but were so disheartened by their defeat, and so apprehensive of an early invasion from Peloponnesus, that they recalled Cimon from his exile for the purpose of concluding the war through his mediation. But this

¹ Cim. 17.² Per. 10.³ XI. 80.

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XVIIB. C. 456.
Battle of
Œnophyta.

account seems totally inconsistent with the facts recorded by Thucydides, and Cimon's return, if in any degree connected with the battle of Tanagra, appears to have been separated from it by a much longer interval. Only about three months after that event, early in the year B. C. 456, the Athenians were again in the field, to retrieve the credit which they had lost in Bœotia, where they had partizans whose political influence depended on the success of their arms. Under the command of Myronides they met the Bœotians, who were assembled in greatly superior numbers in a tract called from its vineyards Œnophyta, and gained a brilliant and long-celebrated victory, which gave them undisputed possession both of Bœotia and of Phocis, or at least made their interest there decidedly predominant. Diodorus¹ says that Myronides made himself master of all the Bœotian towns, except Thebes. But even there, as may be gathered from an allusion of Aristotle², his victory established the ascendancy of a democratical party, which, if not absolutely dependent on Athens, could not be friendly to Sparta. To secure these advantages he razed the walls of Tanagra, and forced the Locrians of Opus to put 100 of their citizens — probably one member of each of the ruling families — as hostages into his hands. It was about the same time that the Athenians completed their long walls, which, as they gave their city the strength of an island,

¹ XI. 83. By a blunder not uncommon with him, he makes two battles out of one; but observes, with great simplicity, that for the first of these battles — though it was one of the most memorable the Athenians ever fought — no historian had assigned a place.

² *Ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένων ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη*, Pol. v. 2. Wachsmuth (I. 2. p. 105. n. 10.) suspects an error, and that Aristotle meant to allude to the battle of Tanagra, when the oligarchy may be supposed to have recovered its ascendancy at Thebes. But it seems quite as probable, that not *διεφθάρη*, but *κακῶς πολιτευομένων* is to be joined immediately with the preceding words; and that the meaning is, that after the victory of Athens at Œnophyta the democratical party at Thebes lost all moderation, and running into excesses like those committed at Megara, Syracuse, and Rhodes, which are mentioned immediately after, provoked a reaction, which finally overthrew it.

turned their views more unreservedly than ever toward the sea ; and not long after in the same year the Æginetans capitulated, on nearly the same terms which had been granted to the Thasians : demolition of their walls, surrender of their ships, and payment of tribute.

CHA
XVI

In the following year, 455, the Spartans were reminded that they also were liable to be attacked at home. An Athenian armament, of fifty galleys, and, if we may trust Diodorus, with 4000 heavy-armed troops on board¹, sailed round Peloponnesus under Tolmides, burnt the Spartan arsenal at Gythium, took a town named Chalcis belonging to the Corinthians, and defeated the Sicyonians, who attempted to oppose the landing of the troops.² But the most important advantage gained in the expedition was the capture of Naupactus, which belonged to the Ozolian Locrians, and now fell into the hands of the Athenians at a very seasonable juncture. The third Messenian war had just come to a close. The brave defenders of Ithome had obtained honourable terms, granted, as the Spartans professed, in compliance with an oracle which enjoined their clemency. The besieged were permitted to quit Peloponnesus with their families, on condition of being detained in slavery if they ever returned. Tolmides now settled the homeless wanderers in Naupactus : a position full of hope for the exiles, as

B. C. 4
Expedi
of Tol-
mides.End of
third M
essenian

¹ According to Diodorus, xi. 84., 1000 men had been voted to Tolmides for this expedition, to be selected by himself. But he took advantage of the power thus committed to him to induce many to give in their names as volunteers, pretending that he should otherwise force them to serve. When in this manner he had obtained 3000 names, he exercised his power by choosing 1000 more. We feel great doubt about the truth of the story in this form, and are inclined to suspect that, if it was well founded, it belongs to the later expedition in which Tolmides lost his life. Even if he had the means of playing such a trick, it is not probable that after having undertaken, as Diodorus relates, to accomplish the objects of his expedition with 1000 men, he should have desired to take out four times that number ; nor does it appear that so large a force was needed for his purpose, as we find that 1000 men sufficed Pericles for similar, if not more extensive operations. Compare Plut. Per. 19.

² According to Diodorus, he also made himself master of all the towns in Caphallenia. Diodorus seems to suppose that one of these was named Zacynthus.

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it was that from which the Dorians had crossed over to the conquest of their native land, and most useful to the Athenians, for their operations in the Corinthian gulf.

Disasters of
the Athenians in
Egypt.

But these successes were counterbalanced by a reverse which befell the arms of Athens this same year in another quarter. After the defeat of Achæmenes, Artaxerxes, disappointed in his hopes of assistance from Sparta, had resolved on a still more vigorous effort, and raised a greater army, which he placed under the command of an abler general, Megabyzus son of Zopyrus. Megabyzus defeated the insurgents and their allies, and forced the Greeks to evacuate Memphis, and to take refuge in an island of the Nile, named Prosopitis, which contained a town called Byblus, where he besieged them for eighteen months. At length he resorted to the contrivance of turning the stream which separated the island from his own side of the river, into new channels, and conducted the work so vigorously, that the Greek galleys were all left aground, and were fired by the Athenians themselves, that they might not fall into the enemy's hands. The Persians then marched into the island over the dry bed of the river; the Egyptians in dismay abandoned their allies, who were overpowered by numbers, and almost all destroyed. A few reached the opposite bank, and made their way to Cyrene. Inarus himself was betrayed into the hands of the Persians, and put to death; according to Ctesias, he surrendered himself to Megabyzus on condition that his life should be spared, but having been carried a prisoner to Persia, was sacrificed by Artaxerxes to the vengeance of his mother for the death of Achæmenes, and the indignation of Megabyzus at this breach of faith involved the empire in a civil war. Egypt however was again reduced under the Persian yoke, except a part of the Delta, where another pretender, named

DISASTERS IN EGYPT.

Amyrtæus, who assumed the title of king, protected by the marshes and by the spirit of the people, the most warlike, Thucydides observes, of the Egyptians, maintained himself for several years against the power of the Persian monarchy. But the misfortune of the Athenians did not end with the destruction of the great fleet and army which had been first employed in the war. They had sent a squadron of fifty galleys to the relief of their countrymen, which, arriving before the news of the recent disaster had reached them, entered the Mendesian branch of the Nile. They were here surprized by a combined attack of the Persian land force and a Phœnician fleet, and but few escaped to bear the mournful tidings to Athens.

Yet even after this calamity we find the Athenians, not suing for peace, but bent on extending their power, and annoying their enemies. Early in the next year (454) an opportunity offered itself of enlarging the range of their influence in the north of Greece. A Thessalian named Orestes, whose father Echecratidas is called by Thucydides king of the Thessalians, and had probably held the office of *Tagus*, had been driven from his country, and applied to the Athenians for aid to effect his restoration. Succours were granted to him, and the forces of Bœotia and Phocis, now at the disposal of Athens, were called out to support her ally. But the superiority of the Thessalians in cavalry checked all their operations in the field; they failed in an attempt upon Pharsalus, and were at length forced to retire without having accomplished any of their ends.¹ It was perhaps to soothe the public disappointment that Pericles shortly

¹ There seems to be no ground for supposing that this expedition was conducted by Myronides, who is evidently mentioned by Diodorus, only because, with his usual carelessness, he makes the invasion of Thessaly immediately follow the battle of Cænophyta.

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afterwards embarked at Pegæ with a thousand men, and, coasting the south side of the Corinthian gulf, made a descent on the territory of Sicyon, and routed the Sicyonian force sent to oppose his landing. He then took on board some Achæan troops, and, sailing over to the coast of Acarnania, laid siege to the town of Œniadæ, which had long incurred the enmity of the Athenians, chiefly it would seem because, being situate in a tract of uncommonly rich land formed by the depositions of the Achelous, it had early excited their cupidity.¹ This attempt however proved unsuccessful; and the general result of the campaign seems not to have been on the whole advantageous or encouraging.

B. C. 453?
Cimon's
recall.

In this state of things Cimon's friends might not find it difficult to awaken a feeling of regret in the people for their old favourite, by contrasting his glorious and profitable victories with the recent failures and losses, and, as a natural consequence, to turn their thoughts and wishes toward peace with Sparta. It seems to have been not long after the events which have been just related, that Cimon was recalled from his exile; and the decree for that purpose was moved by Pericles himself; a fact which seems to intimate that some change had taken place in the relations or the temper of parties at Athens. We have already assigned a reason for rejecting Plutarch's statement as to the motive and the time of Cimon's recall; and indeed he himself, with all the other writers who mention the fact, describes that event as having been immediately followed by a suspension of hostilities, which, according to Thucydides, were interrupted for three years before a formal truce was concluded between the belligerents. Hence it seems clear that Cimon's return, which, as is known from a fragment of Theopompus², took place before five

¹ Paus. iv. 25. 1.

² Published by Marx, Ephori Fragmenta, p. 224.

years of his exile had quite expired, must be dated in the third or fourth year after the battle of Tanagra. According to an account not improbable in itself, but rendered suspicious by the confusion and inaccuracy of the context in which it appears, he had retired to his patrimony in the Chersonesus.¹ The motives which led Pericles to promote his recall must always remain doubtful. It is possible that he made a virtue of necessity, and sought to conciliate his rival by complying with a public feeling which he knew it would be vain to resist. But it is also possible that he may have been really desirous of forming an union with Cimon on terms honourable and advantageous to each. There were some ancient authors, of that class who are in every secret, who related that Cimon's recall was the result of a compact concluded through the mediation of Elpinice, according to which Pericles was to be left undisputed master of the political field, while he himself prosecuted the war with Persia. This was probably no more than an inference drawn from the ensuing events. If we might indulge in a similar conjecture, we should be inclined to connect the conduct of Pericles with those factious machinations, which, as we have seen, threatened the safety of Athens, and involved Cimon himself in an unjust suspicion at the battle of Tanagra. We may at least collect from the facts mentioned by Thucydides, that the aristocratical, or oligarchical, party at Athens was, as usually happens, divided within itself, and included a narrower circle of political fanatics, implacable in their enmity, restless in their ambition, and ready at any moment to sacrifice the independence of their country to their interests or revenge. Cimon by his conduct before the battle of Tanagra had

¹ Andocides de Pace, 3. It is impossible to know that an author who so confounds names, times, and events, may not, in speaking of the Chersonesus, have been thinking, not of Cimon, but of Miltiades, whom in the present text he actually names.

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tion of
Ephialtes.

testified his abhorrence of this furious faction, which probably began to regard him as an apostate, and seems not to have been deterred from pursuing its course. For there can be little doubt that it is in the spirit of this reckless faction we must seek for the explanation of an event, the details of which are lost in impenetrable obscurity, but which appears to have happened in the course of the year preceding Cimon's recall. The virtuous Ephialtes was despatched by the hand of an assassin in the night. That he fell a victim to the resentment of his political adversaries, seems to have been universally admitted. The murderer was never brought to justice, and appears even to have escaped detection¹; but a suspicion so strong that Aristotle did not scruple to adopt it as sufficiently grounded², attributed the deed to a man named Aristodicus, a native of Tanagra, a place where the enemies of Ephialtes might be likely enough to find heated partizans, who would gladly lend their services for the destruction of a democratical leader.³ The loss of Ephialtes, and still more the indication it afforded of the spirit which still prevailed in a portion of the opposite party, may not improbably have disposed Pericles to strengthen himself by a coalition with Cimon, and to promise his concurrence in Cimon's foreign policy, which happened at this juncture to fall in with the wishes of the people.

However this may have been, the three years next following Cimon's return, as we have fixed its date, passed, happily for his contemporaries, without affording any matter for the historian; and this pause was followed by a five years' truce, in the course of which Cimon embarked in his last expedition, and died near the scene of his ancient glory. The pretender Amyr-

¹ Antipho de Cæd. Herod. 68.² Plut. Per. 10.³ The reader will remember the treatment which Tanagra suffered after the battle of Cænophyta.

aus had solicited succour from the Athenians, which pride as well as ambition prompted them readily to grant; for there was now not only honour and spoil to be gained, but a stain to be wiped away from their arms. Cimon was appointed to the command of a fleet of 200 galleys, with which he sailed to Cyprus, and sent a squadron of sixty to the assistance of Myrtæus, while he himself with the rest laid siege to Citium. Here he was carried off by illness, or the consequences of a wound; and the armament was soon after compelled by the want of provisions to raise the siege.

B. C. 449.
Death of
Cimon.

But Cimon's spirit still animated his countrymen, who, when they had sailed away with his remains, fell on with a great fleet of Phœnician and Cilician galleys near the Cyprian Salamis, and, having completely defeated them, followed up their naval victory with another which they gained on shore, either over the troops which had landed from the enemy's ships, or over a land force by which they were supported. After this they were joined by the squadron which had been sent to Egypt, and which returned, it would appear, without having achieved any material object, and all sailed home. (B. C. 449.)

In after-times Cimon's military renown was enhanced by the report of a peace, which his victories had compelled the Persian king to conclude on terms most humiliating to the monarchy. Within less than a century after his death it was, if not commonly believed, confidently asserted, that by this treaty, negotiated, as it was supposed, by Callias, son of Hippocrates, the Persians had agreed to abandon at least the military occupation of Asia Minor, to the distance of three days journey on foot, or one on horseback, from the coast, or, according to another account, the whole peninsula west of the Halys, and to abstain from passing the mouth of the Bosphorus

Cimon's
Peace.

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and the Chelidonian islands, on the coast of Lycia, or the town of Phaselis, into the Western Sea. The mere silence of Thucydides on so important a transaction would be enough to render the whole account extremely suspicious; and the vague and contradictory statements of the later authors with respect both to the conditions and the date of the treaty — for while one describes it as the result of Cimon's victories near the Eurymedon, another refers it to those of his last campaign — conspire to strengthen our distrust. But it is also abundantly evident that a state of things such as would be implied in the supposed treaty never really existed; that the Persian court was totally unconscious of having ever resigned its claims to dominion over the Asiatic Greeks, and to the tribute which it once received from them; and that no allusion was ever made to such a concession in any of the negotiations which took place between Persia and either of the leading states of Greece, from the death of Cimon to Alexander's invasion. The fable, founded no doubt on really glorious recollections of the awe with which Persia had been inspired by the Athenian navy, seems to have sprung up, or to have acquired a distinct shape, in the rhetorical school of Isocrates, and to have been transmitted through the orators to the historians; and Craterus, a compiler of Athenian state documents, did not scruple to insert a piece in his collection, which he pretended was a copy of the treaty concluded by Callias.¹

Project of a
congress at
Athens.

Cimon's death probably saved him from the morti-

¹ This famous peace of Cimon or Callias is the subject of a separate essay in Dahlman's *Forschungen*, which places the whole matter in the clearest light. The reader who cannot consult this work may compare the descriptions of Isocrates, Paneg. 136. 138. Areop. 91. Panath. 64., Demosthenes, D. F. L. 311., Lycurgus in Leocrat. 74., the narratives of Plutarch, Cim. 13. 19. and Diodorus, xii. 4., and the observation of Theopompus in Harpocratio, Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασι, which proves that Craterus either fabricated or adopted a forgery.



ication of seeing his pacific labours defeated by causes which he could not have controuled. We are however inclined to suspect that it was at this juncture that Pericles conceived a project, which is indeed only mentioned by Plutarch, but seems to have been attested by a genuine document found by his author in the Athenian archives, and which might be considered as a step toward the prosecution of Cimon's policy. Plutarch relates that Pericles carried a decree through the assembly, by virtue of which envoys were sent to various parts of Greece, and even to the islands and the Asiatic colonies, to invite every Greek state to send deputies to a general congress to be held at Athens. The professed objects of this assembly were partly religious — to take measures with respect to the temples which had been burnt in the Persian war, and the vows made on that occasion and still due to the gods — partly political: to provide for the security of commerce, and remove all obstacles which obstructed the free passage of Greek vessels. The real end which Pericles had in view is very doubtful. It may have been to dazzle the Athenians with a spectacle in which their city would appear as the common capital of Greece; it may have been the more solid advantage of strengthening the Athenian confederacy, by the accession of some continental states which were still wavering between Athens and her rival; it is also possible that the proposed congress was a mere pretext to cover the secret instructions of the envoys. In any case the period during which the Athenian influence was predominant in Bœotia and Phocis, seems the best suited to such a scheme. Plutarch says it fell to the ground through the counter-machinations of Sparta.

It seems to have been in the year following that of Cimon's death that a new occasion of indirect hostility arose between the two states. The people of

B. C. 4
Sparta
expedi
to Del

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Delphi, though they had been commonly considered as a branch of the Phocian nation, and were nominally subject to the Amphictyonic council, appear in fact to have been from the earliest times in the exclusive possession of the temple which was the boast of their city, that is, to have exercised the superintendence of the oracle, and the guardianship of the sacred treasures, by ministers of their choice. The Phocians, relying perhaps on the protection of Athens, had wrested this important charge from the Delphians. There is reason to believe that the ruling families at Delphi were of Dorian blood. From this or other causes they had always been on friendly terms with Sparta, and she now stepped forward to assert the claims of this valuable ally. An army marched to Delphi, and restored possession of the temple to the Delphians. They were at the same time induced by the authority of Sparta to renounce their union with the Phocian league, and to declare themselves a perfectly independent state; and a line of demarcation, perhaps including some addition of territory, was drawn between them and Phocis.¹ To requite these benefits the Delphians granted to Sparta the right of precedence in consulting the oracle: an honour which the Spartans caused to be recorded at Delphi by an inscription on the bronze image of a wolf. But shortly after they had withdrawn their forces, Pericles appeared at Delphi with an Athenian army, and reinstated the Phocians in the custody of the temple. The honour which had been bestowed on the Spartans was now transferred to Athens, and was commemorated on another part of the same image which celebrated the triumph of Sparta.

This was only a prelude to more important movements which took place in the following year (447).

¹ Strabo, ix. p. 423. Anemorea was on this border.

Bands of Bœotian exiles, who had been driven out of their respective cities by the ascendancy which the battle of Œnophyta had every where given to the Athenian or democratical party, found means of making themselves masters of Chæronea, Orchomenus, and some other towns. This event, which threatened the interest of Athens throughout the north of Greece, seemed to call for prompt interference to avert the danger; and Tolmides, trusting to his gallantry and good fortune, perhaps underrating the enemy's strength, proposed instantly to march, with as many Athenians as might be willing to join him, to suppress the insurrection. Pericles, in whose military character caution was a prominent feature, was averse to this hasty and ill-prepared expedition. But the impetuous spirit of Tolmides was seconded by the assembly, and his reputation drew a thousand volunteers¹, including the flower of the Athenian youth, to share his enterprise. With this force, and some allied troops, whose numbers are not mentioned, he entered Bœotia, and first attacked Chæronea. He succeeded in reducing it, and was retiring with his little army, which he had weakened by leaving a garrison in the captured town, when, in the neighbourhood of Coronea, he was surprised by the appearance of a hostile army, composed of the Bœotian exiles assembled in Orchomenus, of Locrians, exiles from Eubœa, and other partizans of the same cause. The Athenians were completely defeated; many of them were taken prisoners, and Tolmides himself was among the slain. The immediate consequence of this defeat was a counter-revolution, which overthrew the Athenian influence throughout Bœotia. To recover the Athenian prisoners, who were

B. C. 447.
Battle of
Coronea.

¹ Plut. Per. 18. Thucydides, i. 113., mentions the number, but does not describe them as volunteers. If Tolmides ever used the artifice related by Diodorus, and mentioned in a preceding note, we suspect that it may have been on this occasion; not however that he played it off on his fellow-citizens, but on the allies, who might be less zealous in the cause.

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probably for the most part young men of good families, the Athenians stipulated to withdraw all their troops from Bœotia ; and their departure was every where followed by the return of the exiles, and the predominance of the party hostile to Athens.

But the full effects of this disaster did not become visible until the five years' truce had expired (445). Athens had then to sustain a quick succession of hostile attacks, which were probably preconcerted in reliance on the co-operation of Sparta. The first blow was the revolt of Eubœa ; and when Pericles had crossed over to reduce it to subjection, he received tidings of a revolution at Megara, where the adverse party, supported by auxiliaries from Corinth, Sicyon, and Epidaurus, had risen upon the Athenian garrison, and put the greater part to the sword ; the rest took refuge in Nisœa. He at the same time learnt that a Peloponnesian army was on its march toward Attica. This intelligence induced him to transport his forces back from Eubœa with the utmost speed for the defence of Athens, and the Peloponnesians soon after entered the country, and began to ravage the fertile plains on the western frontier. They were commanded by the young king Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias ; but to supply the defect of his years the ephors had placed a counsellor of maturer age, named Cleandridas, at his side. Pericles, it is said, found Cleandridas accessible to bribes, and prevailed on him to withdraw the invading army. Both he, and the young king, on their return to Sparta, were charged with having sold the interests of their country. Cleandridas shrank from the accusation by a voluntary exile, and was condemned to death in his absence. Pleistoanax, according to Plutarch, was sentenced to so heavy a penalty, that, being unable to discharge it, he quitted the country. But Thucydides would rather lead us to suppose that he fled, like Cleandridas, to avoid a severer punishment ; for he chose the sanctuary

B. C. 445.
Invasion of
Attica.

of Jupiter, on Mount Lycæum in Arcadia, as the place of his retreat, and for greater security fixed his abode in a part of the sacred buildings.¹ Pericles however no sooner saw himself rid of this enemy, than he returned with an armament of 50 galleys and 5000 heavy-armed, to quell the revolt of Eubœa. He speedily overpowered all resistance, and seized this occasion of at once securing the Athenian dominion in the island, and providing for a part of the poorer citizens at the expense of their refractory allies. According to Plutarch, the Chalcidian landowners were all again deprived of their estates, and the whole population of Histiaëa was expelled from its native seats, to make room for an Attic colony, and at the same time to expiate the inhumanity with which they had put to death the crew of an Athenian galley captured in the war.²

But though the most pressing danger was thus for the present averted, the alarm which had been excited at Athens by these simultaneous attacks from so many quarters was still so strong as to dispose the people to peace. On the other hand, the Spartans, having lost the most favourable opportunity for action through the treachery or weakness of their commanders, were not eager for a fresh expedition. But they took advantage of the present state of public feeling at Athens, to exact conditions which under other circumstances would probably have been rejected with scorn. What they required amounted indeed to little more than a complete deliverance of Peloponnesus from Athenian influence. The Athenians were in possession of Trœzen, which, notwithstanding its Dorian colony, had always continued to regard them as kinsmen, and they had a hold on

Thirty
years' truce.

¹ V. 16.

² Plut. Per. 23. We shall hereafter notice some reasons for doubting whether the measure was so extensive as Plutarch's language describes it.

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Achaia which enabled them, as we have seen, to levy troops there, though its precise nature is not described. But as long as they continued to occupy Pegæ, there could be no security for the allies of Sparta on the western side of Peloponnesus, and as little was their possession of Nisæa consistent with the safety of the party now prevailing at Megara. The restitution therefore, or evacuation of Trœzen, Achaia, Pegæ, and Nisæa, was demanded by Sparta, and conceded by Athens; and on these terms a truce was concluded between the two states, and the confederacies over which they presided, for thirty years (B. C. 445). Thucydides mentions no other conditions of the treaty; but it seems probable that the Athenians lost ground in some other points after the battle of Coronea. The revolution in Bœotia seems to have been followed by the overthrow of their influence in Phocis, which, when it is next mentioned, is numbered among the allies of Sparta; and it was most probably at the same time that the temple at Delphi was restored to the custody of the Delphians; for, though the fact is not recorded, there can be little doubt that, a few years after, the oracle and the treasury were in their keeping.¹

Pericles, if we may judge from the maxims which Thucydides attributes to him on a subsequent occasion, may not have considered the concessions of this treaty so important as they would appear to those who did not share his views, as to the real foundation of the greatness of Athens, and the policy which her true interest prescribed. The points abandoned, whether they were regarded as posts of attack or defence, would in his eyes seem of little moment, so long as Athens remained absolute mistress of the sea, and held firm possession of her maritime empire.

¹ This is evident from the zeal with which the oracle espouses the Spartan cause just before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Thuc. i. 118.

Yet it is not certain that the treaty was his work, and that it may not have been imputed to the opposite party, and have contributed to render it obnoxious. After Cimon's death, this party found a new leader in Thucydides, son of Melesias; a kinsman of Cimon's, and a person, who, though inferior to him in military talents, was better versed in the art of managing a popular assembly. He devoted himself entirely to political business, and, according to Plutarch, organized a more regular opposition than had hitherto been formed against the administration of Pericles. But his activity only served to hasten his own downfall, and to consummate his adversary's triumph. Pericles far surpassed him in eloquence and address; and he himself is said to have acknowledged this superiority by a lively image, in a conversation with the Spartan king Archidamus. The Spartan asked him, whether he or Pericles was the better wrestler. *When I throw Pericles, he answered, he always persuades the bystanders that he has not been down.* But this was probably the slightest of the advantages which Pericles possessed over him and his party. The contest was not one of rhetoric or wit; and what enabled Pericles to overpower all opposition was not so much his intellectual predominance, as the accordance of his policy with the spirit and situation of his countrymen. The measures which Thucydides opposed were precisely those which were in their own nature popular, and irresistible. The ground which he took must have appeared to his contemporaries at the best as an unseasonable affectation of an over-refined morality; even if they could see in it any thing more than a party manœuvre, thinly covered by a show of severe justice and wise economy. When therefore the contest was brought to an issue, which rendered it necessary for one of the rivals to go into a temporary exile, the ostracism fell, as it could not fail to do, on Thucy-

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dides (B. C. 444.). The anecdote above related seems to imply that he retired to Sparta ; it appears indeed that he was not long after restored to his country, perhaps because he had ceased to be formidable ; but his faction was entirely broken up, and the sway of Pericles in the Athenian councils became more absolute than ever, and lasted with scarcely any interruption to the end of his life.

APPENDIX I.

ON THE ATTIC TRIBES.

THE view we have taken of the four ancient Attic tribes, agrees in the main with those of Wachsmuth, Buttmann (in the Essay on *φρατρία* in the *Mythologus*), and Dr. Arnold, in his Appendix I. to Thucydides, vol. i. But some readers may like to learn the opinions of other learned men on this subject, and on some other points connected with it, to which allusions have here and there been made in the text.

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Niebuhr, in the first edition of his Roman History (i. p. 226.), considered the names of the four tribes abolished by Cleisthenes as significant of so many castes. In the second edition he retains the same opinion with regard to the origin of the names, but on account of the order in which they stand, doubts whether they ever had any such meaning in Attica (i. n. 707.). And in the third edition he appears to have been induced by Hermann's arguments, in the Preface to the *Ion* of Euripides, to abandon his former opinion on this question altogether. But this is of less importance than his view of what the Attic tribes were down to the time of Solon. He conceived them to have included only a part of the population of Attica—the Ionian conquerors blended perhaps with a portion of the ancient inhabitants (see ed. 2. i. p. 307.)—and to have stood in a relation to the rest, similar to that between the Patricians and Plebeians at Rome. Solon, according to Niebuhr, was so far from abolishing this distinction, and throwing open the tribes, and consequently the magistracy and the Council, that the object of his new classification was to exclude a part of the privileged body itself from the offices to which they had before been admitted. (Vol. ii. p. 305. transl.) He even doubts whether Cleisthenes abolished the four tribes, and thinks it more probable that his ten tribes were distinct from them, and only included the *demus*. So that the last step, by which *the two orders united in one body, and the ten tribes became a division including the whole nation*, must have taken place in a later period; but the name of its author and the circumstances attending it have been lost. He conceives it to be *exceedingly improbable, that an order which had been kept so much in the back ground, should have gained the highest franchise at one stride without a struggle*: and thinks the

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same inference may be drawn from the number of the original demes in the tribes of Cleisthenes. *The additional seventy-four must have been cantons, which had previously been left in a state of dependence; but by far the chief part were houses (γέρη) the names of which occur in great numbers among the demes of the ten tribes, mixed up with the rest like bodies of the same kind.*

It is to be regretted that Niebuhr's views on this subject, having been introduced only incidentally, to illustrate the history of the Roman institutions, have not in all points been unfolded with sufficient distinctness to enable us to form a decided opinion on them. In particular we should have been glad to know whether he considered the privileged Ionians as constituting so large a part of the whole population of Attica as is implied in the common account of the subdivisions of the four tribes into phratries and genea, according to which they amounted to upwards of 10,000 families, which must of course have included persons of all conditions. In this case such a change as those ascribed to Solon and Cleisthenes, can hardly be looked upon as very abrupt. But even if the revolution effected by either of them had been represented as much more violent than it is commonly supposed to have been, it would not on that account deserve to be rejected as incredible. For the probability of such an occurrence in Attica cannot be properly measured by a standard borrowed from Roman history. When a spirit of political excitement and reflection had been awakened so generally as we have seen in the other states of Greece, and more especially when such revolutions as have been already described had taken place in the immediate neighbourhood of Athens, at Megara, it would not be surprising, if an order which had been long depressed in Attica, had really risen at once to the enjoyment of the highest franchise — which however it did not attain even in the ordinary view before the time of Aristides.

Platner (*Beitraege*, p. 48.) believes that the Ionian tribes which are commonly referred to a very early period in the history of Attica, arose after the migration of the Ionians from Peloponnesus into Attica, in the reign of Melanthus, and that instead of including the three orders said to have been founded by Theseus, as their subdivisions, they for the most part coincided with them; so as to be in fact the same arrangement under different names. The Eupatrids, to whom the highest political privileges were confined, were, he supposes, all contained in one tribe — that of the Hopletes. Cleisthenes, he thinks, must have abolished the old phratries as well as the tribes, because otherwise the old tribes would still have subsisted in the phratries (an argument not quite intelligible), and probably divided his new tribes each into three phratries.

Plass (ii. p. 240.) gives a very singular account of the matter, which he delivers with as little show either of argument or autho-

city, as if it was familiar to every one, and with as much apparent confidence, as if it had been drawn from an unpublished memorandum of Solon's. The four old Ionian tribes were castes; the Hopletes the nobles, or citizens who enjoyed the full or highest franchise. This single tribe had before Solon been divided into four, the names of which have, it seems, been lost, each containing three phratries, which again contained each thirty γένη. (This appears from the context to be his meaning, though it is not clearly expressed.) Solon wished to admit the three inferior castes to share the privileges of the nobles, and for this purpose he distributed them into the four tribes, which had hitherto belonged exclusively to the Hopletes, and henceforward each γένος consisted of thirty families.

Wachsmuth conceives the Eupatrids to have been distributed among all the four tribes, but he infers from a passage in Suidas: γεννηται — καὶ γεννηται οἱ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ πρώτου γένους τῶν τριάκοντα γενῶν· οὗς καὶ πρότερόν φησι Φιλόχορος ὁμογάλακτας καλεῖσθαι — that there was one Eupatrid or patrician γένος among the thirty in each phratry, and that its members alone were properly called γεννηται, and in earlier times ὁμογάλακτες: so that there would be in all three hundred and sixty noble families. This might have been sufficient to suggest a conjecture similar to Mr. Malden's (History of Rome, p. 144.), though the result of a different hypothesis, as to the number of the council before Solon. But the interpretation of πρώτου, *first in rank*, seems very doubtful. Platner's, p. 68., who supposes it to mean *original*, agrees better with Harpocration's explanation οἱ ἐξαρχῆς εἰς τὰ καλούμενα γένη κατανεμηθέντες.

With respect to the demes which composed the tribes of Cleisthenes, on which Niebuhr founds an argument in favour of his hypothesis, the reader may not be displeased to see a short extract from Mueller's article, *Attika*, in Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopædia, which, as the work is too bulky for most private libraries, may be new even to many persons conversant with German literature. He observes at p. 227.: Cleisthenes had divided the country and the population of Attica into ten tribes, among which the demes, then *about* a hundred in number, were distributed. The number of the demes kept on increasing considerably, even to the time of the orators, and subsequently two new tribes were formed out of a portion of them — the Antigonis and the Demetrias, which were afterwards named Ptolemais and Attalis. Places were here and there detached from the old districts, and with the addition of some which had not before been included in the tribes, served to compose a new canton. In this manner at a still later period a tribe called the Hadrianis was formed chiefly from the small islands round Attica.

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Now, since the tribes of Cleisthenes were local, as those of Elis (Paus. v. 9.), Ephesus (Stept. Βέσσα), and Laconia (*Orchomenus*, p. 314.), the demes of each tribe must have been grouped together as places in the same canton. And such we find to have been in many instances really the case. Marathon, CEnoe, Tricorythus, Rhamnus, Psophidæ, Phegæa, lie close together, and at no great distance from them, Aphidnæ, Perrhidæ, Titacidæ, all again in the same neighbourhood: these are places belonging to the tribe Æantis, which therefore comprehends a definite range from the Bœotian frontier and Parnes to the plain of Marathon. In the same manner Myrrhinus, Prasiæ, and Stiria, lie together, and all belong to the Pandionis, and like cases frequently occur. But the original rule seems to have been lost in a crowd of irregular exceptions: and when new places were annexed in one quarter, while in another, to keep the balance even, old ones were detached, the simple order was neglected and forgotten. Several demes are described as belonging to two or three tribes, as Phaleron to the Ægæis and the Æantis, Phegæa to the Ægæis, Æantis, and Adrianis, &c., and this is probably not the consequence of a mere oversight. And thus it happens that Sunium belongs to the same tribe — the Leontis — as Scambonidæ near Eleusis; Eleusis itself and Azenia near Sunium to the Hippothoontis; and so on. So that it is perhaps no longer possible to trace the local boundaries of the Attic cantons.

APPENDIX II.

ON THE CONDUCT ASCRIBED TO MILTIADES IN THE
SCYTHIAN CAMPAIGN OF DARIUS.

THE story that Miltiades advised the Ionians to break up the bridge on the Danube, and expose Darius to destruction, has been repeated, we believe, without any suspicion by every writer who has had occasion to mention it since Herodotus. Whether the story be true or false is in itself a question of very little importance; but since it affects the connection of events in the history of Miltiades, it may be worth while to point out some of the difficulties which the story involves.

It is remarkable that Nepos (Milt. iii. 6.) represents Miltiades as quitting the Chersonesus immediately after his return from the Danube through fear of Darius. And this is just what we should

have expected him to do, if he had really made himself so obnoxious to the Great King as the story supposes. But we know from Herodotus that he remained for many years in quiet possession of his principality, neither molested by the Persians, nor apparently dreading any attack from them. This forbearance on their part was not the effect either of weakness or want of opportunity. We find the Persian general Otanes actively engaged in military operations on the same coast. (Herod. v. 26.) But he seems to treat Miltiades as a faithful vassal of his master, and makes no attempt to disturb him. As little would it appear that, when the Scythians invaded the Chersonesus, Miltiades was conscious of having endeavoured to render them a most important service. He flies before them, though he had been so secure while the Persian arms were in his neighbourhood. We think that this would have been sufficient to raise a strong suspicion against the truth of the story, if it had not seemed to be confirmed by the hasty flight of Miltiades on the approach of the Phœnicians, for which no other motive is assigned than the enmity of Darius which he had incurred by his conduct on the Danube. It might perhaps be a sufficient objection to this argument to observe, that Miltiades should naturally have felt much stronger fears of Otanes, while the act which had rendered him an especial object of hostility to every loyal Persian was still recent; and therefore that his final abandonment of the Chersonesus must have arisen from some other cause which might have escaped notice. But we think it not impossible to point out a change in the relations of Miltiades to the court of Persia, which took place after his return from the Danube, and which seems sufficiently to account for the apprehension of Persian vengeance which at last induced him to take refuge in Attica. His conquest of Lemnos had dislodged the Pelasgians after they had become Persian subjects (Herod. v. 26.); he had very probably at the same time expelled a Persian governor (Herod. v. 27.); and at all events, by annexing the island to his own dominions, had been guilty of a formal act of rebellion, which was as likely to provoke the indignation of Darius, as the treasonable proposal attributed to him on the Danube. Thus then there is an authentic fact, which may be quite as probably combined with his flight to Athens, as the story which we have such strong reason to doubt.

The domestic danger to which Miltiades found himself exposed on his return to Athens, presented, as we have observed in the text, a sufficient inducement for fabricating the story. And we might even suppose that it had been suggested to him as an artifice for soothing the Scythians, while they were in possession of the Chersonesus. But, it may be asked, are we not making too free with the memory of a great man, when upon any thing short of absolute necessity we impute such a falsehood to him? 7

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would indeed be a grave objection, if we knew of any high qualities in the character of Miltiades beside his military talents. But the story itself, if true, does not imply a very fine sense of honour, though the perfidy of the proposal may be a little extenuated by the Greek notions of patriotism; the pretext on which he invaded the Pelasgians gives a more favourable idea of his ingenuity than of his love of truth; and if he was the mover of the decree for murdering the Persian heralds, we need not scruple to think him capable of inventing a falsehood for the purpose of saving his own life.

We may here observe that the fact of his dying in prison, which has been disputed because it is not mentioned by Herodotus (who had no occasion whatever for noticing it) depends simply on the question, whether he had the means of raising the sum of fifty talents. And there is no reason to doubt, that he could not immediately command one of this amount, and was therefore thrown into prison. The sagacious scepticism with which this has been denied, is worthily supported by the notable discovery, that τὸ βάραθρον was the Athenian name for a dungeon.

APPENDIX III.

ON THE DATE OF THE BATTLE OF MARATHON.

As Boeckh's *Academical Prolusions*, a select number of which were reprinted in Seebode's *Neues Archiv fuer Philologie und Paedagogik*, vol. III., are not often to be met with in England, it may be useful to give a short extract from one published in 1816 (which seems not to have fallen in Mr. Clinton's way before he brought out the first published volume of his *Fasti*, see note e, p. 336.), containing a new and ingenious argument in favour of the opinion of Freret and Larcher, that the battle of Marathon was fought in the month Carnius or Metageitnion, and that the Spartan usage of waiting for the full moon before they began an expedition, which Herodotus represents as applying to all months in the year, related in fact only to the Carneia, and perhaps some other festivals which ended with the full moon, as the Hyacinthia.

It is certain that the tribe Æantis occupied the right wing in the battle. This was the tribe of the polemarch Callimachus, who commanded the right wing by virtue of his office. But there is no reason to suppose that it was on this account the Æantis was so placed, since it was an honour of which the other tribes were

undoubtedly jealous. This station must have belonged to it in the order of the tribes. But in their regular order the *Æantis* stood ninth, and therefore could not have occupied the extreme right. The order followed therefore must have been that which was fixed every year by lot. Hence Herodotus (vi. 111.) uses the imperfect tense, ὡς ἀριθμείοντο αἱ φυλαί, as they were numbered in that year, not ἀριθμούνται, which would have signified the regular order. But the decree for marching to Marathon was carried under the presidency of the *Æantis*, or the first prytania, ending on the 5th or 6th day of Metageitnion (Plut. Qu. Symp. i. 10.). It is very improbable that the battle should have been postponed from this time to the 6th of Boedromion, and that the Spartans should have resisted the urgent solicitations of Athens, and have withheld their succours for a whole month. But if the battle took place in Metageitnion soon after the full moon, the interval will be of a probable length. And as Plato (De Leg. iii. p. 698. E.) says that the Spartans arrived at Marathon the day after the battle, supposing them to have reached the field on the fourth day after the full moon, which would fall on the 13th or 14th, we should have the 16th or 17th Metageitnion for the date of the battle. [See, however, Mr. Clinton, F. H. p. 233. vol. ii. 3d edition. But as to the authority of Herodotus, on which Mr. Clinton lays the main stress, Boeckh remarks, p. 66.: “Herodotus non suis, sed Spartanorum utitur verbis, qui pro suâ breviloquentiâ Phidippi fortasse nihil aliud responderant nisi illud: *non posse sese nono die expeditionem facere, post plenilunium vero auxilia missuros*, tempus quidem, quod scire Atheniensium intererat, accuratè definientes, sed moræ causam Carnia reticentes. Quod si verum est, nonne Herodotus Carniorum memoriam rectè omisit?” And as to the *confirmation* which this account of Herodotus, vi. 106. receives from other writers, it is certainly much weakened by Boeckh’s remark (ibid.): “Auctores plerique, ubi illam legem tangunt, de Marathoniâ pugnâ loquuntur: qui omnes ex uno haud dubio Herodoto hauserunt.” “Supersunt duo non optimæ notæ scriptores, alter auctor libelli De Fluviiis (c. 17. 1.) Plutarcho olim tributi, qui legem istam diu ante Lycurgum ætate Eurotæ, regis fabulosi, obtinuisse ridicule narrat, alter Lucianus iste personatus, qui Ionicè astrologiam laudavit (c. 25.), institutum id ad Lycurgum referens: quorum quanta sit fides, non est quod monemus.”]

APPENDIX IV.

ON THE FORCES OF THE PERSIANS AND THE GREEKS
AT SALAMIS.APPENDIX
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THE numbers of the Persian fleet at Salamis are ambiguously stated by Æschylus in the *Persæ* 347.

Ξέρξης δὲ (καὶ γὰρ οἶδα) χιλιάς μὲν ἦν
Νεῶν τὸ πλῆθος· αἱ δ' ὑπέρκοποι τάχει
Ἑκατὸν δις ἦσαν ἑπτὰ θ'. ὧδ' ἔχει λόγος.

This may express that the whole amount was 1000, which included 207 fast-sailing vessels; or that the bulk was a thousand (where τὸ πλῆθος would be opposed to αἱ ὑπέρκοποι τάχει in a similar sense as when it is used for the commonalty in opposition to οἱ ὀλίγοι, as in Thuc. viii. 9.), and that there were beside 207 of extraordinary speed. The latter meaning, which certainly does not *strain* the words, as has been ignorantly asserted, seems to be established by the concurrence of Herodotus, vii. 184. who raises the whole to 1207. This number is adopted with slight variations by Isocrates (who in three passages, Paneg. 105. 111. 136. gives 1200, but in Panath. 53. 1300.) and by Nepos, Them. 2. who has 1200. Plato, Leg. iii. 14. perhaps signifies the smaller number by χιλίων καὶ ἑπικλειόνων, as Ctesias 26. by his ὑπὲρ τὰς χιλίας.

As it is clear that Æschylus aimed at rigid historical exactness in his account of the Persian forces, we may conclude that he did not designedly understate those of the Greeks. Yet he makes the Greek fleet amount to no more than 300 or 310; whereas Herodotus shows that it was composed of 380 galleys, of which 180 were Athenian. But it is still more remarkable that according to the common reading Thucydides, i. 74., agrees neither with Æschylus nor Herodotus, having ναῦς ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους δύο μοιρῶν. Dr. Arnold considers this as a rhetorical exaggeration, designed by the historian as characteristic of the person in whose mouth it is put. But we cannot help thinking that this little dramatic touch would be exceedingly misplaced; and we believe that Thucydides meant to state the true numbers, in which, if we read τριακοσίας for τετρ., he would have followed Æschylus instead of Herodotus, whom indeed it is possible he had not read. So Nepos assigns 300 to the whole, and 200 to the Athenians. It is difficult to determine how far the enormous

variation in Ctesias, who gives 700 for the whole, and 110 for the Athenians, is owing to an error in the text.

The number of ἐπίβαται on board the Athenian galleys at Salamis seems to have been very small, not only when compared with that of the Persians, who took 30 of the best troops on board each vessel in addition to the ordinary complement of 200, but in comparison with the usual force of a Greek ship of war. At Lade the Chians had 40 ἐπίβαται to each crew. At Salamis the Athenians, according to Plutarch, Them. 14., had only 18 in all, of whom 4 were archers. On the ground of this fact modern readers have been informed, that Themistocles was the author of an improved system of naval tactics. If so, it is singular that no ancient writer should have mentioned this improvement, and still more singular that it should have been so totally neglected by the Athenians themselves, that Thucydides, i. 49., speaks of the ancient usage as subsisting down to the Peloponnesian war, apparently as if he did not know that it had ever been interrupted. After all it is possible that the 18 men mentioned by Plutarch, instead of being the full complement of soldiers on the deck, were an extraordinary addition to the usual number.

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APPENDIX V.

ON A STRATAGEM ASCRIBED TO THEMISTOCLES BY DIODORUS, XI. 41—43.

It is generally admitted that Plutarch is not a sure guide on matters of fact, when he does not mention the source from which his statements are drawn, and when they are not supported by other testimony. Yet even in this case he is always entitled to attention, as well on account of his extensive reading, as because he was not destitute of natural acuteness. His great failing is that he makes the truth of history subordinate to its moral uses, just as a history is sometimes written for the purpose of inculcating certain political tenets. But with all his defects he is a safer guide under similar circumstances than Diodorus: more sagacious, more thoughtful, and careful; or perhaps we should say he is not capable of falling into such gross absurdities as the other frequently commits, nor of misunderstanding and confounding the sense of the authors whom he has read in an equal degree. It is not thoughtlessness or carelessness that prevents Diodorus from

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being a good historian, but his utter want of judgment, which is constantly apparent, and is only rendered the more glaring and offensive by the flimsy veil of his frivolous rhetoric.

Plutarch has related an apocryphal story of a project formed by Themistocles to fire the united fleet of the Greek states in alliance with Athens while it lay at Pagasæ. The truth of this story has been justly questioned; but he would have been much more chargeable with credulity if he had adopted the version given by Cicero (*De Off.* iii. 11.) who supposes that the plan of Themistocles was aimed against the Spartan navy at Gythium: an enterprise which would have been equally infamous, and utterly useless to the Athenians. The one scheme might possibly have entered into the mind of Themistocles; the other could never have suggested itself to him, or to any man of common sense. It is also due to Plutarch to observe, that he mentions the project without the slightest mark of approbation, though he has been ignorantly accused by Rollin, and by a later historian, who echoes the Frenchman's blunder, of this breach of morality, which would have deserved a different name from that of *thoughtlessness*.

Diodorus also gives an account of a project formed by Themistocles, which for some time he kept wrapt in mystery, just as that related by Plutarch. The two stories are so similar in this respect, that it seems evident they arose out of the same tradition; and the question is whether Diodorus may not be better entitled to credit than Plutarch. According to Diodorus the plan of Themistocles, instead of being both iniquitous and impolitic, and hence stifled in embryo, was perfectly consistent with wisdom and justice, and was carried into execution, for it was no other than that of improving and fortifying Piræus, a work, it must be remembered, which had been already begun. So far Diodorus has the concurrent testimony of all the ancient authors on his side. But the part of the story peculiar to himself is the account he gives of the manner in which Themistocles for a time concealed his project; and in this it may not be too much to say, that he has outdone even himself in the extravagance of his absurdity.

Themistocles, it appears, having experienced the jealousy of Sparta on the occasion of building the walls of Athens, was afraid lest she might again interfere to prevent such an accession to her rival's naval power as was likely to result from this new undertaking. His object therefore was to keep it as long as possible concealed from the Spartans, and the more effectually to insure secrecy he would not for a time disclose it to the Athenians themselves. But as some preparations were to be made which rendered their consent necessary, he announced to the assembly that he had formed a plan, which he deemed highly advantageous to the state, but which could not safely be made public, and he therefore de-

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sired them to select two persons in whom they could confide, to judge of the proposed measure, and to make a report of its character. The people selected Aristides and Xanthippus, not only as men of unimpeachable probity, but as rivals of Themistocles, who would therefore be sure to examine his project with jealous vigilance. They reported that what he advised was practicable, expedient, and most important to the commonwealth. Now however, after such an assurance from his political adversaries, the popular jealousy was roused to a much greater height than before : he was suspected of aiming at the tyranny, and was called upon to reveal his plan. He again assured the people that their interest required it to be kept secret. This assurance however did not satisfy them ; no doubt because they imagined that if they gave their consent, the plan would be executed before they knew what it was, and when it would be too late to revoke their sanction. Themistocles, it seems, never thought of quieting their fears by informing them, that they would and must be fully apprised of the nature of his plan, before the execution could be begun. Instead of mentioning this fact, which one would have thought would have been sufficient to remove all objections, he adopted an expedient which was suggested in the assembly, of laying his scheme before the Council of Five Hundred, and abiding by their decision. The council made a report no less favourable than that of Aristides and Xanthippus, and the people now acquiesced ; but public curiosity was raised to the highest pitch.

So far then we do not find any very striking display of that extraordinary dexterity and ingenuity for which Themistocles was so renowned. But what follows in the description of Diodorus is a master stroke of policy. A vulgar mind, which had conceived such a design, would probably have thought that the best mode of insuring its success was to communicate it to those who were to execute it, before it became known to those who might possibly endeavour to thwart it. Such had been the course which Themistocles himself had adopted on a former similar occasion. But this was too simple to be now repeated. In its stead he chose the directly opposite method, and invented a *stratagem*, as Diodorus calls it, of an entirely new kind. While he kept his fellow-citizens in ignorance and suspense about his intentions, he sent an embassy to disclose them to the Spartans, and at the same time to represent, that the common interests of Greece required that Athens should possess a harbour such as he proposed to form. After having thus given full notice to the jealous rival from whom he apprehended hostile interference, he set about the work itself, which, as it could not be begun without the co-operation of the Athenians, was probably not kept secret at Athens very long after it had been published at Sparta.

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If it had been the object of Themistocles, first, to excite alarm and jealousy at Sparta by the rumour of an extraordinary design, which, after the scenes said to have taken place in the Athenian assembly, could not fail soon to be heard there; and next, to afford the Spartans the utmost facility for stopping the work which he had meditated, the course which Diodorus attributes to him was no doubt judiciously chosen. But on the opposite supposition his conduct sets all the calculations of human prudence at defiance, and would be indeed perplexing, if the fatuity of Diodorus did not afford an easy solution of the mystery.

It may seem that a modern historian who is capable of adopting this prodigious tissue of absurdities, and of calling it *a simple and probable narrative*, has forfeited all pretensions to soundness of judgment, and deserves no higher place in the scale of critical sagacity than Diodorus himself. But the force of prejudice may often reduce a good understanding to a level with the most imbecile. The incoherence of the story could not indeed have escaped the notice of a man of ordinary penetration who was not blinded by passion, nor could such a person have failed to observe, that though it is very improbable that Diodorus should have invented such a story, he might easily have found materials which only needed to be put together by a hand so skilful as his, to assume this *simple and probable* form. But his narrative, when a little coloured and disguised, promised to make an excellent piece of satire on the Athenian democracy, and this was a temptation not to be resisted by a mind of such a stamp, as to find nothing more valuable in Greek history than an instrument for serving the ends of a political party.

We think it must be evident to every one, on a moderately attentive perusal, that the story told by Diodorus is utterly inconsistent with the account of Thucydides, i. 93., and we do not believe that Diodorus himself, uncritical as he was, could have told such a story, if he had known or remembered that the buildings at Piræus had been already begun. He manifestly supposes that the project was first conceived by Themistocles after the retreat of the Persians. Otherwise the absurdity of the tale would have been too glaring even for him. And this is equally clear, whatever may be thought as to the degree of forwardness to which Thucydides represents the works to have been carried in the archonship of Themistocles. The interpretation given in the text of the words of Thucydides is undoubtedly liable to dispute; and it has been generally supposed (as by Boeckh, *Staatsh.* ii. 10. i. p. 215. where the name of Pericles is probably written by mistake for Themistocles) that the plan of Themistocles was never completely executed. The reasons which induce us to refer ἐτελέσθη to the same time as ὑπῆρκετο, are: that no cause is assigned, nor does

any appear, why the design of Themistocles should not have been completed; that the words ἔπεισε — τὰ λοιπὰ . . . οἰκοδομεῖν seem most naturally to imply that it was carried into effect to its full extent; and that, since the ἀχρεϊότατοι mentioned by Thucydides, i. 93., are no other than the πρεσβύτατοι and νεώτατοι, ii. 13., the end which Themistocles had in view appears to have been really accomplished.

Mr. Clinton, *Fasti* ii. p. xvi., assigns the archonship of Themistocles and the beginning of the work to B. C. 481. He takes no notice of the argument for an earlier date resulting from the testimony of Philochorus (p. 48, 49. Siebelis) as to the dedication of the Hermes, which was erected by the nine archons who had begun to build the walls of Piræus, and bore the inscription Ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον τειχίζειν οἷδ' ἀνέθηκαν Βουλῆς καὶ δήμου δόγμασι πειθόμενοι. According to Philochorus in Hesychius this Hermes ἀφίδρυτο Κέβριδος ἄρξαντος, where Boeckh—in a dissertation *De Archontibus Atticis pseudonymis* first published in the Berlin Transactions 1827—proposes to read Ὑβριλίδου. Hybrilides was archon B. C. 491. It is a question of less importance whether Themistocles was, as Mueller supposes—in a note p. 452. to Reinaecker's German translation of Leake's Topography of Athens—one of the nine archons who dedicated the statue, but not the eponymus, or whether, according to Boeckh's view, in his archonship the work was only proposed and approved by the people, preparations made for it under his successor Diognetus, and it was not begun before the archonship of Hybrilides, at the end of which the statue was dedicated. [I am now convinced that Themistocles was not archon in 493. Mr. Clinton's arguments in the third edition of his great work, vol. ii. p. 234. note e, are sufficiently conclusive, independently of Mueller's remark *De Munimentis Athenarum*, p. 8. *Mihi Themistocles ille qui Dionysio teste Olymp, lxxi. 4., id est, quatuordecim annis ante Salaminium prælium, archon eponymus fuerat, alienus ab hac quæstione videtur, quod Themistocles, dico hunc Salaminium, anno Ol. lxxiv. 4. ἐς πρώτους νεωστὶ παριῶν ab Herodoto vii. 143. dicitur.*]

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